Joseph J. Romano

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 24, 2019

12192768 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 24, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/192,768 08/15/2008 Joseph J. ROMANO JR. END920080113US2 3427
46583 7590 09/24/2019
Roberts Mlotkowski Safran Cole & Calderon, P.C.
Intellectual Property Department
P.O. Box 10064
MCLEAN, VA 22102-8064
EXAMINER
SCHEUNEMANN, RICHARD N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/24/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@rmsc2.com
lgallaugher@rmsc2.com
secretaries@rmsc2.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JOSEPH J. ROMANO JR.
____________

Appeal 2018-000265
Application 12/192,768
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 7–10, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
THE INVENTION
Appellant claims a method and system for allocating requirements in a
service oriented architecture using software and hardware string
representation. (Spec. ¶ 2, Title).

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Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method implemented in a computer infrastructure to provide a
service oriented architecture (SOA) by correlating one or more
service strings comprised of software components with one or
more server groups used to execute the software components of the
one or more service strings, comprising:

assigning, by a computing device, a business process identifier
to a business process stored in a storage device;
allocating, by use of a software tool in the computing device,
requirements to the business process, wherein the business process
identifies software components that are used to execute the
business process to satisfy the requirements;
creating, by the computing device, one or more service strings
used to provide the requirements for the business process by
identifying one or more sets of services, service components, and
operating systems identified by the business process as being used
to execute the business process to satisfy the requirements
allocated to the business process, and allocating the one or more
sets of services, service components, and operating systems to the
business process;
coupling, by the computing device, each allocated service,
service component, and operating system in the one or more
service strings with a hardware component or hardware component
group on which each identified service, service component, and
operating system executes to create a hardware couple for each
identified service, service component, and operating system;
designating, by the computing device, a total set of hardware
couples comprising the hardware couple created for each allocated
service, service component, and operating system in the one or
more service strings to create respectively one or more server
groups each comprised of at least two servers selected from a web
server; a process server; an enterprise serial bus server; an
application server; and a database server, each server group being
configured to execute the business process;
identifying, by the computing device, common usages of same
or similar service strings used amongst different business processes
and storing the common usages in a storage system; and
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reusing, by the computing device, at least one of the one or
more service strings to create a service string for another business
process that is different from the business process based on the
stored common usages,
wherein the relationship between each server group and the
total set of hardware couples comprising each server group is one-
to-many and the relationship between each service string
and each corresponding server group is one-to-one such that each
service string is directly correlated with a corresponding server
group,
wherein the service components comprise service oriented
architecture (SOA) service components, and
wherein the business process comprises the service oriented
architecture (SOA).

