Interstate Truck Parts

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1993

312 N.L.R.B. 661 (N.L.R.B. 1993)

660
312 NLRB No. 114
INTERSTATE TRUCK PARTS
1 On April 16, 1993, Administrative Law Judge Robert T. Wallace
issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the General Counsel submitted an answering
brief. The National Labor Relations Board has considered the deci-
sion and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to
adopt the recommended Order.
2 Signed authorization cards are reliable evidence of majority sta-
tus. Garry Mfg. Co., 242 NLRB 539, 545 (1979).
3 The Respondent argued that there was no violation of Sec.
8(a)(1) because the employees did not feel threatened. However, the
Board has long held that the Act is violated if the Respondent’s
statements would reasonably tend to interfere with employee rights
under the Act, regardless of whether employees feel threatened. El
Rancho Market, 235 NLRB 468, 471 (1978). The statements here
meet this objective standard.
4 Although the Respondent eventually reimbursed Poley and
Troupe for lost wages, recission of any unlawful change does not
remove the violation of the Act. Hollander Home Fashions Corp.,
225 NLRB 1098, 1103 (1981).
5 The fact that Poley, who also signed a union authorization card,
was not fired is irrelevant. Termination of a union activist serves to
warn remaining employees that future union activities will not be
tolerated. NLRB v. Hale Container Line, 943 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.
1991), enfg. 291 NLRB 1195 (1988).
6 The Board and courts have found threats of plant closure, dis-
charge of a union activist, and coercive interrogation to be unfair
labor practices which are unlikely to dissipate and should be viewed
as having a continued impact. Hedstrom Co., 235 NLRB 1193
(1978), enfd. 629 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1980).
7 The Respondent argues that employee turnover and the passage
of time have erased the effects of its unfair labor practices. How-
ever, the Board has consistently stated that validity of a bargaining
order depends on evaluation of the circumstances when the unfair
labor practices were committed. In addition, employee turnover does
not warrant withholding the bargaining order when turnover is insuf-
ficient to mitigate the effects of the employers actions and replace-
ments are likely to learn of employer misconduct. See International
Door, 303 NLRB 582 (1991). See also Fun Connection & Juice
Time, 302 NLRB 740 (1991). Finally, the Board and the courts have
consistently stated that delay is an unfortunate but inevitable result
of the process of hearing, decision, and review. To deny enforcement
on the basis of passage of time would encourage continued litigation.
See Hedstrom Co., supra. See also L. B. Foster Co., 168 NLRB 83
(1969), enfd. 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 900
(1970).
8 The Board and the courts have found it to be significant that un-
fair labor practices are initiated by a senior company official and
that the official remains in office. See Atlas Microfilming Co., supra.
See also Mayfield Produce Co., 290 NLRB 1083 (1988).
Interstate Truck Parts, Inc. and District Lodge 98,
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO, Petitioner.
Case 5–CA–21367
September 30, 1993
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
The central issue we address in this case is whether
the Respondent, has committed such unfair labor prac-
tices as to warrant the imposition of a remedial bar-
gaining order under the rationale of NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). We agree with the
judge’s reasoning and conclusion that such an order is
appropriate here.1
In June 1990, two of the three employees in the bar-
gaining unit signed union authorization cards. Shortly
after being informed that the union demand for rec-
ognition was supported by a majority of employees,2
Cleland, the president and part owner of the Company,
interrogated employees Myers and Poley in an agitated
manner regarding whether they had signed union au-
thorization cards. He then threatened that ‘‘come Fri-
day’’ they would have ‘‘a rude awakening’’ and would
be ‘‘unhappy campers.’’ Later, he threatened to cut
their wages and benefits and alter their work sched-
ules. At the same time, he also threatened to close the
facility in order to avoid unionization.3 He proceeded
to carry out these threats4 as well as discharge Myers,
a union supporter.5
The Respondent’s unlawful response to the advent
of the Union shows a pattern of conduct which has
been present in other cases where the Board and courts
have found remedial bargaining orders appropriate.
Thus, the Respondent’s unfair labor practices affected
all three members of the bargaining unit, were commit-
ted by the most senior company official, and had a
continuing impact on unit employees.6 See Atlas
Microfilming, 267 NLRB 682 (1983), enfd. 753 F.2d
313 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Electrical Products, 239
NLRB 323 (1978), enfd. 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied 449 U.S. 871 (1980); and United Oil Mfg.
