John E. Boyer et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 3, 2019

12046914 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/046,914 03/12/2008 John E. Boyer FIS920070412US1 1969
77212 7590 09/03/2019
Cantor Colburn LLP - IBM Endicott
20 Church Street
22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
EXAMINER
GRIFFIN, TAMARA JEAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/03/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail@cantorcolburn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JOHN E. BOYER, EDWARD E. KELLEY, and EOIN
LANE1
____________

Appeal 2018-004823
Application 12/046,914
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s decision finally rejecting claims 1–3, 6, 8–11, 14, and 16.
Claims 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15, and 17–25 have been canceled. See Final Act. 1–
2; Appeal Br. 2.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 International Business Machines Corp. (“Appellant”) is the applicant as
provided in 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 and is identified as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 2.
2 We refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”) filed Mar. 12, 2008;
Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed Jan. 8, 2018; and Reply Brief (“Reply
Br.”) filed Apr. 6, 2018. We also refer to the Examiner’s Final Office
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We affirm.
Appellant’s Invention
The invention “relates generally to service oriented architectures, and
more particularly to a system, article, and method that provide a situationally
aware software information tool that assigns a consistent set of tags to
internet resource identifiers (IRs).” Spec. ¶ 1; see Spec. ¶¶ 14–16; Abstract.
Representative Claim
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, further illustrates the
invention:
1. A method for tagging an internet resource identifier
(IR) based on situationally aware software, the method
comprising:
determining, with an application server, a user’s role and
which IR is associated with content currently being viewed by
the user at a user computing device, wherein the user is assigned
a first role and a second role different than the first role and the
user selects one of the first and second roles;
retrieving with the application server, a predefined
vocabulary that is based on the user’s role from a database in
response to the determining;
providing the predefined vocabulary from the application
server to the user at the user computing device;
receiving with the user computing device a user selected
tag selected by the user from the predefined vocabulary;
tagging the IR with the user selected tag to form a tagged
IR; and
presenting the IR to another user based on a search
performed by the another user.

Action (“Final Act.”) mailed Aug. 9, 2017; and Answer (“Ans.”) mailed
Feb. 9, 2018.
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Appeal Br. 7 (Claims App.).
Rejections on Appeal3
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 6, 8–11, 14, and 16 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See
Final Act. 3–6.
2. The Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 6, 8–11, 14, and 16 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over MacLaurin (US
2007/0028171 A1, published Feb. 1, 2007) and Ovil et al. (US
2004/0030540 A1, published Feb. 12, 2004) (“Ovil”). See Final Act. 7–20.
ISSUES
Based upon our review of the record, Appellant’s contentions, and the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions, the issue before us follows:
1. Did the Examiner err in concluding that Appellant’s claims
were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, without significantly more,
under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
2. Did the Examiner err in finding that MacLaurin and Ovil are
properly combinable and collectively would have taught or suggested the
features of Appellant’s claim 1, and the commensurate limitations of claim
9?

3 The application on appeal has an effective filing date of March 12, 2008.
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the instant application
has an effective filing date earlier than the AIA’s effective date for
applications, this decision refers to the pre-AIA version of § 103 (i.e.,
§ 103(a)).
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ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
The Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 6, 8–11, 14, and 16 as a group based
on claim 1 (see Final Act. 3–6). The Examiner concludes claim 1 is directed
to patent-ineligible subject because claim 1 is “directed to suggesting tags to
add to a document based on a user’s role and allowing other users to search
and retrieve documents based on said tags” (Final Act. 3), which is “simply
the organization and comparison of data which can be performed mentally
and is an idea of itself” (Final Act. 4), similar to “obtaining and comparing
intangible data” (citing Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc.,
558 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014)) and “data recognition and storage”
(citing Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l
Ass'n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). See Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 3–5. The
Examiner also determines that the claim includes additional elements
(beyond the purported abstract idea), but these additional elements “serve to
perform generic computer functions such as performing repetitive
calculations” (Final Act. 4) and do not amount to significantly more than the
judicial exception (abstract idea). See Final Act. 4–6; Ans. 3–5.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Appeal Br. 3–4; Reply
Br. 2–3. Specifically, Appellant contends (with respect to claim 1 and the
other pending claims rejected under § 101) that the recited method cannot be
performed mentally, in that “a human cannot attach tags” to an internet
resource identifier (IR) “and then [present the IR] to another with a listing of
tags” because such a process requires a “computer that is configured in a
specific manner.” Appeal Br. 4; see Reply Br. 2–3. Additionally, Appellant
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points out that the Examiner has ignored certain claim features “and
oversimplif[ied] the claim in order to make the claim appear abstract”
(Reply Br. 2), and that the claim specifically recites a server (application
server) “receiv[ing] the selection of an individual’s role” as well as
“provid[ing] a vocabulary to the user on a computing device” (Reply Br. 3).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “‘. . . long held
that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77–80 (2012), “for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217. Assuming that a claim nominally falls within one of the statutory
categories of machine, manufacture, process, or composition of matter, the
first step in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts” (id.), e.g., to an abstract
idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are
drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party
to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract
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ideas, and thus patent ineligible include, but are not limited to, certain
methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic
practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical
formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental
processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends.
Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step of the Alice and Mayo
framework where the elements of the claims are considered “individually
and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional
elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79).
This second step is described as “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e.,
an element or combination of elements that is ‘. . . significantly more than
. . . the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original)
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). “A claim that recites an abstract idea
must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic
computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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The Court acknowledged in Mayo that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the
claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “2019 Revised Guidance”).
Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (hereinafter “Step 2A, Prong 1”);
and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, 2018)) (hereinafter “Step 2A, Prong 2”).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.4

4 Items (3) and (4) are collectively referred to as “Step 2B” hereinafter and
in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
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See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55–56.
Eligibility Analysis—Revised Guidance Steps 1 and 2A, Prong 1
Turning to the first step of the eligibility analysis, “the first step in the
Alice inquiry . . . asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific
asserted improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process
that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely
as a tool.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. “The abstract idea exception
prevents patenting a result where ‘it matters not by what process or
machinery the result is accomplished.’” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting O’Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)).
The Examiner concludes independent claim 1 recites an abstract idea
of “suggesting tags to add to a document based on a user’s role and allowing
other users to search and retrieve documents based on said tags” (supra).
See Final Act. 3–4. Here, in rejecting the claims (in particular claim 1)
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner purportedly analyzed the claims using
the Mayo/Alice two-step framework, consistent with the guidance set forth in
the USPTO’s “2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,”
79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), in effect at the time the rejection was
made, i.e., on Aug. 9, 2017. See Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 3–5. In view of the
2019 Revised Guidance, we provide our detailed patent eligibility analysis
as follows.
Claim 1 recites a method of tagging an internet resource identifier
(IR), such as a uniform resource locator (URL), and presenting the tagged IR
to another user. Accordingly, we conclude that claim 1 recites on its face a
“process”—which is a statutory category of invention (subject matter)
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(USPTO’s Step 1). The process comprises several steps (limitations),
including “determining, with an application server, a user’s role and which
IR is associated with content currently being viewed by the user at a user
computing device,” “the user [being] assigned a first role and a second role,”
a “user select[ing] one of the first and second roles,” “retrieving with the
application server, a predefined vocabulary . . . based on the user’s role,”
“providing the predefined vocabulary from the application server to the user
at the user computing device,” “receiving with the user computing device a
user selected tag selected by the user from the predefined vocabulary,”
“tagging the IR with the user selected tag to form a tagged IR,” and
“presenting the IR to another user based on a search performed by the
another user.” Claim 1 (Appeal Br. 7 (Claims App.)). That is, the process
includes at least the step of an application server making a determination of
the user’s role and IR associated with the currently viewed content.
We analyze whether Appellant’s claim 1, in particular the
“determining” step, recites an abstract idea (USPTO’s Step 2A). Here, the
“determining” step recites an application server performing functions of
determining a user’s role and an IR associated with currently viewed
content, where the user has been assigned multiple roles and selected one of
those roles. Making a determination (determining a role and an IR
associated with content) is an abstract concept. A person can perform the
determinations (delineated above) mentally, or by using pen and paper. See,
e.g., Appellant’s Fig. 2. Nowhere does Appellant point to specific procedure
or algorithm for the determinations that distinguish over a human process.
This determining step, as drafted, is a process that under its broadest
reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind
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but for the recitation of the application server (a generic computer
component).
As explained in 2019 Revised Guidance, abstract ideas fall within one
(or more) of three groupings:
1. Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
2. Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion); and
3. Certain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance,
mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including
agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising,
marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations);
managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and
following rules or instructions).
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The determining step consists of mental processes performed in the
human mind (or utilizing pen and paper) including observation, evaluation,
or judgment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 53 (listing
“[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” as one of the “enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas” (footnote omitted)). The revised guidance
explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can perform in
their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic
computer component performs the acts. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
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generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”).
Eligibility Analysis—Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Appellant’s claim 1 also recites additional elements beyond the
abstract determination step (the judicial exception) (supra)—including
utilizing the application server to retrieve a particular vocabulary
(“retrieving with the application server, a predefined vocabulary . . . based
on the user’s role”), providing the vocabulary to the user at a separate device
(“providing the predefined vocabulary from the application server to the user
at the user computing device”), the user selecting a tag from the vocabulary
(“receiving with the user computing device a user selected tag selected by
the user from the predefined vocabulary”), tagging the (previously
determined) IR using the selected tag (“tagging the IR with the user selected
tag to form a tagged IR”), and presenting the tagged IR to a different user
(“presenting the IR to another user based on a search performed by the
another user”). See claim 1 (Appeal Br. 7 (Claims App)). We evaluate these
additional limitations (elements) to determine whether they integrate the
determining step (the judicial exception) into a practical application of the
exception (USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 2; see 2019 Revised Guidance).
Each of the additional elements—retrieving vocabulary, providing the