THE REJECTION
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-10, 13-15, 18-23, 26 and 27 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1, 15, 22, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, first
paragraph as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 1, 15, 22, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second
paragraph as being indefinite.
Claim 22 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable
over US Patent No. 7,584,282 B2; Sept. 1, 2009 to Reeves in view of US
Publication No. 2006/0167665 A1; July 27, 2006 to Ata and US Publication
No. 2008/0127047 A1; May 29, 2008 to Zhang.
Claims 1, 4, 5, 7–10, 15, 18, 19, 23, 26, and 27 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. §103 as being unpatentable over Reeves, Ata, Zhang and US
Patent No. 7,069,509 B2; June 27, 2006 to Griffin.
Claims 13, 14, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103 as being
unpatentable over as being unpatentable over Reeves, Griffin, Ata,
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Zhang and US Publication No. 2007/0038501 A1; Feb. 15, 2007 to Lee.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1–16, 18–19, and 22 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. . . . If so, . . . then
ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” .
. . . To answer that question, . . . consider the
elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements “transform the nature of the
claim” into a patent-eligible application. . . . [The
Court] described step two of this analysis as a
search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217-218 (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012))
(citations omitted).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character
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as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” See Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the
focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or
on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36.
In so doing we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a
judicial exception, evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 FR 50, pp 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). The Examiner
determines that the claims are directed to allocation of business processes by
grouping software with hardware. According to the Examiner, a human
could group hardware and software components mentally or on paper. (Final
Act. 2–3). The Examiner also determines that the claims recite steps for
allocating requirements to a business process by storing information and
using rules implemented by strings to create more rules for strings. (Final
Act. 8).
The Specification discloses that service oriented architecture allows
different applications to exchange data with one another as they participate
in a business process. The process of communication may involve simple
data passing or two or more services coordinating some activity. (Spec. ¶ 3).
Services are intrinsically unassociated units of functionality which have no
calls to each other embedded in them but rather protocols are defined which
describe how one or more services can talk to each other. This architecture
then relies on a business process expert to link and sequence services, in a
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process known as orchestration, to meet the new and existing business
system requirement. (Spec. ¶5). In the present invention, programming
instructions are operable to create one or more service strings used to
provide requirements for the business process, wherein each service string
identifies software components used to execute the business process and
operable to create one or more hardware strings for the business process.
(Spec. ¶9). Service strings are used to provide the requirements for the
business process and allocate requirements to the business process. In
addition, programming instructions are operable to create one or more
hardware strings for the business process, where in each hardware string
identifies hardware components used to execute the business process. The
Specification also discloses that the determination of requirements of a
business process may be performed manually by an orchestrator who may
then input the requirements of a business process into the system of the
present invention via a business requirements allocation tool. (Spec. ¶39).
As such, the Specification teaches that the invention is about linking
and sequencing services and hardware. At least a portion of the process is
disclosed as being able to be performed by a human mind. (Spec. ¶39).
Appellant characterizes the invention as “making decisions regarding
allocating requirements in a service oriented architecture (SOA) to all
software and hardware involved in each requirement with groupings which
provide requirements, allocations and traceability for a SOA system.”
(Appeal Br.12). The process of making decisions regarding allocating
requirements in a service oriented architecture involves evaluation and
judgment and therefore is a process that can be done in the human mind.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
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The steps of claim 1 also support this determination by reciting
“assigning . . . a business process identifier to a business process,” and
“allocating . . . requirements to the business process,” “creating . . . one or
more service strings used to provide the requirements for the business
process.” These steps of claim 1 constitute “analyzing information by steps
people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2016); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (claims directed to certain arrangements involving contractual
relations are directed to abstract ideas).
Thus, we find that the claims recite a judicial exception of a concept
that can be performed in the human mind.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to test”, claim 1 merely
requires “a computer infrastructure,” “a computing device,” a “software
tool,” and “sever groups.” These recitations do not impose “a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 53 We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant
directs us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent
claim 1 invoke any inventive programming, require any specialized
computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a
particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other
than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions.
See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic
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computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-
eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the revised Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
In this regard, the recitations do not affect an improvement in the
functioning of a computer or other technology, do not recite a particular
machine or manufacture that is integral to the claims, and do not transform
or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing. Id. Thus, claim 1 is
directed to a judicial exception that does not integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application, and thus, is an “abstract idea.”
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, the claim must include an “inventive
concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice
amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)).
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The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the
analysis at Alice step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea
“while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough
for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological
environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while
adding the words “apply it with a computer”
simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a
computer amounts to a mere instruction to
“implemen[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a
computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the
preemption concern that undergirds our § 101
jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers,
wholly generic computer implementation is not
generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that
provides any “practical assurance that the process
is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Instead, “the relevant question is whether the claims here do more
than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Id. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the functions performed by the
computer, including the server groups and the software tool, at each step of
the process are purely conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, select,
and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to
electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a
computer. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine,
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conventional activities previously known to the trading industry. See Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also In re Katz Interactive Call
Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a
possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and
‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose
computer without special programming”). In short, each step does no more
than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately.
The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer, the software tool, or the server groups themselves. As we
stated above, the claims do not affect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field either. The Specification spells out different
generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept
and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on
the concept of information access under different scenarios. (See, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 22–26, 30, and 32). Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing
significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea of information
access using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents,
that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 13–26; Reply Br. 3–
10) Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims
before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
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have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims are directed to resolving problems in a
technological area similar to the solutions to problems in the technological
area provided in BASCOM Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Brief 10). Appellant argues that the
present claims are clearly a computer related technological area and are
directed to a very specific area of technology i.e., specific hardware
elements selected to implement the service strings. (Brief 10, 12; Reply
Brief 6).
Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, the Federal Circuit did not find
that the claims in BASCOM recited an inventive concept because the claims
recited a specific area of technology. Rather, in BASCOM, the Federal
Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s guidance for determining whether the
claims recite an inventive concept set forth in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank International, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
In Alice, the Supreme Court explained that, under the second step of
the patent-eligibility analysis, the relevant question is whether the claims
here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer at 573 U.S. at 217.
The Supreme Court also provided examples of claims that represent more
than instructions to implement an abstract idea on a generic computer, such
as claims that purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself and
claims that effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.
Id. at 217–18.
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Turning to BASCOM, the Federal Circuit held “[t]he inventive
concept described and claimed in the '606 patent is the installation of a
filtering tool at a specific location, remote from end-users, with
customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” 827 F.3d at 1350.
In determining this feature to be an inventive concept, the Federal Circuit
explained that the remote location of a filtering tool having customizable
user-specific filtering features provides the filtering tool both the benefits of
a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server and
is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering content. Id. at
1350-51. Notably, the Federal Circuit specifically determined that “the
claims may be read to ‘improve[] an existing technological process.”’ Id. at
1351 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358).
There is no improvement to the technology recited in claim 1. As we
found above, the functioning of the computer, the software tool and the
server groups themselves are not improved in the process recited in claim 1.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant arguments that the invention of claim 1 provides an
unconventional solution of problems in SOA systems. (Brief 39). To the
extent Appellant maintains that the limitations of claim 1 necessarily amount
to “significantly more” than an abstract idea because the claimed method is
allegedly unconventional or novel, Appellant misapprehends the controlling
precedent. Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo framework is termed
a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of
novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “‘an element or
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
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itself.”’ Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a
purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at
90.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims cannot be performed in the human
mind because the claims recite a software tool and therefore are not
performed in the human mind. If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental process category
unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). We find that in the instant case, with the exception of the
recitation of a generic computing device and generic servers, there is nothing
in claim 1 that forecloses the method from being performed by the human,
mentally or with pen and paper. See Mortg. Grader, Inc. First Choice Loan
Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In fact, the Specification
even discloses that the invention can be performed by a business process
expert or a human orchestrator (Spec. 5, 39).
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims are related to creation of hardware
server groups that are actual physical hardware servers and not some abstract
business practice or mathematical formula. Claim 1 recites that server
groups are created by “designating, by computing device, a total set of
hardware couples comprising the hardware couple created for each allocated
service, service component, and operating system in one or more service
strings.” We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 merely designates
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hardware and software combinations to perform services. (Ans. 5). There is
no actually creation of hardware recited in claim 1. In keeping with our
findings above, the designation of server groups can be done in the human
mind.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that claim 1 is directed to a solution of a problem
which specifically arises in computer technology analogous to the claims in
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Reply Br. 6–7. In DDR, the Court evaluated the eligibility of claims
“address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to
the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol,
would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after
‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” DDR, 773 F.3d
at 1257. There, the Court found that the claims were patent eligible because
they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to
resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The
Court cautioned, however, “that not all claims purporting to address
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. For example, in
DDR the Court distinguished the patent-eligible claims at issue from
claims found patent-ineligible in Ultramercial. See DDR, 773 at 1258–
59 (citing Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 7 0 9 , 715–16 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). As
noted there, the Ultramercial claims were “directed to a specific method of
advertising and content distribution that was previously unknown and
never employed on the Internet before.” Id. at 1258 (quoting
Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16). Nevertheless, those claims were
patent ineligible because they “merely recite[d] the abstract idea of
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‘offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement,’ along
with ‘routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a
request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and
use of the Internet.’” Id.
Appellant’s asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible in
Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR. The
ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited “providing [a] media product for
sale at an Internet website;” “restricting general public access to said
media product;” “receiving from the consumer a request to view [a]
sponsor message;” and “if the sponsor message is an interactive message,
presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer
access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one
query.” Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellant’s asserted
claims recite receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data. This
is precisely the type of Internet activity found ineligible in Ultramercial.
As such, we agree with the Examiner that determining which resources are
needed or required to perform business services is not a process that is
inherently rooted in computer technology. (Ans. 6).
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain this rejection of claim 1. We
will also sustain the rejection as it is directed to the remaining claims
because the Appellant does not argue the separate eligibility of these claims.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. §112, FIRST PARAGRAPH
The Examiner rejected the claims as lacking written description
support because the phrase “server groups” is not found in the Specification.
(Final Act. 10).
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The test for written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
“is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys
to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed
subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). “[T]he written description
requirement does not demand either examples or an actual reduction to
practice; a constructive reduction to practice that in a definite way identifies
the claimed invention can satisfy the written description requirement.” Id. at
1352. Instead, we evaluate the adequacy of written description in view of
the “the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of
the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, [and] the
predictability of the aspect at issue.” Id. at 1351.
We will not sustain this rejection because we agree with the Appellant
that Figure 4 and paragraph 52 of the Specification describe a group of
hardware strings that comprise a group of servers, i.e., a web server, a
process server, an enterprise serial bus server, an application server and a
database server. As the Specification discloses that a hardware string
comprises a group of servers, we find that the Specification provides support
for the claimed “server group.” In addition, claim 1 also confirms this
finding by reciting that the server group comprises a web server, a process
server, an enterprise serial bus server, an application server and a database
server, to carry out the SOA business process recited in claim 1.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. §112, SECOND PARAGRAPH
The Examiner finds that it is unclear what constitutes a “server group”
and how one would create a “server group.” We agree with the Appellant
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that in view of the disclosure in the Specification discussed in our analysis of
the rejection under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, the
disclosure at paragraph 62 along with the recitations of claim 1 clearly
disclose that the server groups are created by designating hardware couples
in one or more service strings. As such, we will not sustain this rejection.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. §103(a)
We will not sustain this rejection because we agree with the Appellant
that the prior art does not disclose “designating. . . hardware couples . . . to
create . . . one or more server groups,” as recited in claim 1. The Examiner
relies on column 5, lines 23–38 of Reeves for teaching this subject matter.
(Final Act. 18–19). Column 5, lines 23–38 of Reeves discloses that a
directory service is created by grouping map objects and managed elements
according to their logical and/or physical relationships. A first office may
contain several servers, SANs, racks, and/or switches and the directory
service maps the hardware and software elements. While this disclosure
does discuss several servers, there is no disclosure that these servers form a
“server group,” and certainly no disclosure that hardware couples in one or
more service strings are designated to create one or more server groups.
We will likewise not sustain this rejection as it is directed to the
remaining claims because each of the remaining claims includes this subject
matter we have found missing in Reeves.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting the appealed claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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We conclude that the Examiner did err in rejecting the appealed
claims under 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph and second paragraph, and
under 35 U.S.C. §103(a).

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 4, 5, 7–10, 13–15,
18–23, 26, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. §101 is affirmed.
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 15, 22, and 23 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph is not affirmed.
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 15, 22, and 23 under
35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph is not affirmed.
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) is not affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED