0520100485
09-29-2010
Keith N. Collins, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.
Keith N. Collins,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Southwest Area),
Agency.
Request No. 0520100485
Appeal No. 0120091676
Hearing No. 451-2008-00219X
Agency No. 4G-780-0073-08
DENIAL
Complainant timely requested reconsideration of the decision in Keith N. Collins v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120091676 (June 9, 2010). EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission may, in its discretion, grant a request to reconsider any previous Commission decision where the requesting party demonstrates that: (1) the appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or (2) the appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(b).
In its previous decision, the Commission affirmed the Agency's final order fully implementing the decision of the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ), following a hearing, which found that Complainant had not established that the Agency discriminated against him based on race and age when he was twice removed from employment.
On request for reconsideration, Complainant argues that the appellate decision contained both a clearly erroneous interpretation of the law and a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact. As to the former, Complainant argues that the Agency's burden of production under Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), is not satisfied by the Agency's articulation during the investigation and hearing of its explanation for his removals. Rather, Complainant argues, under Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), the Agency should have been required to submit "admissible evidence" to substantiate its explanation. What Complainant's argument does not take into account, however, is that the affidavit and in-person testimony of Agency officials is admissible evidence, from which the AJ reasonably could conclude that the Agency had met its evidentiary burden. Further, Complainant overlooks the well-established principle that an agency need not, following the prima facie case, present evidence sufficient to establish its actual motivation. Rather, the agency need only present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it discriminated against the complainant. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. An agency must, however, "frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the [complainant] will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. The sufficiency of the [agency's] evidence should be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions." Id. Here, the Agency's explanation was sufficiently clear to afford Complainant a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. Complainant availed himself of the hearing process, which included the opportunity to engage in discovery to obtain documentary evidence from the Agency which he believed would support his claim. Accordingly, we find that Complainant has not established a clearly erroneous interpretation of law.
Complainant also argues that the appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact with regard to whether he received training and support comparable to that of the employees whom he cited as comparators. We note that Complainant presented evidence on this matter below, and that the appellate decision found substantial evidence of record to support the AJ's conclusion that Complainant nonetheless had not shown that the Agency was motivated by racial or age-based animus with regard to either removal from employment. The AJ noted that the training provided to the cited comparators was not provided until after Complainant had been removed from employment. The AJ further noted that the decision of Agency managers to remove Complainant when it became apparent that he was not meeting expectations was a valid exercise of managerial discretion. Accordingly, we find that Complainant has not established a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact.
After reconsidering the previous decision and the entire record, the Commission finds that the request fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(b). It is therefore the decision of the Commission to DENY the request. The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 0120091676 remains the Commission's decision. There is no further right of administrative appeal on the decision of the Commission on this request.
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0610)
This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
September 29, 2010
Date
2
0520100485
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0520100485