Jesse Bunch

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 26, 2022

2020006453 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/369,865 12/05/2016 Jesse Clement Bunch Bunch-Jesse.Np.01 6630 15365 7590 01/26/2022 Law Office of Michael O'Brien 5355 Northland Dr. NE Suite C131 GRAND RAPIDS, MI 49525 EXAMINER LAROCQUE, EMILY E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2182 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/26/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@obrienpatents.com mobrien@lawyer.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte JESSE CLEMENT BUNCH ____________________ Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, JOHN A. EVANS, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s non-final rejection of claims 5 and 8-22. Claims 1-4, 6, and 7 have been cancelled, and claims 23 and 24 are objected to. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Deepstone LLC. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 2 BACKGROUND According to Appellant, this patent application concerns “use of equations in computer-based systems to solve problems.” Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification describes that “[m]uch of the learning process in STEM at this time involves determining which equation (or equations) to use and how to use it. The instant invention helps to automate and simplify that process.” Id. at 4. Claim 5 illustrates the claimed invention: 5. A computer-implemented method for a user of a device having an input device and a display; the computer- implemented method comprising: displaying a first representation on the display by: selecting a first equation to display using the input device; displaying the first equation on the display; wherein the first equation further comprises a first equation first expression equal to a first equation second expression; causing the first equation to be displayed as a first equator by: modifying the first equation into a form of a rational expression so the first equation first expression is a numerator and the first equation second expression is a denominator; thereby creating a modified first equation; and providing a symbol within the rational expression on the display wherein the symbol indicates the rational expression is an equator. Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 3 REJECTIONS Claims 5 and 8-221 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Non-Final Act. 4-7. DISCUSSION We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and Appellant’s arguments. Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 5 and 8-22 under § 101. Consistent with the discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s findings, reasoning, and conclusions in the Non-Final Office Action (Non-Final Act. 4-7) and the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 4-7). Appellant argues claims 5 and 8-22 as a group. Appeal Br. 5. Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the § 101 rejection of claims 5 and 8-22 based on representative claim 5. Section 101 Rejection Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in error. Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to 1 In the heading of the rejection, the Examiner identified claims 5 and 9-22. Non-Final Act. 4. In the body of the rejection, the Examiner identified claims 5 and 8-24. Id. at 5. The Examiner, however, withdrew the § 101 rejection of claims 23 and 24. Id. at 2. For clarity, we identify claims 5 and 8-22 as rejected. Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 4 include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217-18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 5 become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 6 In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101.2, 3 Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4 MPEP § 2106.04(a)) and § 2106.04(d). 2 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). In response to public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. 3 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. 4 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (1) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (2) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether” the claim as a whole “integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)(II). Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 7 Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application,5 do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.6 MPEP § 2106.05(d). Step 1 Claim 5, as a method claim, falls within the process category of § 101. See MPEP §§ 2106.03, 2106.06; Appeal Br. 5; Ans. 4. Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception? The Examiner determined that claim 5 recites mental processes and mathematical concepts. Ans. 5; Non-Final Act. 5. In particular, the Examiner determined that the steps “selecting a first equation to display”, and “providing a symbol within the rational expression on the display wherein the symbol indicates the rational expression is an equator”' are mental processes that can be performed in the human mind. The step of “modifying the first equation into a form of a rational 5 This corresponds to Alice part one where it is determined whether the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. If a claim is “not directed to an abstract idea under part one of the Alice framework, we do not need to proceed to step two.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 6 This corresponds to Alice part two where it is determined whether the claim contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 8 expression so the first equation first expression is an equator numerator and the first equation second expression is an equator denominator; thereby creating a modified first equation” is both a mental process and a mathematical concept. These steps are merely steps one would make in the human mind as part of a mathematical relationship to manipulate an equation. Selecting and manipulating equations is a common activity performed to reduce or represent an equation in a form more suitable for reduction or further use is a basic mathematical concept. Use of an arguably new expression such as an “equator” as a symbol within an expression is merely introduction of a new mathematical symbol or operation. Ans. 5; see also Non-Final Act. 5. Consistent with Appellant’s description of the claims, we find that the limitations summarized above describe abstract ideas that are fairly characterized as mental processes and mathematical concepts. See MPEP § 2106.04(a) Appellant argues that the Examiner erred because “[t]here is no abstract idea for Claim 5, because that claim is directed to a specific application of a graphic user interface (GUI),” and “[c]laim 5 is patentable because an implementation of a graphic user interface is a specific technical tool and not an abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 26. Appellant also argues that the steps of “selecting a first equation to display” and “tagging the rational expression to indicate the rational expression is an equator” are not mental processes because the Examiner “has cited no reference that any human has ever placed a symbol on a display within a rational expression to indicate that the rational expression is an equator.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing Magna Elecs., Inc. v. Valeo, Inc., No. 13-11376, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77326 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2017)). Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 9 We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. The limitations “selecting a first equation to display,” “providing a symbol within the rational expression on the display wherein the symbol indicates the rational expression is an equator,” and “modifying” the form of an equation, as recited in claim 5, can be performed by the human mind or with pen and paper. The 2019 Revised Guidance explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”), quoted in 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14. Moreover, mathematical concepts include mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)(I). Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s determination that claim 5 recites a mathematical concept. Arguments not made are waived. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant’s argument that the Examiner “has cited no reference that any human has ever placed a symbol on a display within a rational expression to indicate that the rational expression is an equator” is unavailing. See Appeal Br. 8. The novelty of any element or steps in a Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 10 process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981). Our reviewing court further guides that “[e]ligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “[e]ven assuming” that a particular claimed feature was novel does not “avoid the problem of abstractness”). Because we agree with the Examiner that the claim recites an abstract idea, we proceed to Prong Two of Step 2A to determine if the idea is integrated into a practical application, in which case the claim as a whole would not be “directed to” merely an abstract idea. Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application? We determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. We use the term “additional elements” for claim features, limitations, or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See Revised Guidance at 55 n.24. In claim 5, the additional elements include the limitations “a device having an input device and a display,” “using the input Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 11 device” to select a first equation to display, and “displaying the first equation.” See Non-Final Act. 5. To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). The Examiner determined that none of the additional limitations is sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because “[t]he device and use of the device to display are merely generally linked to the mental steps, and mathematical concepts without specifically limiting the practice of the abstract idea.” Non-Final Act. 5. The Examiner also determined that “the claim is devoid of technological improvements within the device, display or input that would result in a practical application of the abstract idea.” Id. In the Examiner’s view, “the claim merely recites doing some mental steps and math and ‘apply’ it to display on a device.” Id. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred because “[t]he Federal Circuit explained that a user interface is patentable subject matter in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. In Core Wireless, the court stated that a user interface claim “improves the efficiency of using the Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 12 electronic devices.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363. However, the court also explained that “[w]e also ask whether the claims are directed to a specific improvement in the capabilities of computing devices” (id. at 1361), and then determine whether “the claims are directed to an improvement in the functioning of computers” (id. at 1363). Thus, in Core Wireless, the improved efficiency of using the electronic devices was related to an identified improvement in the functioning of computers, i.e., allowing a user to more quickly access data and applications in electronic devices, improving “[t]he speed of a user’s navigation through various views and windows.” Id. Here, Appellant has not identified any such improvement to the functioning of the display in claim 5. Appellant’s claim 5 is also unlike the other technology-based integrations cited by Appellant. See Appeal Br. 8-9. For example, in Data Engine Technologies, the court held: When considered as a whole, and in light of the specification, representative claim 12 of the ’259 patent is not directed to an abstract idea. Rather, the claim is directed to a specific method for navigating through three-dimensional electronic spreadsheets. The method provides a specific solution to then- existing technological problems in computers and prior art electronic spreadsheets. Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1007-08 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We do not find sufficient support for Appellant’s assertion that the Federal Circuit held in Data Engine Technologies that “a [user interface] which creates an improved [user experience] that makes the [user interface] easier for users is patentable subject matter,” as Appellant contends. See Appeal Br. 8. Rather, the court determined that the appearance of tabs on a user interface “are specific structures within the three-dimensional Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 13 spreadsheet environment that allow a user to avoid the burdensome task of navigating through spreadsheets in separate windows using arbitrary commands.” Data Engine Techs., 906 F.3d at 1011. Here, Appellant has not persuaded us that any of the additional elements are specific structures within a three-dimensional spreadsheet environment that allow a user to avoid the burdensome task of navigating through spreadsheets in separate windows using arbitrary commands. See id. Nor has Appellant persuaded us that displaying an equation improves the functioning of a computer or any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)). Likewise, in McRO (see Appeal Br. 8-9), the patent-eligible claim focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation. McRO, Inc, v. Bandai Namco Games Am., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims in McRO recited a “specific . . . improvement in computer animation” using “unconventional rules that relate[d] sub sequences of phonemes, timings, and morph weight sets.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1302-03, 1307-08, 1314-15. In McRO, “the incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer,” improved an existing technological process. Id. at 1314. Appellant does not direct us to any evidence that the claimed steps correspond to unconventional rules. Considering claim 5 as a whole, then, Appellant’s invention lacks a technical solution to a technical problem like the claims in these cases. Claim 5 as a whole merely uses instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively, merely uses a computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea. Here, the additional limitation(s) do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 14 do not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field; (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception; (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state; or (iv) any other meaningful limitation. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, claim 5 recites an abstract ideas as identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and none of the limitations integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, because the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application, we conclude that the claim is directed to the judicial exception. Step 2B - “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More” If a claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B, we must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We look to see whether there are any “additional features” in the claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be more than “well- understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. The Examiner determined that the additional elements in claim 5 are not sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above, the Examiner determined that claim 5 merely links the abstract idea to a device having an input device and a display, and merely Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 15 uses the input device to display an equation without more. Non-Final Act. 5- 6. We agree with the Examiner that any inventive concept lies within the abstract mental steps and mathematical concepts. See id. at 6. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments based on Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See Appeal Br. 9. In Bascom, the claims were directed to the inventive concept of providing customizable Internet-content filtering which was found to transform the abstract idea of filtering content into a patent-eligible invention. Although the underlying idea of filtering Internet content was deemed abstract, the claims carved out a specific location for the filtering system, namely a remote Internet service provider (ISP) server, and required the filtering system to give users the ability to customize filtering for their individual network accounts. We find no persuasive analogy between Appellant’s display of equations and symbols and the claims in Bascom. Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification that indicates the display or other computer components perform anything other than well-understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as selecting data, manipulating data, and displaying data. Receiving data, determining which data to display, and displaying data are steps that are well-understood, routine, and conventional functions of a general purpose computer (see MPEP § 2106(d)), and Appellant does not provide sufficient evidence to the contrary. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network-with no further specification-is not even arguably inventive”); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 614 (Fed. Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 16 Cir. 2016) (server that receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images insufficient to add an inventive concept); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225-26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept). Because the Specification describes the additional elements in general terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim limitations may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional computer components and techniques, particularly in light of Appellant’s Specification, as cited above. See Berkheimer Memo7 § III.A.1; Spec. ¶ 91. We conclude claim 5 does not have an inventive concept because the claim, in essence, merely recites various computer-based elements along with no more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea using the computer-based elements. Because the claims are directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent claim 5 and grouped claims 8-22. CONCLUSION Claims Rejected U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 5, 8-22 101 Eligibility 5, 8-22 7 “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining that a specification that describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional). Appeal 2020-006453 Application 15/369,865 17 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time for taking any action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED