Jaffri, Taqi

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 31, 2019

12487118 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/487,118 06/18/2009 Taqi Jaffri 326887.01 6551
69316 7590 10/31/2019
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
IOSIF, MARIO CINCINAT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3681
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte TAQI JAFFRI
____________

Appeal 2018-0011111
Application 12/487,118
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 3–10, 12, 13, and 15–20, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). An oral hearing was held on October 15, 2019.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.,” filed June 6, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed
November 13, 2017), the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed September 12,
2017), and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed November 4, 2016).
2 Appellant identifies “Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC” as the real
party in interest (Appeal Br. 3).
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We REVERSE.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention relates generally to “location-based
advertising on mobile computing devices” (Spec. ¶ 1).
Claims 1, 13, and 19 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below with bracketed notations indentation added, is illustrative
of the claimed subject matter:
1. In an ad delivery server that is in communication with a
mobile client executable on a mobile computing device and a
location broker service executable on a location broker server, a
method for controlling ad delivery from an ad delivery service
executed on the ad delivery server to the mobile client using the
location broker service, the method comprising:
[a] receiving by the location broker service, a mobile
client location signal from the mobile computing device;
[b] determining, by the location broker service, an actual
location of the mobile computing device based on the mobile
client location signal;
[c] sending, by the location broker service, a single use
location use token to the mobile computing device, the location
use token being a unit of data, associated with the actual
location, that indicates a generalized location of the mobile
computing device but does not directly indicate the actual
location of the mobile computing device;
[d] receiving from an advertiser, by the ad delivery
service, a bid to purchase location-targeted ad delivery;
[e] sending, by the ad delivery service, a mobile client
location request to the mobile client;
[f] receiving, by the ad delivery service, the location use
token from the mobile client responsive to the sending of the
mobile client location request to the mobile client;
[g] sending, by the ad delivery service, the location use
token to the location broker server, at which the location broker
service verifies the location use token;
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[h] verifying the location use token, by the location
broker service, by determining whether or not the location use
token sent from the ad delivery service is a location use token
generated from the location broker server;
[i] receiving, by the ad delivery service, the generalized
location of the mobile computing device from the location
broker service, when it is determined that the location use token
sent from the ad delivery service was generated from the
location broker server, based on the verification of the location
use token, without receiving the actual location of the mobile
computing device from the location broker service by the ad
delivery service; and
[j] in response to receiving the bid to purchase location-
targeted ad delivery, delivering, by the ad delivery service, a
location-targeted ad stored in a storage of the ad delivery server
and designated for delivery to mobile computing devices at the
generalized location, to the mobile computing device.

REJECTIONS3
1. Claims 1, 3–10, 12, 13, and 15–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
2. Claims 1, 13, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 first
paragraph (pre-AIA), as failing to comply with the written description
requirement.
3. Claims 1, 13, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 second
paragraph (pre-AIA), as indefinite.
4. Claims 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 19, and 20 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Cone (US 2008/0045232 A1, pub.
Feb. 21, 2008), Grannan et al. (US 2007/0244750 A1, pub. Oct. 18, 2007),
and Marcuvitz (US 2009/0006197 A1, pub. Jan. 1, 2009).

3 We treat the Examiner’s inclusion of canceled claims 2, 11, and 14 among
the claims subject to rejection as an oversight.
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5. Claims 5–7, 10, and 16–18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Cone, Grannan, Marcuvitz, and Bajpai et al.
(US 2010/0069092 A1, pub. Mar. 18, 2010).
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical
formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental
processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
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determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Mayo/Alice framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract
idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application, i.e., that “apply, rely on,
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or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With regard to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the
Examiner states that “at its core” independent claim 1 is “directed to
location-based advertising” (Ans. 5; Final Act. 5). The Examiner states that
“[t]he advertising activity of the claimed method aligns strongly with the
long-standing concept of enabling the success (or improving the chances of
success) of a commercial transaction or commercial exchange between two
or more parties” (Ans. 6; Final Act. 5), and as such, “represents a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce (a
building block in the modern economy) (Alice Corp., Bilski)” (Ans. 6). The
Examiner further states that independent claim 1
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comprise[s] steps of: collecting location data, bid data and
associated advertisement data; analyzing location and bid
information, and selecting an advertisement for display on the
user device. These claim elements mirror activities of
“collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results of the collection and analysis” which were found to be
an abstract idea by a controlling court in Electric Power Group.
(Id.). Thus, the Examiner concludes that independent claim 1 is
“unquestionably directed to one or more abstract ideas” (id.). And, when
viewed through the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Examiner’s
analysis depicts independent claim 1 as reciting one of the “certain methods
of organizing human activity” that include “fundamental economic
principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk)” and
“commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations),” and thus, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
In response, Appellant argues that independent claim 1 is not directed
to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 13). More particularly, Appellant argues that
the Examiner improperly mischaracterizes independent claim 1 as being
directed “to a method of organizing human activity and/or a fundamental
economic practice” (Appeal Br. 13–18).
Under the first prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination that independent
claim 1 recites abstract ideas comprising steps that represent certain methods
of organizing human activity. Here, the Examiner finds independent claim 1
is directed broadly to a method that
tracks a current physical location of a mobile device user and
enables an advertiser who is interested in targeting a particular
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generalized location of a user to bid on the advertising
opportunity created by (based on) knowing that a user is at
bidding time located at a particular generalized location.
(Final Act. 5; Ans. 5). However, as Appellant points out, the Examiner
“does not consider the ordered combination of claimed steps, but instead
either ignores or oversimplifies the claim to support the rejection under
35 U.S.C. [§] 101 by characterizing the claim as being merely abstract”
(Appeal Br. 14). The analysis of the full scope of the claims is addressed in
the next prong.
Having concluded that independent claim 1 recites a judicial
exception, i.e., an abstract idea, we turn to the second prong of step 2A of
the 2019 Revised Guidance and determine whether the claim integrates the
recited judicial exception into a practical application of the judicial
exception. Here we look to see if, for example, any additional elements of
the claim (i) reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer or to
another technological field, (ii) implement the judicial exception with, or by
use of, a particular machine, (iii) effect a transformation or reduction of a
particular article to a different state or thing, or (iv) use the judicial
exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c),
(e)–(h).
Independent claim 1 recites various computer-related limitations,
including an “ad delivery server,” “mobile client executable on a mobile
computing device,” and “location broker service executable on a location
broker server.” Although these computer-related limitations are not wholly
generic in nature and are specific to “controlling ad delivery,” (Spec. ¶ 6),
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we agree with the Examiner that they are described at a high level in the
Specification without any meaningful detail about their structure or
configuration (see Ans. 9). As such, we do not find the computer-related
limitations are sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.
However, claim 1 also recites additional limitations which focus on
addressing problems arising in the context of a location-based advertising
related to maintaining a user’s personal privacy (see Spec. ¶ 1). For
example, the elements of independent claim 1 require:
the location broker service (1) receives a location signal from
the mobile computing device, (2) determines an actual location
of the mobile computing device based on the location signal,
and (3) sends a location use token to the mobile computing
device that indicates a generalized location, but does not
directly indicate the actual location of the mobile computing
device.
(Appeal Br. 19). Here, Appellant notes that “the recitation of a single use
location use token by claim 1 . . . is in contrast to other approaches that may
instead involve long-term storage of a user device location code on a server”
(Appeal Br. 19; cf. Spec. ¶¶ 46–47). Additional elements of independent
claim 1 further require:
the ad delivery service (4) sends a location request to the
mobile computing device, (5) the location use token is received
by the ad delivery service from the mobile client, (6) the
location use token is sent to the location broker service for
verification, (7) the location broker service verifies the location
use token, and (8) the generalized location of the mobile
computing device is then received by the ad delivery service
based on the verification without receiving the actual location
from the location broker service.
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(Id.). Here, Appellant notes that “claim 1 provides that the location request
is sent by the ad delivery service to the mobile computing device rather than
e.g., by the location broker service that was also in possession of the location
use token” (Appeal Br. 20; cf. Spec. ¶¶46–47).
We find that independent claim 1 uses the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(e). Here, as Appellant points out, “claim 1 addresses the issue of
limiting disclosure or dissemination of an actual location of a mobile
computing device as determined based on a location signal received from
that device, while also enabling an ad delivery service to verify the
authenticity of the single use location use token that indicates generalized
location information” (Appeal Br. 20–21).
We conclude that these limitations integrate the recited judicial
exception of “location-based advertising” into a practical application. In
particular, these additional elements limit the conventional practice of
“location-based advertising” by reciting “a series of steps by which a single
use location use token is transferred between three different machine-based
entities through at least three interactions to both limit the dissemination of
actual location information and to enable verification of the generalized
location information indicated by the token” (Reply Br. 5). As such, claim 1
integrates the abstract idea into a practical application and, therefore, is
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directed to patent-eligible subject matter.4 Similar reasoning applies as to
independent claims 13 and 19, as well as to the dependent claims.
Written Description
In rejecting independent claims 1, 13, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112
first paragraph, the Examiner finds that there is no written description
support in the Specification for “without receiving the actual location of the
mobile computing device from the location broker service by the ad delivery
service,” as it appears in limitation [i] of independent claim 1, and “but does
not directly indicate the actual location of the mobile computing device,” as
it appears in limitation [c] of independent claim 1 (Final Act. 2).
Independent claims 13 and 19 include similar limitations. More particularly,
the Examiner finds that the “‘without’ and ‘but does not’ limitations
represent negative limitations that require a clear distinction between the
meaning of the terms ‘generalized location’ and ‘actual location’, and said
unambiguous meaning of each expression has not been established” (id. at
3). The Examiner acknowledges that “[t]he [S]pecification provides some
examples,” but takes the position that “examples are not definitions, and
accordingly this negative limitation is not supported by the [S]pecification”
(id.).
Appellant maintains that the rejection is improper, and asserts, that
“the above features of claim 1 are clearly supported by and consistent with
the [S]pecification” (Appeal Br. 35–38 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 7, 20, 22, 27, and
30)).

4 Because we have determined the claim is not directed to the recited
judicial exception, we need not reach the question of whether the claim
provides an inventive concept under the second step of the Alice inquiry.
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Whether a Specification complies with the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is a question of fact and is
assessed on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The disclosure, as
originally filed, need not literally describe the claimed subject matter (i.e.,
using the same terms or in haec verba) in order to satisfy the written
description requirement. But the Specification must convey with reasonable
clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date, the inventor was in
possession of the claimed invention. See id.
Here, Appellant points out that “the [S]pecification clearly provides
that the location use token is not data directly indicating the mobile client
location 138,” and thus, “[w]ithin the context of claim 1, a precise location is
an example of an actual location of the mobile computing device” (Appeal
Br. 35 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 20, 22)). Appellant further points out that the “[u]se
of the generalized location without the actual location in claim 1 is
distinguishable from examples in the [S]pecification in which the actual
location is sent or received” (Appeal Br. 36 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 7, 30)).
Appellant also directs attention to a portion of the Specification that provides
a clear distinction between “the terms ‘actual location’ and ‘generalized
location’ in relation to each other” (Appeal Br. 36 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 20, 27)).
Thus, we agree with Appellant that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would reasonably understand from the Specification, as originally filed, that
the Specification provides support for the argued limitations at the time the
application was filed.
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Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 13, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 first paragraph.

Indefiniteness
We are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent
claims 1, 13, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. The
Examiner determined that “without receiving the actual location of the
mobile computing device from the location broker service by the ad delivery
service,” as it appears in limitation [i] of independent claim 1, and “but does
not directly indicate the actual location of the mobile computing device,” as
it appears in limitation [c] of independent claim 1, render the claim
indefinite because the Specification does not make a clear distinction
“between the meaning of the terms ‘generalized location’ and ‘actual
location’” (Final Act. 3). The Examiner takes the position that because “the
metes and bounds of the expression ‘generalized location’ are not clearly
defined[,] . . . a person of ordinary in the art would have no way of
understanding what is and what is not included by this expression”
(Ans. 15). We disagree.
In our view, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand
from the Specification (including the claim language) what is being claimed,
namely that the term “generalized location” “informs those skilled in the art
about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty” (Appeal Br. 41).
Here, as Appellant points out,
a person having ordinary skill in the art would recognize that a
“generalized location” of a mobile computing device is a
regionalized form of the “actual location” of the mobile
computing device. For example, the specification at
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Par. [0020] and again at Par. [0027] provides: “a generalized
location, i.e., a region.”
(Appeal Br. 41; see also Appeal Br. 43 (stating “since a ‘generalized
location’ is a regionalized form of an actual location, the generalized
location is not merely ‘anything under the sun’ as broadly characterized by
the Examiner.”). Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1, 13, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, is whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is
claimed when the claim is read in light of the [S]pecification.”).

Obviousness
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1, 13, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because
Cone, upon which the Examiner relies, fails to disclose or suggest “verifying
the location use token, by the location broker service, by determining
whether or not the location use token sent from the ad delivery service is a
location use token generated from the location broker server,” as recited by
limitation [h] of independent claim 1, and similarly recited by independent
claims 13 and 19 (Appeal Br. 59–60).
The Examiner maintains that the rejection is proper, and cites Cone,
as disclosing “a verification step” (Ans. 22 (citing Cone ¶¶ 18–41; Figs. 3–
6); Final Act. 11). However, we agree with Appellant that there is nothing
in the cited portions that discloses or suggests the argued limitation.
In making this determination, we note that Cone is directed to a
personal location code broker (Cone ¶ 6). Cone describes that a personal
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location code (PLC) is “a network-independent code for locating a user”
which “allows a user to make available a PLC which can be used by others
to obtain the current location of the user based on the location of one or
more devices associated with the user” (id. ¶ 18). Cone’s “PLC serves as a
key to location privacy management” because it allows a user to “control
who is allowed to locate them” (id.). Cone further describes that “[u]sers
can provide their PLCs to others verbally or by electronic means such as e-
mail, instant messaging, application-to-application” (id. ¶ 19).
In one embodiment, Cone discloses “a device sends a location request
message containing a PLC associated with a target user to the application
server 202 (e.g., as part of a utilizing a service) or to the location
service 212” (id. ¶ 21). Cone discloses “[i]f the location request was
provided to the application server 202, the application server provides a
location request along with the PLC to the location service 212” (id. ¶ 22).
Cone then discloses “[t]he location service 212 verifies whether the PLC can
be used to locate the target user and determines which network (e.g.,
network 1, 2 or 3) a device associated with the target user (e.g., the user’s
cell phone) is registered with” (id. ¶ 23).
We have reviewed the cited portions of Cone, and agree with
Appellant that none of the cited portions of Cone discloses or suggests the
argued limitation. Instead, we agree with Appellant that there is “no
disclosure in Cone of a verification step for the PLC that is the equivalent of
the verification step for the single use location use token,” as required by
limitation [h] of independent claim 1, and similarly required by independent
claims 13 and 19 (see Appeal Br. 59–60). Although we agree with the
Examiner that Cone discloses “a verification step” (Ans. 22), we cannot
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agree with the Examiner that Cone discloses or suggests the “verification”
required by independent claims 1, 13, and 19. That is, we do not see, and
the Examiner does not explain adequately, how or why Cone discloses or
suggests that the location broker service “verif[ies] the location use
token . . . by determining whether or not the location use token sent from the
ad delivery service is a location use token generated from the location broker
server” (cf. Ans. 22). The Examiner does not rely on Grannan or Marcuvitz
to address this deficiency.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claims 1, 13, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same
reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 4, 8, 9,
12, 15, and, 20, which depend therefrom. On the same basis, we do not
sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 5–7, 10, and 16–18, as
the additional reference, Bajpai, is not cited to remedy the aforementioned
deficiency.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–10,
12, 13,
15–20
101 Eligibility 1, 3–10, 12,
13, 15–20
1, 13, 19 112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
1, 13, 19
1, 13, 19 112, second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 1, 13, 19
1, 3, 4, 8,
9, 12, 13,
15, 19, 20
103(a) Cone, Grannan,
Marcuvitz
1, 3, 4, 8, 9,
12, 13, 15, 19,
20
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
5–7, 10,
16–18
103(a) Cone, Grannan,
Marcuvitz, Bajpai
5–7, 10, 16–18
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–10, 12,
13, 15–20

REVERSED