01971749
03-17-1999
Jacquelyne S. Robinson, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.
Jacquelyne S. Robinson, )
Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 01971749
v. ) Agency Nos. 1G-753-1002-95
) 1G-753-1011-95
William J. Henderson, ) Hearing Nos. 310-96-5296X
Postmaster General, ) 310-96-5297X
United States Postal Service, )
(S.E./S.W. Region), )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination on the bases of race (African-American),
national origin (African-American), sex (female), reprisal (prior EEO
activity), and perceived physical and mental disabilities (ankle injury
and stress),<1> in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq. Appellant alleges
she was discriminated against when: (1) she was denied light duty on
or around August 19, 1994, and (2) she was denied the opportunity to
work on or around September 14, September 21 through 23, September 29,
through October 14, and October 28, through December 7, 1994.<2> The
appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the
following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.
The record reveals that appellant, a PS-06 Machine Distribution Clerk
at the agency's Dallas, Texas General Mail Facility, filed two formal
EEO complaints with the agency on November 30, 1994, alleging that
the agency had discriminated against her as referenced above. At the
conclusion of the investigations, appellant requested a hearing before
an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge
(AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision (RD)
finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case
of race, sex or national origin discrimination concerning her denial of
light duty because she failed to adequately demonstrate that similarly
situated employees not in her protected classes were treated differently
under substantially similar circumstances. The AJ also noted that the
record does not establish if the alleged comparators had engaged in
prior EEO activity. The AJ further noted that appellant did not allege
discrimination by the Manager of Operations, who denied her light duty
request.
Concerning appellant's allegation that she was not permitted to work on a
number of occasions in the Fall of 1994, the AJ concluded that appellant
failed to establish a prima facie case of sex, race, national origin,
or reprisal discrimination because she presented no evidence of similarly
situated employees who were permitted to work where medical documentation
was not provided or was unsatisfactory to agency management officials.
The AJ observed, to the contrary, that there was evidence that other
employees were also prevented from working until they, too, submitted
adequate medical documentation. On this basis, the AJ noted that
appellant's prima facie case of race and national origin discrimination
was precluded where a female employee of a different race and national
origin was treated similarly to appellant.
Concerning both issues, the AJ noted that appellant failed to establish
a prima facie case of reprisal for the additional reason that she
provided no evidence that any of the management officials alleged to be
responsible were aware of her prior EEO activity. The AJ also concluded
that appellant failed to demonstrate that these management officials
perceived her as disabled.
Finally, the AJ concluded that nevertheless, the agency articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that
appellant failed to provide adequate medical documentation updating
her medical condition, after having been out of work a few years due to
stress, which was related to her contemporaneous on-the-job ankle injury.
The AJ noted that the individual who ordered appellant off the clock
made that decision prior to receiving any medical documentation, and
further, that other employees were also prohibited from working until
they provided adequate medical documentation. Concerning the requested
light duty, the AJ noted that the Light Duty Coordinator indicated that
she only checked with Tour One about light duty positions, and while it
was a mistake to not check with Tour 2 or 3, she did not pursue light
duty assignments further because appellant gave her the impression
that she was ready to return to work without restrictions. For the
above-referenced reasons, the AJ thus concluded that appellant failed to
establish unlawful discrimination. The agency's FAD adopted the AJ's RD.
On appeal, appellant restates arguments previously made at the hearing.
The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the
AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate
regulations, policies, and laws. In reaching this conclusion, we first
note that a request for medical documentation, does not, without more,
warrant the conclusion that the agency perceived her to be an individual
substantially limited in one or more major life activities, as set forth
under the Rehabilitation Act.
We also note that contrary to one of the AJ's findings of fact, the
record indicates that one of the named comparators was, in fact, granted
light duty. See investigative file (Agency Case No. 1G-753-1002-95, at
Exhibit 4, page 1). However, the record is unclear as to whether this
comparator, or the others cited in the record, are similarly situated
to appellant. In any event, we need not make such a determination
because we agree with the AJ that the agency articulated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. In this respect, we note
that appellant failed to present evidence that any of the agency's
actions were in retaliation for appellant's prior EEO activity or were
motivated by discriminatory animus toward any of her protected classes.
In particular, the manager responsible for placing appellant off the
clock testified that even after he received medical documentation
indicating appellant could return to work, he stated that appellant,
herself, told him that she was not able to perform her regular duties.
Notwithstanding the medical documentation, the manager was not going
to permit appellant to work if she, herself, felt she could not do the
job, and although appellant denies making such statements, she fails to
present evidence, other than her denial, that the proffered explanation
was a pretext for discriminatory or retaliatory animus.
Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's findings of no
discrimination which were based on a detailed assessment of the record.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including appellant's
contentions on appeal, and arguments and evidence not specifically
addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is
considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney
concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your
action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil
action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph
above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 17, 1999
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations1 The Commission notes
that appellant alleges that the agency treated
her adversely based on a perception that she
was disabled, and appellant does not allege that
she had a record of, or was an individual with
a disability, as defined by the Rehabilitation
Act and set forth in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(a)(i)
or (ii).
2 The Commission notes that while the Administrative Judge's (AJ)
statement of the issues on page 2 of the Recommended Decision (RD)
does not set forth all the dates appellant alleged she did not work,
appellant's testimony at the hearing, as set forth in finding of fact
number 14 on page 5 of the AJ's RD, comprise the applicable dates
appellant did not work.