Jose R. Paulino et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 23, 2019

14812668 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/812,668 07/29/2015 Jose R. Paulino 67097-3011PUS1;77777US02 3612
54549 7590 09/23/2019
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS/PRATT & WHITNEY
400 West Maple Road
Suite 350
Birmingham, MI 48009
EXAMINER
PRAGER, JESSE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3745
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/23/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOSE R. PAULINO and CHRISTOPHER W. STROCK
Appeal 2019-000438
Application 14/812,668
Technology Center 3700
Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, LEE L. STEPINA, and
ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 United Technologies
Corporation, appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 and 3–
23. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as United
Technologies Corporation. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2019-000438
Application 14/812,668

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a ceramic coating system and method.
Claims 1, 13, and 19 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with
emphasis added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A gas turbine engine article comprising:
a substrate;
a bond coating covering at least a portion of the substrate
with a step extending to opposing circumferential sides of the
article and formed in the bond coating; and
a thermally insulating topcoat disposed on the bond
coating, the thermally insulating topcoat includes a first topcoat
portion separated by at least one fault extending through the
thermally insulating topcoat from a second topcoat portion.
Appeal Br. 9 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Strangman
Skelly
US 4,764,089
US 6,503,574 B1
Aug. 16, 1988
Jan. 7, 2003
Subramanian US 2016/0369637 A1 Dec. 22, 2016

REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 3, 4, 8–10, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(l) as anticipated by Skelly. Final Act. 3.
II. Claims 1, 3, 4, 8–10, 12–17, 19, and 23 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(l) as anticipated by Strangman. Final Act. 5.
III. Claims 5–7, 18, and 20–22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Strangman. Final Act. 8.
IV. Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Strangman and Subramanian. Final Act. 10.
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OPINION
Rejection I, Skelly
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8–10
The Examiner finds that Skelly discloses all of the elements recited in
claim 1, relying on crack 48 as a disclosure of at least one fault that extends
through a thermally insulating topcoat and separates the topcoat into first
and second topcoat portions. Final Act. 3–4.
Appellant contends that crack 48 of Skelly does not qualify as the
recited fault because “crack 48 does not separate portions of the thermal
barrier coating 44.” Appeal Br. 4.
In response, the Examiner takes the position that “a first topcoat
portion can be defined on the left of the crack 48 and a second portion of the
topcoat on the right of the crack 48.” Ans. 2. Thus, the Examiner finds that
crack 48 of Skelly is located between left and right-hand portions of coating
44. The Examiner also finds that the presence irregular ceramic structure 46
of Skelly, shown in Figure 2 on right-hand and left-hand sides of crack 48,
makes crack 48 “between” two portions of coating 44. Id.
In reply, Appellant states that, rather than extending through coating
44 of Skelly, crack 48 is between coating 44 and bond coat 34. Reply Br. 2.
According to Appellant, the Examiner’s findings regarding irregular ceramic
structure 46 of Skelly “does not resolve the fact that Skelly does not disclose
the crack 48 extending into the thermal barrier coating 44 but [is instead]
between the bond coat 34 and the thermal barrier coating 44.” Id. at 3.
Appellant reiterates “Skelly fails to disclose ‘at least one fault extending
through the thermally insulating topcoat’ because the crack 48 is located
between the bond coat 34 and the thermal barrier 44 such that the crack 48
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does not extend through or separate portions of the thermal barrier coating
44.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Although we appreciate the Examiner’s position that crack 48 is
located between portions of material that make up coating 44 (and irregular
ceramic structure 46), we do not agree that crack 48 extends through either
coating 44 or irregular ceramic structure 46. Rather, we agree with
Appellant that crack 48 appears only on the edge of coating 44 and separates
coating 44 from bond coat 34. Skelly 7:13–17 (“If, during service, a crack
48 forms in the region between the bond coat 34 and the thermal barrier
coating 44, the crack 48 can propagate only to the extent of one pitch D
between the grooves 40 before encountering an interface that impedes the
propagation of the crack.”). Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of
claims 1, 3, 4, and 8–10 as anticipated by Skelly.
Claim 19
Claim 19 requires “faults that extend from the step through the
thermally insulating topcoat to separate a first topcoat portion from a second
topcoat portion.” Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). The Examiner relies on the
same insufficiently supported findings regarding crack 48 of Skelly as those
discussed above regarding claim 1. See Final Act. 4–5. Accordingly, we do
not sustain the rejection of claim 19 as anticipated by Skelly.