Co., 254 NLRB 1320 (1981), enfd. 672 F.2d 1208 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1036 (1983).
It is clear that traditional remedies which do not in-
clude a bargaining order will not likely be sufficient to
eliminate the coercive effects of the Respondent’s un-
lawful conduct or ensure a free and fair election. There
is little possibility that reinstatement of Myers and the
posting of notices could successfully dissipate the ef-
fect of the Respondent’s unfair labor practices. Reim-
bursement cannot erase the impression left on employ-
ees of the power of the Respondent to effect their
wages and conditions of employment in retaliation for
union activities. Similarly, reinstatement with backpay
will not erase the impression that the Respondent not
only has the power to discharge its employees, but can
delay litigation over its unfair labor practices and avoid
unionization for over 2-1/2 years. Thus, the unfair
labor practices committed will have a continuous effect
on the ability of the employees to exercise their Sec-
tion 7 rights and make a free choice in an election.7
Finally, a recurrence of the unfair labor practices ap-
pears likely. The Respondent’s past practices dem-
onstrate strong antiunion animus. The senior company
official who committed the acts remains in place.8
Thus, the possibility of erasing the effect of the Re-
spondent’s past practices and ensuring a fair election
661INTERSTATE TRUCK PARTS
1 All dates are in 1990 unless otherwise indicated.
2 On this date, Respondent having failed to comply with a sub-
poena duces tecum, hearing was postponed indefinitely to permit the
Board to seek enforcement. On September 18, 1991, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania directed
Respondent to comply after placing limitations on its obligation to
provide customer lists. On April 17, 1992, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court.
3 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
4 Cleland claims he threw the letter in the trash can without read-
ing it. He wasn’t sure whether he called the Union. However, he re-
calls a phone call in which he told a union representative he was
‘‘not interested.’’
by the use of traditional remedies is slight. Employee
sentiment, once expressed through cards, is better pro-
tected by a bargaining order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Interstate Truck Parts, Inc.,
Lewisberry, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order.
Marc A. Stefan and Brenda Valentine Harris, Esqs., for the
General Counsel.
Thomas A. Beckley and Charles O. Beckley II, Esqs., for Re-
spondent Company.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT T. WALLACE, Administrative Law Judge. The
charge was filed July 26, 1990,1 the complaint issued No-
vember 8, 1990, and the trial was in York, Pennsylvania, on
June 272 and on November 17, 1991.
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by interrogating
employees about their union membership, and by threatening
them with loss of benefits, closure, and other unspecified re-
prisals for seeking to be represented by the Union. In addi-
tion, Respondent is alleged to have violated Section 8(a)(3)
by changing work schedules, eliminating benefits, and by
discharging employee Jason Myers. A ‘‘Gissel’’ bargaining
order3 is sought.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs
filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, reconditions and sells truck
parts at its facility in Lewisberry, Pennsylvania, where it an-
nually purchases and receives goods and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of
Pennsylvania. The Respondent admits and I find that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that District Lodge 98,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
At times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had a
total of six employees. These include its part-owner/president
Richard Cleland, Manager Ricky Knaub, secretary/clerk Deb
Popp, and three nonsupervisory warehouse/counter/delivery
persons: Myers, Donald Poley, and Jeff Troupe.
In June, Myers signed a card authorizing the Union to act
as his collective-bargaining representative; and at his urging
Poley also signed.
On July 17, Cleland received a letter in which the Union
announced that it represented the majority of Respondent’s
employees and requested recognition.
In response to Cleland’s early morning telephone inquiry
on Wednesday, July 18, a representative of the Union told
Cleland that the demand for recognition was supported by at
least half of Respondent’s employees. Cleland ended the con-
versation abruptly by hanging up.4
Shortly thereafter, Cleland saw Myers and Poley nearby
and approached them. According to Poley, Cleland looked
and sounded ‘‘agitated.’’ Myers agrees, stating that Cleland’s
face was red and his voice raised. Cleland asked them if they
had signed union cards. When each replied, ‘‘Yes,’’ he told
them they had backed him into a corner and that, come Fri-
day, they would have a ‘‘rude awakening’’ and be ‘‘unhappy
campers.’’
Later that day in the shop area, Cleland told Myers and
Poley he was going to change their morning start time from
8 to 5:30 a.m., cut their pay to $5 an hour, and take away
all their benefits. When Myers protested, Cleland cut him
off, saying, ‘‘I’ll do whatever I want!’’ Later still, in the of-
fice, Cleland told Poley he did not want a union in the shop
and would close down to avoid that situation. Cleland did
not deny making those statements.
And before the day ended, Cleland prepared a document
which reads as follows:
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 1, 1990
Due to financial difficulties we are forced to make
changes in employee benefits and wages. These
changes will be:
NO paid vacations
NO paid holidays
NO paid medical insurance
Salary reduction to $5 per hour (Effective on Aug.
3 check)
We are sorry for any inconvenience this may cause, but
due to the current circumstances it cannot be avoided.
The notice, without further explanation, was given to em-
ployees in the same envelope with their paychecks on Friday,
July 20. Also included were separate notes, one informing
Myers that, effective Monday, July 23, his Monday through
Friday workweek was changed to Tuesday through Saturday,
and the other telling Poley that his regular starting time
would be 5:30 a.m. Poley and Troupe, accompanied by Man-
ager Knaub, promptly went to Cleland and asked for an ex-
662 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 The employees were paid at the new hourly rate at least in
checks received on August 3. Respondent claims that within an en-
suing 2- to 4-week period he restored their prior hourly rates and
reimbursed them for all wages lost during the interim. It also claims
that the other changes decreed on July 20 never took effect.
planation. Cleland assured them that it was a temporary situ-
ation based on a bankruptcy filing by a customer,
‘‘TransCon.’’5
Following his new schedule, Myers did not report to work
on Monday; and when he arrived at the shop on Tuesday,
July 24, he noticed two new employees at work. Shortly
thereafter, he was directed to the office. There, Cleland told
him he was no longer needed. When Myers inquired as to
why, Cleland waived a paper and retorted, ‘‘Which of the
forty do you want?’’ Myers said all of them, and Cleland
began to read from the paper. After mentioning tardiness,
failing to come to work ‘‘one day,’’ and refusing to do a
brake delining job, Cleland paused as if to say, ‘‘Is that
enough?’’ Myers asked for a copy of the paper. Cleland re-
plied that he didn’t have time to stand around reading and
that he would have the secretary give him one in the same
envelope with his severance check. That was not done, and
Myers departed without being given any other reason for his
termination. Cleland did not dispute Myers’ account of his
termination interview.
A. Analysis
1. Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
Coming as they did 1 day after the Union’s written de-
mand for recognition and uttered in anger, President
Cleland’s statements to Myers and Poley on July 18 were
patently unlawful. His asking them if they signed union cards
constitutes coercive interrogation. O.K. Trucking Co., 298
NLRB 804, 809 (1990); Hudson Neckwear, 302 NLRB 93
(1991). Telling them that their union support backed him into
a corner and that they would be unhappy campers come Fri-
day is an implied threat of retaliation for engaging in pro-
tected activities. M. K. Morse Co., 302 NLRB 924 (1991).
His statement that their pay and benefits would be reduced
and that their starting time would be advanced to 5:30 in-
stead of 8 a.m. was an explicit threat of retaliation. St. Vin-
cent’s Hospital, 244 NLRB 84, 92 (1979). Finally, Cleland’s
threat to close down to avoid unionization is a ‘‘hallmark’’
violation. Matheson Fast Freight, 297 NLRB 63, 68–69
(1989).
Respondent’s claim that the interrogation and threats were
not unlawful because the employees did not ‘‘really believe
them’’ lacks merit. Since long ago it has been the rule that
whether or not an effort to coerce employees was successful
is irrelevant to whether the statements or action reasonably
tend to interfere with their protected rights. American
Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959). It is the rule
today. As stated in O.K. Trucking Co., supra at 804 fn. 2:
‘‘[T]he Board does not consider such subjective reac-
tions, but rather whether, under all the circumstances
the [employer’s statement] reasonably tends to restrain,
coerce or interfere with rights guaranteed under the
Act.’’
And it was the rule in between long ago and today. Thus,
in Seneca Foods Corp., 244 NLRB 558, 562–563 (1979), the
Board states:
‘‘[T]he testimony that the employees did not feel or act
scared or intimidated by the comments directed to them
. . . [is irrelevant] . . . the test is whether the employ-
er’s conduct may reasonably be said to have the tend-
ency to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights.’’
2. Violations of Section 8(a)(3)
a. Lost wages/benefits
It is undisputed that immediately on receiving the Union’s
demand for recognition, Respondent, through President
Cleland, informed its employees that their paid vacations,
holidays, and medical insurance would be eliminated, their
pay reduced, and their work schedules significantly changed.
Those actions represent the typical situation of a respondent
who ‘‘on learning of its . . . employees’ effort to secure rep-
resentation, took strong retributive actions to prevent their se-
curing same.’’ Seven-Up Bottling Co., 235 NLRB 297, 304
(1978).
Respondent defends its actions by sailing on two different
tacks. First, Cleland asserts legitimate business reasons; and,
second, he claims there is no violation because the benefit
and schedule changes never took effect and the pay cut was
reimbursed. The first effort founders on the shoals of
Cleland’s contradictory, inconsistent, and incredible testi-
mony, while the second crashes on salient rocks of fact.
As to business necessity, he claims that cutbacks were
prompted by an immediate need to compensate for a $35,000
loss incurred following bankruptcy of an important customer.
But Cleland states that his accountant advised him of the
problem in May or June, well before he acted to implement
cutbacks on July 18, 1 day following receipt of the Union’s
demand for recognition. Also, the timing of that action is in-
consistent with his admitted hiring of two new employees on
July 23, an act which belies the claimed financial crunch.
Fedco Freightlines, 273 NLRB 399, 400–401 (1984). In
these circumstances, and since no financial records were pre-
sented, I decline to credit the claim.
Equally unavailing is Respondent’s assertion that there can
be no violation because all the announced changes were re-
scinded. However, at least some became effective albeit for
short periods, and that is sufficient to constitute actual dis-
crimination within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1). Hollander
Home Fashion Corp., 255 NLRB 1098, 1103 (1981); Geor-
gia Hosiery Mills, 207 NLRB 781 (1973). Thus, Myers fol-
lowed his new schedule and lost wages by not reporting to
work on Monday, July 23, and other employees suffered loss
of income until (assertedly) fully reimbursed weeks later.
b. Myers’ discharge
The evidence establishing a prima facie showing of unlaw-
ful motive in the discharge of Myers is overwhelming. It is
undisputed that he engaged in a protected union activity
(signing a union authorization card) and that Cleland learned
about it through his unlawful interrogation. The requisite
antiunion animus is demonstrated by the coercive threats and
retaliations discussed above. Finally, the timing of the dis-
663INTERSTATE TRUCK PARTS
6 At the trial, Cleland claimed Myers took unauthorized absences
on October 17, 1989, and on June 9 and 29. Myers’ personnel file
contains a reference to only one of the three alleged ‘‘no-call, no-
show’’ incidents, and that document reflects that his being off on
June 29 was approved by Secretary Popp.
7 In response to a question of Respondent, counsel, Cleland volun-
teered that a lot of the information used in preparing the list came
from contemporaneous notations he made in his personal diary. The
diary was not made available to the General Counsel prior to or dur-
ing trial despite the court order to comply with language in a sub-
poena requiring production of ‘‘All . . . documents [defined as in-
cluding diaries] made or received by any supervisor, agent or man-
agement official relating to the decision to discharge Jason Myers
. . . .’’
charge is telling, occurring shortly after the Union’s demand
for recognition and Cleland’s being made aware of the im-
pact removal of one known union supporter from a three-per-
son unit would have on the Union’s demand.
Accordingly, Respondent has the burden of demonstrating
that the discharge of Myers on July 24 would have occurred
even apart from his involvement with the Union. Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). It has failed in that
regard.
On July 24, Cleland gave Myers three reasons. The first,
tardiness, derives from timecard data showing that over the
13 months of his employment he was late punching in on 35
occasions. Of those, 25 were for 5 minutes or less, 9 were
for less than one-half hour, and 1 (on March 20) was for 38
minutes. Myers was docked 15 minutes’ pay for each in-
stance of tardiness occurring within 15-minute increments,
and at no time did Respondent ever inform him that contin-
ued lateness would result in discharge. The second, an ab-
sence for 1 day, was not accompanied by a date; so Myers,
and we, are left to speculate as to which absence6 was re-
ferred to and whether he had permission. The third reason,
refusing to do a brake delining job, was understood by
Myers to refer to an incident which occurred on May 4; and,
even assuming a dereliction, no reason is given as to why
in this matter, as well as the others, discipline was delayed
until July 24.
At the trial, Cleland provided a laundry list of additional
reasons for the discharge. Of those, the most recent cited in-
stance involved a claimed late delivery on Tuesday, July 17,
a full week prior to his discharge and another admittedly was
newly discovered several weeks after the discharge. He had
secondhand knowledge of circumstances surrounding a num-
ber of the events, and persons directly concerned (Manager
Knaub and secretary Popp) were not called as witnesses. See
Bay Metal Cabinets, 302 NLRB 152 (1991). And his attempt
to bolster his vague testimony about other incidents on the
list was abortive.7
B. Bargaining Order
At the time pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent em-
ployed three warehouse/counter/delivery persons: Myers,
Poley, and Troupe. Apart from management personnel, the
three individuals comprised the entire work force when the
Union demanded recognition. Accordingly, the unit of
warehouse/counter/delivery persons constitutes an appropriate
unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
The record also establishes that two of the three unit em-
ployees signed union authorization cards prior to the Union’s
demand for recognition on July 17. Therefore, for Gissel pur-
poses, the only remaining question is whether ‘‘Respondent’s
unlawful conduct warrants the imposition of a Gissel bar-
gaining order to protect the employees’ majority selection of
a bargaining representative based on authorization cards.’’
Bakers of Paris, 288 NLRB 991 (1988). In view of the na-
ture of the unfair labor practices detailed above, I conclude
that a bargaining order is both necessary and appropriate.
President Cleland’s reaction on learning that a majority of
his employees had signed authorization cards was to coer-
cively interrogate employees to determine who supported the
Union. And promptly thereafter, he instituted a series of dra-
conian pay and benefit reductions which were directly linked
by him to the Union’s organizational effort. Then, to assure
that the Union’s majority would not remain intact, he dis-
charged one of the two known union supporters. Such unfair
labor practices are a prototypical basis for imposition of a
bargaining order.
In broad terms, the ‘‘swiftness, severity, and extensiveness
of Respondent’s unfair labor practices, [make it] highly un-
likely that its employees would be willing or able freely to
express their choice in [an] election.’’ Bakers of Paris, supra;
Mayfield Produce Co., 290 NLRB 1083 fn. 3 (1988). Here,
Cleland’s reaction to the recognition demand was immediate,
ruthless, and impacted on the entire unit. More specifically,
his discovery of their organizational efforts caused him to
subject the employees to threats that they would be ‘‘un-
happy campers’’ for having backed him ‘‘into a corner.’’
And true to his word, within 2 days they had notice of a pay
cut, new starting time (5:30 instead of 8 a.m.), and elimi-
nation of paid vacations, holidays, and medical insurance.
The immediate imposition of harsher terms and conditions of
employment following an employer’s learning of an organiz-
ing effort is a classic indicia of a situation where a bargain-
ing order is appropriate. Garry Mfg. Co., 242 NLRB 539
(1979), enfd. 630 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Stand-
ard-Coosa-Thatcher, Inc., 257 NLRB 304, 305 (1981), enfd.
691 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982).
In addition, Cleland threatened to close the facility rather
than allow unionization. Threats of closure are another ‘‘hall-
mark’’ violation of the Act, Long-Airdox Co., 277 NLRB
1157, 1160 (1985), and such a threat is ‘‘one of the most
coercive actions which a company can take . . . .’’ Donn
Products v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1980).
Further, discharge of a key union supporter because of his
protected activity is misconduct which goes ‘‘to the very
heart of the Act.’’ Penn Color, Inc., 261 NLRB 395, 396
(1982), citing NLRB v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532,
536 (4th Cir. 1941). Significantly, the discharge and other
violations were conceived and carried out by Respondent’s
president. Eddyleon Chocolate Co., 301 NLRB 887, 891
(1991).
In sum, it is abundantly clear that a majority of the em-
ployees clearly and unambiguously expressed their desire to
be represented by the Union for purposes of collective bar-
gaining. When Respondent learned of that development, it
reacted swiftly and severely to frustrate their efforts through
threats, reducing pay, announcing onerous schedule changes,
and loss of major benefits and, finally, discharging a union
supporter known to be critical to the Union’s majority. The
664 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
deep and lasting effect of those actions preclude any real
possibility that a free and fair election could he held by ap-
plication of remedies which do not include a bargaining
order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I find that Respondent violated the Act in the particulars
and for the reasons stated above. I further find that those un-
fair labor practices and each of them have affected, are af-
fecting, and unless permanently enjoined will continue to af-
fect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act. And I further find (1) that the following employ-
ees of Respondent constitute an appropriate unit for collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act:
All warehouse/counter/delivery persons employed by
Respondent at its Lewisberry, Pennsylvania location,
excluding office clerical employees and guards and su-
pervisors as defined by the Act;
(2) that on or about July 13, 1990, a majority of employees
in the unit selected District Lodge 98, International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO as
their representative for purposes of collective bargaining; (3)
that since then the named Union, by virtue of Section 9(a)
of the Act, has been and is the exclusive representative of
the unit for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment;
and (4) that the unfair labor practices found to have been
committed are so serious and substantial in character that the
possibility of erasing their effects and of conducting a fair
election by the use of traditional remedies is slight, and the
employees’ sentiments regarding representation, having been
expressed through authorization cards, would, on balance, be
protected better by issuance of a bargaining order than by re-
course to traditional remedies.
