Jefferson Smurfit Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1998

326 N.L.R.B. 878 (N.L.R.B. 1998)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 878
Teamsters Union Local No. 688 affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–
CIO (Jefferson Smurfit Corporation) and Char-
les Epley. Case 14–CB–8241
August 27, 1998
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS FOX
AND HURTGEN
On a charge, amended charge, and second amended
charge filed by Charles Epley, an individual Charging
Party, on January 24, March 2, and May 24, 1994, re-
spectively, a complaint and notice of hearing issued on
May 27, 1994, alleging, inter alia, that Teamsters Union
Local No. 688, affiliated with the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO (the Respondent), violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing to give non-
member unit employees notice of their rights under
Communication Workers v. Beck.1 On June 13, 1994,
the Respondent filed a timely answer to the complaint.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party
executed an informal settlement agreement, approved on
July 1, 1994. On March 8, 1995, the General Counsel
issued an order vacating and setting aside settlement
agreement, amended complaint, and notice of hearing.
On March 15, 1995, The Respondent filed a timely an-
swer to the amended complaint.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party
executed another informal settlement agreement, ap-
proved on June 15, 1995. This informal settlement “re-
served out” the issue of the Respondent’s refusal to give
nonmember unit employees notice of their Beck rights.
On June 21, 1995, the General Counsel, the Respon-
dent, and the Charging Party filed with the Board a stipu-
lation of facts and motion to transfer the case to the
Board. The parties agree that the stipulation and attached
exhibits, including the charge, the amended charge, the
second amended charge, the complaint and notice of
hearing, the answer to complaint, the settlement agree-
ment approved July 1, 1994, the order vacating and set-
ting aside settlement agreement, the amended complaint
and notice of hearing, the answer to amended complaint,
the order postponing hearing indefinitely, and the settle-
ment agreement approved on June 15, 1995, shall consti-
tute the entire record in this case and that no oral testi-
mony is necessary or desired. The parties have waived a
hearing before and decision by an administrative law
judge.
On September 8, 1995, the Board approved the stipula-
tion and transferred the proceeding to the Board for issu-
ance of a decision and order. The General Counsel filed
a brief.

1 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
On the entire record and brief, the Board makes the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Jefferson Smurfit Corporation, the Employer, is en-
gaged in the manufacture and nonretail sale of containers
at production facilities in the St. Louis metropolitan area
including Kirkwood, Missouri, the Employer’s Kirk-
wood facility. At all material times, the Employer has
been an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. At all
material times, the Respondent has been a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES PRACTICES
Since July 20, 1992, the Respondent was certified and
by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act has been the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the following
unit employees of the Employer:

All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees, including leadmen, employed
by the Employer at its 3505 Tree Court Industrial
Boulevard, Kirkwood, Missouri facility, EXCLUDING
office clerical and professional employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.

Since April 25, 1993, the Respondent and the Em-
ployer have maintained and enforced a collective-
bargaining agreement covering the unit and containing
the following union-security provision:
It is understood and agreed by and between the parties
hereto that as a condition of continued employment, all
persons who are hereafter employed by the Employer
in the unit which is the subject of this Agreement shall
become members of the Union not later than the thirty-
first day following the beginning of their employment
or the execution date of this Agreement, whichever is
the later; that the continued employment by the Em-
ployer in said unit of persons who are already members
in good standing of the Union shall be conditioned
upon these persons continuing their payment of the pe-
riodic dues of the Union. . . . Further, the failure of any
person to maintain his union membership in good
standing as required herein shall upon written notice to
the Employer by the Union to such effect, obligate the
Employer to discharge such person.2
2 The complaint does not allege that this clause is facially unlawful.
Chairman Gould notes that, although the complaint does not allege
that the union-security clause herein is facially invalid because of its
requirement that unit employees “shall become members of the Union,”
where membership “in good standing” is conditioned on the employ-
ees’ payment of “periodic dues” to the Union, he notes that the Sixth
Circuit in Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788 (1997), held that the union-
security clause in that case containing similar language rendered it
facially invalid. As Chairman Gould stated in his partial dissent in
326 NLRB No. 74
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORP.) 879
It is alleged that the Respondent refused to give non-
member unit employees notice of the following matters
(a) The percentage of funds the Respondent spent in
the last accounting year for nonrepresentational activi-
ties.
(b) The information that nonmember unit employees
can object to having their dues and fees spent on nonrep-
resentational activities.
(c) The information that, if employees object to being
charged for nonrepresentational activities, the Respon-
dent will charge them only for representational activities.
(d) The information that, if employees object to being
charged for nonrepresentational activities, the Respon-
dent will provide them with detailed information con-
cerning its expenditures for representational activities
and nonrepresentational activities.
Since July 1, 1994, the Employer has hired 12 new
nonmember unit employees.3 They were retained for
more than 31 days following the commencement of their
employment. The terms of the union-security provision
apply to them.
The Employer, as part of its routine practice and pro-
cedure, and with the Respondent’s knowledge, provides
new hires, including the 12 mentioned above, with a
packet of materials on their first day of employment.
The Employer instructs the new hires to read and fill out
the forms in the packet. The materials include tax-
withholding and other forms, including an application for
union membership and a dues-checkoff authorization.
The materials from the Respondent do not refer to Beck
rights or otherwise inform new hires of their right to be-
come financial core members or Beck objectors. The
new hires, including the 12 hired since July 1994, exe-
cuted applications for union membership and executed
dues-checkoff authorizations on their first day of em-
ployment.
From the second payroll period of the month following
a new hire, the Employer withholds dues and forwards
the dues along with membership applications to the Re-
spondent. If an employee is hired during the first half of
the month, the remittance is made during the second pay-
roll period of the month in which the employee is hired.
If an employee is hired during the latter half of the
month, the remittance is made during the second payroll
period of the month following the month in which the
employee is hired.

Teamsters Local 443 (Connecticut Limousine Service), 324 NLRB 633
(1997), his concurring opinion in Monson Trucking, 324 NLRB 933
(1997), and his concurring opinion in Group Health, Inc., 325 NLRB
342 (1998), he agrees with the Sixth Circuit, except to the extent that its
reasoning relies upon Patternmakers’ League v. NLRB, 483 U.S. 95
(1985).
Member Hurtgen agrees that a union-security clause requiring
“membership in good standing” is unlawful on its face. See NLRB v.
General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963); Communication Workers v.
Beck, supra. He further believes that a union-security clause requiring
“membership” is unlawful on its face, unless the clause clearly sets
forth the limitations placed on that term by General Motors and Beck.
3 The significance of the July 1 date is that the 12 employees were
hired on that date.
The Respondent learns about new hires when it re-
ceives the dues and membership cards from the Em-
ployer, and it thereby learned that the aforementioned 12
had been hired. Thirty days thereafter, it collects dues
under the provisions of the union-security clause. If the
Respondent receives dues from an employee who has not
been retained more than 30 days, the Respondent refunds
the dues to the employee.
Since July 1, 1994, the Respondent has failed and re-
fused to give the 12 newly hired nonmember unit em-
ployees, hired since that date, notice of their Beck rights.
None of these employees has requested any information
from the Respondent regarding their Beck rights, nor
have they notified the Respondent of a desire to exercise
their Beck rights.
A. The Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent’s
duty of fair representation includes an obligation to give
Beck notice to newly hired, nonmember unit employees
before they are required to pay membership dues and
fees under the union-security clause. The General Coun-
sel states that it is the Respondent’s contention4 that no-
tice to newly hired, nonmember unit employees is re-
quired only after those employees have requested infor-
mation from the Respondent regarding their Beck rights,
or have notified the Respondent of a desire to exercise
their Beck rights.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
For reasons set forth below, we find that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing to give 12
newly hired nonmember unit employees notice of their
Beck rights before it first sought to obligate these em-
ployees to pay dues under the union-security clause.
In California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224
(1995), enfd. 133 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1998), the Board
concluded that a union violates its duty of fair represen-
tation by failing to give notice of Beck rights when the
Respondent first seeks to obligate nonmember unit em-
ployees to pay dues under a union-security clause. A
union meets this notice obligation as long as it takes rea-
sonable steps to ensure that all employees whom the un-
ion seeks to obligate to pay dues are given notice of their
Beck rights. 320 NLRB at 233.
The notice should (1) inform employees that nonmem-
bers have the right to object to paying for union activities
not germane to the union’s duties as bargaining agent
and to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities; (2)
provide sufficient information to enable the employee to
decide intelligently whether to object; and (3) apprise
employees of any internal union procedures for filing
objections. If the employee chooses to object, he or she
4 The Respondent filed no brief.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 880
must be apprised of the percentage of the reduction in
dues and fees for objecting nonmembers, the basis for the
calculation, and the right to challenge these figures.5
It is undisputed that the Respondent failed to notify 12
newly hired nonmember employees of the Beck rights
specified above at the time it first sought to obligate them
to pay dues. The Respondent did not arrange for the
Employer to include a Beck notice in the packet of mate-
rials given to new hires when they were asked to join the
Respondent and pay membership dues and fees. The
Respondent did not use any other lawful method that
ensures that newly hired nonmembers are informed of
their Beck rights before or at the time that they are obli-
gated to pay dues under the union-security clause. Under
California Saw, supra, the Respondent violated its duty
of fair representation by failing to provide that notice.
Accordingly, we find that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Jefferson Smurfit Corporation is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Teamsters Union Local No. 688, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By failing to notify 12 newly hired nonmember unit
employees at the time it sought to obligate them to pay
fees and dues under the union-security clause of the
rights of nonmembers under Beck, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A), we will order it to cease and desist and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act, including, as explained more fully below,
notifying employees of their rights under Beck and pro-
viding them with an opportunity to exercise their Beck
objection rights retroactively.
The Board has a split opinion as to the class of em-
ployees to whom the remedy should be extended. For
reasons stated in their separate opinions, Chairman
Gould would provide the remedy to all unit employees,
whether they are members or nonmembers of the Union;
Member Hurtgen would require that the remedy be pro-
vided to all nonmember unit employees; and Member
Fox would limit the class of employees to whom the
remedy would be provided to nonmember employees
whom the Respondent first sought to obligate to pay dues
or fees under the union-security clause on or after July 1,
1994.

5 320 NLRB 233. We find no merit in the amended complaint alle-
gation that the Respondent was obligated to inform employees of the
percentage of funds spent in the last accounting year for nonrepresenta-
tional activities. Such an obligation would arise only after an employee
has chosen to object.
Member Hurtgen disagrees with Chairman Gould’s
position that the notices should be sent to all unit em-
ployees, i.e., members and nonmembers. In this regard,
Member Hurtgen notes that this case was pled and liti-
gated as involving only nonmember unit employees. The
complaint was so confined, and the stipulation was so
confined. It is thereby distinguishable from Rochester
Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997), relied on by dissenting
Chairman Gould.
Chairman Gould and Member Hurtgen, contrary to
dissenting Member Fox, would not confine the remedy to
those who were hired since July 1, 1994. As Member
Fox concedes, there is an established violation as to those
employees. And, as she also concedes, the remedy can
extend not only to the 12 employees named in the stipu-
lation, but also to others who are similarly situated and
who were hired since July 1, 1994.6 Chairman Gould
and Member Hurtgen do not understand why the remedy
should not also extend to those who are similarly situated
and hired before July 1. In their view, the key to the
remedy is whether employees are situated similarly to the
presently known victims of the unfair labor practices, not
whether their hire happened to be before or after July 1.
Finally, Chairman Gould and Member Hurtgen do not
regard this remedy as punitive. It is restorative and com-
pensatory in the classical sense, i.e., it gives employees
the opportunities that they should have had if the Union
had given appropriate notices.
In accordance with Rochester Mfg Co., supra, with re-
spect to those employees who, with reasonable prompt-
ness after receiving their notices, elect nonmember status
and proceed to make Beck objections with respect to one
or more of the accounting periods covered by the com-
plaint, we shall order the Respondent, in the compliance
stage of the proceeding to process their objections, nunc
pro tunc, as it would otherwise have done, in accordance
with the principles of California Saw. The Respondent
shall then be required to reimburse the objecting non-
member employees for the reduction in their dues and
fees, if any, for nonrepresentational activities that oc-
curred during the accounting period or periods covered
by the complaint in which they have objected. Interest
on the amount of proportionate back dues and fees owed
to an objector shall be computed in the manner pre-
scribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB
1173 (1987).
6 The stipulation covers the 12 employees hired on July 1, 1994. But
it does not purport to limit the remedy to those employees. Indeed,
even Member Fox concedes that the remedy can and should extend to
employees hired after July 1.

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORP.) 881
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Teamsters Union Local No. 688, affiliated
with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–
CIO, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to notify nonmember unit employees, when
it first seeks to obligate them to pay dues under a union-
security clause, of their right to be and remain nonmem-
bers and of the rights of nonmembers under Communica-
tions Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to
paying for union activities not germane to the Respon-
dent’s duties as bargaining agent, and to obtain a reduc-
tion in fees for such activities.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Notify all nonmember unit employees in writing of
their right to be or remain nonmembers, and of the rights
of nonmembers under Communication Workers v. Beck,
supra, to object to paying for union activities not ger-
mane to the Respondent’s duties as bargaining agent, and
to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities.
(b) Process the objections of nonmember unit em-
ployees whom the Respondent first sought to obligate to
pay dues or fees under the union-security clause on or
after July 24, 1993, in the manner prescribed in the rem-
edy section of this decision.
(c) Reimburse, with interest, nonmember unit em-
ployees who file objections under Communication Work-
ers v. Beck, supra, with the Respondent for any dues and
fees exacted from them for nonrepresentational activities,
in the manner prescribed in the remedy section of this
decision.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its union hall offices copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”7 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to
employees and members are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps the Respondent has taken to comply.

7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

CHAIRMAN GOULD, dissenting in part.
I agree with my colleagues that the Respondent vio-
lated the Act by failing to provide nonunion employees
of the bargaining unit notice of their Beck rights, but I
cannot agree with the scope of the remedial notice that is
being ordered to remedy the violation.In California Saw1
and Weyerhaeuser,2 the Board discussed the “close con-
nection” that exists between the rights of employees un-
der the Supreme Court decisions in General Motors3 and
Beck.4 Specifically, the Board explained that, because
Beck rights may be exercised only by employees who are
not members of the union, they must first be made aware
and then exercise their right under General Motors to be
and remain nonunion employees of the bargaining unit.
California Saw, 320 NLRB 224, 235 fn. 57 (1995).
Thus, when a union has unlawfully failed to provide
nonunion bargaining unit employees with notice of their
Beck rights, the remedy requires that they receive notice
of both their General Motors and Beck rights, notwith-
standing that no violation may have been found for fail-
ing to provide notice of General Motors rights. Id.
In accord with these principles, the Respondent is be-
ing ordered to provide notice of General Motors and
Beck rights to the nonunion employees in the bargaining
unit, despite the absence of a finding that the Respondent
unlawfully failed to provide General Motors notice. I
agree with this aspect of the remedy, but I would go fur-
ther by extending the remedy to all employees in the bar-
gaining unit. In my view, extension of the remedy in this
respect ensures that all employees in the bargaining unit
are made aware of the full extent of their obligations un-
der the contractual union-security clause.
To effectuate this remedial goal, the Board in Roches-
ter5 ordered General Motors and Beck notice to all unit
employees, members as well as nonmembers, notwith-
standing that the Beck notice violation encompassed only
nonmember unit employees. As explained by the Board
in Rochester, “[t]o restrict the Beck remedy in this case to
nonmembers would result in a situation where a segment
of the bargaining unit—current members—would receive
no notice of their Beck rights at the time that they learn,
pursuant to our Order, of their right to become nonmem-
bers.” Supra, 323 NLRB at 261.
This rationale is equally applicable to the instant case.
Where, as here, the Respondent has unlawfully failed to
provide notice of the Beck component of the packaged
1 California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. 133
F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1998).
2 Paperworkers Local 1033 (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320 NLRB
349 (1995), enf. denied on other grounds sub nom. Buzenius v. NLRB,
1124 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 1997).
3 NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
4 Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
5 Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 882
rights vis-a-vis a portion of the bargaining unit, it is ap-
propriate to invoke our remedial authority to order dis-
closure of the full set of rights not only to them but to the
entire unit thereby ensuring that all employees in the unit
are made aware of the full extent of their obligations un-
der the contractual union-security clause. To the extent
that the Respondent may have already informed unit em-
ployees not covered by the complaint of their General
Motors and Beck rights, it will be considered in compli-
ance with its legal obligations. If, however, the Respon-
dent has not yet complied with the law in this respect, an
order that it do so will ensure that all unit employees are
equally aware of their obligations under the union-
security clause.
Therefore, for the foregoing stated reasons, and in ac-
cordance with Rochester, I would order commensurate
unit-wide notice of employees’ rights under General
Motors and Beck.

MEMBER FOX, dissenting in part.
The complaint in this stipulated case alleges that since
on or about August 31, 1993, the Respondent has failed
to inform nonmember employees of certain rights to
which they are entitled under Communications Workers
v. Beck,1 in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
The parties have stipulated that since about July 1, 1994,
the Employer has hired 12 new nonmember employees
who became subject to the contractual union-security
clause, that on their first day of employment the new
hires were given packets of information that included
applications for union membership and dues-checkoff
authorization forms but no explanation of their rights
under Beck, and that none of the 12 were given notice of
their Beck rights before they joined the union. The par-
ties have not stipulated to any failure to give Beck notice
to employees who were in the bargaining unit prior to
July 1994. Thus, the only violation that has been alleged
and proven on this record is the failure to give Beck no-
tice to the 12 employees hired after that date.
As a remedy for the violation, I would require the Re-
spondent to give Beck notice and a Rochester2 remedy to
these 12 employees and any other new nonmember em-
ployees who first became obligated under the union-
security clause after July 1, 1994, and who the General
Counsel can show in compliance also did not receive
notice of their rights under Beck.3 In my view, however,
the Board lacks the authority to extend the remedy to any
unit employee who became obligated to pay dues or fees
under the union-security clause prior to that date.

1 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
2 Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997).
3 Where the General Counsel has alleged and proven discrimination
against a defined and easily identified class of employees, the Board,
with court approval, has found it appropriate to extend remedial relief
to all members of that class, including individuals not specified in the
complaint. E.g., Woodline Motor Freight, 278 NLRB 1141, 1143 fn. 6
(1986), enfd. in pertinent part 843 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1988); Morton
Metal Works, 310 NLRB 195 (1993), enfd. 9 F.3d 108 (6th Cir. 1993),
citing Ironworkers Local 433 (Reynolds Electrical), 298 NLRB 35, 36
(1990), enfd. 931 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the General Counsel
has alleged and the stipulated facts establish that newly hired nonmem-
ber employees who became covered by the union-security clause after
July 1, 1994 were not given notice of their Beck rights. Because this is
a defined and easily identified class, it is appropriate to extend the
remedy to all employees in that class.
It is axiomatic that the Board’s remedies must be tai-
lored to fit the nature and extent of the violations found,
and that the Act does not confer upon the Board “a puni-
tive jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon [the
Respondent] any penalty it may choose because he is
engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the Board
be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be
effectuated by such an order.” Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235–236 (1938). As I have
noted, there is no evidence in this record whatsoever that
any unit employee who was already employed and pay-
ing dues or fees under the union-security clause prior to
July 1, 1994, did not receive Beck notice, either at the
time they were hired or at some later date.4 Because no
violation has been established as to such employees (or
even alleged as to employees who were in the bargaining
unit prior to August 31, 1993), to extend the remedy to
them would be punitive rather than restorative.
In this regard, it should be noted that this is not simply
a matter of requiring notice to employees of their rights
under Beck. The remedy we are providing also requires
that the employees to whom it is extended be given the
opportunity to exercise their Beck objection rights retro-
actively and, if they object, be reimbursed by the Re-
spondent with interest for any dues and fees collected
from them for nonrepresentational purposes. The pur-
pose of this remedy to is put employees who were unlaw-
fully denied the opportunity to make an informed and
timely choice as to whether to object back in the same
position they would have been in had they received no-
tice of their Beck rights at the appropriate time. Extend-
ing the remedy to employees who have not been alleged
and proven to have been unlawfully deprived of the op-
portunity to make such a choice serves no such remedial
purpose.
As the Supreme Court stated in Carpenters Local 60 v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961):

The Board has broad discretion to adapt its remedies to
the needs of particular situations so that “the victims of
discrimination” may be treated fairly. See Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 194. But
the power of the Board “to command affirmative action
is remedial, not punitive, and is to be exercised in aid of

4 The Board has held that the requirement that employees covered by
a union-security clause be given notice of their Beck and General Mo-
tors rights is satisfied by giving the employee notice once and is not a
continuing requirement. Paperworkers Local 1033 (Weyerhauser
Paper Co.), 320 NLRB 349, 350 (1995), revd. on other grounds sub
nom Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 1997).

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORP.) 883
the board’s authority to restrain violations and as a
means of removing or avoiding the consequences of
violation where those consequences are of a kind to
thwart the purposes of the Act.” Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 236.

Here, employees in the bargaining unit prior to July
1994 have not been shown to have been victims of the
Respondent’s unlawful conduct; thus, no “consequences
of violation” are removed by the majority’s order requir-
ing the Respondent to allow them to retroactively object
and obtain a refund of dues and fees collected from them.
“The order in these circumstances becomes punitive and
beyond the power of the Board.” Id. I therefore dissent
from this portion of the majority’s decision.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT fail to inform nonmember unit employ-
ees, when we first seek to obligate them to pay dues un-
der the union-security clause, of their rights to be and
remain nonmembers and of the rights under Communica-
tion Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to
paying for union activities not germane to the Respon-
dent’s duties as bargaining agent, and to obtain a reduc-
tion in fees for such activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL notify all nonmember unit employees in writ-
ing of their right to become and remain nonmembers and
of the rights of nonmembers under Communication
Workers v. Beck, supra, to object to paying for union
activities not germane to the Respondent’s duties as bar-
gaining agent and to obtain a reduction in fees for such
activities.
WE WILL process the objections of nonmember bar-
gaining unit employees whom the Respondent first
sought to obligate to pay dues or fees under the union-
security clause on or after July 24, 1993.
WE WILL reimburse, with interest, nonmember unit
employees who file objections for any dues and fees ex-
acted from them for nonrepresentational activities for
each accounting period since August 1, 1994.
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL NO. 688 AFFILIATED
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS AFL–CIO