0120122357
10-18-2012
Kathy K. Roberson, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.
Kathy K. Roberson,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Capital Metro Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120122357
Hearing No. 430-2011-00367X
Agency No. 4K280004309
DECISION
On May 1, 2012, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's March 29, 2012, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order (FO).
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are: (1) whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) properly issued a decision without a hearing and (2) whether the AJ erred as a matter of law in finding that Complainant failed to establish that she was discriminated against as alleged.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Rural Carrier at the Agency's Mathews Post Office facility in Mathews, North Carolina. On April 2, 2009, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) when she was not paid or allowed to work the "evaluation" of Rural Route 47 as a "44J correction."
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).1 Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's December 12, 2011 motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on March 27, 2012.
The AJ found the following facts: Complainant was the primary relief carrier for Rural Route 47 ("RR 47"). Complainant's pay was based on the "evaluation" of RR 47. The "evaluation" is determined by official mail counts and determines the maximum amount of time required for a route to be performed. From February 23, 2008 to March 7, 2008, a national rural mail count was conducted. As a result, the evaluation of RR 47 was changed such that RR 47 was changed from a "K" route to a "J" route and was evaluated at eight hours per work day and 88 hours every two weeks. Carriers assigned to deliver the route would work five days on the one week of a two-week, or biweekly pay period, and six days the other week.
Complainant alleged that she was not scheduled to work the evaluation of RR 47 after having inquired about working on the route with the Postmaster (PM) and union representative. Complainant alleged that that she should have been permitted to work and be paid for the evaluation of RR 47.
The AJ found that drawing all reasonable inferences in Complainant's favor, no genuine issue of material fact existed. Further, the AJ found that assuming Complainant established a prima facie case, the Agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, no Rural Carrier outside of Complainant's protected classes was treated more favorably or unfavorably than other Rural Carrier Associates (RCA). The AJ further found that the PM stated that all Rural Carriers who were not on "hold downs" were not entitled to work more than 40 hours per week.2 Complainant and others were not scheduled to evaluate certain routes during the national mail count as a result.
In her attempt to establish pretext, Complainant contends, among other things, that other relief carriers were treated more favorably because they were scheduled to work the evaluated hours for routes they covered.3 Further, she argued that the PM "has not exercised sound business judgment and has picked on what they consider the lowest common denominator[:] Me and persons like myself in contravention of the Contract between the NRLCA and the laws of the land, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which gives me the right to enforce a contract, and the wages provided there under."
The AJ determined that at the core of Complainant's argument, she alleged that the PM held the mistaken belief that all Rural Carriers who were not on "hold downs" were not entitled to work more than 40 hours per week at the time the evaluation of RR 47 occurred. However the AJ found that Complainant's argument to be unpersuasive. The AJ determined that "bad, imprudent, or reasonably mistaken business decisions sincerely held at the time - made by Agency officials" does not alone establish that the Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. The AJ concluded that Complainant failed to demonstrate that the Agency's proffered reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.
The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant argues that the AJ failed to apply "strict scrutiny." Further Complainant argues that the AJ failed to take the facts in the light most favorable to her. Complainant also argues that the AJ failed to consider the material facts that show that the PM failed to pay her the appropriate wages. Finally, Complainant argues that the AJ erroneously believed the PM's "excuse of confusion" regarding the wages paid to her. The Agency argues that Complainant's contentions on appeal are without merit and requests that the Commission affirm the AJ's decision finding no discrimination.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999) (providing that both the Administrative Judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, are subject to de novo review). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).
We find that after a careful review of the record, the AJ appropriately issued a decision without a hearing. We find that record reveals that ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing was given to the parties; a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts existed; the parties had the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and the parties had the chance to engage in discovery before responding. Further, we find that the AJ applied the appropriate standard of review for this case. Additionally, we find that the AJ appropriately considered all justifiable inferences based on the record evidence in Complainant's favor.
To prevail in a case such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).
Assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination, we find that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the PM stated that all Rural Carriers who were not on "hold downs" were not entitled to work more than 40 hours per week. Complainant and others were not scheduled to evaluate certain routes during the national mail count as a result.
Because we find that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, we now turn to Complainant's burden to prove that the proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. Complainant's main argument is that the PM was mistaken in his belief that Complainant was not entitled to work the evaluation for RR 47 because she was not on a hold down for this route. However, we note that merely because the PM was mistaken about whether Complainant could work the evaluation for RR 47 does not prove that the Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. Further, we note that the record reveals that the PM applied this mistaken belief to all relief carriers, despite Complainant's assertions to the contrary. Additionally, nothing in the record shows that the Agency's actions were the result of discriminatory animus. Accordingly, we find that Complainant failed to show that she was discriminated against as alleged.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we affirm the FO adopting the AJ's finding of no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney
with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
___10/18/12_______________
Date
1 The record reveals that the Agency dismissed the complaint. Complainant appealed the dismissal to the Commission. In Roberson v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120092604 (Mar. 23, 2011), the Commission reversed the Agency's dismissal of the complaint and ordered the Agency to conduct an investigation in the matter.
2 A carrier is "a hold down" when he covers a vacant route, or the carrier permanently assigned to a route is away from the route and not performing it for an uninterrupted and lengthy period of time.
3 While Regulars Carriers are paid the evaluation for the routes they "own" regardless of how much time they take to deliver their routes, RCAs are paid for the hours they actual work when substituting for the Regular Carriers.
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0120122357
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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