0120121306
06-19-2012
Jorge E. Villalonza, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.
Jorge E. Villalonza,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southeast Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120121306
Agency No. 4H-330-0218-11
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final decision (FAD) by the Agency dated December 13, 2011, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's decision.
BACKGROUND
Complainant worked as a City Carrier at the Agency's Coconut Grove facility in Miami, Florida.
On May 18, 2011, Complainant and the Agency entered into a settlement agreement to resolve all grievances and the EEO allegations set forth in the above-referenced Agency complaint number. The settlement agreement (Agreement) provided, in pertinent part, that:
(2) The Agency will pay "Compensation of 46 full days of 8 hours pay (back pay)," and the Agency agreed that
(3) "All benefits will be reinstated in full."
Complainant asserts that the Agency breached the Agreement paragraph 3 when: 1) the Agency did not properly adjust his leave-without-pay balance to a zero balance; 2) the Agency denied him 24 hours of annual leave and 12 hours sick leave; and 3) the Agency did not timely provide his monetary relief. Complainant seeks an award of "a 10% penalty for USPS failure to comply with the monetary settlement in a timely manner."
As further background, the record shows that the Agency paid Complainant 368 hours of back pay on September 30, 2011. Complainant does not appear to be disputing the back pay award.
Complainant claims that the Agency still owes him for leave to which he is entitled. The record include paystubs for the pay period 20 11 and 26 11. The record shows that he accrued 136 hours of annual leave as of pay period 20 11. By pay period 26 11, his earned annual leave balance had increased to 184.
Similarly, he earned 68 hours of sick leave as of pay period 20 11. The pay stub for 26 11 showed that he earned 92 hours. The record reflected that his leave balance was credited with the hours which he earned.
The record also shows that the policy of the Agency is that an employee is not entitled to accrue benefits while in a Leave-Without-Pay (LWOP) status. Complainant concedes that he was in a LWOP status. The leave without pay balance was 227.39 for both periods.
In its December 13, 2011 FAD, the Agency concluded that there was no breach. The Agency concluded that it had fully compensated Complainant to the extent required by the Agreement. The Agency found that Complainant had been credited with all of the applicable benefits, including full leave benefits, to which he was entitled under the Agreement.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant argues that the Agency did not properly process the Agreement in a timely manner. Complainant also maintains that the Postmaster gave him verbal assurances that the 227.39 hours that were showing on his paystubs as LWOP would not be resolved.
ANALYSIS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
We find that the Agreement was valid and binding and was knowingly entered by both parties. We further find that the expressed wording of the Agreement simply states that all benefits would be reinstated in full.
In the instant case, the Agreement did not specify any action with regard to Complainant's LWOP balance. Assuming that adjusting the LWOP calculation is one of the encompassed "full benefits," we find that Complainant has not shown that the Agency violated the Agreement when it did not automatically reduce the LWOP balance to zero.
Moreover, Complainant appears to be challenging the Agency's calculation of payroll earnings, particularly those earned subsequent to the Agreement at issue. To the extent that Complainant is raising new issues or claims of retaliation that were not covered by the terms of the Agreement or the existing complaint referenced above, he would need to timely bring those maters to the attention of an EEO counselor. In this case, however, we find that the Agency did not breach the wording of the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's decision, finding no breach.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tends to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 19, 2012
__________________
Date
2
0120121306
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120121306