Rejection II, Strangman
Claims 1, 13, and 19 each require a step that extends to opposing
circumferential sides of the claimed article. Appeal Br. (Claims App.). The
Examiner finds Strangman discloses “a bond coating (8) covering at least a
portion of the substrate (Fig. 4) with a step (3) extending to opposing
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circumferential sides of the article (Fig. 2, 2B) and formed [in] the bond
coating (bond coat, Fig. 4).” Final Act. 5 (underlining omitted, emphasis
added).
Appellant contends that Strangman fails to disclose the claimed step
because Strangman instead discloses a series of steps 3, each bounded by
grooves 14 and edges 4.2 Appeal Br. 5. Appellant refers to Figures 2 and
2B of Strangman as support for this argument, and we reproduce these
figures below.

Figure 2 of Strangman is an enlarged perspective view of a shroud
substrate that has a pattern of slant-steps 3 and longitudinal isolation grooves

2 Appellant also argues that Strangman does not disclose the claimed
“circumferential sides.” Based on the result of our discussion below, we do
not reach this issue.
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14 in its inner surface, and Figure 2B is a section view taken along lines 2B-
2B in Figure 2.
In response, the Examiner further states, “the broadest reasonable
interpretation of a step includes that a row of slant-steps (3) with grooves
(14),” and “[t]he claim does not positively recite that the step has an
uninterrupted surface, and [the] specification (see pars. 13, 20, 27) does not
set forth that the step cannot have grooves in it.” Ans. 4.
In reply, Appellant reiterates that Strangman discloses that each slant-
step 3 is bounded by grooves 14 and edges 4, and, therefore, none of slant-
steps 3 can extend to opposing circumferential sides of the article. Reply Br.
5 (citing Strangman 4:6–14).3
Appellant has the better position. We do not agree that the broadest
reasonable interpretation of the term “step” in claim 1 includes a series of
slant-steps 3 as disclosed by Strangman.4 Appellant’s Figure 3 depicts a
single vertical “step” 86, which, in Figure 3, extends inward and outward
from the page. As this figure is taken in cross-section, what it depicts does
not preclude the existence of interruptions in step 86. However, Appellant’s
Specification states, “[t]he step 86 extends in a radial and circumferential
direction such that multiple BOAS systems 62 arranged together form a
circumference around the axis A of the gas turbine engine 20 with the step
86 extending entirely around the circumference.” Spec. ¶ 45. We

3 Appellant also notes that Figures 2 and 2B of Strangman do not depict the
bond coating, which is the structure in which the claims require the recited
step to be located. Thus, any steps shown in Figures 2 and 2B are not in the
bond coating. Reply Br. 5.
4 Strangman describes the pertinent structure in Figures 2 and 2B as “a grid
of slant-steps 3.” Strangman 4:3–5.
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understand this statement to imply that step 86 is uninterrupted because the
result of connecting multiple steps 86 is a step extending entirely around the
axis of the gas turbine. With respect to the Examiner’s position on page 4 of
the Answer, ending claim construction with the finding that “[t]he claim
does not positively recite that the step has an uninterrupted surface, and
specification (see pars. 13, 20, 27) does not set forth that the step cannot
have grooves in it,” results, on this record, in an unreasonably broad
construction of the claims. Our reviewing court has addressed this type of
claim construction, stating:
The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable
interpretation in light of the specification is not whether the
specification proscribes or precludes some broad reading of the
claim term adopted by the examiner. And it is not simply an
interpretation that is not inconsistent with the specification. It is
an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the
inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an
interpretation that is “consistent with the specification.”
In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In
re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In any event, grooves 14
do more than merely “interrupt” steps 3. Rather, as shown in Figure 2B of
Strangman, grooves 14 extend the entire height of steps 3. In light of the
Specification, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “step” in
claim 1, consistent with the Specification, does not allow for the inclusion of
grooves, in the step, such as grooves 145 of Strangman. Accordingly, we do

5 Depending on the location of the “circumferential sides,” the pertinent
interruption may be vertical edges 4 rather than grooves 14. See Appeal Br.
5–6; Reply Br. 4–5 (Appellant’s argument regarding whether Strangman
depicts circumferential sides as claimed).
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not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 13, and 19 and associated
dependent claims 3, 4, 8–10, 12, 14–17, and 23 as anticipated by Strangman.

Rejections III and IV, Strangman and Subramanian
Rejections III and IV rely on the same unreasonably broad
interpretation of the term “step” as discussed above regarding Rejection II.
See Final Act. 8–11. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above
regarding Rejection II, we do not sustain Rejections III and IV.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections are reversed. More specifically,
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 8–
10, and 19
§ 102; Skelly  All
1, 3, 4, 8–
10, 12–17,
19, and 23
§ 102; Strangman  All
5–7, 18, and
20–22
§ 103; Strangman All
11 § 103; Strangman,
Subramanian
All
REVERSED