REMEDY
In addition to the customary cease-and-desist order and re-
quirement for notice posting my order will require Respond-
ent (1) to offer permanent, immediate, and unconditional re-
instatement to Jason Myers and make him whole for his dis-
criminatory and unlawful discharge, with backpay and inter-
est thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987); (2) in the
same manner to make other employees whole for any eco-
nomic loss sustained by them pursuant to unlawful reduc-
tions in wages and benefits and schedule changes announced
on July 20, 1990; and (3) to recognize and, on request, bar-
gain with District Lodge 98, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO as the exclusive
representative of its employees in the named unit in regard
to terms and conditions of employment and, if understanding
is reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement.
Because the serious and egregious misconduct shown here
demonstrates a general disregard for the employees’ fun-
damental rights, I find it necessary to issue a broad order re-
quiring Respondent to cease and desist from infringing in
any manner on the rights guaranteed employees by Section
7 of the Act. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
Disposition
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended8
ORDER
The Respondent, Interstate Truck Parts, Inc., Lewisberry,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from discouraging membership in, ac-
tivities on behalf of, or sympathies towards District Lodge
98, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL–CIO or any other labor organization by
(a) Interrogating any employee about union support or
union activities.
(b) Threatening employees with loss of wages, benefits,
schedule changes, shop closure, and unspecified reprisals.
(c) Reducing wages, eliminating benefits, and effecting
schedule changes.
(d) Discharging or otherwise disciplining employees.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or co-
ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer Jason Myers immediate reinstatement to his
former position of employment or, if such position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to seniority or other rights and privileges previously en-
joyed, and remove from its files any reference to his unlaw-
ful discharge and notify him in writing that this has been
done and that the discharge will not be used against him in
any way.
(b) Make Jason Myers whole for any loss of pay that he
may have suffered as a result of his discharge in the manner
set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) In the same manner make other employees whole for
any economic loss sustained by them pursuant to the unlaw-
ful reductions in wages and benefits and schedule changes
announced on July 20, 1990.
(d) On request, bargain with District Lodge 98, Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL–CIO as the exclusive representative of the employees in
the following appropriate unit:
All warehouse/counter/delivery persons employed by
Respondent at its Lewisberry, Pennsylvania location,
excluding office clerical employees and guards and su-
pervisors as defined by the Act;
concerning terms and conditions of employment; and, if an
understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a
signed agreement.
(e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
665INTERSTATE TRUCK PARTS
9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(f) Post at its facility in Lewisberry, Pennsylvania, copies
of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’9 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 5, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately on receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
In recognition of these rights, we notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you as to whether
you sympathize with or support District Lodge 98, Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL–CIO or any other union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of wages, benefits,
schedule changes, shop closure, and unspecified reprisals be-
cause you sympathize with or support unionization.
WE WILL NOT reduce wages, eliminate benefits, or make
schedule changes because you sympathize with or support
unionization.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against
you because you sympathize with or support unionization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain,
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Jason Myers immediate reinstatement to his
former position or, if such position no longer exists, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to seniority
or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and remove
from our files any reference to his unlawful discharge and
notify him in writing that this has been done and that the dis-
charge will not be used against him in any way, and WE
WILL make him whole for any loss of pay that he may have
suffered as a result of his unlawful discharge.
WE WILL make Jason Myers, Donald Poley, and Jeff
Troupe whole for any economic loss sustained by them pur-
suant to the unlawful reductions in wages and benefits and
schedule changes we announced on July 20, 1990.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with District Lodge 98,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL–CIO as the exclusive representative of our employ-
ees in the following appropriate unit:
All warehouse/counter/delivery persons employed by us
at our Lewisberry, Pennsylvania location, excluding of-
fice clerical employees and guards and supervisors as
defined by the Act;
concerning rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment; and, if an understanding is
reached, on request, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement.
INTERSTATE TRUCK PARTS, INC.