vocabulary, the user selecting a tag from the vocabulary, tagging the IR
using the selected tag, and presenting the tagged IR to another user—
analyzed individually and collectively represent more than mere extra-
solution (post-solution) activity, the claim as a whole is directed to a
particular improvement in tagging IRs.
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The additional elements recite a specific manner of associating tags
with IRs (of user viewed content) and presenting the tagged IRs to a
different user, which provides a specific improvement over prior systems,
resulting in an improved (more consistent) process of tagging internet
resource identifiers. Thus, the claim as a whole integrates the mental
process into a practical application. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim 1 is not
directed to a judicial exception (an abstract idea), and we reverse the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. For these same
reasons, we also reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 6, 8–11, 14,
and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Obviousness Rejection
Appellant argues independent claim 1, independent claim 9, and
dependent claims 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, and 16, together as a group with
respect to the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection. See Appeal Br. 4–5. We select
independent claim 1 as representative of Appellant’s arguments with respect
to claims 1–3, 6, 8–11, 14, and 16. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner rejects claim 1 over MacLaurin and Ovil. See Final
Act. 7–11; Ans. 5–6. Appellant contends the Examiner does not provide a
sufficient rationale for combining MacLaurin and Ovil and, therefore, the
Examiner’s rejection is improper. See Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 3–4.
Specifically, Appellant contends, inter alia, that Ovil teaches making
changes to a document and MacLaurin cannot be properly combined with
Ovil because the resulting combination would make changes to the internet
resource identifiers (IRs). See id. Appellant contends the IRs must remain
unchanged and that the Examiner’s modification would rendering the prior
art unsatisfactory for its intended purpose. See id.
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The Examiner explains that “[MacLaurin] teaches tagging IRs without
changing the underlying IR” and “further teaches suggesting tags to a user
based on the role of the user” (Ans. 5 (citing MacLaurin ¶¶ 26, 28–29)). See
Final Act. 7–10; Ans. 5–6. The Examiner cites Ovil solely for the selection
of a role from multiple roles—as explained by the Examiner “Maclaurin
does not explicitly teach allowing a user to switch back and forth between
multiple roles.” “Ovil was used . . . to teach only that the technology
allowing user to switch back and forth between multiple ‘roles’ and to
receive different ‘suggestions’ for each role already exists.” Ans. 6; see
Final Act. 10–11 (citing Ovil ¶¶ 28, 130–132); Ans. 5–6. The rationale or
motivation for combining the teaching of Ovil with MacLaurin, according to
the Examiner, would have facilitated “more accurate suggestions based on
context” (the selection of a role from multiple roles). Final Act. 11 (citing
Ovil ¶ 132). Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings with
respect to either MacLaurin or Ovil.
We agree with the Examiner that the Examiner has provided a proper
rationale for combining the undisputed features of MacLaurin and Ovil. See
Final Act. 10–11; Ans. 5–6. Appellant does not explain sufficiently why the
references are incompatible. In contrast to Appellant’s arguments (see
Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 3–4) the Examiner need not explain how to
bodily combine the features of the prior art references—“[t]he test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981) (emphasis added). See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322,
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1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Here, Appellant argues the references
individually and does not address the specific arguments set out by the
Examiner. The references cited by the Examiner must be read, not in
isolation, but for what each fairly teaches in combination with the prior art
as a whole. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually
where the rejections are based on combinations of references).
The Supreme Court has held that in analyzing an obviousness
rationale, the Examiner “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim . . . [and may] take account of
the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
Also, the Examiner may consider “the background knowledge possessed by
a person having ordinary skill in the art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In
re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Further, an artisan is
presumed to possess both skill and common sense. See KSR, 550 U.S. at
421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.”). For the all the reasons set forth above, we find the
Examiner provided a legally cognizable rationale for the combination of
MacLaurin and Ovil, in that the Examiner “articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR,
550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988).
We further find that it would have been within the skill of an
ordinarily skilled artisan to combine MacLaurin’s tagging process with
Ovil’s suggestion (teaching) of selecting a role from multiple roles (i.e.,
determining a role). See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been
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used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the
technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her
skill.”). We are not persuaded that combining the respective familiar
elements of the cited references in the manner proffered by the Examiner
would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill
in the art” at the time of Appellant’s invention. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550
U.S. at 418).
Accordingly, Appellant’s contentions do not persuade us of error in
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative independent claim 1.
Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 1,
independent claim 9, and dependent claims 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, and 16, not
separately argued with particularity (supra).
CONCLUSIONS
Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–3,
6, 8–11, 14, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1–3, 6, 8–11, 14, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3, 6, 8–11, 14, and
16.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED