JJI International, Inc.v.Sparkle Life LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 25, 2014

No. 91204296 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 25, 2014)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: September 25, 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

JJI International, Inc.
v.
Sparkle Life LLC

_____

Opposition No. 91204296

_____

Craig M. Scott of Scott & Bush Ltd.
for JJI International, Inc.

Thomas Toner of Shumaker Loop & Kendrick LLP
for Sparkle Life LLC.
_____

Before Bergsman, Wellington, and Lykos,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Sparkle Life LLC (“Applicant”) filed an application to register the mark
Sparkle Life in standard character form for “bracelets; charms; costume jewelry;
necklaces; precious and semi-precious crystal stones and beads for use in jewelry” in
International Class 14.1

1 Application Serial No. 85356064 was filed on June 24, 2011 based on an allegation of first
use anywhere and in commerce on July 1, 2010 under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act.
Opposition No. 91204296
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JJI International, Inc. (“Opposer”) has opposed registration of Applicant’s mark
based on a likelihood of confusion with its registered standard character mark
SPLASHES & SPARKLES for “jewelry” in International Class 14.2 Specifically,
Opposer pleaded, inter alia,3 that “registration of [Applicant’s mark] will damage
[Opposer] because this designation is confusingly similar to [Opposer’s registered
mark], and Applicant’s use of the designation in connection with jewelry is likely to
cause confusion, deception, and/or mistake among the consuming public in violation
of Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.” ¶7.
In its answer, Applicant denied the allegations that use of the applied-for mark
would cause a likelihood of confusion with Opposer’s registered mark.
I. The Parties’ Stipulation Regarding the Introduction of Evidence
On January 13, 2014, a stipulated agreement involving the parties’ introduction
of evidence was filed with the Board.4 See TBMP §§702.04(d) (2014) (“ACR Using
Stipulated Record and Trial Briefs”) and 702.04(e) (“Utilizing Stipulations in Non-
ACR Board cases”). By way of the stipulation, the parties agreed to the following:
that testimony may be introduced by sworn declaration in lieu of live deposition;
and that “documents or things produced and/or disclosed in discovery…[and]
written discovery responses and/or disclosures of either party in this opposition

2 Registration No. 3005830 issued on October 11, 2005; Sections 8 & 15 affidavits filed and
accepted.
3 Opposer also pleaded false suggestion of a connection and deceptiveness grounds for
opposition in the Notice of Opposition under Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act. Opposer did
not pursue either ground at trial or argue these grounds in its trial brief. In accordance
with the Board’s usual practice, we deem these claims to have been waived. See, e.g., Knight
Textile Corp. v. Jones Investment Co., 75 USPQ2d 1313, 1314 n.4 (TTAB 2005).
4 32 TTABVUE (“Stipulation For Introduction of Evidence At Trial”).
Opposition No. 91204296
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proceeding” may be introduced as evidence and relied upon at trial, subject to
objections on “any applicable ground.”5
II. Record
The record in this case consists of the pleadings and, by rule, the file of the
involved application. Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1).
In accordance with the aforementioned stipulation, Opposer has submitted the
sworn declarations, with accompanying exhibits, of its CEO, Mr. Dale Kincaid,6 and
of its designated expert, Dr. Geoffrey T. Fong.7 Mr. Fong’s declaration includes an
“Export Report” as an exhibit. In addition, Opposer submitted the following
materials under notices of reliance: a copy of its pleaded registration (Registration
No. 3005830) and printouts from the USPTO electronic database for the same
registration, including printouts from the registration file history;8 copies of an
Office Action, request for abandonment and Notice of Abandonment, all involving a
third-party application (Serial No. 85180816) for the mark SPARKLE;9 documents
produced by Opposer during discovery;10 and Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s
First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents.11

5 Id.
6 33 TTABVUE.
7 31 TTABVUE.
8 27 TTABVUE (Notice of Reliance)
9 28 TTABVUE (Notice of Reliance)
10 29 TTABVUE (Notice of Reliance). We note that, absent a stipulated agreement like the
one submitted in this proceeding, a party generally may not introduce copies of documents
it produced in response to discovery requests under a notice of reliance. Trademark Rule
2.122(e).
11 30 TTABVUE (Notice of Reliance).
Opposition No. 91204296
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During its testimony period, Applicant introduced the following materials via
notices of reliance: printouts from forty (40) various third-party websites for
purposes of showing “descriptive and/or trademark use of the term SPARKLE in
conjunction with jewelry”;12 and copies of nineteen (16) third-party registrations for
marks containing the term SPARKLE in connection with jewelry;13 and 3 third-
party registrations for marks containing the term SPLASH in connection with
jewelry.14
III. Opposer’s Standing and Priority
In view of Opposer’s pleaded registration, which is of record, and the declaration
of Opposer’s CEO, Opposer has established its standing in this matter.
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Priority is also not an issue with respect to Opposer’s registered mark and goods
identified in the registration vis-à-vis the applied-for mark and goods identified in
the application. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen, Inc., 182 USPQ 108
(CCPA 1974).
IV. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of
all probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of
likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973); see also In re Majestic Distilling Company, Inc., 315

12 34 TTABVUE.
13 35 TTABVUE.
14 Id.
Opposition No. 91204296
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F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,
544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated
by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics
of the goods and differences in the marks.”).
A. The Parties’ Goods, Trade Channels and Consumers
There is no dispute that the parties’ goods, as described in the respective
identifications of goods, are identical to the extent that they include jewelry. More
specifically, Opposer’s identified “jewelry” is broad enough to include Applicant’s
“bracelets; charms; costume jewelry; necklaces” and is otherwise very closely related
to applicant’s “precious and semi-precious crystal stones and beads for use in
jewelry.” Because the goods are, in part, identical and neither party’s goods are
limited to any specific trade channels, classes of consumers, or price points, we must
also presume that the trade channels and classes of customers are the same. See
American Lebanese Syrian Assoc. Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research Inst., 101
USPQ2d 1022, 1028 (TTAB 2011); see also In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101
USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding Board entitled to rely on this
presumption).
Accordingly, the factors focusing on the similarity of the parties’ goods, trade
channels and consumers all support a finding of likely confusion.
Opposition No. 91204296
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B. Dissimilarity of the Marks and Weakness of the Term SPARKLE
We now consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks at issue in terms of
appearance, sound, meaning, and overall commercial impression. Palm Bay Imports
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir.
2005). “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression’
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In conjunction with the similarity of the
marks, we also consider the sixth du Pont factor that requires consideration of any
evidence pertaining to “the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar
goods.” In essence, this factor involves the notion that as a result of a certain degree
of third-party use of similar marks for similar goods, consumers may be able to
differentiate between such marks and that confusion is not likely even if the marks
contain a common element.
In comparing the respective marks in their entireties, it is clear that an essential
question before us is what importance, if any, should give to the fact that both
marks contain the term SPARKLE(S). Although Opposer argues that the marks
have a “similar format, structure and syntax,” it is primarily the term SPARKLE(S)
that Opposer contends “constitutes the dominant part of each mark” and relies on
for purposes of similarity. Brief at pp. 12-13.
Opposition No. 91204296
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Applicant, on the other hand, contends that the term “Sparkle” is “fairly diluted”
and a “weak formative in the jewelry industry.” Brief at p. 4. Applicant points to the
evidence it introduced, namely, the printouts from forty (40) different websites
depicting trademark and descriptive use of “Sparkle” as well as the third-party
registrations containing the same term (or a formative thereof).
We agree with Applicant, and the record establishes, that “Sparkle” is a
suggestive, if not descriptive, term when used in connection with jewelry and it is
entitled to only a narrow scope of protection or exclusivity of use.
“Sparkle” may be defined as a noun meaning “a sparkling appearance, luster, or
play of light: ‘the sparkle of a diamond.’”15
It may also be defined as verb meaning “Shine brightly with flashes of light: ‘her
earrings sparkled as she turned her head.’”16
The aforementioned definitions, including the example sentences supplied in the
dictionaries,17 make it clear that the term “Sparkle” is very suggestive in connection
with jewelry.

15 Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sparkle (accessed: September 19, 2014). The Board
may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries that exist in
printed format. In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014);
Threshold.TV Inc. v. Metronome Enters. Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1031, 1038 n.14 (TTAB 2010)
16 Oxforddictionaries.com Oxford University Press (2014)
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/sparkle (accessed:
September 19, 2014).
17 We further note that the Merriam-Webster online dictionary also provides the following
example sentence that references jewels or jewelry in its definition of the word “Sparkle”:
“He caught the sparkle of her diamond out of the corner of his eye.” http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sparkle (accessed: September 19, 2014), definition based on print
version of Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Eleventh Edition.
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Opposition No. 91204296
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21 22
23
24

21 Id. at p. 64.
22 Id. at p. 67.
23 Id. at p. 74.
24 Id. at p. 95.
Opposition No. 91204296
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25
Although we cannot gauge the popularity of these websites, e.g., the number of
people who have viewed them, sales, etc., the sheer number of websites and manner
of use makes it evident that SPARKLE is a term that easily lends itself for use in
marks in the field of jewelry. This evidence, on its face, further shows that
consumers readily understand the highly suggestive or descriptive meaning of the
term in connection jewelry. Indeed, in the latter excerpt shown above, the term
“sparkling” is used to describe shiny or shimmering pieces of jewelry, namely,
bracelets, necklace and earrings.
This highly suggestive meaning of the term “Sparkle” in connection with jewelry
is further buttressed by the manner in which so many third-parties have sought to

25 Id. at p. 120.
Opposition No. 91204296
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adopt marks containing this term in connection with jewelry. Tektronix, Inc. v.
Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693, 694-95 (CCPA 1976) (third-party
registrations “may be given some weight to show the meaning of a mark in the same
way that dictionaries are used”); In re Sela Prods., LLC, 107 USPQ2d 1580, 1588
(TTAB 2013). In other words, in conjunction with the defined meaning of the term,
these registrations corroborate the term’s suggestive significance in the field of
jewelry. A representative sample of the third-party registrations of record includes
the following:

Mark Reg.
No.
Goods
MAKE LIFE
SPARKLE
3565207 jewelry, precious stones, gemstones and watches

SPARKLEMOM
3592064 bracelets; earrings; key chains of precious metal; key
rings of precious metal; necklaces; rings being jewelry
IT’S ALL ABOUT
THE SPARKLE
3732391 distributorship services in the field of diamonds,
precious stones and jewelry
PRINCESS
SPARKLE (with
design)
3336189 hand crafted jewelry
SPIRITUAL
SPARKLE
3795102 jewelry, diamonds, precious gemstones, semi-precious
gemstones, precious gems and watches
SPARKLES OF
HOPE
4111001 jewelry
THE ULTIMATE
SPARKLE
4211424 Jewelry
DESIGN, STYLE,
SPARKLE!
4248874 jewelry and imitation jewelry; key chains as jewelry;
women's jewelry…
THE SPARKLE
FACTORY
4356294 retail store services featuring jewelry…
MORE
SPARKLE.
MORE STYLE.
MORE
COMPLIMENTS
4229833 Jewelry
Opposition No. 91204296
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Based on the entire record and given the meaning of the term SPARKLE, we
conclude that this term is weak and the fact that both parties share this term does
not support a finding that the marks are similar. The term has inherent weakness
as shown by the numerous examples of others using its defined meaning to either
describe jewelry or strongly suggest a common characteristic of jewelry, i.e., that it
shines or glimmers. The fact that so many other third-parties in the jewelry
business have adopted the term (or its formatives) in their own marks, registered
marks with the same, or use the term to describe the goods certainly dilutes the
term’s source-identifying significance.
Given the conceptual or inherent weakness of the term “Sparkle,” we find that
the marks, viewed in their entireties, are dissimilar and the commercial
impressions created are very different. Applicant’s SPARKLE LIFE connotes a
glamorous lifestyle. Opposer’s SPLASHES & SPARKLES, on the other hand, will be
understood as describing flashy or showy goods. In addition, while both marks begin
with the letters “SP,” Opposer’s mark has an alliterative feature that is not present
in Applicant’s mark. Moreover, the initial terms in each mark are different and,
with respect to Opposer’s mark, consumers tend to focus on the first term
SPLASHES for purposes of remembering the mark. Cf., Palm Bay Imports Inc., 396
F.3d at 1372, 73 USPQ2d at 1692 (2005); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century
Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and Presto
Products Inc. v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is
Opposition No. 91204296
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often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of
a purchaser and remembered”).
In sum, we find the marks are sufficiently dissimilar and there would be no
likelihood of confusion. That is, viewing the marks in their entireties, we find that
because the common element SPARKLE(S) is weak in that it is both suggestive of
the jewelry and in use by third parties for jewelry, the differences in the marks
discussed above create an overall different commercial impression sufficient to
distinguish the marks.
C. Dr. Fong Report (“Fong Survey”)
With regard to the Fong survey introduced by Opposer, we note that Dr. Fong
concluded that his “expert opinion [is] that there is likelihood of confusion” between
the parties’ marks because there is a “statistically significant rate of likelihood of
consumer confusion of 16.5%.”26 Relying on the Fong survey, Opposer asserts it
“corroborates that Applicant’s mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.” Brief at
p. 22.
The Fong survey main questionnaire was conducted via Internet and comprised,
in part, the following essential questions:27

26 31 TTABVUE (Fong Declaration ¶ 5).
27 The control and test surveys were administered equally to 412 respondents (206
respondents per survey) from a pool of 1550 persons receiving invitation (by email) to
participate in the survey. The respondents met certain qualifications, e.g., responded that
they were over 18 years old, were completing the survey with an appropriate device
(computer, tablet, etc.), did not have family members who work for a jewelry company, and
would consider purchasing a piece of women’s jewelry in the price range of $25-250 in the
last/next 12 months.
Opposition No. 91204296
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Q1. The image below shows a piece of jewelry that you might see in a store or
online. Please look at the image as if you were considering shopping for this type
of jewelry.28

Have you ever seen this brand of jewelry before (in person or in an
advertisement)?

• Yes
• No
• Unsure

Q2. The image below shows a different piece of jewelry. Please look at the image
as if you were considering shopping for this type of jewelry.

Q3. Do you think that the jewelry in the image above is put out by a different
company or the same company that puts out the jewelry in the image you saw
before, or are you unsure?

• The jewelry in each image is put out by a different company.
• The jewelry in each image is put out by the same company.
• Unsure.

28 The quality of the image in the copy introduced in evidence does not reproduce well;
essentially, there are earrings with Opposer’s SPLASHES & SPARKLES mark appearing
above in a border. For the “control” survey, the same questions were posed using the mark
SHIMMER LIFE.
Opposition No. 91204296
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For the respondents who answered “same,” they were asked (“Q3”) to explain “as
completely as possible” the reason for their answer to Q3.
For those who answered “different” or “unsure,” they were then asked the
followed question:
Q4. Do you think that the company that puts out the jewelry in the image above
is affiliated or connected with the company that puts out the jewelry in the
image you saw before, it is NOT affiliated or connected, or are you unsure?
(Select one only).

• I believe that the two companies are affiliated or connected
• I believe that the two companies are NOT affiliate or connected
• Unsure

The respondents were then asked to explain “as completely as possible” the
reason for their answer to Q4.
Applicant has attacked the credibility of the Fong survey for several reasons.
First, it argues that the survey is the result of a “fatally flawed design” inasmuch as
it employed a “highly suggestive methodology.” Brief at p. 22. In particular,
Applicant attacks the Fong survey because it “displayed the products back-to-back
when such products would never appear in such a manner in the marketplace.” Id.
at 25. The survey was also “impermissibly misleading” because “use of the word
‘brand’ in the initial question impermissibly focused respondents on the branding
shown on the products.” Id. at 26. As to the follow-up question (“Q4”) asked of
respondents who answered that they did not believe (or were unsure) that the
products were put out by the same company, Applicant likens this to “return[ing] to
the well” because respondents are asked twice about a relationship and there is no
explanation what “affiliated” might mean. Id. at 28. Applicant also questions the
Opposition No. 91204296
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timing of the survey, i.e., within a 24 hour period on December 27-28, and the
necessity of the certain questions to qualify respondents. According to Applicant,
this follow-up question encouraged respondents “to search for a connection between
the products.” Id. at 28. Ultimately, Applicant argues that the Fong survey should
be excluded.
For purposes of assessing a likelihood of confusion, two main survey formats
have been employed. The first is sometimes called the Ever-Ready format and
generally involves showing participants the junior mark and asking them to name
the company they think puts out the mark (and then why they think that or
whether they can name any other products made by that brand) with the
assumption that they are aware of the senior mark from prior experiences (i.e. the
senior mark is strong). See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366,
188 USPQ 623 (7th Cir. 1976). The Board has accepted this type of survey and it
has been called the “model” or “gold standard” in likelihood of confusion cases.29
However, this survey format is generally used in cases where the senior mark is
alleged to be famous or very strong.30
The second type of survey format, sometimes referred to as the “Squirt format,”
involves presenting participants with both conflicting marks, without any
assumption of familiarity with any of the marks. See SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628

29 Likelihood of Confusion Studies and the Straightened Scope of Squirt, 98 Trademark Rep.
739, 748 (2008).
30 In this regard, we note that Dr. Fong’s survey report does not reveal the results of the
responses to the first question inquiring whether the respondent has “ever seen this brand
[referring to Opposer’s mark] of jewelry before” and Opposer does not argue that its mark is
“famous.”
Opposition No. 91204296
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F.2d 1086, 207 USPQ 897 (8th Cir. 1980). The marks are presented as an array of
branded products, akin to a “product line-up,” and participants are asked if they
think any of the goods bearing the marks are from the same source or different
sources. They are then asked what makes them think that. This format has
received criticism to the extent that it improperly replicates market conditions
because participants artificially informed about a mark that they may not
necessarily know already and then asked about connections with that mark.31
Other survey formats are certainly possible and, indeed, a survey, if properly
conducted and with certain results, may be can be regarded as evidence akin to
actual confusion. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n v. Harvard Cmty. Health Plan
Inc., 17 USPQ2d 1075, 1078 n.7 (TTAB 1990).
In this case, the Fong survey loosely resembles the Squirt format and, for several
reasons explained below, has some flaws. This is not to say that we agree with all of
Applicant’s criticisms of the Fong survey or that it should be excluded entirely from
our consideration. Rather, we have considered the Fong survey in our likelihood of
confusion analysis, with its limitations, and remain convinced in our ultimate
finding regarding the dissimilarity of the parties’ marks.
First, we find that the universe of respondents that Dr. Fong used was too
narrow. As noted above, there are no restrictions to the channels of trade, classes of

31 “Historically, …Squirt studies have been rejected because they utilize close-ended
questions, and opprobrium is likely to continue with respect to such questions that have a
clearly ‘leading’ effect…” Likelihood of Confusion Studies and the Straightened Scope of
Squirt, 98 Trademark Rep. 739, 752 (2008); See also, INTA Courts and Tribunals
Subcommittee, Report on Best Practices in Conducting Surveys in Trademark Matters at
page 13.
Opposition No. 91204296
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consumers, or price points in either description of goods. Nevertheless, Dr. Fong
limited the universe of respondents to people interested in purchasing (or have
purchased) “women’s jewelry” in the price-range of $ 25-249. Furthermore, the
survey excluded respondents from the “relevant universe” if their purchases or
prospective purchases were made in a “regional or national store chain (e.g.,
Claire’s, Forever 21) or its websites…discount retailer (e.g., Walmart, Target) or its
website…[and] Online from the manufacturer.” Because of the broadness of the
parties’ jewelry, as described in the respective identifications of goods, their jewelry
could include men’s jewelry, and not just that “for women,” and could span a larger
price-range. We also see no valid reason for the exclusion of purchases or
prospective purchases from regional or national retail store chains like Walmart,
Target in determining who qualified as a respondent to continue with the survey.
Second, the Fong survey did not present enough marks for the respondents to
consider in light of the numerous third parties that use the term SPARKLE(S) in
connection with jewelry. It would have been preferable had Dr. Fong included an
array of branded products including the parties’ marks. By limiting the comparison
to only two marks, this increases the chances of (and perhaps encourages) the
participants to identify the branded items as being put out by the same source. As
with the Squirt format survey, this format also exposes itself to the criticism that it
does not replicate market conditions because participants are being informed by the
survey about marks that they were not necessarily already familiar with and then
asked about connections between the two.
Opposition No. 91204296
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Finally, we note that the Dr. Fong’s conclusory 16.5% rate of likelihood of
confusion falls closer to the lower end of the spectrum for purposes of assessing a
likelihood of confusion. Cf., Miles Labs Inc. v. Naturally Vitamin Supplements Inc.,
1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445, 1456-57 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (finding that “there is no question . . .
that a 29% level of confusion is significant”); Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n v.
Harvard Cmty. Health Plan Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1075, 1078 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (finding
14% level of confusion probative of likely confusion); 6 J. Thomas McCarthy,
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 32:188 (4th ed. 2009)
(likelihood of confusion survey results in the range of “25% to 50% have been viewed
as solid support for a finding of a likelihood of confusion”).
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Fong survey slightly favors a finding
that there is a likelihood of confusion.
V. Conclusion
In sum, Opposer has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there is
a likelihood of confusion between its registered mark SPLASHES & SPARKLES
and Applicant’s mark, SPARKLE LIFE. Although we have found herein that, in
part, the parties’ goods, trade channels and classes of consumers are identical, we
find that the differences between the respective marks are sufficient so as to avoid a
likelihood of confusion. For the aforementioned reasons, the fact that the marks
share the same suggestively weak element SPARKLE(S) has little significance and
the marks in their entireties have different commercial impressions. Indeed, we find
this factor to be pivotal and the dissimilarities of the marks outweigh the other
factors such that confusion is not likely. See Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises Inc.,
Opposition No. 91204296
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951 F.2d 330, 21 USPQ2d 1142, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“We know of no reason why,
in a particular case, a single du Pont factor may not be dispositive”).
Decision: The opposition is dismissed and the application will proceed to
registration.