John Hegeman et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 5, 2019

13171101 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 5, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/171,101 06/28/2011 John Hegeman 26295-18560 4954
87851 7590 12/05/2019
Facebook/Fenwick
Silicon Valley Center
801 California Street
Mountain View, CA 94041
EXAMINER
LI, SUN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3681
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/05/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
fwfacebookpatents@fenwick.com
ptoc@fenwick.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JOHN HEGEMAN and RONG YAN
____________

Appeal 2018-005281
Application 13/171,101
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed February 13, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed April 24, 2018),
and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed March 20, 2018) and Final
Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed August 14, 2017). Appellant identifies
the real party in interest as Facebook, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention “relates to selecting and presenting
advertisements to users in an online service” and, more particularly, to
“selecting and presenting advertisements to users in an online service based
on cost modifiers normalized based on the market value of the
advertisements or users” (Spec. ¶ 2).
Claims 1, 12, and 20 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
[(a)] receiving a plurality of advertisements, each
advertisement associated with a bid price;
[(b)] receiving feedback from a group of users
representing a level of interest explicitly indicated by the group
of users for each of at least a subset of the advertisements;
[(c)] for each of at least the subset of the advertisements;
[(c1)] computing an expected revenue value for
presenting the advertisement to a particular user based on
the bid price;
[(c2)] identifying, from the received feedback,
feedback provided for the advertisement by users having
social relationships with the particular user through a
social networking service[;]
[(c3)] computing a modifier value based on the
identified feedback;
[(c4)] normalizing, by a computer, the modifier
value for the advertisement based on a market value
associated with a characteristic of the particular user; and
[(c5)] computing a total value for the advertisement
based on the expected revenue value and the normalized
modifier value;
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[(d)] selecting one or more advertisements for
presentation to the particular user from the plurality of
advertisements based at least in part on the total values of the
advertisements; and
[(e)] sending the selected one or more advertisements for
display to the particular user.
REJECTION
Claims 1–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues claims 1–21 as a group (Appeal Br. 5–15). We
select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or
fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
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ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner
determined that the claims are directed to “obtaining/collecting bid and
feedback information, analyzing feedback information, processing [the
feedback] information, . . . selecting [an] . . . advertisement based on the
analysis, and sending the selected advertisement” (i.e., to an abstract idea not
meaningfully different from the abstract idea identified in Electric Power
Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), and that
the claims also involve “‘organizing information through mathematical
correlations,’ which was identified by the court[ ] as an abstract idea in
Digitech Image Tech., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2014)” (Final Act. 19–22). The Examiner also determined that the
claims do not include additional elements or a combination of elements
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception (id.
at 23–26).
After Appellant’s briefs were filed, and the Examiner’s Answer
mailed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published
revised guidance for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER
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ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019
Revised Guidance”). That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination
procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by
(1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract
idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception
if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that
exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised Guidance, by its terms, applies to all
applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on,
or after January 7, 2019. Id.2
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)
The first step in the Mayo/Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to
determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible
concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step,
as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test;
in Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas:
(1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human
activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or
legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance,

2 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04(II) and also supersedes all versions of the
USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.”
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related
guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly,
Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s
rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on
currently superseded USPTO guidance.
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84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next consider whether the claim includes
additional elements, beyond the judicial exception, that “integrate the
[judicial] exception into a practical application,” i.e., that apply, rely on, or
use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). Id. at 54–55.
Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is
“directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner
erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal
Br. 6–12). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including
the claim language) that the claims focus on an abstract idea, and not on any
improvement to technology and/or a technical field.
The Specification is entitled “USER FEEDBACK-BASED
SELECTION OF ONLINE ADVERTISEMENTS USING NORMALIZED
COST MODIFIERS,” and states that the disclosure relates to “selecting and
presenting advertisements to users in an online service” (Spec. ¶ 2). The
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Specification describes, in the Background section, that online services, such
as social networking services, search engines, news aggregators, Internet
shopping services, and content delivery services, have become a popular
venue for presenting advertisements to prospective buyers (Spec. ¶ 3).
Some online services provide their services free of charge or charge only
minimal fees (id.); other online services adopt a bidding system that requires
multiple advertisers to compete for advertisement space (id. ¶ 5). The
Specification describes that attractive content items tend to increase user
traffic and increase the overall advertisement fees collected by the online
services; therefore, online services strive to provide more interesting and
attractive content items to their users (id. ¶ 6). Recognizing that the number
and content of the advertisements may diminish the attractiveness of the
content items, the Specification describes that, in order to increase the
relevance of the advertisements, some online services analyze information
about users and their activities (e.g., search terms used) to target
advertisements to those users; these online services, thus, estimate or predict
the current context of a user’s Internet usage based on user input or user
characteristics, and target advertisements most likely to be of interest to the
user (id. ¶ 7).
The present invention is ostensibly intended to provide an improved
method and system for selecting advertisements for presentation to a user of
an online service. The Specification, thus, describes that the online service
selects one or more advertisements from a pool of advertisements based on
feedback about the advertisements received from a group of users who have
previously viewed the advertisements (id. ¶ 8). “In this way, the online
service can take into account not only the expected revenue that it will
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receive from presenting an advertisement to a user, but also the value to the
online service of presenting content to its users that is interesting and that
creates a positive experience for the users” (id.).
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites a method comprising:
(1) “receiving a plurality of advertisements, each advertisement associated
with a bid price” (step (a)); (2) receiving feedback about at least a subset of
the advertisements from users who have viewed the advertisements, i.e.,
“receiving feedback from a group of users representing a level of interest
explicitly indicated by the group of users for each of at least a subset of the
advertisements” (step (b)); (3) computing, for each advertisement in the
subset, a total value of the advertisement based on the expected revenue
value of presenting the advertisement to a particular user and the feedback
received for the advertisement, i.e.,
for each of at least the subset of the advertisements;
computing an expected revenue value for presenting
the advertisement to a particular user based on the bid
price;
identifying, from the received feedback, feedback
provided for the advertisement by users having social
relationships with the particular user through a social
networking service[;]
computing a modifier value based on the identified
feedback;
normalizing, by a computer, the modifier value for
the advertisement based on a market value associated with
a characteristic of the particular user; and
computing a total value for the advertisement based
on the expected revenue value and the normalized
modifier value
(steps (c) and (c1)–(c5)); and (4) selecting one or more advertisements based
on the total value of the advertisements and presenting the selected
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advertisement(s) to the user, i.e., “selecting one or more advertisements for
presentation to the particular user from the plurality of advertisements based
at least in part on the total values of the advertisements” and “sending the
selected one or more advertisements for display to the particular user”
(limitations (d) and (e)). These limitations, when given their broadest
reasonable interpretation, recite (1) collecting information, i.e., a plurality of
advertisements and feedback regarding at least a subset of the
advertisements; (2) analyzing the information, i.e., determining a total value
for each of the advertisements in the subset; and (3) displaying the results of
the collection and analysis, i.e., selecting one or more advertisements based
on the total values of the advertisements and displaying the selected
advertisements to a user — i.e., targeted advertising, which a method of
organizing human activity, and, therefore, an abstract idea. See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The Federal Circuit has held similar concepts abstract. For example,
in Bridge and Post, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 778 F. App’x 882,
885 (Fed. Cir. 2019), the Federal Circuit held that abstract ideas include
tracking a user’s computer network activity and using information gained
about the user to deliver targeted media, such as advertisements. See also,
e.g., Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (customizing a user interface to have targeted advertising
based on user information); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank
(USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tailoring information
presented to a user based on particular information); Morsa v. Facebook,
Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 622 F. App’x 915
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(Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that targeting advertisements to certain
consumers is no more than an abstract idea).
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claim
recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two).
The only additional element in claim 1, beyond the abstract idea, is a
computer for implementing the claimed method — an element that is
disclosed in the Specification at a high degree of generality, i.e., as
comprising a collection of generic components (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 38–41,
43, 45, 48, and 50). We find no indication in the Specification, nor does
Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 1
invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized
computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a
particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other
than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions.
See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic
computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-
eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an
improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed
invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the
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abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the 2019
Revised Guidance.3
Appellant argues that the claims go beyond the collection, analysis,
and display of information present in Electric Power, and “describe a new
source or type of information (e.g., identified feedback from other users
having a social relationship with a particular user in a social networking
system) and new techniques (e.g., computing modifier value based on
identified feedback) for analyzing it (e.g., selection of an advertisement for a
particular user)” (Appeal Br. 7–8). Yet, the law is clear that limiting the
collection and analysis of information to particular content does not make
the collection and analysis any less abstract. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“As many cases make clear,
even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to
particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the
collection and analysis other than abstract.” (quoting Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (citing cases)).
That the techniques of analyzing the information may be “new” also is
insufficient, without more, to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does
not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.

3 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or
combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract
idea, into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the
claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception.
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Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013); see also Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps
in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.”).
It also is not controlling that the claims do not preempt any and all
ways of selecting advertisements (Appeal Br. 8–10; see also id. at 12).
Although the Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives [the
exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter] as one of pre-
emption,” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216, characterizing preemption as a
driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing
preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has
made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial
exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption
are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice Corp.,
573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter,
[but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” Id.
That claim 1 requires a computer is, moreover, not a persuasive
reason to argue that the claim is not directed to an abstract idea (Appeal
Br. 10–11). Although “a method that can be performed by human thought
alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101,”
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2011), it does not automatically follow that methods requiring physical
components — i.e., methods that arguably cannot be performed entirely in
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the human mind — are, therefore, not directed to abstract ideas. Indeed, an
argument, substantially similar to Appellant’s, was expressly rejected by the
Court in Alice. Thus, although the claimed invention in Alice involved a
computer system acting as a third-party intermediary between two parties:
“As stipulated, the claimed method requires the use of a computer to create
electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous
instructions; in other words, ‘[t]he computer is itself the intermediary,”’
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 224, the Court held that “the claims at issue amount
to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the abstract idea
of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer.” Id.
at 225–26. See also In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607,
611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible
components escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”).
Responding to the Examiner’s Answer, Appellant asserts in the Reply
Brief that the present claims are similar to the claims at issue in Finjan, Inc.
v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and are not
directed to an abstract idea because the claims utilize “a new type of
information (the identified feedback based on connections of the particular
user)” in selecting advertisements for a particular user and, thus, enable an
online system “to do things it could not do before (select advertisements
more likely to enhance user experience instead of simply to increase the
advertisement revenue collected by an online service provider)” (Reply
Br. 8). Yet, we can find no parallel between claim 1 and the claims at issue
in Finjan.
In Finjan, the court determined that the claims were directed to a non-
abstract improvement in computer functionality (rather than the abstract idea
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of computer security), and employed “a new kind of file that enable[d] a
computer security system to do things it could not do before,” namely, tailor
access for different users and identify threats before a file reaches a user’s
computer. Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305. Claim 1, on the other hand, uses
generic computer components and generic computer functionality to analyze
feedback data and select those advertisements most likely to be of interest to
a particular user. As such, claim 1 falls within the familiar class of claims
that do not “focus . . . on . . . an improvement in computers as tools, but on
certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.” Elec.
Power, 830 F.3d at 1354.
We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the
additional elements recited in the claim are no more than generic
components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they
do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice
Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is
not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical
assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
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that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements
amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Addressing step two of the Mayo/Alice framework, Appellant
attempts to draw an analogy between the pending claims and the claim at
issue in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016), arguing that the pending claims are patent eligible because
the claimed invention is “an improvement on relevant technology” (Appeal
Br. 13). Appellant asserts that “[t]he claimed invention improves on the
relevant technology by providing advertisements to users that will also be of
interest to the users by ‘accounting for both the direct monetary value to the
online service as well as the indirect value to the online service of a positive
user experience for its users’” (id. at 14 (citing Spec. 3–4); see also Reply
Br. 7–8). But, we fail to see how, and Appellant does not explain how,
providing advertisements to users that will be of interest to those users
amounts to a technological improvement as opposed to an improvement in a
business practice.
It clearly appears from the Specification that the problem the claimed
invention addresses is one prompted by a desire to avoid the degradation of
the user experience, decrease in user traffic, and ultimately the decrease in
revenue collected by the online service provider that may occur when
advertisements are presented to users based solely on maximizing the
advertisement fees collected by the online service provider, i.e., by selecting
advertisements having a higher bidding price, without regard to whether the
advertisements will be of interest to users. This is not a technical problem;
instead, it is a business concern. And the purported solution here of
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selecting advertisements for presentation to a particular user based on
feedback about the advertisements received from other users, who have
viewed the advertisements and have social relationships with the targeted
user through a social networking service, is a business, not a technical,
solution. As described above, we find no indication of record that the
operations recited in claim 1 invoke any assertedly inventive programming,
require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer
components, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than
generic computer components to perform generic computer functions.
In McRO, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim, when
considered as a whole, is directed to a “technological improvement over the
existing, manual 3–D animation techniques” and uses “limited rules in a
process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in
conventional industry practice.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316. Specifically, the
Federal Circuit found that the claimed rules allow computers to produce
accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated
characters that previously could only be produced by human animators; and
the rules are limiting because they define morph weight sets as a function of
phoneme sub-sequences. Id. at 1313.
Appellant has not identified any analogous improvement here that is
attributable to the claimed invention. Although presenting advertisements
that are relevant and will be of interest to a user may improve a business
process, it does not achieve an improved technological result.
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
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sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2–21, which fall with
claim 1.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)
/Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–21 101 Eligibility 1–21
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED