K-D Lamp Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 13, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 648 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
K-D Lamp Company and Melvin E. Remley. Case 9-
CA- 10549
May 13, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND WALTHER
On February 3, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Josephine H. Klein issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order, as modified herein.3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, K-D Lamp Company, Cincinnati, Ohio, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(b):
"(b) In any other manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing her findings.
2 We specifically disavow the discussion and conclusions set forth in the
addendum (AUD, 11 (2), pars. 8 14) in the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision. The issues considered there were neither alleged nor litigated at
the hearing.
3 In her recommended Order the Administrative Law Judge uses the
narrow cease-and-desist language, "in any like or related manner."
Respondent here has committed a violation which goes to the very heart of
the Act. We shall therefore require Respondent to cease and desist from in
any other manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to employees by
Sec. 7 of the Act. N.LR.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4,
1941); H. C. Macaulay Foundry Company, 223 NLRB 815 (1976).
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to reinstate
economic strikers who have unconditionally
requested reinstatement when work for which
they are qualified becomes available.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make Melvin E. Remley whole for
any loss of earnings he may have suffered because
of our discrimination against him by payment to
him of a sum of money equal to that which he
normally would have earned from August 5, 1976,
until September 14, 1976, when we did offer him
reinstatement.
K-D LAMP COMPANY
DECISION
JOSEPHINE H. KLEIN, Administrative Law Judge: Pursu-
ant to a charge filed on August 11, 1976, by Melvin E.
Remley, a complaint was issued against K-D Lamp
Company, Respondent, on September 30, 1976, alleging
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I) and (3) of the
Act 1 by failing to reinstate Remley, an economic striker,
between August 5 2 and September 15, 1976.
Pursuant to due notice, the case was heard before me in
Cincinnati, Ohio, on December 7, 1976. The General
Counsel and Respondent were represented by counsel and
the Charging Party appeared pro se. All parties were
afforded full opportunity to present oral and written
evidence and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The
parties waived oral argument and briefs were filed on
behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent on January
3, 1977.
Upon the entire record, together with careful observation
of the witnesses and consideration of the briefs, I make the
following:
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.
2 The complaint alleged this initial date as August 9. In his brief the
General Counsel moves to amend the complaint to state August 5 as the
appropriate date. Since undisputed evidence establishes the August 5 date to
be correct, the General Counsel's motion to amend is granted.
229 NLRB No. 101
648
K-D LAMP COMPANY
I. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
Respondent, a Massachusetts corporation, is engaged in
the manufacture of automobile headlights and related
equipment at its Cincinnati. Ohio, location. During the
past 12 months, a representative period, Respondent had a
direct inflow in interstate commerce of goods and products
valued in excess of $50,000, which it sold and caused to be
shipped from its Cincinnati, Ohio, plant directly to points
outside Ohio. Respondent is, and was at all times material
herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
At all times material herein International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America and its Local 1258 (collectively
referred to as the Union) were labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1I. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
With some exceptions not pertinent to the present
proceeding, Respondent's production and maintenance
employees in Cincinnati are represented by the Union. The
collective-bargaining agreement covering these employees
expired on August 7, 1974. No agreement for a renewal
contract having been reached by that time, the Union
struck on August 8, 1974.
Just before the strike began there were approximately
160 employees in the bargaining unit here involved. Of
these, around 9 were in the paint department and from 75
to 100 in the assembly department.
The plant continued to operate during the strike, which
continued until August 5, 1975. Mr. Frank O. Leurck,
respondent's manager of factory personnel and its only
witness at the hearing, testified that during the strike it was
necessary to hire some 800 persons in order to achieve an
adequate complement of satisfactory employees.
When the strike ended, about 60 employees applied for
reinstatement. 3 Sometime in August 1975 Remley tele-
phoned Mr. Lee Seiler, Respondent's manager of opera-
tions, about returning to work. On August 29, Seiler wrote
Remley that there were then no openings in Remley's
department. Remley was advised to report to Seiler and
"sign the proper form so that [his] name [could] be added
to those on the recall list." The letter concluded: "In the
event of a future job opening, first consideration will be
given to those on the recall list for those in the department
where the opening is available." On September 2, 1975,
Remley and James F. Cox went to the plant and signed the
recall list, thereby making an unconditional offer to return
to work.
Cox and Remley had been employed as service and
utility workers in Respondent's paint department since
1942 and 1947, respectively. Paint spraying was among
their duties. Remley had been president of the Local Union
since 1973 and previously was a union committeman
and/or shop steward in the paint department for some 26
years. Cox was reinstated on October 6, 1975. He then
3 Leurck testified that by the time of the present heanng all but two (or
possibly three) had been reinstated. It does not appear why those few had
not been reinstated.
4 Apparently there is disagreement as to wsho had signed first. It is
unnecessary to resolve that conflict in this case.
apparently spent most of his working time at spray
painting. He testified that, although there had been only 9
employees in the paint department when the strike began,
upon his reinstatement there were some 12 to 14, none of
whom had worked for Respondent before the strike. When
he left, at the end of July 1976, there were around seven or
eight.
During the last week in July 1976 Remley spoke to
Leurck about the possibility of being recalled for a position
in the assembly department, but Leurck maintained that a
striker could be reinstated only in the department in which
he had been working before the strike and that Respondent
"would hire from the outside for the assembly department,
once all of the assembly department employees were
recalled to active service." In this connection, Remley's
uncontradicted testimony was:
Well, I asked [Leurck] did he think it was fair-I
told him I didn't think it was fair that when you have
permanent openings in the plant, since we are all
supposed to be classed as employees, and since we
don't have no damn agreement that would particularly
isolate employees in one department or another, that I
didn't think it was fair that just because a person
happened to go out on strike in one department and
signed up to come back to work unconditionally, that
the only place they will consider him to work is the
department which he was originally in.
And he says that that-they was going to-they felt
that they had to take us back unconditionally in the
department which we was from, but they didn't have to
take us in any other department.
Either in the same conversation or in another conversation
toward the end of July, Leurck told Remley that he could
resume work for Respondent only "if there is a permanent
opening, and that has to be by somebody either quitting or
dying." At that point Remley said that he understood Cox
might be about to go to work for the post office. Leurck
replied: "Well, in that case there will be a permanent
opening." Within a few days, however, when it became
generally known that Cox was indeed going to work for the
post office, Leurck telephoned Remley and stated that
striker Evie Taylor, also employed in the paint department,
had signed the reinstatement list before Remley. It appears
that, as a matter of fact, Remley and Taylor had applied on
the same day.4
Cox failed to report to work on August 2, 3, and 4, 1976.
Accordingly, under a company rule, he was terminated as
of August 5.5 Remley and Taylor were both recalled by
letters dated September 14, 1976, and resumed work the
next day.
The General Counsel contends that Remley should have
been recalled to replace Cox upon the latter's termination
on August 5, 1976. Respondent, on the other hand,
maintains that until September 14 there was no permanent
position in the paint department available for Remley.
Respondent asserts that Cox's departure did not automati-
5 Although denominated a discharge, Cox's termination apparently was
in fact a voluntary quit to assume a job with the postal service.
649
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cally create a fillable vacancy since (1) business declined
during the early part of August, and (2) Remley could not
be reinstated between mid-August and mid-September
because Mr. Stone, Respondent's president, was out of the
country for that period. Since Cox's termination at least
prima facie created a vacancy, the evidence in support of
Respondent's two-point defense will now be examined.
A. Asserted Decline in Business
In support of Respondent's assertion of a decline in
business after the end of July, Leurck testified as follows:
Q. Mr. Remley has testified that you told him in
late July that the business was good at that time.
A. That is correct.
Q. Did the business continue good then into
August and through August?
A. No, it did not. It dropped off almost sixty
percent.
* *
Q. Mr. Leurck, when did business start to decline?
A. At the end of July. ... The first three weeks of
August were horrible.
No production or sales records were offered.
As stipulated at the hearing, the total hours worked by
hourly employees in the paint department during July,
August, and September, 1976, were as follows:
Leurck conceded that when Cox left there was spray
painting to be done. It is undisputed that after Cox's
departure, Foreman Richard Kolde apparently did sub-
stantial amounts of spray painting. Remley testified,
without contradiction, that he saw Kolde performing such
work on August 6, the day after Cox's termination. The
time spent by Kolde in spray painting is not included in the
figures set forth above.
Whatever may have been the business situation in the
plant as a whole (as to which there is no evidence), in view
of Respondent's position that employees' reinstatement
rights were limited by departmental boundaries, Respon-
dent's defensive claim of a decline in business must be
appraised with reference only to the paint department.
The available data and undisputed evidence do not
support Leurck's conclusory testimony. Thus, in the first
week of August the number of employee hours worked in
the paint department was about the same as in the week
ending July 3. The number in the second week of August
somewhat exceeded that in the first week of July. And the
employee hours shown for August were augmented by
work done by Foreman Kolde. By the third week in August
the employee hours worked in the paint department
exceeded those in the third week of July. No matter how
the figures are viewed, they do not support Leurck's
estimate of a 60 percent decline in business in the early part
of August. From the second week of August until Remley
and Taylor were reinstated, there was apparently sufficient
work in the paint department to require the services of
transferees from the assembly department.
Week Ending
July 3
July 10
July 17
July 24
July 31
August 7
August 14
August 21
August 28
September 4
September 11II
September 18
September 25
No. of Hours
133.58
80.00
184.83
209.67
226.50
131.75
141.17
185.16
256.00
245.42
211.67
235.00
193.00
During the same period two employees, Ruth Rennick and
Virginia Ralston, were transferred temporarily from assem-
bly to the paint department. The hours worked in the paint
department by these transferees were:
Week Ending
August 15
August 22
August 29
September 5
September 12
Rennick Ralston
8
40
0
0
0
21.17
0.00
40.00
40.00
32.00
Cox testified that Ralston had started to work in the paint
department about 6 weeks before he left. At first she was
on a "temporary" basis but later "as a regular."
B. Stone's Absence
Leurck testified that President Stone was out of the
country from around the 10th to the 15th of August until
about the same date in September. On direct examination
Leurck maintained that he did not have authority to take
on any employees in Stone's absence. In this connection
Leurck's testimony was:
Q. Did you personally have the authority to create
new permanent positions in any departments at the
company's facilities?
A. No.
Q. When this occurred what was the process
involved, say during July and August and September of
1976 in particular?
A. Whenever any foreman would come to me and
ask whether he could put on anybody, I would say,
"Well, we will present the figures to Mr. Stone," and
Mr. Stone would, in view of the orders coming in,
would make a judgment as to who we should hire-not
who we should hire, but how many we should bring in.
Q. Did this go to replacing employees as well as
just adding additional employees to the work force?
A. It did.
Q. Did Mr. Stone personally then have to approve
the addition of any permanent people?
A. He did.
Q. Did this apply to new hires as well as to people
returning from the strike?
A. It did.
650
K-D LAMP COMPANY
Q. Where was Mr. Stone from approximately
August 10 until September 10 or I I?
A. In the Middle East.
Q. During that period did he authorize any persons
to come in on a permanent basis?
A. No, he did not.
Leurck then testified unequivocally that no persons were
"brought into the assembly department ... on a perma-
nent basis, between August 5 and September 14," 1976.
However, on cross-examination he conceded that between
August 25 and September 10 Respondent hired 12
employees "in classifications which were an integral part of
the production process." He produced a subpenaed record
which showed that two assemblers had been hired on
September 7 and three on September 10;6 six press
operators in August and two on September 9; and one
employee in the catalog department on August 16. On
cross-examination Leurck also acknowledged that when
employees Rennick and Ralston were transferred to the
paint department, employees were hired to fill their
positions in the assembly department.
Since Stone did not return from abroad until September
10 or 11, at the earliest, it is clear that none of the hires
listed above was specifically authorized or cleared by him.
Leurck's testimony concerning the authority for these hires
was:
Q. Now with whom did you clear these new hires?
A. Mr. Seiler on the press department.
* S
Q. Mr. Seiler then has the authority to hire
employees without clearing through Mr. Stone?
A. Yes.
Q. He does?
A. Let's put it this way: He did in this instance.
* * *
Q. How about the assemblers hired on 9-10, the
three assemblers hired on 9-10, did you talk to-that's
your department, isn't it, assemblers?
A. Actually they are all my departments, but I
don't recall asking anyone about those three, for hire.
Q. You then took the initiative on your own to hire
those employees?
A. That's right.
Q. I am not certain what your bailiwick is. Are you
over all of these employees, including the press
operators?
A. I do all the hiring.
Q. You do all the hiring?
A. Except for catalog.
6 Leurck testified that the three "assemblers" hired on September 10
were actually in the catalog department, being too young to work on
production machinery. He thought the same might be true of the September
7 hires, who were brought in without going through the regular process of
personnel work. It is not clear why these people were ostensibly placed in
jobs which they could not legally fill. But. in any event. Leurck's testimony
in this regard raises doubt as to the asserted sharp separation among
departments.
There is one other factor of great significance in
appraising Respondent's contention that Cox could not be
replaced until Stone returned. There is only Leurck's
conclusory testimony, adduced largely by leading ques-
tions, to support Respondent's contention that no employ-
ees could be hired or even reinstated except by Stone. Had
Stone testified to such severe restriction on the authority of
high-echelon management personnel and had he been
subject to cross-examination as to the basis of the
restriction, his testimony might have been persuasive. As
the person imposing the restriction, he was in the best
position to testify knowingly concerning it. But Stone did
not testify. After appearing at my request at a prehearing
conference, he left the premises shortly after the hearing
opened.
In its brief, Respondent substitutes for relevant testimo-
ny a quotation from a management handbook 7 to establish
that "for the President to retain exclusive power to create
new positions not only was understandable, but, given
circumstances, quite prudent." In addition to the fact that
the quotation does not necessarily support the contention
of Respondent's counsel, it should be noted that we are not
here concerned with the creation of "new positions," but
rather with the replacement of an employee who left
unexpectedly. Absent any factual explanation, it is virtual-
ly inconceivable that any production company the size of
Respondent would voluntarily place itself in a position
where it was unable to maintain a complement of
employees sufficient to meet its production needs during
an extended absence of its president. That help was needed
in the paint department is demonstrated by the facts
previously set forth as well as by the fact that, immediately
upon Stone's return, two employees, Taylor and Remley,
were recalled.
The fact is, and I find, that Cox's departure as of
September 5 created the vacancy of a permanent position
in the paint department. The evidence also clearly
establishes that, contrary to Respondent's contention,
employees could be, and were, hired by Respondent during
Stone's absence.s
So far as the present record discloses, Remley was
entitled to immediate reinstatement to the Cox position.
Remley had had some 39 years' experience with Respon-
dent, largely in spray painting, precisely the work that Cox
had been doing. There is no evidence that any other
employee had similar experience. Although Remley quoted
Leurck as having at one time maintained that Taylor had
priority on the recall list, Respondent has not so contended
in this proceeding. Respondent's position is simply that
there was no vacancy "available" for Remley until
September 14, 1976. That position is contrary to the
preponderance of the evidence.
Accordingly, on all the evidence, I find that, as alleged,
Respondent failed and refused to reinstate Remley be-
7 Puff, Manpower Requirements, in H.B. Maynard, Handbook ofManufac-
turing Management (1970), pp. 8-4-8-5.
8 In view of the hiring of new employees in other departments. it is not
unreasonable to infer that if any restriction had been placed on Leurck, it
was directed only against reinstatement of Remley. union president and
longtime officer.
651
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tween August 5 and September 14, 1976, in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
A brief addendum appears in order.
Remley was statutorily entitled to reinstatement in any
available job for which he was qualified. Fire Alert
Company, 207 NLRB 885, 886 (1973). Although there was
no specific evidence of Remley's qualification for any
available job in the assembly department, Leurck testified
that employees temporarily transferred from the assembly
department were usually competent to do the work in the
paint department. Leurck's testimony also indicated that
work in the assembly department was neither highly skilled
nor specialized. It is reasonable to assume that Remley,
with many years' satisfactory service with Respondent,
would be qualified to fill a job in the assembly department,
particularly in view of Leurck's testimony concerning the
difficulty he encountered in obtaining satisfactory replace-
ments for the strikers.
Remley's statutory right was reinforced by the terms and
conditions of employment prevailing at the plant. The
expired collective-bargaining agreement between Respon-
dent and the Union was received in evidence as an
Administrative Law Judge's exhibit. Leurck testified that,
so far as here relevant, that agreement embodied Respon-
dent's prior practices. That contract contained specific
provisions for transfers, both temporary and permanent,
between departments. It provided that permanent vacan-
cies were to be posted and notices thereof were to be
mailed "to all laid off employees who the Company
believes may be capable of filling the job." Intradepart-
mental transfers were preferred but requests for interde-
partmental transfers were to be considered before there
was outside hiring. Although seniority was generally
accrued on a departmental basis, an interdepartmental
transferee carried his seniority with him. And Leurck
testified that job knowledge and seniority were taken into
consideration, but "[g]enerally it would be by seniority" in
the plant as a whole.
Leurck testified that the provision for permanent
transfers had been abolished upon expiration of the
contract. However, there is no suggestion that this change
was discussed with or approved by the Union. Although
the contract had expired, Respondent was not at liberty
unilaterally to change the existing terms and conditions of
employment embodied therein. Respondent did not ex-
plain the reasons or circumstances of the alleged change.
Absent any explanation, it is not unreasonable to infer that
it was designed primarily to restrict strikers' reinstatement
rights. Thus, no weight can be given to Leurck's testimony
that permanent transfers had been abolished upon expira-
tion of the contract.
As a striker, Remley retained his employee status.
Accordingly, after his unconditional request for reinstate-
ment he was entitled to an opportunity to bid on vacancies
in departments other than the paint department. As an
unrecalled striker, he was essentially in layoff status (i.e.,
Under the present charge, filed on August 11, 1976. presumably only
vacancies arising since February IH, 1976. could be considered.
"' The General Counsel's conduct of this litigation is apparently in line
with a position previously taken by the Regional Director. Respondent's
brief states that on November 19. 1975, Remley filed a charge (9 CA -9842),
an idle employee awaiting recall) and thus entitled to
notice of vacancies for which he might qualify.
In view of the foregoing considerations, I should be
inclined to conclude that Respondent violated the Act by
refusing to consider Remley for reinstatement to vacancies
that may have arisen in other departments between
September 2, 1975, 9 and September 14, 1976. Fire Alert
Company, supra.
But the present complaint specifically alleges that the
violation commenced on August 5, 1976, when a vacancy
arose in the paint department. Although the collective-
bargaining agreement was received in evidence and Leurck
was questioned about the transfer provisions, counsel for
the General Counsel did not press the matter and no
evidence was developed as to earlier vacancies in other
departments to which Remley might have been entitled. In
his brief the General Counsel again contends only that
Remley was entitled to reinstatement in the paint depart-
ment when Cox left on August 5, 1976.10 In view of the
course of the present proceedings and the fact that the
earlier availability of jobs in other departments was not
fully litigated, I have limited my finding of violation to the
period alleged, i.e., August 5 through September 14, 1976.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By failing and refusing to reinstate economic striker
Melvin E. Remley when work for which he was qualified
became available, and after he had unconditionally
requested reinstatement, thereby discouraging membership
in the Union, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
4. By the foregoing conduct Respondent interfered
with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, in
violation of Section 8(aX)() of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor
practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in an unfair
labor practice, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to offer Remley
reinstatement from August 5 until September 14, 1976, I
shall recommend that it be required to make Remley whole
for any loss of earnings he suffered by reason of
Respondent's failure to reinstate him during that period by
payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he
the "gravamen [of which] was that recall by department was unlawful."
According to Respondent, that charge was dismissed, the Regional Director
stating that it was lawful for Respondent to reinstate strikers "in the order in
which they requested reinstatement as job vacancies occur in the depart-
ment in which they were working at the time of the strike."
652
K-D LAMP COMPANY
normally would have earned during that period. Loss of
earnings shall be computed in the manner set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at
6 percent per annum as prescribed in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER"
Respondent, K-D Lamp Company, Cincinnati, Ohio, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to reinstate economic strikers
who have unconditionally requested reinstatement when
work for which they are qualified becomes available.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
H In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
(a) Make Melvin E. Remley whole, in the manner set
forth in "The Remedy" section of this Decision, for lost
earnings caused by Respondent's failure to offer him
reinstatement between August 5 and September 14, 1976.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its Cincinnati, Ohio, facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."' 2 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
653