iRobot Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 23, 2020

2020002143 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/020,313 06/27/2018 Colin Angle 5329.012US4 7602 162742 7590 11/23/2020 SLW / iRobot Corporation P.O. BOX 2938 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402 EXAMINER MOTT, GENNA M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3662 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/23/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): SLW@blackhillsip.com uspto@slwip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte COLIN ANGLE, DAVID SNELLING, MELISSA O’DEA, TIMOTHY S. FARLOW, SAMUEL DUFFLEY, JEFFREY W. MAMMEN, and MICHAEL J. HALLORAN Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 Technology Center 3600 Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, and MICHAEL L. WOODS, Administrative Patent Judges. GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 2–10 and 24–28. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as iRobot Corporation. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to methods for providing what the Specification refers to as “environmental mapping.” See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 40. Claim 2, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 2. A computer-implemented method for operating a cleaning robot, the method comprising: generating a progressively improving map of an area being cleaned; transmitting a graphical representation of the progressively improving map or portion thereof to a user interface on a user terminal that is remote from the cleaning robot; localizing a location of a dock in the area being cleaned by the cleaning robot, wherein the graphical representation of the progressively improving map comprises a graphical representation of the relative position of the location of the dock in the graphical representation of the progressively improving map, wherein an area of the progressively improving map changes over time. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Dooley US 2009/0281661 A1 Nov. 12, 2009 Chiappetta US 2010/0082193 A1 Apr. 1, 2010 Choe US 2011/0264305 A1 Oct. 27, 2011 Kim US 2012/0125363 A1 May 24, 2012 Atia US 2015/0230100 A1 Aug. 13, 2015 REJECTIONS Claims 2–10 and 28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea. Final Act. 3. Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 3 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 2–10 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. Final Act. 4; Ans. 3. Claims 2, 3, 6, and 24–28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim and Choe. Final Act. 5. Claims 4 and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Choe, and Dooley. Final Act. 7. Claims 7 and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Choe, and Atia. Final Act. 7. Claims 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Choe, and Chiappetta. Final Act. 8. OPINION Section 101 Appellant argues the claims subject to § 101 rejection as a group, for which we select claim 2, the sole independent claim, as representative under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). The Examiner determined, and we agree, that the recited series of steps could be performed in the human mind, in effect creating a mental map of an area being cleaned, and the only other step, which relates to transmitting the map to a user terminal, is generic and conventional post- solution activity.2 Final Act. 3. It is unclear why Appellant believes a progressively improving map is not something that can be generated in a human mind. Appeal Br. 10. It cannot be the subject of reasonable debate 2 See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer- implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”). Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 4 that humans have long had the capacity to make a mental map of an area, be it inside a home or in some geographic location, for example, without the need for any technological assistance. Such maps are formed by the process of observation, evaluation, and refinement.3 Although Appellant lists several steps in their arguments (Appeal Br. 10), it is not clear why Appellant believes any particular step, other than the “transmitting . . . to a user interface on a user terminal” (to the extent that requires something more than a pen and paper), cannot be considered to cover purely mental steps. As the Examiner correctly points out, contrary to Appellant’s argument (Appeal Br. 11), the recited steps are not required to be carried out in, or by, the robot. Final Act. 3. Rather, per the claims, the robot need only be observed cleaning an area to perform the steps of the process. Appellant does not apprise us of any claim language precluding this observation from taking place in the human mind. Nor does Appellant apprise us as to how any of the subsequent evaluations must, according to the claim, take place outside of the mind. Numerous cases have held that generic recitations of routine functions like “transmitting . . . to a user interface on a user terminal” are mere insignificant post-solution activity insufficient to transform an abstract idea into something patent eligible.4 Appellant argues the claimed subject matter constitutes an “improvement to a technology or technical field.” Appeal Br. 10. Supporting such an argument requires at least directing our attention to the subject matter in the claims or the Specification that constitutes such an improvement. There does not appear to be anything “technical” about the 3 See, e.g., MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III) and cases cited therein. 4 See, e.g., MPEP § 2106.05(g) and cases cited therein. Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 5 claim recitations or the portions of the Specification cited as support for them. Rather, the sequence involves the mere recitation of desired results regardless of how those results are achieved. This is precisely the type of abstraction that creates concerns of preemption and monopolization of basic ideas and tools of general availability.5 Accordingly, claim 2 was properly rejected by the Examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 103(a) Claim 2 is again representative for the rejection premised on Kim and Choe. The remaining claims and rejections are argued based only on dependency. The Examiner determined Kim to disclose the method of claim 2 absent the user interface, for which the Examiner cited Choe. Final Act. 5–6. Appellant does not raise any issues regarding the Examiner’s reliance on Choe. Appellant raises two issues with regard to the Examiner’s reliance on Kim, both of which involve claim construction. First, Appellant argues that Kim’s map is not “progressively” improved because it does not change over time, only as it is being made. Appeal Br. 14. Second, Appellant argues that, to the extent Kim’s map changes, the changes are merely to mark characteristics or attributes of the mapped area, not to change the quantity of surface area mapped, which, Appellant argues, is how one skilled in the art would understand the recitation “an area. . . changes.” Appeal Br. 15. The Examiner disputes both of Appellant’s contentions that the claim language is sufficiently narrow, so as to exclude the subject matter Appellant argues does not fall within the scope of that which is claimed. Ans. 7–8. We 5 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216–17 (2014). Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 6 agree with the Examiner in both cases, but note that, regardless of whether we agree with Appellant or the Examiner on these issues of claim construction, the outcome of this appeal would not change because the cited portions of Kim satisfy the disputed limitations, even under Appellant’s narrower proposed construction. Appellant does not sufficiently apprise us as to precisely how the language “progressively improving” somehow equates to, for example, a map that is made, stored, and later recalled and further edited, as opposed to just the ordinary and gradual process of making a map in the first instance. Final Act. 8. We are not apprised of any claim language recited to support such an interpretation, and Appellant does not direct our attention to any specific portion of the Specification illustrating Appellant’s proposed interpretation is the one that should be applied in light of the Specification. Appellant directs our attention only to paragraph 140, which simply indicates “‘the map’ gets bigger as the robot 200 travels.” Reply Br. 5. We fail to see any distinction between “making” a map, that includes more area as in Kim, and “improving” a map to change, or include, more areas. Both operations “progressively improv[e]” the map. As noted above, it is true that there is a portion of the Specification (para. 140) that indicates “[t]he surface area” of the map grows. But, in claim 2, Appellant chose to omit any language to indicate that it was the amount of surface area to which “area . . . changes” refer. Reading the claim in light of the Specification would therefore clearly indicate, by Appellant’s choice to omit such specific language, that claim 26 was not intended to be 6 Claim 6, for example, which is not separately argued, perhaps could be differentiated somewhat in this regard. Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 7 limited to the precise description in paragraph 140 of the Specification. “‘[R]eading a claim in the light of the specification,’ to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 (CCPA 1969). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the introduction of a characteristic, such as the floor type, or the presence of an obstacle, is within the broadest reasonable interpretation of “an area of the . . . map changes.” Ans. 7–8. Although we do not agree with Appellant that the Examiner relied on overly broad interpretations of the claim language in rejecting claim 2, we additionally note that, even under Appellant’s proposed narrower constructions, Kim would still seem to meet the claim language in question according to the grounds for rejection originally set forth by the Examiner. Appellant appears to incorrectly interpret the entire areas illustrated in Figures 6–97 of Kim’s disclosure as the maps created by Kim’s robot, but they are not. Appeal Br. 15 (“FIGS. 7-9 illustrate the same map of the entire cleaning area.”). Rather, those figures illustrate areas to be mapped (Fig. 6), partially mapped (Figs. 7, 8), or entirely mapped (Fig. 9). For example, the maps depicted in Figures 7a and 7b of Kim are bounded by L2 as opposed to the outermost lines of the areas depicted in those figures. Kim’s method for 7 Kim’s Figure numbers do not accurately correspond to the Figure numbers referenced in Kim’s Detailed Description in Kim’s pre-grant publication or issued patent (US 9,456,725 B2). Figure 5 in Kim is referred to as Figure 9 in Kim’s description. Figures 6–9 in Kim are respectively referred to as Figures 5–8 in Kim’s description. We refer to the numbers associated with Kim’s actual figures when referring to Kim’s figures herein. Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 8 map generation does provide several possible options (Figs. 10A–C). However, in at least one of the possibilities for following Kim’s method, Kim’s method would first produce the carpet area map in Figure 7a, then, at a subsequent time, on a subsequent run, expand that map to include the entire area depicted in Figure 9a. See Kim paras. 106–111 (cited at Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 7–8). Kim’s addition to the areas or obstacles in a subsequent run at a subsequent time would meet Appellant’s more narrow proposed definition of “progressively improving” Kim’s map. Kim’s addition to the quantity of surface area actually mapped would meet Appellant’s more narrow proposed definition of having an “area [that] changes over time.” Accordingly, we would sustain the Examiner’s rejection, independent of the issues raised and discussed above concerning the breadth of the Examiner’s proposed claim construction. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED. Appeal 2020-002143 Application 16/020,313 9 DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 2–10, 28 101 Eligibility 2–10, 28 2, 3, 6, 24– 28 103(a) Kim, Choe 2, 3, 6, 24– 28 4, 5 103(a) Kim, Choe, Dooley 4, 5 7, 8 103(a) Kim, Choe, Atia 7, 8 9, 10 103(a) Kim, Choe, Chiappetta 9, 10 Overall Outcome 2–10, 24–28 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED