ITAP MENU, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 17, 2020

14334355 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/334,355 07/17/2014 Michael WILSON ITAP-001-US-C1 1088
61365 7590 03/17/2020
Overhauser Law Offices, LLC
740 W. Green Meadows Drive
Suite 300
Greenfield, IN 46140
EXAMINER
ZUKANOVICH, BRANDY A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3684
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPNotices@overhauser.com
poverhauser@overhauser.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MICHAEL WILSON, OZAN SELCUK,
SHAWN MCCOOL and SCOTT BEARDSLEY
___________

Appeal 2019-002137
Application 14/334,355
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR.
and JEFFREY S. SMITH, Administrative Patent Judges.

WHITEHEAD JR., Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals from the final rejection of claims 15–18 under
35 U.S.C. § 134(a). Appeal Brief 7. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies ITAP MENU LLC., as the real party in
interest. Appeal Brief 3.
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Introduction
According to Appellant, the claimed subject matter “relates to systems
used to present purchase options to purchasers in connection with the sale of
vehicles or other products having multiple optional features.” Specification
¶ 4.

Representative Claim
15. A method for displaying and documenting a selection of vehicle
F&I[2] items for a vehicle to be acquired on financed terms, the vehicle
having a base cost, comprising:
• designating a first set of periodic payment terms;
• designating a second set of periodic payment terms that is different than
the first set of periodic payment terms;
• providing a physical display displaying a visual user interface comprising:

2 F&I Menu selling refers to the finance and insurance (F&I)
portion of a vehicle acquisition transaction in which, along with
the financing terms of the transaction (whether sale or lease), the
vehicle dealer provides to the vehicle purchaser / lessee a number
of options–a menu–of additional products and services that the
purchaser can choose to include into the vehicle purchase
transaction. For example, an F&I menu might include optional
items such as extended warranty products, paint and exterior
protection, anti-theft registration, pre-paid maintenance, identity
theft protection, tire and wheel protection, door ding protection,
etc. For a sale or lease of a product like a cell phone, a F&I menu,
(or optional items) might include, extended warranty plans, data
access plans, roaming plans, international calling or roaming
plans, loss or theft insurance, cloud or other data storage services,
etc.
Specification ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
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o F&I icons each representing an F&I item having an associated
price,
o an unselected F&I items area displaying unselected F&I icons;
o a selected F&I items area displaying selected F&I icons;
o a base price area displaying the base cost of the vehicle without
any selected F&I items;
o a first with-F&I items price area displaying the first set of
periodic payment terms and a first periodic payment amount for
the vehicle and F&I items displayed in the selected F&I items
area, the first periodic payment amount being calculated using
the first set of periodic payment terms;
o a second with- F&I items price area displaying the
second set of periodic payment terms and a second
periodic payment amount for the vehicle and F&I items
displayed in the selected F&1 items area, the second
periodic payment amount being calculated using the
second set of periodic payment terms;
• moving an F&I icon between the unselected F&I items area and the
selected F&I items area, and upon such moving, instantly:
o recalculating and displaying the first periodic payment
amount for the vehicle and F&I items displayed in the
selected F&I items area using the first set of periodic
payment terms; and
o recalculating and displaying the second periodic payment
amount for the vehicle and F&I items displayed in the
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selected F&I items area using the second set of periodic
payment terms; and
• selecting one or more F&I items to acquire with the vehicle;
• displaying a signature area;
• capturing an electronic signature of a customer; and
• storing an image of the captured signature, and an identification of
the F&I items in the selected F&I items area.
References
Name3 References Date
Baxer US 2005/0102520 A1 May 12, 2005
Thibodeau US 2007/0136162 A1 June 14, 2007

Rejections on Appeal
Claims 15 stands provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory
double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 28 of co-pending
Application 14/171,174. Final Action 3.
Claims 15–18 stand provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 10 and 28
of co-pending Application 14/171,174. Final Action 3.
Claims 15–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Action 4–9.
Claims 15–18 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Thibodeau and Baxter. Final Action 9–16.

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
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ANALYSIS
Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner,
we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed September 27, 2018), the Reply Brief
(filed January 28, 2018), the Final Action (mailed October 11, 2017) and the
Answer (mailed November 2, 2018), for the respective details.

Double Patenting Rejections
“Appellant submits that because the cited application has not issued as
a patent, a ‘double patenting’ rejection is premature.” Appeal Brief 7.
Appellant contends, that filing a Terminal Disclaimer would be considered
should the cited co-pending application issue during the pendency of the
instant application. Appeal Brief 7–8.
Appellant may not request that the provisional double patenting
rejections of claims 15–18 as set forth above be held in abeyance.4
Appellant does not proffer substantive arguments regarding the non-
statutory double patenting rejections. We summarily affirm the Examiner’s
provisional rejection of claims 15–18. See Appeal Brief 7–8; see also Ex
parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (“If an
appellant fails to present arguments on a particular issue — or, more
broadly, on a particular rejection — the Board will not, as a general matter,
unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the rejection. See, e.g.,
Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (the Board may
treat arguments appellant failed to make for a given ground of rejection as
waived)”).

4 Appellants may not reserve arguments for some later time. Arguments not
made are considered waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Appellant contends:
Appellant’s Brief established that a “double patenting”
rejection was improper because there is no issued patent having
claims to which the present claims can be compared to determine
whether they are “patentably distinct.” The Answer does not
respond to this argument, so the “double patenting” rejection
should be reversed on this basis alone. Moreover, Appellant
notes that the claims of the present application have a priority
date of June 14, 2011, while the claims of copending Application
No. 14/171174 were filed later, on February 3, 2014.
Reply Brief 2 (emphasis added).
We will not consider Appellant’s arguments in the Reply Brief
because they are not timely filed. As noted, “Any argument raised in the
reply brief which was not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to
an argument raised in the examiner’s answer . . . will not be considered by
the Board for purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”
37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)(2017). See Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam
Applications S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
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566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
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principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).5 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of

5 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
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internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).6
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.

6 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance –Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines the claims are directed to patent ineligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Final Action 4–9. We agree with
the Examiner’s determination because the claims are directed to an abstract
idea comprising commercial or legal interactions such as sales activities,
behaviors and/or business relations and do not include additional elements
that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (describing the two-step framework “for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts”); see also 2019 Revised Guidance, Section I (Groupings of
Abstract Ideas).
We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. Unless
otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as
our own. We add the following primarily for emphasis and clarification
with respect to the 2019 Revised Guidance.
Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
Step 2A, Prong One (Recitation of an Abstract Idea)
Appellants contend that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because, “The elements of claim 15 describe a method that provide a unique
advantage; they allow a customer to instantly see how their selection of F&I
items will impact multiple possible periodic payments.” Appeal Brief 11.
The Specification discloses:
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An F&I Menu system is disclosed that it provides
interactivity between the finance manager/ salesperson and the
purchaser. Directly on a mobile device such as a tablet computer,
the finance manager and the purchaser can adjust the options that
are presented and the options that are selected for inclusion with
the vehicle purchase, how the prices of these options appear (the
total price of the option or the option’s impact on the financed
payment), the financing terms (the number of months, the type
of transaction (lease, financing, cash, etc.), and more. Selections
and adjustments can be made in real time by the purchaser, and
the pricing and financing calculations are adjusted by the system
in real time on the screen. When the purchaser makes final
selections, the F&I menu system records the transaction,
captures the signatures, and facilitates printing of a summary of
the selections made. A vehicle purchaser has control over the
information that supports his or her purchasing decisions for F&I
products and services.
Specification ¶ 10.
Claim 15 recites a method for documenting a selection of vehicle F&I
items for a vehicle to be acquired on financed terms, the vehicle having a
base cost:
[1] designating a first set of periodic payment terms;

[2] designating a second set of periodic payment terms that is
different than the first set of periodic payment terms;

[3] the first periodic payment amount being calculated using the
first set of periodic payment terms;
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[4] the second periodic payment amount being calculated using
the second set of periodic payment terms;
[5] recalculating the first periodic payment amount for the
vehicle;
[6] recalculating the second periodic payment amount for the
vehicle.
Accordingly, these steps comprise managing commercial or legal
interactions (sales activities or behaviors; business relations); thus, the claim
recites the abstract idea of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity.”
See 2019 Revised Guidance, Section I (Groupings of Abstract Ideas); see
also Specification ¶ 52. Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed
to abstract ideas when they recited similar subject matter. See Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1280
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (concluding that “managing a stable value protected life
insurance policy by performing calculations and manipulating the results” is
an abstract idea); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (holding that concept of “creating a contractual relationship—a
‘transaction performance guaranty’” is an abstract idea); Inventor Holdings,
LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that concept of “local processing of payments for remotely
purchased goods” is a “fundamental economic practice, which Alice made
clear is, without more, outside the patent system.”); OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding
that claimed concept of “offer-based price optimization” is an abstract idea
“similar to other ‘fundamental economic concepts’ found to be abstract ideas
by the Supreme Court and this court”). Therefore, we conclude the claims
recite an abstract idea pursuant to Step 2A, Prong One of the 2019 Revised
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Guidance. See 2019 Revised Guidance, Section III(A)(1) (Prong One:
Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception).

Step 2A, Prong Two (Integration into a Practical Application)
Under Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we must determine
“whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of the exception”; it is noted that a “claim that
integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 2019 Revised Guidance,
Section III(A)(2).
We find Appellant’s claims are distinguished from those claims that
our reviewing court has found to be patent eligible by virtue of reciting
technological improvements to a computer system. See, e.g., DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1249, 1257 (holding that claims reciting computer
processor for serving “composite web page” were patent eligible because
“the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order
to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks”); Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that claims directed to “an improved computer
memory system” having many benefits were patent eligible); see also
Appeal Brief 18.
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In McRO7, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim, when
considered as a whole, was directed to a “technological improvement over
the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques” through the “use [of] limited
rules . . . specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in
conventional industry practice.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed rules allowed
computers to produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial
expressions in animated characters that previously could only be produced
by human animators; and the rules were limiting because they defined
morph weight sets as a function of phoneme sub-sequences. McRO, 837
F.3d at 1313 (internal citations omitted).
We find insufficient evidence of record here that the present situation
is like the one in McRO where computers were unable to make certain
subjective determinations, i.e., regarding morph weight and phoneme
timings, which could only be made prior to the claimed invention by human
animators. See Appeal Brief 12–14. The Background section of the McRO
’576 patent includes a description of the admitted prior art method and the
shortcomings associated with that prior method. See McRO, 837 F.3d at
1303–06. There is no comparable discussion in Appellant’s Specification or
elsewhere of record.
Subsequently, we detect no additional element (or combination of
elements) recited in Appellant’s representative claim 1 that integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance,
Section III(A)(2). For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements

7 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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(e.g., display) does not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other
technology; (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for a
generic computer); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to
a different state; and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Accordingly, we determine the claim does not integrate the recited
judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance,
Section III(A)(2) (Prong Two: If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical
Application).
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
Step 2B
Next, we determine whether the claim includes additional elements
that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby
providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)).
In Bascom8, our reviewing court found that while the claims of the
patent were directed to an abstract idea, the patentee alleged an “inventive
concept can be found in the ordered combination of the claim limitations
that transform the abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical

8 Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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application of that abstract idea.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352. In particular,
the patent claimed “a technology-based solution (not an abstract-idea-based
solution implemented with generic technical components in a conventional
way) to filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with
other Internet filtering systems.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1351. In contrast,
Appellant’s claim 15 is immediately distinguishable, as it recites an abstract-
idea-based solution, that is, documenting a selection of a vehicle’s F&I items
to be acquired on financed terms, implemented with generic technical
components (computer with display), in a conventional way. (See generally
Specification). Therefore, we are not persuaded that ordered combinations
of steps in claim 15 provide an inventive concept. See 2019 Revised
Guidance at 56; see also Appeal Brief 17–18.
Accordingly, we conclude claims 15–18 are directed to a fundamental
economic practice, which is one of certain methods of organizing human
activity identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance and thus an abstract idea.
Further, the claims do not recite limitations that amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea itself. We sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 rejection of claims 15–18.

35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection
Appellant contends that Thibodeau fails to disclose “F&I icons . . . ,
“an unselected F&I items area . . . ”; “a selected F&I items area . . . ”; “a
base price area . . . ”; “a first with-F&I items price area . . . ” and “a second
with-F&I items price area ”. Appeal Brief 20. (Emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s Specification indicates that, “an F&I menu might include
optional items such as extended warranty products, paint and exterior
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protection, anti-theft registration, pre-paid maintenance, identity theft
protection, tire and wheel protection, door ding protection, etc.”
Specification ¶6.
Thibodeau discloses:
In one embodiment the purchase package may be generated
based on the customer’s profile information (e.g., credit status,
driving history, preferences, etc.). The purchase package may
include data reflecting one or more vehicle related options, such
as options related to a physical and/or operational attribute of the
vehicle, such as engine size, transmission type, leather seats, etc.
The purchase package may also include data reflecting one or
more service options for the vehicle, such as prepaid
maintenance plans, etc. The purchase package may also include
data reflecting one or more part replacement options for the
vehicle, such as a plan for covering the cost of certain vehicle
parts or fluids. Additionally, the purchase package may include
data reflecting one or more available insurance plans for the
selected vehicle and customer. Moreover, the purchase package
may include data reflecting one or more prepaid fuel plans for
the vehicle. The purchase package may include data reflecting
the total cost for the purchase package, each selected options
included in the package.

Thibodeau ¶ 22 (emphasis added).
We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive because it is evident
that Thibodeau teaches F&I menu items as recited in claim 15. See
Thibodeau ¶22. Appellant further argues, that:
Thibodeau does not disclose any user interface at all. Thibodeau
states that it a customer may interact with its system via a
“computer system” that may include a “web browser[].”
However, Thibodeau does not disclose what is actually displayed
on that computer system, and it certainly does not disclose the
above elements required by claim 15.

Appeal Brief 20 (citing Thibodeau ¶25).
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Thibodeau discloses a “customer system 103 may include a processor
that executes a Web browser software program to allow customer 105 to
browse Web sites including content reflecting vehicles offered for sale by a
merchant, such as selling merchant 110.” Thibodeau ¶ 25. Because the
consumer interacts with the software program to select desired items via a
user interface and therefore we do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive.
Thibodeau further discloses “methods and systems consistent with
embodiments of the present invention provide purchase packages for a
customer to purchase a product, such as a vehicle. The purchase packages
include options that may be purchased along with the product and are
affiliated with a financial account provided by financial account provider
140.” Thibodeau ¶ 31 (emphasis added); see Final Action 12–13.
Appellant further argues that “the ‘unselected F&I items area’ and the
‘selected F&I items area’ have additional functions - they are sources and
destinations for the F&I icons, and moving an icon between these areas
results invokes the ‘instantly recalculating and displaying step.” Appeal
Brief 22. Again, we do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive because as
the consumer selects options, Thibodeau calculates the final cost of the
vehicle factoring in the customer’s selected opinions. See Final Action 12
(citing Thibodeau ¶¶ 4, 11, 22, 31–35(“if customer 105 is physically present
at a selling merchant 110 site, selling merchant 110 may receive the
customer’s selections via a local computer system, such as the same
computer system used to provide the options to customer 105 (e.g., merchant
representative computer system, kiosk, etc.”), 37 and 39); see also
Thibodeau ¶ 36 (“Selling merchant 110 may determine whether to accept the
customized option provided by customer 105. If so, selling merchant 110
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includes the customized option as one of the selected options received in
Step 330 for inclusion in the purchase package.”). We note, “As our
precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007).
Accordingly, we do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive
because Thibodeau discloses the claimed invention with the exception of
“displaying a signature area; capturing an electronic signature of a
customer; and storing an image of the captured signature.” Final Action
13. The Examiner finds Baxter addresses Thibodeau’s noted deficiency.
Final Action 13. We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 15, as well as, dependent claims 16–18 not argued
separately. See Appeal Brief 30–31.

CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
15–18 Double Patenting 15–18
15–18 101 Eligibility 15–18
15–18 103 Baxter, Thibodeau 15–18

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(v).

Appeal 2019-002137
Application 14/334,355

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AFFIRMED