Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 29, 1943

52 N.L.R.B. 975 (N.L.R.B. 1943)

I
In the Matter of JONES & LAuGFILIN STEEL CORPORATION and UNITED
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO
Case No. 6-R470.-Decided September 29, 1943
Mr. Craig Carnes , for the Board.
Mr. 'James C. Beech , of Pittsburgh , Pa., for the Company.
Mr. Frank Burke, and Mr. Philip M. Curran, of Pittsburgh, Pa.,
for the Union.
Miss Melvern R. Krelow , of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
DIRECTION OF ELECTION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon petition duly filed by United Steelworkers of America, CIO,
herein called the Union, alleging that a question affecting commerce
had arisen concerning the representation of employees of Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, herein called
the Company, the National Labor Relations Board provided for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice before Robert H. Kleeb, Trial
Examiner. Said hearing was held at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on
August 31, 1943. The Company and the Union appeared, partici-
pated, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on' the
issues . The Company made a motion to dismiss the petition on the
grounds that (1) plant-protection employees are not employees within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act; (2) the unit peti-
tioned for is inappropriate; (3) the Union is the same organization
as is now the sole bargaining agent for the Company's production
and maintenance employees; and (4) the present collective bargain-
ing agreement between the Company and the Union excludes plant-
protection employees. The Trial Examiner reserved ruling. For
reasons appearing below, this motion is denied. The Trial Exam-
iner's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error
and are hereby affirmed. All parties were afforded opportunity to
file briefs with the Board.
52 N. L. R. B., No. 169.
975
976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On September 7, 1943, the Company requested oral argument before
the Board. For reasons hereinafter set forth, the request is hereby
denied.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation is a Pennsylvania corporation
engaged in the manufacture and sale of steel and steel products. The
Company operates plants in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania, and Cleveland, Ohio. This proceeding involves only
the Company's Pittsburgh Works. During the past 12 months, the
Company used at its Pittsburgh Works approximately 8,000,000 tons
of raw materials, of which 50 percent was shipped to the Pittsburgh
Works from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
During the same period, the Company manufactured at its Pittsburgh
Works approximately 2,000,000 tons of steel, of which approximately
75 percent was shipped to points outside the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
The Company admits, for the purpose of this proceeding only, that
it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America is a labor organization affiliated
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations admitting to member-
ship employees of the Company.
III. THE QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION
On or about July 12, 1943, the Union requested recognition as the
bargaining representative of the Company's plant-protection em-
ployees. The Company refused to recognized the Union.
Under a contract dated December 2, 1942, the Union represents all
production and maintenance employees of the Company, and the
employees in the unit proposed herein are specifically excluded from
the benefits of the above-mentioned contract. As heretofore stated,
the Company moved to dismiss the petition on the ground, inter alia,
that the present collective bargaining agreement between the Com-
pany and the Union excludes plant-protection employees. The
Union, however, does not intend to merge the plant-protection em-
ployees with the unit for which it has already been recognized as the
exclusive bargaining agent, but intends to bargain for them as a
separate unit. We have, on several occasions heretofore, permitted
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION 977
the same labor organization to bargain for the production and main-
tenance employees and the plant-protection employees in separate
units.'
A statement of the Regional Director, introduced in evidence at
the hearing, indicates that the Union represents a substantial number
of employees in the unit hereinafter found to be appropriate 2
We find that a question affecting commerce has arisen concerning
the representation of employees of the Company within the meaning
of Section 9 (c) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT
The Union contends that a unit consisting of all plant-protection
employees at the Company's Pittsburgh Works, including corporals,
but excluding lieutenants, sergeants, clerks, and all other employees,
constitute an appropriate unit. The Company, without disputing the
scope of the unit, except insofar as it includes corporals, contends that
such a unit is not an appropriate one; that plant-protection employees
are not employees within the meaning of the Act; and that its plant-
protection employees, who are all auxiliaries of the military police,
should not be represented by the Union, which represents the Com-
pany's production and maintenance employees. These contentions
have been advanced in other cases and have been found untenable.3
More recently in the Dravo Corporation case 4 the Board has discussed
these contentions fully, especially with respect to whether the mili-
tarization of guards alters the character of their employment, and
whether such militarized guards should be precluded from represen-
tation by an organization already representing the Company's pro-
duction and maintenance employees. The Board there stated
... It cannot seriously be contended at this time that guards
who al'e sworn into temporary membership in the armed services
lose thereby any of the benefits of the Act . . . We cannot regard
the induction of the guards into the Coast Guard Reserve as a
meaningless act, since it does indicate that such persons from the
nature of their oaths then owe allegiance directly to the Govern-
ment, as well as to the corporation. The services do not contend,
1 Matter of Chrysler Corporation, Highland Park Plant, 44 N. L. R. B. 881 ; Matter of
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation , Otis Works , 49 N. L. R B. 390
2 The Regional Director reported that the Union presented 59 membership cards bearing
apparently genuine signatures , 54 of which are dated between May and July 1943, 5
undated . Of the 59 cards submitted, 55 bear the names of persons whose names appear
on the Company 's pay roll of July 28, 1943 . Said pay roll contains the names of 105
employees in the unit.
3 Matter of Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp, 41 N. L. R. B . 973; Matter of Chrysler
Corporation, Highland Park Plant, supra; Matter of Federal Motor Truck Company,
50 N. L R. B 214; and Matter of The Maryland Dry Dock Company, 50 N. L. R. B. 363.
4 Matter of Dravo Corporation , 52 N. L. R. B. 322. .
978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
however, that such persons thereby become Government em-
ployees and are therefore outside the provisions of the Act. Nor
would the facts in this case support such a contention, for it is
clear that the wages and duties of this group of personnel re-
mained unchanged after their induction so that it is apparent that
the proximate relationship of employer and employee still exists
between the Company and the guards.
We therefore feel constrained to hold that the guards, as well
as other employees, are free to select their own bargaining repre-
sentatives under the Act.
No facts or arguments are presented here which would warrant de-
parting from our prior decisions; accordingly, the Company's, con-
tentions are rejected.
As stated above, the Union desires the inclusion of corporals, and it
appears that the Company desires their exclusion on the ground that
the corporals possess the same amount of supervisory authority as do
the sergeants whom the Union would exclude. The Company employs
seven corporals and seven sergeants, two on each shift, and the sev-
enth as relief alternate. Up to the spring of 1942, there were no classi-
fications of corporals on the Company's pay roll. In March or April
1942, the Company appointed corporals to augment the staff of ser-
geants so that the various guard posts could be checked more fre-
quently. The corporals and sergeants spend practically all of their
time in the plant visiting the various posts and instructing the new
guards in their duties. When the sergeants and the corporals are on
the same "turn," the corporals work directly under the sergeants' su-
pervision. When the sergeant is absent, the corporal will act as
sergeant, and have charge of the "turn." In contrast to the guards,
who are paid on an hourly basis, both the sergeants and the corporals
are paid on a salary basis, and receive higher compensation., Although
the sergeants and the corporals do not have the authority to hire or
discharge, or promote or demote, they have supervision over the
guards, and have authority to discipline them for any misconduct or
breach of duties. Since the corporals generally have the same duties
and disciplinary authority affecting the status of guards as those of
the sergeants, we conclude that corporals are supervisory employees
and we shall exclude them from the unit.
We find that all plant-protection employees of the Company at its
Pittsburgh Works, excluding lieutenants, sergeants, corporals, and all
other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, dis-
charge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of em-
ployees, or effectively recommend such action, clerks, and all other
employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION
V. THE DETERMINATION OF REPRESENTATIVES
979
We shall direct that the question concerning representation which
has arisen be resolved by an election by secret ballot among the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit who were employed during the pay-
roll period immediately preceding the date of our Direction of Elec-
tion, subject to the limitations and additions set forth therein.'
DIRECTION OF ELECTION
By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the National Labor
Relations Board by section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
.and pursuant to Article III, Section 9, of National Labor Relations
Board Rules and Regulations-Series 2, as amended, it is hereby
DIRECTED that, as part of the investigation to ascertain representa.
tives for the purposes of collective bargaining with Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, an election by secret
ballot shall be conducted as early as possible, but not later than thirty
(30) days from the date of this Direction, under the direction and
supervision of the Regional Director for the Sixth Region, acting in
this matter as agent for the National Labor Relations Board, and sub-
ject to Article III, Sections 10 and 11, of said Rules and Regulations
,among the employees in the unit found appropriate in Section IV,
above, who were employed during the pay-roll period immediately
preceding the date of this Direction, including employees who did not
work during said pay-roll period because they were ill or on vacation
or temporarily laid off, and including employees in the armed forces
of the United States who present themselves in person at the polls,
but excluding those employees who have since quit or been discharged
for cause, to determine whether or not they desire to be represented by
United Steelworkers of America, CIO, for the purposes of collective
bargaining.
5 The Union has waived the right to object to any election ordered herein on the basis
of charges filed in Case No . 6-C-835.
549875-44-voi. 52-63