Jennifer H. Lyne

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 7, 2008

No. 78357832 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 7, 2008)

Mailed:
March 7, 2008

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Jennifer H. Lyne
________

Serial No. 78357832
(filed January 26, 2004)
_______

Robert C. Lyne of Thompson & McMullan, P.C. for Jennifer H.
Lyne

Edward Nelson, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 106
(Mary I. Sparrow, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Taylor, Bergsman, and Wellington, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Jennifer H. Lyne filed an intent-to-use application
for the mark MAN CAMP (in standard character format) for
services originally recited as follows:
Providing physical training and instruction in
occupational and life skills, in International Class
41.

During the prosecution of the application, applicant
amended the recitation of services to the following:
Providing via the internet to others, who may be
either male or female, instruction in occupational and
life skills to develop self-sufficiency, handiness,
and problem-solving competency, but not including
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Serial No. 78357832

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services provided in a camp, in International Class
41.

The application has been refused registration on the
ground that the mark is merely descriptive pursuant to
Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1),
and because the recitation of services, as amended, is
indefinite and unacceptable. Trademark Rule 2.71(a), 37
C.F.R. §2.71(a).
Before we address the grounds for refusal, we find it
helpful to briefly review the prosecution history of this
application.
In his first Office Action (issued August 19, 2004),
the Examining Attorney refused registration of applicant’s
mark MAN CAMP on the ground that it is merely descriptive
of the recited services because “applicant is providing a
‘camp’ (a place of temporary structures) where man/men are
trained or educated about occupational and life skills.”
On April 27, 2005, applicant responded to the first
Office Action arguing that her mark simply “evokes images
of a ‘camp’.” She argues the mark is not descriptive of
the recited services because CAMP is not “intended to refer
to an actual, physical place,” rather it is “intended to
conjure up positive images.” She also argues that MAN is
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being used suggestively, namely, that “a person attends to
learn to be a man.”
On June 24, 2005, the Examining Attorney issued an
Office Action making the descriptiveness refusal final. To
support the refusal, he attached dictionary definitions of
the terms “man” and “camp.”
In response to the final refusal, applicant filed (on
December 8, 2005) the amendment to her application’s
recitation of services.1 Again, by way of the amendment,
the recitation of services now reads:
Providing via the internet to others, who may be
either male or female, instruction in occupational and
life skills to develop self-sufficiency, handiness,
and problem-solving competency, but not including
services provided in a camp.

[Emphasis provided]

The amendment prompted the Trademark Examining
Attorney to issue (on February 6, 2006) a short non-final
Office Action wherein he stated the amended recitation of
services is unacceptable because it “no longer makes
reference to ‘providing physical training’ and the use of
‘instruction’ by itself broadens the scope of the recited
services and can not be accepted,” citing Trademark Rule

1 On January 12, 2006, the Board received applicant’s notice of
appeal. On the following day, the Board issued an order
suspending action on the appeal and restored jurisdiction to the
Examining Attorney for consideration of the amendment.
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2.71(a) and TMEP Section 1402.06. He continued the
descriptiveness refusal “for reasons previously set forth
in the prior office actions.”
On July 29, 2006, applicant filed a response arguing
that her amendment to the recitation is acceptable because
the deletion of “physical training” does not broaden the
original recitation of services. Applicant also argued
that the term CAMP is not descriptive because the amended
recitation contains the exclusion phrase, “but not
including services provided in a camp.”
On September 8, 2006, the Trademark Examining Attorney
issued a Office Action reinstituting the “finality” status
of the refusal to register applicant’s mark. He maintained
the descriptiveness refusal. As to the recitation of
services, the examining attorney did not address
applicant’s arguments in her response, but offered a
completely new reason for not accepting the amended
recitation of services based on the underlined phrase in
the recitation of services provided above.2 Specifically,
he states that this exclusionary phrase (“but not including

2 In the Office Action, the Examining Attorney states “[a]ll
other requirements previously set forth have been satisfied.” We
assume that this does not refer to the refusal to accept the
amended description of services even though the Examining
Attorney changed the reasoning behind the refusal.

Serial No. 78357832

5
services provided in a camp”) in the recitation of services
needs clarification because “the language is contradictory,
the instruction and skills attained as a result of
applicant’s intended services can in fact be provided in a
camp. Applicant must amend this wording to specify the
common commercial or generic name for the services. TMEP
§1402.01.”3
On February 14, 2007, applicant filed a request for
reconsideration wherein she argued, inter alia, that “any
exclusion is going to be to some degree contradictory to
the general statement to which it refers.” She also cited
TMEP Section 1402.06 which provides, in part Under 37
C.F.R. §2.71(a), there is no general prohibition against
specific types of limitations in identifications of goods
and services, such as the use of negatives, exceptions or
similar language. Limitations on identifications phrased
in the negative or as exceptions are acceptable, if they
are otherwise proper.
Applicant further contended that the term “services”
in the exclusionary phrase clearly refers to and limits

3 The Examining Attorney’s designation of this Office Action as
“final” appears to have been premature inasmuch as this is the
first time he objected to the exclusionary language. See TMEP
Section 714.03 [“Final action is appropriate when a clear issue
has been developed between the examining attorney and the
applicant, i.e., the examining attorney has previously raised all
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applicant’s recited services immediately preceding the
phrase. The applicant also proposed substituting
“specifically excluding” for “not including.”
In denying applicant’s request for reconsideration,
the examining attorney elaborated a little further on his
reasons for rejecting the exclusionary phrase. He stated
that “[t]he breath (sic) of activities or services that can
be offered in a camp are so broad and wide that the
language suggested by applicant fails to meet the level of
specificity required for the recitation of services.”
The record includes several dictionary definitions of
the terms “man” and “camp” and copies of printouts from
third-party websites showing use of the phrase “man camp.”4
The term “camp” is defined in the record, in pertinent
part, as follows:5
1a. A place where tents, huts, or other temporary
shelters are set up, as by soldiers, nomads, or
travelers. b. A cabin or shelter or group of such
buildings: gathered branches and grasses for a makeshift
camp; had a fishing camp in Vermont. c. The people using
such shelters: a howl that awakened the whole camp. 2a. A
place in the country that offers simple group

outstanding issues and the applicant has had an opportunity to
respond to them.”]
4 Dictionary definitions attached by the Examining Attorney to
the June 24, 2005 Office Action. Website printouts were attached
to the Examining Attorney’s May 2, 2007 Office Action in addition
to a second set of dictionary definitions for the terms “man” and
“camp.”
5 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language,
Fourth Edition (2000).
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accommodations and organized recreation or instruction,
as for vacationing children: a girls' summer camp; a
tennis camp. b. Sports A place where athletes engage in
intensive training, especially preseason training. c. The
people attending the programs at such a place. 3.
Military service; army life. 4. A group of people who
think alike or share a cause; side: The council members
disagreed, falling into liberal and conservative camps.
We turn first to the Examining Attorney’s rejection of
applicant’s amendment to the recitation of services.
Trademark Rule 2.71(a) provides that the identification of
goods and/or recitation of services may be amended to
clarify or limit, but not to broaden, the identification of
goods and/or services. As cited to by applicant, Section
1402.06(a) of the TMEP provides:
37 C.F.R. §2.71(a), there is no general prohibition
against specific types of limitations in identifications
of goods and services, such as the use of negatives,
exceptions or similar language. Limitations on
identifications phrased in the negative or as exceptions
are acceptable, if they are otherwise proper.
Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the evidence
of record, we disagree with the position taken by the
Examining Attorney. Instead, we find the recitation of
services, as amended, to be acceptable. Specifically, we
construe the exclusionary phrase at issue as limiting
applicant’s instructional services to not include any
services rendered in a camp setting of the type indicated
in the definitions. The Examining Attorney’s argument that
the term “camp” is so broad or vague so as to render the
Serial No. 78357832

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recitation as meaningless is not well taken. Again, the
relevant defined meanings of the term “camp” reference a
type of physical place or location. The recitation, as
amended, has therefore been limited to not include
instructional services rendered within any of these places.
Although the exclusionary phrase may be redundant because
the services are already limited to being “provided via the
internet”, it is not otherwise improper.
We are cognizant of the possibility that applicant may
actually intend to offer (or is already offering) her
services in a “camp” setting of the type contemplated by
the definitions. However, because this is an ex parte
appeal of an intent-to-use application, the issue of
whether or not applicant will render such services is not
before us. We nonetheless note that any registration that
issues based on the application before us will only cover
the services identified in the recitation.
In view thereof, the Examining Attorney’s refusal to
register applicant’s mark on the basis that the recitation
of services is unacceptable as indefinite is reversed.
We now turn to the remaining issue on appeal is the
Examining Attorney’s descriptiveness refusal under Section
2(e)(1). The examining attorney bears the burden of
showing that a mark is merely descriptive of the identified
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goods or services. See In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner, and Smith Inc., 828 F.2d 21567, 4 USPQ2d 1141, 1143
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
It is well settled that a term is considered to be
merely descriptive of goods and/or services, within the
meaning of Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, if it
immediately describes an ingredient, quality,
characteristic or feature thereof or if it directly conveys
information regarding the nature, function, purpose or use
of the goods and/or services. See Section 2(e)(1) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052. See also In re Abcor
Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1978).
It is not necessary that a term describe all of the
properties or functions of the goods and/or services in
order for it to be considered to be merely descriptive
thereof; rather, it is sufficient if the term describes a
significant attribute or feature about them. Moreover,
whether a term is merely descriptive is determined not in
the abstract, but in relation to the goods and/or services
for which registration is sought. See In re Bright-Crest,
Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979). Thus, "[w]hether consumers
could guess what the product is from consideration of the
mark alone is not the test." In re American Greetings
Corp., 226 USPQ 365 (TTAB 1985). The issue is whether
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someone who knows what the services are will understand the
mark to convey information about them. In re Tower Tech,
Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314. 1316-1317 )TTAB 2002); In re Patent &
Trademark Services Inc., 49 USPQ2d 1537, 1539 (TTAB 1998);
In re Home Builders Association of Greenville, 18 USPQ2d
1313, 1317 (TTAB 1990).
After carefully reviewing the arguments and the
evidence of record, we find that the mark MAN CAMP does
not immediately describe, without conjecture or
speculation, a significant characteristic or feature of the
services, as amended, recited in the application. The
Examining Attorney has not met his burden of establishing
that the term CAMP is descriptive of applicant’s
instruction services which are “provided via the internet
to others” and “do not include services provided in a
camp.”
From the outset, we candidly note that our decision is
constrained by the scant record. The Examining Attorney
concentrated his argument on a descriptiveness refusal
based on application’s original recitation of services, and
submitted evidence that only supported that argument.
Throughout the prosecution of the application and in his
appeal brief, his argument has been essentially that MAN
CAMP is merely descriptive because the instructional
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services “can or will be made available to man (men) in a
camp or camp like setting.” Brief, p. 4. When applicant
amended her recitation of services to specify that the
services would be offered “via the internet” and “not
including services provided in a camp”, the Examining
Attorney did not adapt his argument or proffer any new
evidence to establish that the term CAMP or the mark MAN
CAMP remains merely descriptive of the services. In
particular, the Examining Attorney did not explain how a
service provided via the internet can be rendered in a camp
or camp-like setting. Thus, the use of the word “camp” in
connection with providing a service via the internet is
incongruous, and would take some thought or reasoning to
associate the word “camp” with an Internet activity.
The only relevant evidence of record bearing on the
issue of whether the term “camp” may be descriptive in
relation to applicant’s services consists of the dictionary
definitions of the term and copies of printouts from third-
party websites showing use of terms “man camp” and “camp.”
The definitions of record limit the term “camp” to a
physical location or structure, e.g., a place for tents or
camper vehicles, a place of summer recreation for children,
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a prison camp, etc.6 (See definition of record recited in
this decision.) None of the defined meanings of “camp”
lend themselves to include or potentially describe services
rendered via the internet.
As to the third-party website evidence, it also only
shows use of the phrase “man camp” or the term “camp” to
describe recreational activities being offered at a
specific physical location or place. There is no
indication from these websites that any of uses of the
terms “camp” or “man camp” could also be used to describe
applicant’s instruction services provided via the internet.
One website advertises a “Father & Son MAN CAMP in the Blue
Ridge Mountains”, over a three-day period, with directions
to a specific location (Sandy Cove, MD), and featuring
activities such as fishing, archery, canoeing, etc.
Another website printout advertises “The Aspen Man Camp” as
“Life changing, Butt Kicking, Fitness Adventures for the
‘Real Man’” below a picture of several people in
countryside, one of whom is holding a sword. The third

6 The only defined meaning of the term (as a noun) that does not
reference a physical location is “a group of people who share the
same ideas,” e.g., members of the environmentalist camp. This
defined meaning is not relevant to nor does it describe
applicant’s instructional services provided over the internet.

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website is from a radio station advertising a radio program
on the subject of:
“one of the largest gas drilling companies has started
housing some of its employees at the drill rigs
themselves, to keep tables on them and enforce strict
anti-substance polices. Aspen Public Radio’s
[reporter] visited a man camp near Parachute [town]
and filed this report.”

The radio program description clearly uses the phrase “man
camp” to describe a physical location where employees are
housed.
There is no evidence to suggest that internet-provided
services, such as applicant’s instruction services, may be
rendered in a camp or camp-like setting. And, simply put,
without any evidence in this regard, we can not make a
finding that applicant’s mark MAN CAMP, as a whole, is
merely descriptive of applicant’s services.
Decision: The recitation of services, as amended, is
acceptable and the requirement for a more definite
recitation is reversed. The descriptiveness refusal under
Section 2(e)(1) of the Act is also reversed.7

7 The application will be forwarded to the Intent to Use division
of the Office for issuance of a notice of allowance.