Ji Fang et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 24, 2022

2021001523 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/018,511 01/23/2008 Ji Fang XRX-3005US 8259 182639 7590 02/24/2022 Burns & Levinson LLP/Xerox Corporation 125 High Street BOSTON, MA 02110 EXAMINER AUSTIN, JAMIE H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/24/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): DOCKETING@BURNSLEV.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JI FANG, VICTORIA M. E. BELLOTTI, DANIEL G. BOBROW, and TRACY HOLLOWAY KING ____________ Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This application returns to us after we affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of then-pending claims 1-25. Ex parte Fang, Appeal No. 2017- 008390 (PTAB Oct. 26, 2018). Prosecution continued after that decision, and Appellant1 now appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s subsequent decision to reject claims 1-25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Palo Alto Research Center Incorporated. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention recommends activities to a user based on information extracted from received content, including temporal information. See generally Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative: A computer-executed method for recommending activities, the method comprising: receiving, by a server of an activity management system, a query from a mobile device belonging to a user, wherein the query requests a recommendation for the user and comprises a message entered into the user’s mobile device; applying natural language processing (NLP) on the message to: determine that the message is associated with an activity of the user; extract information associated with the activity in the message by performing operations comprising: identifying, from a set of activity types, an activity type of the activity; identifying, based on the application of the NLP on the message, an indication of willingness to participate in the identified activity type, location information associated with the activity, and a probability of interest for the activity; determining an activity time from unstructured temporal information of the activity extracted from linguistic cues of tense information in the message based on the application of the NLP on the message; in response to determining that the temporal information is not available, allocating a default activity time determined based on statistical data; and expressing the activity time in a canonical form; Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 3 storing, by the activity management system, the activity, activity type, the indication, and the activity time in the canonical form in an entry in a repository; and generating, based on the entry, a recommendation for the activity to the user in response to the probability of interest for the activity being greater than a threshold. RELATED APPEAL As noted previously, and although not acknowledged by Appellant in the “RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES” section on page 1 of the Appeal Brief and page 4 of the Reply Brief, this appeal is related to an earlier appeal in this application where we affirmed the Examiner’s decision to reject then-pending claims 1-25. Ex parte Fang, Appeal No. 2017- 008390 (PTAB Oct. 26, 2018) (“Bd. Dec.”). On pages 3 to 14 of that decision, we affirmed the Examiner’s ineligibility rejection of the then- pending claims under § 101. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner rejected claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 8-17.2 The Examiner rejected claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 18-19. 2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed March 27, 2020 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed September 29, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed October 27, 2020 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed December 28, 2020 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 4 THE INELIGIBILITY REJECTION The Examiner determines that the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea, namely making recommendations based on information extracted from received messages, which is said to recite mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity that are not integrated into a practical application. See Final Act. 8-13. According to the Examiner, the additional recited elements, including the recited activity management system server, mobile device, processor, storage device, computer system, and memory, perform generic computer functions that do not add significantly more to the abstract idea. See Final Act. 11, 14-17. Appellant argues that the claimed invention is eligible because, among other things, it is not directed to a judicial exception. See Appeal Br. 13-29; Reply Br. 11-27. According to Appellant, not only does the claimed invention, which applies artificial intelligence to information management technology, not fall within any of the enumerated categories under the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) eligibility guidelines, the claimed invention’s artificial intelligence elements incorporate a human mind’s capability into a computer to (1) extract meaningful information from unstructured activity information; (2) convert the extracted information into a structured representation; and (3) recommend activities based on the converted information, thus integrating the purported exception in a practical application. See Appeal Br. 13-21; Reply Br. 11-27. Appellant adds that the claimed invention is not only a specific software solution that is necessarily rooted in computer technology, but the invention also improves Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 5 information management platform capabilities and, therefore, does not invoke computers merely as tools. See Appeal Br. 21-25; Reply Br. 22-24. Appellant also contends that the claimed invention amounts to significantly more than the purported judicial exception because the claims are directed to inventive concepts. See Appeal Br. 27-29; Reply Br. 16, 25- 26. According to Appellant, not only is the claimed invention tied to a particular machine, directed to a specific, tangible application, and involved in a field of use, the ordered combination of recited elements that uses NLP to generate activity recommendations from structured representations of unstructured activity information expressed in a natural language in a user message yields an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 27-29. ISSUE Under § 101, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-25 as directed to ineligible subject matter? This issue turns on whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea and, if so, whether the recited elements- considered individually and as an ordered combination-transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of that abstract idea. PRINCIPLES OF LAW An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 6 In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217-18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267-68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 7 products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). That said, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Under the subject matter eligibility guidance in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020), we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (see MPEP § 2106.04); and Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 8 (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.04, 2106.04(d), 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See MPEP § 2106.05. ANALYSIS Claims 1, 8, and 15: Alice/Mayo Step One Representative independent claim 1 recites a computer-executed method for recommending activities, where the method comprises: receiving, by a server of an activity management system, a query from a mobile device belonging to a user, wherein the query requests a recommendation for the user and comprises a message entered into the user's mobile device; applying natural language processing (NLP) on the message to: determine that the message is associated with an activity of the user; extract information associated with the activity in the message by performing operations comprising: identifying, from a set of activity types, an activity type of the Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 9 activity; identifying, based on the application of the NLP on the message, an indication of willingness to participate in the identified activity type, location information associated with the activity, and a probability of interest for the activity; determining an activity time from unstructured temporal information of the activity extracted from linguistic cues of tense information in the message based on the application of the NLP on the message; in response to determining that the temporal information is not available, allocating a default activity time determined based on statistical data; and expressing the activity time in a canonical form; storing, by the activity management system, the activity, activity type, the indication, and the activity time in the canonical form in an entry in a repository; and generating, based on the entry, a recommendation for the activity to the user in response to the probability of interest for the activity being greater than a threshold. As the Specification explains, “recommender systems” help users find information they otherwise would be unable to find on their own by generalizing personalized recommendations responsive to input such as context data, user models, or user queries. Spec. ¶ 3. Appellant’s invention recommends activities by (1) receiving content obtained from text or converted to text from speech; (2) analyzing the received content to identify (a) an activity type, (b) indication of willingness to participate in any type of activities, and (c) temporal information. Spec. ¶ 5. The system then recommends one or more activities, venues, or services that afford or Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 10 support activities for a user based on the extracted information. Id. As the Specification’s paragraphs 29 and 30 explain, one challenge in extracting information from content is challenging due to the complexity and irregularity of natural languages. For example, the text “don’t want to watch a movie” implies the user is unwilling to watch any movies, thus indicating the system should not recommend movies then. See Spec. ¶ 29. On the other hand, the text “don’t want to watch that movie” implies the user is unwilling to watch a particular movie at that time, thus indicating the system should not recommend that particular movie then, but may recommend other movies. Id. In addition to these linguistic complexities, various linguistic irregularities, such as abbreviations and grammatical errors, only exacerbate the challenge of extracting information from language-based content. See id. ¶ 30. Given these challenges, the invention includes a user content extraction engine (UCEE) 204 that uses text patterns and keywords to extract desired information to (1) identify whether the user associated with a message is interested in a certain activity or activity type; (2) identify temporal and location expressions associated with the activity or activity type; and (3) resolve non-standard temporal and location expressions to a standard format. Spec. ¶ 31. As shown in the flow chart in Figure 3, received messages are searched for keywords and patterns corresponding to activities in step 303, and if such information is found, the message is then analyzed for temporal, location, and preference information in step 306, and extracted information is converted to canonical form and stored in steps 310 and 312. Spec. ¶¶ Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 11 55-56. The system then produces a list of recommended activities based on the extracted information in steps 314 to 322. See id. ¶¶ 57-58. Turning to claim 1, we first note that the claim recites a method and, therefore, falls within the process category of § 101. But despite falling within this statutory category, we must still determine whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. To this end, we must determine whether the claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) fails to integrate the exception into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(II). If both elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id. The Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, namely making recommendations by information extracted from received messages, which is said to be a mental process and a method of organizing human activity that are not integrated into a practical application. See Final Act. 8-13. To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea, we (1) identify the claim’s specific limitations that recite an abstract idea, and (2) determine whether the identified limitations fall within certain subject matter Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 12 groupings, namely, (a) mathematical concepts3; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity4; or (c) mental processes.5 Here, apart from the recited (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository,” all of claim 1’s recited limitations fit squarely within at least one of the above categories of the USPTO’s eligibility guidelines. When read as a whole, the recited limitations are directed to (1) analyzing information received in a natural language; (2) extracting and formatting certain information based on that analysis; and (3) making recommendations based on the extracted information. That is, apart from the recited (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository,” the claimed limitations recite mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a)(2)(II)-(III). 3 Mathematical concepts include mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(I). 4 Certain methods of organizing human activity include fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(II). 5 Mental processes are concepts performed in the human mind including an observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(III). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 13 First, not only does the limitation reciting “receiving . . . a query from a . . . user, wherein the query requests a recommendation for the user and comprises a message . . .” merely gather data, it can be done entirely mentally by a human who merely reads a message written by a user that asks for a recommendation. Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that a recited step that obtained information about transactions that used an Internet address identified with a credit card transaction could be performed by a human who simply reads records of Internet credit card transactions from a pre-existing database). Therefore, the recited receiving step fits squarely within the mental processes category of the USPTO’s eligibility guidelines and, therefore, recites an abstract idea. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(III). Second, the limitation calling for applying NLP on the message to: (1) “determine that the message is associated with an activity of the user”; and (2) “extract information associated with the activity in the message by performing operations,” where those operations comprise (a) “identifying, from a set of activity types, an activity type of the activity”; (b) “identifying, based on the application of the NLP on the message, an indication of willingness to participate in the identified activity type, location information associated with the activity, and a probability of interest for the activity”; (c) “determining an activity time from unstructured temporal information of the activity extracted from linguistic cues of tense information in the message based on the application of the NLP on the message”; (d) “in response to determining that the temporal information is not available, allocating a default activity time determined based on statistical data”; and (e) Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 14 “expressing the activity time in a canonical form” can all be done entirely mentally or with pen and paper. First, (1) determining that a received message is associated with user activity, and (2) extracting information associated with the activity in the message by performing the recited operations can be done entirely mentally by merely observing that the message is associated with user activity, and cognitively focusing on or isolating certain activity-related information in the message, or by writing that mentally-extracted information down on a piece of paper. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address) see also id. (noting that a map of credit card numbers can be constructed by writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address). That NLP is applied on the message does not change our conclusion. First, even assuming, without deciding, that NLP is a function of artificial intelligence as Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 23; Reply Br. 14, 23-24), and leaving aside Appellant’s inartful reliance on Wikipedia to support this contention-a non-peer-reviewed source of dubious reliability6-NLP is 6 See Bing Shun Li v. Holder, 400 F. App’x 854, 857 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (noting Wikipedia’s unreliability and citing Badasa v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 909, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2008)); see also Ex parte Three- Dimensional Media Group, Ltd., Appeal No. 2009-004087 (BPAI July 30, 2010) (non-precedential), at 31 (“Wikipedia is generally not considered to be as trustworthy as traditional sources for several reasons, for example, Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 15 also a function of human intelligence used in the course of everyday interpersonal communication, whether oral or written. That is, when a person listens to another speaker, or reads written words and phrases, that person’s brain effectively processes the received words and phrases that are spoken or written in a particular language to understand and comprehend the ideas and concepts associated with those received words and phrases. That Appellant admits that speech recognition is “typically performed on human mind” [sic] (Appeal Br. 15) only underscores this mental process. Therefore, applying NLP to a received message to perform the recited activity-based message determination and information extraction steps, including “determining an activity time from unstructured temporal information of the activity extracted from linguistic cues of tense information in the message” could be done entirely mentally by merely using logical reasoning to infer such a time from the language of the received message and its usage in context. For example, a human could infer a particular time for an activity from the phrase “I’m leaving the office right after my shift ends today,” namely the particular day and time (say 5 PM on a particular day of the week) when the individual’s scheduled shift ends, where the activity is the person leaving or exiting the office. The recited step of “expressing the activity time in a canonical form” likewise can be done entirely mentally or with pen and paper. Notably, Appellant’s Specification does not define the term “canonical” unlike other terms whose concrete definitions leave no doubt as to their meaning. See Spec. ¶ 21 (defining the terms “activity” and “content” explicitly). The because (1) it is not peer reviewed; (2) the authors are unknown; and (3) apparently anyone can contribute to the source definition”). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 16 Specification’s paragraph 35 does, however, give an example of dates in a canonical form, such as “YYYY/MM/DD,” and notes that hours can be standardized into a 24-hour format. Although this description informs our understanding of the term “canonical form,” we decline to import that description into the claim. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments. . . . [C]laims may embrace different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We, therefore, interpret the term “canonical form” with its plain meaning in the art, namely “[a] particularly clean and simple representation which usually follows or satisfies a general rule.” MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL TERMS 304 (5th ed. 1994 Sybil P. Parker ed.). Given this definition, expressing an activity time in a canonical form, namely a particularly clean and simple representation which usually follows or satisfies a general rule, could be done either mentally or by writing that expression down on a piece of paper. For example, not only could the employee’s exit time of “5 PM” be cognitively inferred from the received phrase “I’m leaving the office right after my shift ends today” in the example above, but that time could also be expressed either mentally or on a piece of paper in a canonical form, such as “1700”-a particularly clean and simple representation that comports with a standard 24-hour format. To the extent Appellant contends that these language-based inferences and their associated canonical expressions cannot be done mentally (see Reply Br. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 17 24), we disagree. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a map of credit card numbers can be constructed by writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address); Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Technologies, Inc., 815 F. App’x 529, 536-37 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (non-precedential) (holding ineligible recited data backup method that (1) formatted data stored at a mobile customer premises equipment into fields by determining data fields; (2) identified which data portions corresponded to a respective data field; and (3) tagged the data as directed to an abstract idea). Therefore, applying NLP on the received message to (1) determine the message is associated with a user activity, and (2) extract information associated with the activity by performing the recited operations fits squarely within the mental processes category of the USPTO’s eligibility guidelines and, therefore, recites an abstract idea. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(III). The recited (1) “storing . . . the activity, activity type, the indication, and the activity time in the canonical form in an entry . . . ,” and (2) “generating, based on the entry, a recommendation for the activity to the user in response to the probability of interest for the activity being greater than a threshold” likewise can be done entirely mentally or with pen and paper. In addition, the recited recommendation generation effectively manages personal behavior, relationships, or interactions between people, including following rules or instructions, at least regarding recommending particular activities to others. Accordingly, the recited storing and recommendation generation steps fit squarely within the mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity categories of the Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 18 USPTO’s eligibility guidelines and, therefore, recite an abstract idea. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(II)-(III).7 Notably, the recited (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository” are the only recited elements beyond the abstract idea, but these additional elements, considered individually and in combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 1 as a whole. First, we are not persuaded that the claimed invention improves a computer or its components’ functionality or efficiency, or otherwise changes the way those devices function, at least in the sense contemplated by the Federal Circuit in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claimed self-referential table in Enfish was a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention uses such a data structure to improve a computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the way that device functions (see Appeal Br. 21-22, 24-25), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is rooted in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical solution 7 As the Examiner indicates (Ans. 17), Appellant’s contention that the Examiner failed to identify which elements of the claimed invention are directed to a mathematical relationship or formula (Appeal Br. 18) is inapposite to the Examiner’s ineligibility determination that was limited to the mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity categories of the USPTO’s eligibility guidelines. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 19 (see Appeal Br. 22-25; Reply Br. 22-24), we disagree. Even assuming, without deciding, that the claimed invention uses artificial intelligence, including applying NLP, to perform the recited steps as Appellant contends, any speed or efficiency increase comes from the capabilities of the generic computer components-not the recited process itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (non-precedential) (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general- purpose computer ‘do not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.’” (citation omitted)). Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of claim 1 is not on an improvement in computer processors as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use generic computing components as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095. Nor is this invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 22). There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules that rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 20 Notably, the recited process automatically animated characters using particular information and techniques-an improvement over manual three- dimensional animation techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1316. But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed invention here (1) analyzes information received in a natural language; (2) extracts and formats certain information based on that analysis; and (3) makes recommendations based on the extracted information. This generic computer implementation is not only directed to mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity, but also does not improve a display mechanism as was the case in McRO. See SAP Am. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (distinguishing McRO). Rather, Appellant’s claimed invention is more analogous to that which the court held ineligible in In re Greenstein, 778 F. App’x 935 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (non-precedential). There, the court held ineligible claims reciting a method for providing recommendations over the internet where software was used to (1) process a stored received request for the purchase or lease of goods or services, and (2) present a recommendation as directed to the abstract idea of providing recommendations for a purchaser or lessor. See Greenstein, 778 F. App’x at 936-40. Our emphasis underscores that, like Appellant’s invention, the invention in Greenstein provided recommendations to users automatically after processing received requests-automatic recommendation functionality that, despite using software to achieve that end, was nonetheless directed to an abstract idea. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 21 Appellant’s claimed invention is also analogous to that which the court held ineligible in Enco Sys., Inc. v. DaVincia, LLC, 845 F. App’x 953 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (non-precedential). There, the court held ineligible claims reciting providing captioning in an audio-visual (AV) signal by, among other things, (1) automatically identifying a voice and speech pattern in an audio signal with a speech-to-text processing system; (2) training the speech-to- text processing system to learn new words in the audio signal; and (3) directly translating the audio signal in the AV signal to caption data automatically with the speech-to-text processing system, where the translation was adjusted based on the training and identification of the voice and speech pattern as directed to the abstract idea of automating the AV- captioning process. See Enco, 845 F. App’x at 954-58. Our emphasis underscores that the claimed invention in Enco effectively used NLP, namely converting a natural language input into digital form to enable the computer to understand and respond to that input,8 to perform at least some of the recited functions. See id. 8 See Steven M. Kaplan, WILEY ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING DICTIONARY 497 (2004) (“Wiley EE Dictionary”) (defining “natural language processing” as “[t]he conversion of a natural language input into digital form, so that computers may understand and respond to it. Used, for instance, to convert words, phrases, and sentences spoken into a microphone into computer actions, or text which can be displayed, processed, saved, or printed.” (bolding omitted). The term “natural language processing” “also applies to such processing of a written natural language text which is scanned.” Id. That same dictionary also defines “natural language” as “[a] language, such as Spanish or German, which evolves naturally over an extended period, as opposed to an artificial language, such as machine language, which has been developed for specific needs.” Id. (bolding omitted). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 22 Appellant’s claimed invention is likewise analogous to that which the court held ineligible in West View Research, LLC v. Audi AG, 685 F. App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2017). There, the court held ineligible a smart computerized apparatus capable of interactive information exchange with a human user, where the apparatus identifies entities matching at least part of an entity’s name spoken by a user, where the entity is one to which the user wishes to navigate and, after receiving subsequent user speech input, (1) identifies one of the entities and an associated location, and (2) provides a graphical representation of the location, its immediate surroundings, and another geographically-proximate entity as directed to an abstract idea. See West View, 685 F. App’x at 924-27. Our emphasis underscores that the claimed invention in West View effectively used NLP, namely converting a natural language input into digital form to enable the computer to understand and respond to that input, to perform at least some of the recited functions. See id. Appellant’s claimed invention is likewise analogous to that which the court held ineligible in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014). There, the court held ineligible a method of processing information from diverse types of documents by (1) receiving output from an automated digitizing unit; (2) storing information in memory, where the information was not fixed from one document to the next; (3) recognizing document portions corresponding to a data field; and (4) storing information from those document portions into memory locations for that field as directed to the abstract idea of (a) collecting data; (b) recognizing certain data within the collected data set; and (c) storing the recognized data in memory. See Content Extraction, 776 F.3d Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 23 at 1345-49. Our emphasis underscores that the claimed invention in Content Extraction effectively used NLP, namely converting a natural language input into digital form to enable the computer to understand and respond to that input, to perform at least some of the recited functions. See id. Appellant’s claimed invention, however, is not analogous to that which the Board held eligible in Ex parte Hannun, Appeal No. 2018-003323 (PTAB Mar. 28, 2019) (informative). There, the Board held eligible a computerized speech transcription method that was directed to a specific implementation including the steps of (1) normalizing an input file; (2) generating a “jitter set” of audio files; (3) generating a set of spectrogram frames; (4) obtaining predicted character probabilities from a trained neural network; and (5) decoding a transcription of the input audio using the predicted character probability outputs. See Hannun, at 9-10. To be sure, the claimed invention in Hannun effectively used NLP, namely converting a natural language input into digital form to enable the computer to understand and respond to that input, to perform at least some of the recited functions. Nevertheless, the above five steps noted by the Board in Hannun, unlike those in Appellant’s claimed invention here, could not be practically performed mentally nor did they organize human activity. See id. Cf. Enco, 845 F. App’x at 957-58 (distinguishing Hannun). Nor is Appellant’s claimed invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014) despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 22-24; Reply Br. 24). In DDR, instead of a computer network operating in its normal, expected manner by sending a website visitor to a Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 24 third-party website apparently connected with a clicked advertisement, the claimed invention in DDR generated and directed the visitor to a hybrid page that presented (1) product information from the third party, and (2) visual “look and feel” elements from the host website. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258-59. Given this particular Internet-based solution, the court held that the claimed invention did not merely use the Internet to perform a business practice known from the pre-Internet world, but rather was necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in computer networks. Id. at 1257. That is not the case here. As noted previously, Appellant’s claimed invention, in essence, (1) analyzes information received in a natural language; (2) extracts and formats certain information based on that analysis; and (3) makes recommendations based on the extracted information. The claimed invention here is not necessarily rooted in computer technology in the sense contemplated by DDR where the claimed invention solved a challenge particular to the Internet. Although Appellant’s invention uses computing components, the claimed invention does not solve a challenge particular to those components that are used to implement this functionality. Nor is Appellant’s claimed invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011) despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 28-29; Reply Br. 27). There, the court held eligible a method of immunizing a mammalian subject that (1) screened immunization schedules by (a) identifying two groups of mammals immunized according to respective immunization schedules; and (b) comparing the schedules’ Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 25 effectiveness in protecting against or inducing a chronic disorder to identify lower and higher risk schedules, respectively; and (2) immunized a subject in accordance with a lower risk schedule. See Classen, 659 F.3d at 1060-69. The court noted that the claims were directed to a specific, tangible application, namely lowering the risk of a chronic immune-mediated disorder, including the physical step of immunizing on a determined schedule. Id. at 1066. That is not the case here. As noted previously, Appellant’s claimed invention, in essence, (1) analyzes information received in a natural language; (2) extracts and formats certain information based on that analysis; and (3) makes recommendations based on the extracted information. In short, Appellant’s claimed invention does not recite a specific, tangible application as was the case with that in Classen, particularly given the court emphasizing its physical immunization step. See id. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention is somehow tied to a particular machine to satisfy the machine-or- transformation test (see Appeal Br. 27; Reply Br. 25), we disagree. To be sure, a claim that transforms a particular article to another state or thing or is tied to a particular machine to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test can be a “useful clue” to eligibility in the Alice/Mayo framework. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010)); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593; see also MPEP § 2106.05(b) (citing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604). Despite not being the sole eligibility test, the machine-or-transformation test can Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 26 nevertheless indicate whether additional elements integrate the exception into a practical application. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(b), (c). It is well settled, however, that whether a recited device is a tangible system or, in 35 U.S.C. § 101 terms, a “machine,” is not dispositive. ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”)). For a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., by using a computer for performing calculations. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Here, the recited machine-based components, including the (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository” function solely as obvious mechanisms for permitting the recited solution to be achieved more quickly and, therefore, do not meaningfully limit the claim’s scope. See Versata, 793 F.3d at 1335. So, leaving aside the fact that satisfying the machine-or-transformation test is not dispositive to eligibility, see Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604, that test is not satisfied here in any event. Therefore, the recited additional elements, namely the recited (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 27 user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository” do not integrate the exception into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.05(b), (c).9 To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention’s field of use somehow renders the invention eligible (see Appeal Br. 27), we disagree. That the claimed invention recommends activities, without more, does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, for merely generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment or field of use does not render the claimed invention any less abstract. See Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DirectTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016); accord Flook, 437 U.S. at 584, 588-90, 596-97 (holding ineligible method for updating an alarm limit on a process variable, despite the process involving the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons); see also MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(I); 2106.05(h). Furthermore, the recited query reception is insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, does not integrate the 9 Although Appellant refers to a Board Decision entitled Ex parte Milman that is said to have been decided on August 22, 2017 on page 27 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant provides no citation information for this decision. Nor are we able to find this decision that is said to have been decided on that date. Although a decision entitled Ex parte Milman was mailed on July 26, 2017, the panel in that case actually affirmed the Examiner’s ineligibility rejection in that case. See Ex parte Milman, Appeal No. 2015-006545 (PTAB July 26, 2017). Nevertheless, to the extent Appellant relies on this or another non-precedential Board decision, we are not bound by those decisions here. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) (“SOP 2”) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FIN AL.pdf (“A routine decision is binding in the case in which it is made, even if it is not designated as precedential or informative, but it is not otherwise binding authority.”). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 28 exception into a practical application for that additional reason. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra- solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371-72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data- gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); accord MPEP § 2106.05(g). On this record, then, the claimed invention does not recite additional elements that (1) improve a computer itself; (2) improve another technology or technical field; (3) implement the abstract idea in conjunction with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim; (4) transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing; or (5) apply or use the abstract idea in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the abstract idea’s use to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(I), 2106.05(a)-(c), (e). In short, the claim’s additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 1 as a whole. In conclusion, although the recited functions may be beneficial by (1) analyzing information received in a natural language; (2) extracting and formatting certain information based on that analysis; and (3) making recommendations based on the extracted information, a claim for a useful or beneficial abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 29 Claims 1, 8, and 15: Alice/Mayo Step Two Turning to Alice/Mayo step two, claim 1’s additional recited elements, namely the recited (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository”-considered individually and as an ordered combination-do not provide an inventive concept that amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea when reading claim 1 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. As noted above, the claimed invention merely uses generic computing components to implement the recited abstract idea. Here, the claimed (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository” are the additional recited elements whose generic computing functionality is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Fair Warning, 839 F.3d at 1096 (noting that using generic computing components like a microprocessor or user interface do not transform an otherwise abstract idea into eligible subject matter); buySAFE v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network-with no further specification-is not even arguably inventive.”); accord Spec. ¶ 61 (disclosing various general-purpose computer components used to implement the invention); Final Act. 16; Ans. 26 (citing this disclosure). That Appellant admitted in the earlier appeal that the then-claimed method could be performed by a general-purpose computer only underscores the notion that the claimed invention does not focus on an improvement in Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 30 computers as tools, but rather certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools. See Bd. Dec. 10 (“That Appellants admit that the claimed method can be performed by a general-purpose computer . . . only bolsters the notion that the claimed invention does not focus on an improvement in computers as tools, but rather certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.”). To the extent that Appellant contends that the recited limitations other than the five additional elements enumerated above, namely those detailed above in connection with Alice step one, add significantly more to the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two (see Appeal Br. 17), these limitations are not additional elements beyond the abstract idea, but rather are directed to the abstract idea as noted previously. See BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional” (emphasis added)); see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(II), 2106.05(d) (instructing that additional recited elements should be evaluated in Alice/Mayo step two to determine whether they (1) add specific limitations that are not well- understood, routine, and conventional in the field, or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry). Rather, the claimed (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository” are additional recited elements whose generic computing functionality is well-understood, Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 31 routine, and conventional. See Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that components such an “interface,” “network,” and “database” are generic computer components that do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement); accord Spec. ¶ 61 (describing generic computer components used to implement the invention); Final Act. 16-17 (determining that the recited additional elements are generic computing components that do not add significantly more to the abstract idea). To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner allegedly did not comply with the USPTO’s evidentiary requirements for ineligibility rejections after Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (see Appeal Br. 16-17), such an argument is unavailing. To be sure, the Examiner must show-with supporting facts-that certain claim elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional where such a finding is made. See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369 (noting that whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention is a factual determination). In light of this factual determination, the USPTO requires that Examiners support a finding that an additional element, or combination of additional elements, is well- understood, routine, and conventional. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(I)(2). As noted previously, the recited (1) computer-executed method; (2) “activity management system”; (3) “server”; (3) “mobile device”; (4) message entered into the user’s mobile device; and (5) “repository” are additional recited elements whose generic computing functionality is well- understood, routine, and conventional. Therefore, to the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner failed to provide evidence that all Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 32 recited elements-including those other than the additional elements enumerated above-are well-understood, routine, and conventional (see Appeal Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 2), such an argument is not commensurate with the more limited scope of the Examiner’s finding in this regard. Rather, the Examiner’s finding is that the elements other than the abstract idea, namely the additional computer-based elements, provide generic computing functionality that is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Final Act. 11 (noting that the recited additional elements are conventional generic computing components and, therefore, do not add significantly more to the abstract idea). As noted previously, there is ample evidence of this generic computing functionality in not only the cited case law, but also Appellant’s own Specification. See, e.g., In re Jobin, 811 F. App’x 633, 637-38 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (non-precedential) (noting that recited “online system,” “server,” “data structure,” and “user device” elements recite generic technology for implementing the claimed abstract idea); FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1096 (noting that using generic computing components like a microprocessor or user interface do not transform an otherwise abstract idea into eligible subject matter); Spec. ¶ 61 (describing generic computer components used to implement the invention); Final Act. 16-17 (citing relevant authority). Appellant’s contention that the Examiner’s citation to Berkheimer is inappropriate because the Examiner must ostensibly first demonstrate whether the claimed elements are similar to Berkheimer (Appeal Br. 16) is unavailing. As the Examiner indicates (Ans. 9), the Examiner cites Berkheimer merely as the legal basis for the requirement that the Examiner show, with supporting facts, that certain claim elements are well-understood, Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 33 routine, and conventional where such a finding is made-an evidentiary requirement mandated in conjunction with the USPTO’s eligibility guidelines. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(I)(2). Nor do we find availing Appellant’s contention that the Examiner reliance on patents in this regard ostensibly shows that the present disclosure is “innovative and unconventional.” Appeal Br. 17. Not only does Appellant fail to cite authority to support such a contention, Appellant’s contention actually runs counter to the accepted forms of evidence enumerated in the MPEP that satisfy the Berkheimer evidentiary requirement. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(I)(2) (noting that an appropriate form of support is a citation to a publication that demonstrates the well- understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s)). To the extent Appellant contends that a patent somehow does not qualify as such a publication, Appellant provides no evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. That the Examiner did not reject the claims over prior art as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 17) is not dispositive to patent eligibility-a separate statutory inquiry. See Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 868 F.3d 1350, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo test is a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not directed to novelty or nonobviousness, but rather searches for elements sufficient to ensure that the claimed invention is directed to more than a patent ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18. “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 34 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”); Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that an eligibility finding does not turn on the novelty of using a user-downloadable application for the particular purpose recited in the claims). Appellant’s reliance on BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 27-28; Reply Br. 27) is likewise unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims directed to a technology-based solution to filter Internet content that overcame existing problems with other Internet filtering systems by making a known filtering solution-namely a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet Service Provider (ISP)-more dynamic and efficient via individualized filtering at the ISP. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. Notably, this customizable filtering solution improved the computer system’s performance and, therefore, was patent-eligible. See id. But unlike the filtering system improvements in BASCOM that added significantly more to the abstract idea in that case, the claimed invention here uses generic computing components to implement an abstract idea as noted previously. The recited insignificant extra-solution activity, namely the recited query reception step, likewise does not add significantly more to the abstract idea. That a query with a recommendation request and message is received does not mean that this data gathering function is performed in an unconventional way to add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two. See MPEP Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 35 § 2106.05(II). Given these limitations’ high level of generality, the recited extra-solution activity does not add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two. In conclusion, the additional recited elements-considered individually and as an ordered combination-do not add significantly more to the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 1 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1, and claims 8 and 15 not argued separately with particularity. Claims 2, 9, and 16 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 reciting identifying the activity type and determining the activity time from the unstructured temporal information comprises searching the message for one or more predetermined keywords or text patterns based on application of the NLP on the message. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 29; Reply Br. 27-28), and for the reasons noted previously, searching a message for keywords or text patterns based on applying NLP to the message can be done entirely mentally. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that obtained information about transactions that used an Internet address identified with a credit card transaction could be performed by a human who simply reads records of Internet credit card transactions from a pre-existing database). Therefore, because the recited limitations are part of the abstract idea, they do not add significantly more to the abstract Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 36 idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 2 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2, and claims 9 and 16 not argued separately with particularity. Claims 3-5, 10-12, and 17-19 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 reciting identifying the indication of willingness to participate in the identified activity type comprises (1) determining, based on the application of the NLP on the message, that an activity of the identified activity type has occurred in the past, is occurring at the present time, or is going to occur at a future time; and (2) incorporating a relative positive or negative willingness of the user to participate in the identified activity type into the indication of willingness. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 29-30; Reply Br. 27-28), and for the reasons noted previously, the recited temporal determination based on applying NLP to the message, and the relative positive or negative willingness incorporation can be done entirely mentally using observation and logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address). Therefore, because the recited limitations are part of the abstract idea, they do not add significantly more to Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 37 the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 3 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2, and claims 4, 5, 10-12, and 17-19 not argued separately with particularity. Claims 6, 13, and 20 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6 reciting (1) converting the identified activity type, the indication of willingness, and the location information to a canonical form that corresponds to the canonical form of the activity time; and (2) storing, in the entry, the converted information in association with the activity time in the canonical form. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 30; Reply Br. 27-28), and for the reasons noted previously, the recited conversion can be done entirely mentally using observation and logical reasoning, and the converted information can be stored cognitively by merely remembering it or writing it down on a piece of paper. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address); see also id. (noting that a map of credit card numbers can be constructed by writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address). Therefore, because the recited limitations are part of the abstract idea, they do not add significantly Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 38 more to the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 6 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 6, and claims 13 and 20 not argued separately with particularity. Claims 7, 14, and 20 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 reciting causing the entry to expire in the repository based on the activity time in the entry and a set of pre-defined expiration rules. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 30; Reply Br. 27-28), and for the reasons noted previously, causing an entry to expire can be done entirely mentally by (1) cognitively comparing the activity’s time to a predetermined threshold, such as the current time, and (2) designating activities before the current time as moot or “expired” because they occurred in the past-a cognitive comparison and decision that merely uses observation and logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address); see also id. (noting that a map of credit card numbers can be constructed by writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address). Therefore, because the recited limitations are part of the abstract idea, and because the recited Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 39 repository is an additional generic computing element as noted previously, the recited limitations do not add significantly more to the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 7 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 7, and claims 14 and 20 not argued separately with particularity. Claims 22 and 23 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22 reciting receiving a second message from a second mobile device belonging to a second user, and assigning a default future tense to the second message. First, not only does the recited “receiving a second message from a . . . second user” merely gather data and, therefore, is insignificant extra- solution activity,10 the recited message reception can be done entirely mentally by a human who merely reads a message written by a second user. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that obtained information about transactions that used an Internet address identified with a credit card transaction could be performed by a human who simply reads records of Internet credit card transactions from a pre-existing database). Therefore, the recited receiving step fits squarely within the mental 10 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371-72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); accord MPEP § 2106.05(g). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 40 processes category of the USPTO’s eligibility guidelines and, therefore, recites an abstract idea. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(III). Furthermore, despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 30; Reply Br. 27-28), and for the reasons noted previously, assigning a default future tense to the second message can be done entirely mentally by cognitively associating that tense to the message after reading it-a mental association that merely uses observation and logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address); see also id. (noting that a map of credit card numbers can be constructed by writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address). Therefore, because the recited limitations are part of the abstract idea, and because the recited second mobile device is an additional generic computing element as noted previously, the recited limitations do not add significantly more to the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 22 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 22, and claim 23 not argued separately with particularity. Claim 24 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 reciting (1) receiving a series of messages from the mobile device; (2) revising a model Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 41 of plans for the user based on the series of messages based on the application of the NLP on the message; (3) reducing the probability of interest for the activity and increasing a second probability of interest for a second activity, based on the revised model; and (4) modifying the recommendation to incorporate the second activity in response to determining that the second probability of interest is above a predetermined threshold. First, not only does the limitation reciting “receiving a series of messages . . .” merely gather data and, therefore, is insignificant extra- solution activity,11 it can be done entirely mentally by a human who merely reads messages written by a user. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that obtained information about transactions that used an Internet address identified with a credit card transaction could be performed by a human who simply reads records of Internet credit card transactions from a pre-existing database). Therefore, the recited receiving step fits squarely within the mental processes category of the USPTO’s eligibility guidelines and, therefore, recites an abstract idea. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(III). Furthermore, despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 30; Reply Br. 27-28), and for the reasons noted previously, the recited model revision, associated interest probability increase and reduction, and recommendation modification can be done entirely mentally by (1) 11 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371-72 (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); accord MPEP § 2106.05(g). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 42 cognitively changing a mental “model of plans” after reading the messages; (2) cognitively adjusting the activities’ respective probabilities of interest based on this change to the mental model; (3) cognitively comparing the second probability to a predetermined threshold to determine if that probability is above the threshold and, if so, (4) mentally modifying the recommendation to incorporate the second activity-mental analysis and decisions that merely use observation and logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address); see also id. (noting that a map of credit card numbers can be constructed by writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address). Therefore, because the recited limitations are part of the abstract idea, and because the recited mobile device is an additional generic computing element as noted previously, the recited limitations do not add significantly more to the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 24 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 24. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 43 Claim 25 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25 reciting recording an uncertainty variable indicating a degree to which the activity management system is uncertain of an activity time value. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 31; Reply Br. 27-28), and for the reasons noted previously, the recited uncertainty variable can be conceived entirely mentally, and recorded by merely writing it down on a piece of paper-mental analysis and decisions that merely use observation and logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address); see also id. (noting that a map of credit card numbers can be constructed by writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address). Therefore, because the recited limitations are part of the abstract idea, and because the recited activity management system is an additional generic computing element as noted previously, the recited limitations do not add significantly more to the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 25 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 25. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 44 THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REJECTION The Examiner finds that the recited limitations that are based on applying NLP on the message lack support and, therefore, fail to satisfy the written description requirement under § 112, first paragraph. Final Act. 18- 19; Ans. 4-8. Although the Examiner acknowledges that (1) Appellant’s disclosure supports extracting information, including information in natural languages, and (2) NLP may involve extracting information, the Examiner nonetheless finds that Appellant’s disclosure does not support the recited limitations that are based on applying NLP application on the message. See Final Act. 18-19; Ans. 4-8. Appellant argues that the disclosure supports the recited limitations that are based on applying NLP on the message, particularly given NLP’s meaning in the art considered in light of, among other things, the disclosed (1) keyword and pattern searching; (2) activity determination based on that search result; (3) conversion of extracted information to canonical form; and (4) storing that information in a repository as described in paragraphs 55 to 58 of the Specification and Figure 3. See Appeal Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 8-11. ISSUE Has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under § 112, first paragraph by finding that Appellant’s original disclosure fails to convey with reasonable clarity that Appellant possessed applying NLP to the message to, among other things, perform the recited participation willingness indication identification and activity time determination steps based on that NLP application? Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 45 ANALYSIS We begin by noting that the term “NLP” was not recited in the claims that were before us in the earlier appeal, much less the recited limitations that are based on applying NLP on the message that now form the principal basis for Appellant’s arguments, including those with respect to the eligibility rejection as noted previously. See Bd. Dec. 2 (reproducing then- pending claim 1). Rather, the term “NLP” and, more specifically, the recited limitations that apply NLP on the message, were added to the claims after our earlier decision. See Request for Continued Examination filed Dec. 28, 2018, at 2-11; see also Amd’t filed Feb. 20, 2020, at 2-10. Nor does the term “NLP” appear in Appellant’s original disclosure, much less applying NLP on the message as now claimed. That silence, however, is not dispositive here. To be sure, satisfying the written description requirement requires that the disclosure reasonably convey to skilled artisans that Appellant possessed the claimed invention as of the filing date. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The written description requirement, however, does not demand (1) any particular form of disclosure, or (2) the Specification recite the claimed invention verbatim. Id. at 1352. Here, Appellant’s original disclosure reasonably supports the recited application of NLP on the message, despite lacking that explicit terminology. As noted previously, the term “NLP” is defined quite broadly in the art, namely “[t]he conversion of a natural language input into digital form, so that computers may understand and respond to it. Used, for instance, to convert words, phrases, and sentences spoken into a microphone into computer actions, or text which can be displayed, processed, saved, or Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 46 printed.” (bolding omitted). Wiley EE Dictionary, at 497. That dictionary adds that NLP “also applies to such processing of a written natural language text which is scanned.” Id. Moreover, the same dictionary also defines “natural language” as “[a] language, such as Spanish or German, which evolves naturally over an extended period, as opposed to an artificial language, such as machine language, which has been developed for specific needs.” Id. (bolding omitted). Based on this authority, whose publication date not only precedes Appellant’s filing date and is an established, peer-reviewed publication in the electrical engineering art-unlike the authorities proffered by Appellant to establish the meaning of “NLP”12-the functionality of Appellant’s disclosed invention effectively applies NLP on messages as claimed. For example, Appellant’s Figure 3 shows an exemplary process of extracting implicit or explicit temporal or location information from a 12 As the Examiner indicates (Ans. 6), the cited Gerbade article was published over 10 years after Appellant’s filing date. Therefore, this article’s probative value is diminished, at least regarding establishing the meaning of “NLP” at the time of the invention, namely January 23, 2008. We reach a similar conclusion regarding Appellant’s reliance on Wikipedia on page 14 of the Reply Brief to establish the meaning of “NLP.” Not only was the content on this web site made available to the public well after Appellant’s filing date, Wikipedia is a non-peer-reviewed source of dubious reliability. See Holder, 400 F. App’x at 857 (noting Wikipedia’s unreliability and citing Badasa, 540 F.3d at 910-11); see also Ex parte Three-Dimensional Media Group, Ltd., Appeal No. 2009-004087 (BPAI July 30, 2010), at 31 (“Wikipedia is generally not considered to be as trustworthy as traditional sources for several reasons, for example, because (1) it is not peer reviewed; (2) the authors are unknown; and (3) apparently anyone can contribute to the source definition”). Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 47 message to recommend activities. Spec. ¶ 55. As shown in that figure, the system, among other things, (1) searches received messages for keywords and patterns corresponding to activities; (2) analyzes the message temporal, location, and preference information; (3) converts the extracted information to canonical form; (4) stores that extracted information in a repository; and (5) ultimately produces a list of recommended activities. Spec. ¶¶ 55-57. Given this functionality that includes extracting implicit temporal or location information from a received message-implicit information contained in natural language statements and phrases as noted in the Specification’s paragraph 29-Appellant’s disclosed functionality effectively applies NLP to received messages as claimed. We reach this conclusion particularly given the relatively broad definition of “NLP” in the art noted above, namely “[t]he conversion of a natural language input into digital form, so that computers may understand and respond to it.” See Wiley EE Dictionary, at 497. To be sure, a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the written description requirement. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352 (citations omitted). But that is not the case here, where the functionality described in Appellant’s original disclosure effectively applies NLP to received messages in the manner claimed. Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-25 as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Appeal 2021-001523 Application 12/018,511 48 CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s) /Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-25 101 Eligibility 1-25 1-25 112, first paragraph Written Description 1-25 Overall Outcome 1-25 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED