Kenneth Unser et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 19, 2019

14538144 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 19, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/538,144 11/11/2014 Kenneth UNSER 0076412-000330 3090
125578 7590 09/19/2019
MASTERCARD
C/O Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC
P.O. Box 1404
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
HENRY, MATTHEW D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/19/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ADIPDOC1@BIPC.com
charles.wieland@bipc.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte KENNETH UNSER and JEAN-PIERRE GERARD
____________________

Appeal 2018-005796
Application 14/538,144
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MICHAEL J. ENGLE, and
IFTIKHAR AHMED, Administrative Patent Judges.

MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20. Appellants have cancelled claims 2 and 12.
Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 Appellants indicate the real party in interest is MasterCard International
Incorporated. Appeal Br. 1.
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Illustrative Claim
Illustrative claim 1 under appeal reads as follows (emphasis,
formatting, and bracketed material added):
1. A method for determining employment status based
on transaction data, comprising:
[A.] storing, in a profile database of a processing server,
a plurality of consumer profiles, wherein each consumer profile
[i.] includes data related to one or more consumers
including one of:
[a.] an employment status category of a
plurality of employment status categories
and
[b.] an indication of unknown employment
status, and
[ii.] further including a plurality of transaction data
entries, each transaction data entry including
transaction data related to a payment
transaction involving one or more of the
related one or more consumers;
[B.] identifying, for each employment status category of
the plurality of employment status categories, a corresponding
set of consumer profiles in the profile database, wherein each
consumer profile in the corresponding set includes the
respective employment status category;
[C.] identifying, for each employment status category, a
plurality of associated purchase behaviors based on at least the
transaction data included in the plurality of transaction data
entries included in each consumer profile in the corresponding
set of consumer profiles;
[D.] identifying, for a specific consumer profile in the
profile database, a plurality of purchase behaviors based on the
transaction data included in the transaction data entries included
in the specific consumer profile, wherein the specific consumer
profile includes an indication of unknown employment status;
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[E.] identifying, by a processing device of the processing
server, a predicted employment status category of the
employment status categories for the specific consumer profile
based on a correspondence between the plurality of purchase
behaviors identified for the specific consumer profile and the
plurality of associated purchase behaviors identified for the
predicted employment status category; and
[F.] updating, in the profile database, the specific
consumer profile to include the predicted employment status
category.
References2
Voskuhl et al. US 8,583,471 B1 Nov. 12, 2013
Brundage US 8,838,522 B1 Sept. 16, 2014

Rejections3
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 because the claimed invention “is directed to non-statutory subject
matter” (Final Act. 9), i.e., because the claimed invention is directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 9–12.
We select claim 1 as representative. Appellants do not separately
argue claims 3–11 and 13–20. Except for our ultimate decision, we do not
discuss the § 101 rejection of claims 3–11 and 13–20 further herein.

2 All citations herein to these references are by reference to the first named
inventor only.
3 All citations to the “Final Action” are to the Final Action mailed on
November 24, 2017.
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B. 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Voskuhl and Brundage.
Final Act. 14–27.
We select claim 1 as representative. Appellants do not present
separately arguments for claims 3–11 and 13–20. Except for our ultimate
decision, we do not discuss the § 103 rejection of claims 3–11 and 13–20
further herein.
Issues on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious?

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments (Appeal Brief and Reply Brief) that the Examiner has erred. We
disagree with Appellants. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from
which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief arguments.
We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the
following points.
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
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In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is
now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO § 101 Guidance
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s January
7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (“2019 Memorandum”). Under that guidance,
we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) (see 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong One) any judicial
exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e.,
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) (see 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong Two) additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).4
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

4 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly
evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of 2019 Memorandum). Solely for
purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate
it under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of 2019 Memorandum). See 2019
Memorandum 51.
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Memorandum Step 2B.
C. Examiner’s § 101 Rejection - Alice/Mayo - Steps 1 and 2
C.1. 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong One
Applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines claim 1
recites an abstract idea:
[T]he independent claims are directed toward[:]
[A.] storing a plurality of consumer profiles,
[B.] identifying a corresponding set of consumer profiles
in the profile database including the respective
employment status category,
[C.] identifying a plurality of purchase behaviors based on
at least the transaction data included in the plurality
of data entries included in each consumer profile,
[D.] identifying a plurality of purchase behaviors based on
the transaction data included in the transaction data
entries included in the specific consumer profile,
[E.] identifying a predicted employment status category of
the employment status categories for the specific
consumer profile, and
[F.] updating the specific consumer profile to include the
predicted unemployment status category.
Final Act. 10 (emphasis, formatting, and bracketed material added).
The Examiner also determines:
[Steps A–F] are considered to be abstract ideas and (receiving
information, analyzing it, and displaying it (Electric Power
Group)[5] and organizing information through mathematical

5 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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correlations (Digitech)[6]), which are concepts held by the courts
to be abstract. The storing, identifying, identifying, identifying,
identifying, and updating steps/functions disclosed above and in
the independent claims are directed toward the abstract concept
of receiving information, analyzing it, and displaying it because
the stored/received consumer profile data is being analyzed to
determine an employment status category, which is then
displayed to a user for interpretation. The storing, identifying,
identifying, identifying, identifying, and updating
steps/functions disclosed above and in the independent claims
are directed toward the abstract concept of organizing
information through mathematical correlations because the
stored/received consumer profile data is being organized based
on high/low spend rates (e.g. mathematical correlations) to
determine an employment status category for that user as shown
on Figure 4 of Applicant’s specification.
Final Act. 10–11 (emphasis added).
The Examiner further determines:
The Appellant’s claimed limitations and specification are not
directed toward improving the way data is stored or processed,
but rather analyzing data in a specific way which has been shown
to be directed toward an abstract idea. . . . [T]he solution appears
to be more of a business-driven solution rather than a technical
one.
Ans. 8 (emphasis added).
C.2. 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong Two
Further applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Particularly, the Examiner determines
(i) the claim does not amount to an improvement to another
technology or technical field; (ii) the claim does not amount to
an improvement to the functioning of a computer itself; (iii) the

6 Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
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claim does not move beyond a general link of the use of an
abstract idea to a particular technological environment.
Final Act. 11.
Further, the Examiner determines:
The Amdocs[7] case is monitoring and billing internet users for
their data usage which is unrelated to the Appellant’s claimed
limitations involving analyzing transaction data to make
determinations and storing the determinations in a database. In
addition, the Appellant’s claimed limitations are not enhancing
the initial information, but rather receiving the initial transaction
data (as claimed) and then analyzing that data to make
determinations (identified to be directed toward an abstract idea)
and storing that data in a database (even if not directed toward
abstract idea would not account for significantly more than the
abstract idea. The Appellant’s claimed limitations and
specification are not directed toward improving the way data is
stored or processed, but rather analyzing data in a specific way
which has been shown to be directed toward an abstract idea. The
Appellant’s claimed limitations do not appear to bring about any
improvement in the operation or functioning of a computer per
se, or to improve computer-related technology by allowing
computer performance of a function not previously performable
by a computer . . . , but rather the solution appears to be more of
a business-driven solution rather than a technical one.
Ans. 8 (emphasis added).
C.3. 2019 Memorandum Step 2B
Applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines:
[T]he claim merely amounts to the application or instructions to
apply the abstract idea on a computer where receiving data
(referenced July 2015 Update to Subject Matter Eligibility p. 7)
and displaying/presenting data (referenced from Electric Power
Group p. 9-10) have been identified as well-known, routine, and
conventional steps/functions to one of ordinary skill in the art.
Even if not directed toward the abstract idea, the above storing

7 Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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steps/functions would not account for significantly more than the
abstract idea because receiving/storing data (referenced July
2015 Update to Subject Matter Eligibility p. 7) has been
identified as well-known, routine, and conventional
steps/functions to one of ordinary skill in the art. Further, method
claims 1 and 3-10 recite a database of a processing server,
receiving device, transmitting device, and memory; however,
these elements merely facilitate the claimed functions at a high
level of generality and they perform conventional functions.
Final Act. 11–12 (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Examiner determines:
In addition to this, adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent)
with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a general computer or laptop (as disclosed in
Paragraphs 0065-0067 and Figure 6 of Appellant’s specification)
is insufficient for qualifying as “significantly more”.
Ans. 4.
D. Panel’s Analysis of Appellants’ § 101 Arguments
D.1. 2019 Memorandum Step 2A, Prong 1
The Examiner correctly determines that claim 1 recites the following
limitations:
[A.] storing a plurality of consumer profiles,
[B.] identifying a corresponding set of consumer profiles in the
profile database including the respective employment
status category,
[C.] identifying a plurality of purchase behaviors based on at
least the transaction data included in the plurality of data
entries included in each consumer profile,
[D.] identifying a plurality of purchase behaviors based on the
transaction data included in the transaction data entries
included in the specific consumer profile,
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[E.] identifying a predicted employment status category of the
employment status categories for the specific consumer
profile, and
[F.] updating the specific consumer profile to include the
predicted unemployment status category.
Final Act. 10 (emphasis, formatting, and bracketed material added).
The Examiner points out that for claim 1, mathematical correlations
are used to determine an employment status category (Final Act. 11) and a
business-driven problem is solved (Ans. 8). As to the Examiner’s
mathematical concept abstract idea analysis, as we find no mathematical
correlation explicitly claimed or disclosed, we conclude this analysis is
relevant only to the extent that it focuses on certain methods of organizing
human activity that are ineligible.
As to the business related abstract idea, we conclude that claim 1
recites a method to determine an employment status category based on
transaction data (i.e., “consumer’s transaction activity” (Spec. ¶ 2) including
“payment transactions” (Spec. ¶ 22)), which Appellants disclose as a sub-
step to better target relevant advertisements (Spec. ¶ 2). Such a
determination constitutes “commercial or legal interactions” such as
“advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors” and “business
relations”; and these are ones of certain methods of organizing human
activity identified in the 2019 Memorandum, and thus an abstract idea.
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
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D.2. 2019 Memorandum Step 2A, Prong 2
D.2.a.
Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now turn
to whether claim 1 is directed to that abstract idea, or instead integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application. Appellants contend:
The claimed invention is directed to address a challenge:
how to identify the employment status for an individual whose
status is unknown. The appealed claims solve this challenge via
the use of a novel and nonobvious technical implementation that
utilizes data analysis that cannot be performed without the aid of
sophisticated computer technology that has been specifically
configured to perform such analysis. . . . [T]he present claims,
when their limitations are considered as an ordered combination,
recite an improvement to technology that provides computing
devices, when specifically programmed as outlined in the
specification, with the ability to identify the employment status
of an individual based on their transaction history.
Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis added).
[G]eneric computing systems are not configured to perform the
analysis and functions recited in the present claims, as
specialized configuration is necessary to be able to handle
transaction data, let alone to also identify purchase behaviors and
predict employment status categories based thereon. Instead, a
processing server must be specifically configured as described in
the present application to be able to carry out the claimed
invention, which provides a solution to the aforementioned
technical problem. The result is an improved technological
process that provides a solution to an existing problem through
improved computer functionality by the specialized
configuration claimed in the appealed claims and described in the
specification, which has been held by the courts and in past
guidance issued by the Office as being patent-eligible.
Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis added).
There is no suggestion in the cited language [Spec. ¶ 57] that a
“general purpose computer” can be used. Instead, the Examiner
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is simply alleging this possibility while presenting no evidence
in support of this assumption.
Reply Br. 2 (emphasis added).
The Appellant further notes that the appealed claims are
similar to those at issue in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. [v]. Opennet
Telecom, Inc., [841 F.3d 1288] (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Amdocs, the
claims at issue were found to be patent eligible, and “could [. . .]
be described [. . . as] receiving initial information, for correlating
that initial information with additional information, and for using
that additional information to enhance the initial information”
([841 F.3d at 1299–1300]).
Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis and bracketed material added).
D.2.b.
As to Appellants’ improvement to technology argument, we conclude
that Appellants’ claimed process is “a method to determine an employment
status category based on transaction data,” which is a business problem and
not a technological problem. We do not agree with Appellants that receiving
transaction data to determine employment status involves a “technological
field,” a “technological problem,” or a “technological solution.” Rather, we
determine that this is directed to the field of “commercial or legal
interactions” including “advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors” or “business relations” and their problems and solutions. See
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014) (holding
that claim “describ[ing] only the abstract idea of showing an advertisement
before delivering free content” is patent ineligible).
Further, Appellants argue the claim provides “improved computer
functionality.” Appeal Br. 7. However, the claim provides only a result-
oriented solution, i.e., is equivalent to the words “apply it” to perform the
recited transmit and receive functions. We determine that claim 1 does not
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“focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology,” but is “directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract
idea and merely invoke[s] generic processes and machinery.” McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This
is not enough to transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject
matter. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (explaining that claims that
“amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the
abstract idea . . . using some unspecified, generic computer” “is not ‘enough’
to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention” (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77, 79)); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he claim language here provides
only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer
accomplishes it.”).
As to Appellants’ argument that the Examiner presents no evidence
that a “general purpose computer” can be used, we are unpersuaded.
Appellants overlook that their own Specification explicitly states
“[p]rocessor device 604 may be a special purpose or a general purpose
processor device.” Spec. ¶ 61 (emphasis added).
As to Appellants’ Amdocs argument, we agree with Appellants that
improving a technological process may result in integrating the judicial
exception into a practical application. This consideration has also been
referred to as the search for a technological solution to a technological
problem. See Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300 (“[T]his claim entails an
unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed
fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously
required massive databases)”).
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However, as discussed supra, we conclude that Appellants’ claimed
process is “a method to determine an employment status category based on
transaction data” which is a business problem and not a technological
problem. Again, we do not agree with Appellants that receiving transaction
data to determine employment status involves a “technological field,” a
“technological problem,” or a “technological solution.”
D.2.c.
We agree with the Examiner that as to the steps of claim 1, the
recitations “merely amount to the application or instructions to apply the
abstract idea using a computer and generic hardware/software, and [are]
considered to amount to nothing more than requiring a computer workstation
and generic hardware/software to merely carry out the abstract idea itself.”
Ans. 5.
In view of Appellants’ Specification, and consistent with the
Examiner’s determinations, we conclude that claim 1 does not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. We determine claim 1 does
not recite:
(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer;
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or
(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
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See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We agree with the Examiner that
claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception, and does not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
D.3. 2019 Memorandum Step 2B
Discussing claim 1, the Examiner points out:
[T]he claim merely amounts to the application or instructions to
apply the abstract idea on a computer where receiving data
(referenced July 2015 Update to Subject Matter Eligibility p. 7)
and displaying/presenting data (referenced from Electric Power
Group p. 9-10) have been identified as well-known, routine, and
conventional steps/functions to one of ordinary skill in the art.
. . . Further, method claims 1 and 3-10 recite a database of a
processing server, receiving device, transmitting device, and
memory; however, these elements merely facilitate the claimed
functions at a high level of generality and they perform
conventional functions.
Final Act. 11–12 (emphasis added).
We agree with the Examiner that use of a database and a processing
device is well-understood, routine, and conventional. This is evidenced by
the references cited during examination. See, e.g., Voskuhl, col. 8, ll. 5–8,
Fig. 2; Brundage Fig. 4. See also, “generic computer components such as . .
. ‘database’ . . . . do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement.” Mortg.
Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); “These benefits, however, are not improvements to database
functionality. Instead, they are benefits that flow from performing an
abstract idea in conjunction with a well-known database structure.” BSG
Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2018); and
“This type of activity, i.e., organizing and accessing records through the
creation of an index-searchable database, includes longstanding conduct that
existed well before the advent of computers and the Internet. . . . We have
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previously held other patent claims ineligible for reciting similar abstract
concepts that merely collect, classify, or otherwise filter data.” Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
We conclude claim 1, in addition to the abstract idea, recites only a
well-understood, routine, conventional elements/combination previously
known in the industry. In view of Appellants’ Specification, and consistent
with the Examiner’s determinations, we determine the claims do not recite:
(vi) a specific limitation other than what is well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field or
unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular
useful application.
See MPEP § 2106.05(d).
E. Appellants’ § 103 Arguments
Again, except as noted below, we adopt as our own (1) the findings
and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s
Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief arguments. We concur with
the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following
points.
E.1.
Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 because:
[E]ach of the cited portions of Voskuhl refer to the association of
an income bracket with an individual. Voskuhl is completely
silent as to storing any information for individuals with respect
to their employment status, as recited in the present claims. As
such, Voskuhl fails to disclose or suggest the storing of an
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employment status category in each of a plurality of consumer
profiles, as recited in the present claims. At page 7 of the
Response to Arguments, the Examiner alleges that a consumer’s
income is equivalent to their employment status, referring to
paragraph [0034] of the present specification. However, the
present application refers to income as a subset of the
employment status, where the employment status of the
consumer referred to in the example is full-time employment,
with the income range being merely any additional descriptor.
As stated above, Vosku[hl] is completely silent as to the
employment status of the individuals discussed therein.
Appeal Br. 9 (emphasis added).
As to Appellants’ above contention, we are not persuaded. We agree
with the Examiner (Ans. 8–9) that income ranges in Voskuhl reasonably
equate to the claimed “employment status categories.” See Appeal Br. Cl.
App. 3 (Appellants’ claim 8 recites “the plurality of employment status
categories includes at least one of: unemployment, part-time employment,
full-time employment, student, and employment associated with one income
category of a plurality of income categories.” (emphasis added)).
E.2.
Appellants also contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because:
[T]he Examiner alleges that Voskuhl discloses [transaction data
entries], referring specifically to col. 8, ll. 21-45, which discloses
that an external website log records data about buying patterns,
with the example provided in col. 12, ll. 45-63 that “If the user
choose to purchase concert tickets to the next Britney Spears
concert on the external website, the social networking system
100 may collect that information and store an interest in Britney
Spears in the user profile information object associated with the
user.” Thus, in Voskuhl there is no storage of transaction data
for a transaction in the user profile, as recited in the present
claims. Instead, in Voskuhl the user profile includes only user
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interests that are based on their purchases, and no data related to
the purchase itself. In addition, Voskuhl does not disclose what
is stored in the external website log about any patterns. As
Voskuhl does not mention transaction data in the entirety of the
application, the external website log fails to suggest the storing
of transaction data for individual transactions. Thus, Voskuhl
fails to disclose or suggest the storing of transaction data entirely,
let alone in the user profile, as recited in the present claims.
Appeal Br. 10–11 (emphasis added).
[T]here is no mention in Voskuhl of any logging of purchasing
activity, instead there is only the mention of collecting
information regarding customer interests. These interest
patterns are separate and distinct from purchases, and could be
identified based on data that has little or nothing to do with
transaction data or transactional activity.
Appeal Br. 11 (emphasis added).
As to Appellants’ above contention, we are not persuaded. We agree
with the Examiner that interest data in Voskuhl reasonably equates to
product data which Appellants disclose (Spec. ¶ 29) as being an example of
the claimed “transaction data.” Ans. 10. As Appellants acknowledge,
Voskuhl’s interest data is stored “in the user profile information object
associated with the user.” Appeal Br. 10. Contrary to Appellants’ argument
that “Voskuhl does not disclose what is stored in the external website log”
(id. at 11), Voskuhl states that purchase price and purchase frequency are
collected:
The external data gathering module 300 may also collect other
information about the user’s actions on the external website, such
as the price of the tickets and how frequently the user makes
purchases on the live music concert website. This information
may then be used as a factor in a predictive model for inferring
household income for users of the social networking system 100.
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Voskuhl, col. 8, ll. 38–44 (emphasis added). Further, we conclude that
Voskuhl storing the interest data in a user profile is reasonably suggestive of
storing other user transaction data in a user’s profile as an alternative to
storage in the external website log.
E.3.
Appellants also contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because:
As the cited references do not disclose or suggest the storage of
transaction data, they cannot further disclose or suggest using
that transaction data to identify purchase behaviors based
thereon, as recited in the present claims.
Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis added).
[T]he Examiner appears to be alleging that the stored customer
interests is equivalent to both the transaction data recited in the
claims, as well as the purchase behaviors recited in the claims
that are identified using the transaction data. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the Examiner’s interpretation of
Voskuhl’s consumer interests is correct with respect to one of the
claim recitations, it cannot operate as both the transaction data
and purchase behaviors.
Appeal Br. 13 (emphasis added).
As to Appellants’ above contention, we are not persuaded. As
discussed supra, Voskuhl teaches storage of transaction data in the form of
interest data in a user profile, and is reasonably suggestive of storing other
transaction data in the user profile. Appellants’ Specification states:
Purchase behaviors identified for each group may include
propensity to spend across a plurality of categories that are based
on merchant, industry, product type, product industry, product
brand, one or more periods of time, transaction amounts, etc.
Spec. ¶ 23. We understand the claimed “purchase behaviors based on the
transaction data” to mean purchase behaviors are derived from transaction
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data. We conclude that Voskuhl’s “how frequently the user makes
purchases” data is purchase behavior data derived from data about plural
individual transactions. Further, we are not persuaded by Appellants’
argument that “[consumer interests] cannot operate as both the transaction
data and purchase behaviors” because the Examiner does not rely on the raw
consumer interests data to teach both these features. Rather, the Examiner
relies on Voskuhl’s derived “how frequently” (Final Act. 16) to teach
purchase behavior.
E.4.
Appellants also contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because:
At page 17 of the Office Action, the Examiner alleges that the
identification of income brackets in Voskuhl is equivalent to the
prediction of employment status categories as recited in the
present claims. However, as discussed above, Voskuhl is silent
with respect to employment status, and income brackets on their
own are not indicative of the employment of an individual.
Appeal Br. 14 (emphasis added).
As to Appellants’ above contention, we are not persuaded for the
reasons already set forth supra at Section E.1.

CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1, 3–11, and 13–
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter.
(2) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1, 3–11, and 13–
20 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
(3) Claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20 are not patentable.
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DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED