International Longshore and Warehouse Union, AFL-CIO; International Longshore and Warehouse Union, L

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 30, 2014

19-CC-100903 (N.L.R.B. May. 30, 2014)

JD(SF)–24–14
Portland, OR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES, SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION, AFL-CIO
and
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 8, AFL-CIO Cases 19–CC–100903
and
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 40, AFL-CIO
and
ICTSI OREGON, INC.
Mara-Louise Anzalone, Esq. & Helena A. Fiorianti, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Robert Remar, Esq. & Emily M. Maglio, Esq. (Leonard Carder LLP),
for the Respondent Unions.
Michael T. Garone, Esq. (Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt) &
Peter Hurtgen, Esq. (Curley, Hessinger & Johnsrud LLP),
for the Charging Party Company.1
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JEFFREY D. WEDEKIND, Administrative Law Judge. This is the second of two
recent proceedings alleging unlawful secondary conduct by the ILWU and its Locals 8 and 40
(the Unions) in support of their labor dispute with the Port of Portland over the assignment of
dockside “reefer” work.2 The disputed work involves plugging, unplugging, and monitoring
refrigerated containers after they are unloaded from vessels at Port terminal 6. The Unions
contend that the work should be assigned to the Local 8 longshoremen— who are employed

1 Thomas T. Triplett, Esq. (Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt) also appeared on the Charging
Party Company’s posthearing brief. Randolph C. Foster, Esq. (Stoel Rives, LLP), made a
limited appearance at the hearing on behalf of the Port of Portland, a nonparty to the proceeding,
regarding the Port’s petition to revoke the ILWU’s subpoena duces tecum.
2 Local 8 represents crane operators, truckdrivers, gearlockermen, and various other
longshore workers. Local 40 represents marine clerks and vessel planners. The NLRB’s
jurisdiction is undisputed and well established.
JD(SF)–24–14
2
through the union hiring hall by ICTSI Oregon, Inc., the company that operates the terminal
under a 25-year lease agreement with the Port—rather than the electricians, who are directly
employed by the Port and are represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW) Local 48.
5
The complaint in the first proceeding (19–CC–082533 et al.) alleged that the Unions
unlawfully threatened to shut down ICTSI’s terminal operations in May 2012 if ICTSI did not
assign the dockside reefer work to longshoreman pursuant to the ILWU’s 2008 coastwise labor
agreement with the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) or otherwise support their demand for
the work. The complaint further alleged that, when ICTSI failed to comply with their demands, 10
the Unions carried out their threats by, among other things, directing intermittent slowdowns and
work stoppages at the terminal in early June 2012, thereby adversely affecting both ICTSI and
the carriers that unload cargo at the terminal.
In July 2012, shortly after the foregoing complaint issued, the federal district court in 15
Portland (Michael H. Simon, J.) granted the General Counsel’s requests for a temporary
restraining order and an interim injunction against the Unions under Section 10(l) of the Act.
The court specifically enjoined the Unions, pending a final decision by the Board, from engaging
in slowdowns or work stoppages at terminal 6 or otherwise threatening or coercing ICTSI or any
other person engaged in commerce with an object of forcing ICTSI or any other such person to 20
cease doing business with the Port. The court also required the Unions to provide to each of
their officers, representatives, employees, agents, and members involved with work performed at
terminal 6 a copy of the order and a clear written directive to refrain from engaging in any
conduct inconsistent with the order. See GC Exh. 7. See also Hooks ex rel. NLRB v. ILWU,
2012 WL 2994056 (D. Or. July 20, 2012) (discussing the July 3 TRO); and 2012 WL 6115046 25
(D. Or. Dec. 10, 2012) (discussing the July 19 injunction). The court issued another, similar
interim injunction against the Unions about 4 months later, which addressed additional alleged
secondary conduct related to the reefer work (filing and pursuing lost work opportunity
grievances against ICTSI and the carriers) in August 2012. See Hooks ex rel. NLRB v. ILWU,
905 F.Supp.2d 1198 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2012), affd. in relevant part 544 Fed. Appx. 657 (9th Cir. 30
Sept. 30, 2013).
In the meantime, a full, 12-day hearing on the complaint allegations was held before
NLRB Administrative Law Judge William L. Schmidt. Based on that hearing record and the
parties’ posthearing briefs, in August 2013 Judge Schmidt issued a decision finding that the 35
Unions violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act as alleged. Specifically, Judge Schmidt
found that the Unions lacked a valid work-preservation claim to the dockside reefer work
because the Port’s electricians, rather than the longshoremen, had historically performed that
work at the terminal.3 He further found that the Port retained the right of control over the reefer
work when it leased the terminal’s operations to ICTSI in 2010; that the Port was therefore the 40
“primary” employer in the work-assignment dispute; and that ICTSI and the carriers were

3 As noted by Judge Schmidt (JD. at 3–4), the Board itself reached a similar conclusion in a
related jurisdictional-dispute proceeding under 10(k) of the Act, IBEW Local 48 (ICTSI Oregon,
Inc.), 358 NLRB No. 102 (Aug. 13, 2012), vacated Pacific Maritime Assn. v. NLRB, 3:12–cv–
021799–MO (D. Or. June 17, 2013) (Mosman, J.), NLRB notice of appeal filed Sept. 5, 2013,
No. 13–35818 (9th Cir.).
JD(SF)–24–14
3
“neutrals” in that dispute. Although the Unions contended that their coastwise labor agreement
with PMA compelled a different conclusion, Judge Schmidt rejected the argument as the Port
was not a member of the PMA or party to that agreement, and ICTSI did not join the PMA until
after executing the lease with the Port. He also rejected the Unions’ argument that the carriers’
ownership interest in the refrigerated containers gave the carriers the right to control who 5
plugged and monitored them after being unloaded at the Port. Finally, Judge Schmidt found that
various agents of the Unions did, in fact, threaten ICTSI officials in May 2012 and subsequently
orchestrate intermittent slowdowns and work stoppages at the terminal in June 2012 in support of
their dispute with the Port. ILWU (“ILWU I”), JD(SF)–36–13, 2013 WL 4587186 (August 28,
2013), Respondents’ exceptions filed October 30, 2013.410
The complaint in this case is similar to the complaint in ILWU I except that it covers the
subsequent time period beginning September 2012. Specifically, it alleges that the Unions have
continued since that time (notwithstanding the district court’s July 2012 interim injunction) to
engage in secondary conduct in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act by appealing to and 15
ordering the longshoremen employed by ICTSI at terminal 6 to engage in work slowdowns in
support of the Unions’ work-assignment dispute with the Port, or by condoning and ratifying
such conduct by their subsequent acts or omissions.5
Following several pretrial conference calls, another 12-day hearing was held regarding20
these additional allegations on November 12–15 and 18–21, and December 9–12, 2013.6 The
parties subsequently filed posthearing briefs on March 13, 2014.7 After considering the briefs
and the entire record, for the reasons set forth below I find that the ILWU and Local 8 violated
the Act substantially as alleged. However, I dismiss the allegations against Local 40.8
25

4 The transcripts and exhibits from the hearing in ILWU I have been been entered into the
record here as Jt. Exh. 1. References to the transcript and exhibits from that case appear herein
as “Tr(I).” and “Exh(I).”
5 The underlying charge was filed by ICTSI on March 22, 2013, and the General Counsel
issued the complaint a few months later, on June 28. The Unions subsequently filed a motion for
a bill of particulars on October 17 (GC Exh. 1(h)), which I orally granted at the first pretrial
conference call on October 31. The General Counsel thereafter provided additional information
to the Unions by letter dated November 4 (GC Exh. 1(k)), and also submitted an amended
complaint at the start of the hearing (GC Exh. 2).
6 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct the transcript is granted and received
in evidence as GC Exh. 71.
7 The Unions subsequently filed a notice of supplemental authority on March 31, 2014. The
General Counsel’s motion to strike the Unions’ notice is denied.
8 Specific citations to the transcript, exhibits, and briefs are included where appropriate to aid
review, and are not necessarily exclusive or exhaustive. In making credibility findings, all
relevant and appropriate factors have been considered, including the demeanor and interests of
the witnesses; whether their testimony is corroborated or consistent with the documentary
evidence and/or the established or admitted facts; inherent probabilities; and reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the record as a whole. See, e.g., Daikichi Corp., 335
NLRB 622, 633 (2001), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003); and New Breed Leasing
Corp. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 522 U.S. 948 (1997).
JD(SF)–24–14
4
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Judge Schmidt’s Findings in ILWU I
As indicated above, the Unions have filed exceptions to Judge Schmidt’s decision, which 5
remain pending, and thus his findings are not final. Nevertheless, contrary to the Unions’
contention, it is appropriate to consider and rely on those findings in deciding the issues in this
case. The issues decided by Judge Schmidt were fully litigated before him, and relitigating or
revisiting those issues de novo in this related proceeding, while the matter is before the Board,
would be antithetical to judicial efficiency and economy and potentially lead to inconsistent 10
results and unnecessary delays. See Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 358 NLRB No. 81 fn. 1 & JD. at 4–5
(2012) (Board affirmed judge’s ruling that the respondent company was precluded from
relitigating lawfulness of suspension, an issue fully litigated and decided by another judge in a
prior case, even though that decision was pending before the Board on exceptions); Grand
Rapids Press of Booth Newspapers, 327 NLRB 393, 394–395 (1998), enfd. mem. 215 F.3d 1327 15
(6th Cir. 2000) (judge relied on another judge’s findings in an earlier case as evidence of animus
even though the case was pending before the Board on exceptions); and Detroit Newspapers
Agency, 326 NLRB 782 fn. 3 (1998), enf. denied on other grounds 216 F.3d 109 (D.C Cir. 2000)
(judge relied on earlier decision of another judge to find that a strike was an unfair labor practice
strike, even though the decision was pending before the Board on exceptions). 20
Further, although provided the opportunity to do so, the Unions failed to present any
newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence or changed circumstances since the
period addressed by Judge Schmidt that would warrant different findings.9 In arguing to the
contrary, the Unions cite evidence that, beginning sometime in the summer of 2012, ICTSI 25
engaged in negotiations with the carriers to execute new stevedoring contracts to replace the
existing contracts expiring on December 31, 2012; that ICTSI’s written contract proposals to the
carriers in early 2013 specifically included rates for dockside reefer services; and that ICTSI
implemented or reached interim agreements including those rates with respect to at least some of
the carriers effective January 1, 2013. See Tr. 1477–1519; and R. Exhs. 35–43. However, the 30
Unions have failed to establish that these or other events actually effected or resulted in any
material change. ICTSI likewise charged carriers for dockside reefer services under the prior
contracts, which had been negotiated by the Port but assigned to ICTSI when it took over the
terminal operations in early 2011. Pursuant to the terms of its lease agreement with the Port,
ICTSI then reimbursed the Port for its labor, management, and overhead costs of providing the 35
dockside reefer services.10 There is no evidence that this lease agreement was modified in any
material way during the relevant period here (September 2012–June 2013), i.e. there is no

9 The relitigation issue first arose during the initial pretrial conference call on October 31. I
reserved ruling at that time to permit the parties to brief the issue, which they subsequently did
(Jt. Exhs. 2, 3). I thereafter ruled at the second pretrial conference call on November 7 that the
Unions would not be permitted to relitigate Judge Schmidt’s findings, but could present newly
discovered and previously unavailable evidence or evidence of changed circumstances since the
period addressed in that case. I reiterated this ruling at the outset of the hearing (Tr. 17–18), and
as necessary thereafter.
10 Tr. 1448; R. Exh. 33. See also ILWU I, JD. at 8; R Exhs.(I) 6, 26; and Tr.(I) 1153, 1178–
1182, 1261–1266, 1270–1280, 1652–1656.
JD(SF)–24–14
5
evidence that the Port relinquished the reefer work to ICTSI’s control or that there was any
significant change in how the electricians were paid during that period.11
Accordingly, for purposes of deciding the issues in this case, consistent with Judge
Schmidt’s decision in ILWU I, I find that the Port’s electricians, rather than the longshoremen, 5
historically performed the dockside reefer work at the terminal; that the Port continued to have
the right of control over that work and was the “primary” employer with respect to the work
assignment dispute with the Unions; and that ICTSI and the carriers were “neutrals” in that
dispute, during the relevant period. I further find that agents of the Unions unlawfully threatened
ICTSI officials in May 2012 and orchestrated intermittent slowdowns and work stoppages at the 10
terminal in June 2012 in support of their dispute with the Port over the dockside reefer work.
II. The Alleged Unlawful Conduct
Given the foregoing findings, the only remaining issues are: (1) whether the alleged 15
additional slowdowns since September 2012 actually occurred; (2) whether the object of the
additional slowdowns was likewise to pressure ICTSI to assign the dockside reefer work to the
longshoremen or otherwise support the Unions’ dispute with the Port over the assignment of that
work; and (3) whether agents of the Unions appealed for, ordered, condoned, or ratified the
slowdowns.20
A. Whether the alleged slowdowns occurred.
The complaint alleges that Local 8 longshoremen continued to engage in slowdowns
during the relevant period—i.e., deliberately worked in a less productive manner—by operating 25
their cranes at a reduced speed, refusing to hoist their cranes in “bypass mode” to discharge high

11 See Tr. 1463–1464 (testimony of Sam Ruda, the Port’s chief commercial officer). See also
District Court Judge Simon’s March 15, 2013 order in a related action the ILWU and the PMA
filed under Section 301 of the LMRA to enforce certain arbitration decisions awarding the
disputed reefer work to ILWU members, ILWU v. ICTSI Oregon, Inc., 932 F. Supp.2d 1181
(discussing the Port’s counterclaims and requests for declaratory and injunctive relief
establishing that the Port controls the assignment of the reefer work and prohibiting ICTSI from
assigning the reefer work to ILWU members). In their March 31, 2014 notice of supplemental
authority, the Respondent Unions cite Judge Simon’s more recent order in the foregoing
proceeding, which dismissed portions of ICTSI’s antitrust counterclaim against the ILWU and
PMA on the ground that the ILWU’s coastwise agreement with the PMA and attempts to obtain
the disputed reefer work under that agreement had a work-preservation objective. 2014 WL
1218116 at *5, 10–11 (D. Or. March 24, 2014). However, Judge Simon— who as discussed
above previously granted the General Counsel’s requests for interim injunctions against the
Respondents based on the conduct alleged in ILWU I—clearly did not thereby hold that the
Respondents’ alleged conduct against ICTSI in that case (or this case) was lawful. Indeed, as
both Judge Simon and the Ninth Circuit noted in granting or upholding the interim injunctions,
the Respondents’ work-preservation defense to the General Counsel’s 8(b)(4) allegations fails if
the Port controls the work. See 905 F.Supp.2d at 121; and 544 Fed.Appx. at 659. And Judge
Simon made clear in his March 15, 2013 order that he would stay a ruling on the control issue
pending the Board’s final resolution of that issue.
JD(SF)–24–14
6
containers, refusing to move two 20-foot containers (“twin 20s”) at a time on older trailers, and
driving their trucks slowly and taking long routes around the yard. As summarized below, there
is ample record evidence supporting these allegations.
(1) Kelly Roby, ICTSI’s assistant terminal manager, credibly testified that he regularly 5
observed Local 8 crane operators unnecessarily working their cranes in a slow “box” pattern
(rather than a smoother “arc” pattern) throughout the relevant period (Tr. 1110–1112). He also
observed Local 8 truckdrivers driving slow, at 3–5 mph instead of the usual 15 mph, and taking
indirect routes around the yard, for no apparent reason. Indeed, on one occasion in late 2012, he
observed at least four of the five trucks in one gang taking the long way around the yard, even 10
though there was only one ship docked. Moreover, some of the drivers refused to comply with
the foreman’s order to take the direct route until after he threatened them with discharge. (Tr.
1115–1118, 1124–1126).12
(2) James Mullen, ICTSI’s director of labor relations and terminal services (and the 15
former terminal manager for 8 years), credibly testified that he likewise personally observed
Local 8 crane operators working unnecessarily slowly. After observing two crane operators
operating in such a manner 2 days in a row in late September 2012, he reviewed the supercargo
logs for the shifts, which confirmed that both performed only about 15 net container moves per
hour, far below normal. He therefore filed slowdown complaints against both operators under 20
the provisions of the coastwise agreement between the PMA and the ILWU.13
Mullen credibly testified that he also personally witnessed an incident in late 2012 when
most of the Local 8 truckdrivers on two gangs were taking the “scenic route” around the yard
and leaving the crane hook hanging for no apparent reason. As in the incident described by 25
Roby, many of the drivers refused to comply with the foreman’s order to take the direct route
until after he threatened them with discharge (Tr. 333–340; GC Exh. 4).
(3) Brian Yockey, ICTSI’s terminal manager (and the former marine manager for 10
years), credibly testified that, in late November 2012, he overheard an experienced Local 8 crane 30
operator on the radio state that the operators were no longer “allowed” to use the bypass mode to
hoist their cranes past a certain safety limit to discharge high containers. Yockey immediately
contacted Craig Bitz, a Local 8 Labor Relations Committee (LRC) representative and relief
business agent, and reminded him of the parties’ longstanding agreement and practice of using

12 Judge Schmidt found that Local 8 crane operators and truckdrivers engaged in similar
conduct in early June. See ILWU I, JD. at 25–26, and 35–36.
13 See Tr. 826–827; and GC Exhs. 14, 19, 20, 62. These and several other similar slowdown
complaints against Local 8 or its members remained pending at the time of the hearing. See Tr.
813; and GC Exh. 56. However, the Unions appear to have abandoned any contention that the
allegations in this proceeding should be stayed or deferred under Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
NLRB 837 (1971), pending final resolution of those complaints under the contractual grievance-
arbitration procedures. Compare Tr. 246 with R. Br. 104, fn. 50. In any event, I reaffirm my
ruling at the hearing that such deferral is unwarranted. See Iron Workers Pacific Northwest
(Hoffman Construction), 292 NLRB 562, 577–578 (1989), enfd. 913 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding that pre-arbitral deferral of 8(b)(4) charges under Collyer was inappropriate because,
inter alia, the arbitrator had no authority to decide if the alleged conduct was secondary).
JD(SF)–24–14
7
the bypass mode in such situations. Bitz responded that operating in the bypass mode was an
OSHA violation, and that the Union was “not going to work in a manner to help [ICTSI] as they
have in the past” because of the complaints ICTSI had filed against Local 8 members.14 ICTSI
therefore had to shift ballast to get the ship lower in the water, which added several hours to the
operation. (Tr. 342–347, 505–511). 5
Yockey also credibly testified that, beginning in the summer of 2012, Local 8 crane
operators and truckdrivers refused to move more than one 20 foot container at a time on older
trailers or “bomb carts.” Again, they reportedly refused to do so for safety reasons—initially
asserting that the older carts could not hold weight; then asserting that there were problems with 10
the tires; and then asserting that they could not trust the weights of the containers— even though,
like using the bypass mode, it had been the normal practice for years to move two 20-foot
containers at a time on the carts, and there had been no recent incidents or accidents doing so.
The matter was only resolved after months of investigation and discussions with Bitz. See Tr.
357–361, 615–618. See also Mullen’s testimony, Tr. 827–828, 1028–1029. 15
(4) Bitz acknowledged that he told longshoremen not to operate cranes in bypass mode
for safety reasons, and that he also spoke to them about moving twin 20s (Tr. 1766–1768).15
Moreover, he admitted that the longshoremen did not work as productively during the relevant
period because they were “upset” and would not “go the extra mile” or “cut through the yards 20
like they used to” (Tr. 1803). And he did not deny telling Yockey during their conversation
about the bypass mode that the Union was not going to help the Company as it had in the past
because of all the recent complaints against Local 8 and its members.
(5) Steven Cox, a Local 8 crane operator, likewise admitted that he and other 25
longshoremen did not work as productively during the relevant period because they and the
Local Unions refused to “babysit” or “take care of the company” anymore (Tr. 688, 692–694).
(6) Jan Holmes, the standing area arbitrator at the terminal for many years, specifically
found that three Local 8 crane operators engaged in a slowdown while working a Hapag Lloyd 30
vessel on April 6, 2013, based on their exceptionally low production figures (11.8, 13.5, and 11.7
net container moves per hour), and other evidence presented at the formal hearing, including
videotape of the operation (CP Exh. 4). There is no dispute that the facts relevant to the
slowdown allegations were fully and fairly litigated before Arbitrator Holmes, and that she has
substantial expertise in the industry (Tr. 230, 915, 987).16 35

14 Although Bitz did not identify the complaints, as indicated above Mullen had recently filed
several additional complaints alleging that individual Local 8 members had operated their cranes
in a nonproductive manner in late September (GC Exhs. 14, 18–20).
15 I discredit Bitz’ uncorroborated testimony that the twin-20 issue arose because
longshoremen were concerned about overloading the carts and the gearlockermen had been
making a lot of repairs to them. Cf. ILWU I, JD. at 31–32, and 37–38 (discussing Local 8’s use
of alleged safety concerns as a pretext for unlawful work stoppages in June 2012).
16 I therefore give substantial weight to Arbitrator Holmes’ findings that the longshoremen
engaged in a slowdown. See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59–60 &
fn. 21 (1974); and Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964). Consistent
with the allegations in ICTSI’s complaint, Arbitrator Holmes also found that Local 8 was
JD(SF)–24–14
8
As noted by the Unions, Arbitrator Holmes rejected certain other ICTSI claims or complaints
alleging similar slowdowns during the relevant period. See R. Exh. 17 (alleged slowdown on June
3, 2013); CP Exh. 5 (alleged slowdown on March 19, 2013); R. Exh. 18 (alleged slowdown on
October 6, 2012); and R. Exh. 23 (alleged slowdown on September 30, 2012).17 However, the
General Counsel does not rely on the specific conduct at issue in those arbitrations as support for 5
the allegations in this case. Further, as indicated by Arbitrator Holmes’ findings regarding the
April 6, 2013 shift, the mere fact that she found that longshoremen did not engage in slowdowns
on some shifts, does not establish that they did not do so on other shifts. Nor are those decisions
sufficient to rebut the substantial other evidence discussed above (which Arbitrator Holmes may
not have had before her at the time) that longshoremen engaged in a pattern of such slowdown 10
activity across the relevant 9-month time period. See also Dr. Ward’s expert testimony, below.
(7) Bryce Ward, Ph.D., a senior economist at ECONorthwest, performed a
microeconomic analysis of terminal productivity for ICTSI in 2013 and found that both average
gross moves per hour (total moves divided by total hours paid) and average net moves per hour 15
(total moves divided by total hours actually worked, i.e., not including downtime or delays
caused by late arriving vessels, equipment breakdowns, etc.) were substantially lower during the
relevant period. Specifically, the number of moves averaged 23.1 gross and 27.3 net moves per
hour during the 29 months prior to June 1, 2012, but dropped significantly in the first 6 weeks
thereafter to 16.9 gross and 19.7 net moves per hour, and rose only about half as much after 20
ICTSI began filing slowdown complaints under the coastwise agreement and the district court
issued the July 19 interim injunction, remaining relatively low at between 19.4–20 gross and
23.1–23.8 net moves per hour through the end of the relevant period. In short, overall production
remained about 3–4 moves below the previous gross and net averages, a highly statistically
significant and economically meaningful difference. Dr. Ward also conducted a regression 25
analysis of various internal and external productivity factors or determinants, and concluded that
a deliberate labor slowdown was the most probable explanation for the productivity decline. (Tr.
1130–1255; GC Exhs. 45–48).
Dr. Ward has performed labor and employment microeconomic analyses for both 30
employers and unions, and his qualifications to analyze and provide expert testimony about
terminal 6’s productivity are not disputed. See GC Exh. 45; and Tr. 1130–1134. Nor did the
Unions object to the introduction of his written reports and analyses or dispute the underlying
statistical evidence he relied on showing a significant decline in productivity.
35

responsible or “guilty” of the slowdown. However, she apparently did so pursuant to contract
provisions that require the Union to ensure that its members do not engage in slowdowns. See
CP Exh. 3, p. 3, citing Secs. 11 and 18 of the coastwise agreement (R. Exh(I). 1). She did not
address whether Local 8 actually called for, ordered, ratified, or condoned the slowdown, as
alleged in this case. Nor did she address the additional factual issue presented here whether the
slowdown was motivated in whole or in part by the reefer dispute. Accordingly, as discussed
infra, I do not accord Arbitrator Holmes’ decision any weight on these factual issues, or with
respect to the ultimate legal issue presented in this case. See generally Olin Corp., 268 NLRB
573 (1984).
17 Two of these arbitration decisions, CP Exh. 5 and R. Exh. 18, were issued after “informal”
or “on the job” hearings conducted at the terminal during or shortly after the subject shift.
JD(SF)–24–14
9
Nevertheless, the Unions argue that Dr. Ward’s conclusion about the cause of the decline
is fundamentally flawed. Specifically, the Unions assert that Dr. Ward failed to consider the
significant change in shipping schedules that occurred effective September 22, 201218—when
Hapag Lloyd, the terminal’s second largest customer, began docking at the terminal on
weekends, the same day as the terminal’s largest customer, Hanjin, rather than midweek as it had 5
in the past—and the increased yard congestion that occurred as a result of having two ships
berthed and worked at the same time. See R. Br. 99–101; and Dr. Ward’s testimony, Tr. 1201–
1202, 1211, 1243 (although he considered the number of gangs per vessel, he did not consider
the total number of gangs working at the same time or yard congestion as separate productivity
factors or determinants). 10
The Unions’ argument has some surface appeal, as it is undisputed that two vessels did
not usually dock at the same time prior to September 22, 2012, and that working two vessels at a
time requires additional gangs, increases yard congestion, and can affect the truckdrivers’ routes
(Tr. 526–527, 1116–1117, 1126, 1711–1717, 1797, 1995). However, the argument ultimately 15
fails to withstand scrutiny for several reasons. First, the terminal is configured to accommodate
up to three vessels at a time (GC Exh. 11; R. Exh. 59; and Tr. 307, 1116). Second, the Unions
themselves have not mentioned the schedule change or increased yard congestion in their public
comments about the terminal’s production problems. See GC Exh. 45, pp. 5, 20 (summarizing
Local 40 Secretary-Treasurer/Business Agent Dana Jones’ January 9, 2013 testimony before the 20
Port Commission); and GC Exh. 57 (ILWU Coast Committeeman Leal Sundet’s November 2,
2013 editorial in OregonLive.com).19 Third, while Local 8 has occasionally cited the presence of
two vessels and yard congestion, along with numerous other factors, in defending against
ICTSI’s slowdown complaints during the relevant period, Arbitrator Holmes effectively rejected
the Union’s argument in ruling for ICTSI in one case (see CP Exh. 4), and did not expressly rely 25
on it in ruling against ICTSI in another (R. Exh. 23).20
Moreover, while the schedule change and increased yard congestion were not considered
as separate factors or determinants by Dr. Ward, they were effectively incorporated into his
analyses of net moves per hour. As indicated above, the calculation of net moves per hour30
subtracts any external or internal delays, including standby time when the crane’s hook is
hanging waiting for labor or trucks to arrive through the yard (Tr. 856, 1150, 1201, 1706).
Indeed, after ICTSI began filing slowdown complaints in June 2012, at the urging of Local 8 the
longshoremen began diligently recording and notifying the marine clerks (who as noted above
are represented by Local 40) of such delays to ensure that they were reflected in the supercargo 35

18 See CP Exh. 12; and Tr. 2153–2157. I discredit Bitz’ uncorroborated testimony to the
extent it indicates that the regular schedule change began earlier, in late June (Tr. 1712–1714).
19 Sundet and Jones are admitted agents of the International and Local 40, respectively (Jt.
Exh. 5).
20 Local 8 also argued in the former arbitration proceeding that production on the Hapag
vessel was low because Hapag vessels now dock at berth 604. Berth 604 has older, shorter, and
slower cranes than berth 605, where Hapag vessels used to dock midweek, when Hanjin vessels
were not docked there (Tr. 1116, 1709–1713, 1716, 1796–1797). However, Arbitrator Holmes
effectively rejected this argument as well. Moreover, Dr. Ward specifically considered berths as
a factor or determinant in his regression analyses. See, e.g., GC Exh. 45, p. 18 fn. 35, and p. 20
fn. 48; and GC Exh. 47, p. 19 fn. 36, p. 22 fn. 49, and p. 23.
JD(SF)–24–14
10
logs and operations reports that were used by ICTSI to calculate net moves. See GC Exh. 30; R.
Exh. 58; and Tr. 400, 532, 793, 1793–1794, 1824. Nevertheless, as indicated above, average net
moves per hour remained significantly below normal throughout the relevant period.
The Unions also generally argue that various other factors outside the longshoremen’s 5
control, such as management turnover and inexperience and certain changes in the yard (e.g.
changing stop signs to yield signs in late June or early July 2012) and other policies and
practices, caused or contributed to the relatively low productivity during the relevant period.
However, these factors were either specifically considered by Dr. Ward in his regression
analyses or, as with the schedule change and increased yard congestion, were captured by his 10
analyses of net moves per hour.21 Moreover, as discussed above, there is substantial other
evidence that the slowdowns were deliberate. Thus, this argument fails as well.
The complaint additionally alleges that Local 8 crane operators engaged in slowdowns by
arriving late to their assigned cranes. However, unlike the allegations above, the General 15
Counsel has failed to prove this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence. The record
indicates that late-arriving crane operators was a recurring problem even before June 2012.
While the problem increased during the relevant period, it was due in large part to the
gearlockermen’s failure to finish their crane inspections as quickly (which the General Counsel
does not allege to be part of a deliberate attempt to lower production). Further, there was 20
significant improvement after Mullen requested Local 8’s assistance in resolving the problem in
early November 2012. See Tr. 351–352, 356, 406–407, 644, 821; and GC Exh. 40. See also
Arbitrator Holmes’ decision, R. Exh. 19 (reinstating an operator who was fired by ICTSI for
arriving late to his crane on November 9, 2012). Accordingly, this allegation is dismissed.
25
Finally, the complaint alleges that Local 40 marine clerks also engaged in a slowdown
during the relevant period by refusing to schedule “twin 20” container moves. (This is the only
complaint allegation that Local 40 members directly engaged in slowdowns during the relevant
period.) However, the testimony given by Yockey and Mullen about the marine clerks’
involvement in the matter is too vague and sketchy to make such a finding. Accordingly, this 30
allegation is likewise dismissed.
B. Whether an object of the slowdowns was the reefer dispute
In ILWU I, Judge Schmidt found that there was strong evidence that the object of the 35
June 2012 slowdowns was to pressure ICTSI to support Local 8’s demand for the reefer work
given their timing and the explicit threats by ILWU and Local 8 officers at that time to shut
down ICTSI if it did not assign the work to the longshoremen (JD. at 21–25, 27, 34–37, 45–47).
As the General Counsel and ICTSI concede, there is no evidence of any similar explicit threats
during the relevant period here. And, as discussed above, productivity increased somewhat in 40

21 At least one of the specific changes cited by the Unions as hurting production—requiring
longshoremen to work up until 10 minutes, rather than 15 minutes, before the end of the shift—
did not occur until after June 2013. See Tr. 859, 1727–1731, 1802–1803; and R. Exh. 15.
JD(SF)–24–14
11
mid-July 2012 after ICTSI began filing slowdown complaints against both Local 8 and
individual longshoremen and the district court issued the first interim injunction.22
Nevertheless, there is strong circumstantial evidence that ICTSI’s failure to support Local
8’s claim to the reefer work continued to be an object of the slowdowns and low productivity. 5
As discussed above, productivity never fully recovered after June 2012 and remained
consistently and significantly depressed throughout the relevant 9-month period. Further, as
summarized below, there is abundant evidence that the Unions never notified all of the
longshoremen about the district court’s July 19 injunction.
10
(1) On July 20, 2012, the day after the district court’s order, the ILWU emailed a press
release to the Locals stating that the Union had actually been “vindicated” because the court’s
decision had “confirm[ed] that longshoremen are being unfairly blamed for PMA member
carriers leaving the Port” (GC Exh. 58).23 There was no mention whatsoever of the injunction in
either the email or the press release. And the only attachments were certain email exhibits 15
“associated with” the court proceeding, which assertedly showed that carriers had left the Port
because of ICTSI rather than the ILWU.
(2) Only one of the five crane operators who testified at the hearing (Gregory Carse)
recalled ever seeing an injunction posted. See Tr. 708–709 (testifying that one was posted in the 20
union hall). Further, it was never established which injunction Carse saw or when he saw it. A
July 23 notice authored by the ILWU’s attorney about the July 19 injunction was introduced into
the record (GC Exh. 8), but there is no evidence that the notice and attached injunction (GC Exh.
7) were actually posted or distributed to ILWU members. Although Bitz testified (Tr. 1700–
1701) that he posted an injunction “all over the terminal,” he identified it as the later injunction 25
issued by the court on November 21, 2012, which the record indicates was not posted until
January 3, 2013 at the earliest (R. Exh. 56).24
(3) Although Bitz testified that the injunction was discussed at several union meetings to
ensure that all Local 8 members were informed about it (Tr. 1702–1705), no meeting minutes 30
were introduced to corroborate his testimony. The minutes of only one union meeting were
introduced on the matter: the union meeting on July 11, over a week before the interim
injunction issued, where the TRO was mentioned (R. Exh. 57). Further, none of the Local 8
members who testified recalled an injunction being mentioned at a union meeting,
notwithstanding that they attended regularly as required by union rules. See Tr. 669–671, 697 35

22 With respect to ICTSI’s June 2012 slowdown complaints, see, e.g., Tr. 395; and R. Exh. 62
(discussing the June 2012 slowdown complaints and arbitrations). See also Dr. Ward’s
September 19, 2013 report, GC Exh. 47, at p. 9 (the increase in production after July 19 “may
stem from ICTSI’s increased willingness to file complaints when very low productivity occurs.”)
23 It is unclear what July 19 court decision the press release was referring to (there is no
opinion accompanying the court’s order).
24 As indicated by the Unions, it is possible that Bitz was simply confused when he initially
identified the November injunction as the one he posted. See Tr. 1704. However, regardless of
which injunction Bitz meant to identify, his testimony that he posted the injunction “all over the
terminal” is uncorroborated and contrary to the weight of the evidence, and I discredit it.
JD(SF)–24–14
12
(Cox); 716 (Carse); 735–736, 741 (John Mulcahy); 772, 775 (Ted Gray); and 893–894 (Terrandy
Hudson).25
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the July 23 injunction notice authored by the
ILWU’s attorney was timely and prominently posted, it was hardly an exhortation to cease 5
pressuring ICTSI to support Local 8’s claim to the reefer work under the ILWU/PMA coastwise
agreement. The notice both began and ended by saying that the district court’s July 19 order was
“wrong,” and was being posted “under protest.” And its final words to the longshoremen were,
We will win this dispute; justice will prevail; ICTSI will be required to comply 10
with the directives of the maritime industry! (GC Exh. 8).
Similarly, the January 3, 2013 notice regarding the court’s November 21, 2012 injunction stated:
We strongly believe the Court’s order is wrong and that the ILWU has acted 15
lawfully to protect and defend its collectively-bargained rights. We see this
company’s actions as an attack on collective bargaining, an attack on the ILWU
and an attack on the ILWU-PMA West Coast bargaining relationship . . .We will
appeal the Court’s order. We are confident that we will prevail and that, in the
end, ICTSI will be held to account. (R. Exh. 56)20
Whether or not the ILWU had the right to post such notices with the injunctions,26 the
notices were certainly not drafted to maximize the impact of the court’s orders.
In response, the Unions argue (Br. 75) that “temporal proximity alone” does not support 25
an inference that the slowdowns continued to have a secondary objective, citing Shafer Redi-
Mix, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 7, 643 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2011). However, Shafer is
inapposite, as the issue there was whether temporal proximity is enough to infer that an employer
actually suffered damages “by reason of” a union’s unlawful secondary activity as required by
Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Compare Service Employees Local 87 30
(Trinity Building), 312 NLRB 715, 749 (1993); and K & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d
1228, 1233 fn. 3 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing timing of picketing as evidence of its secondary object).
In any event, as discussed above, the inference here is supported by more than temporal
proximity.
35
The Unions also argue that there were many other reasons that Local 8 longshoremen
were upset with ICTSI, particularly ICTSI’s installation of video cameras in the yard and closer
supervision, stricter enforcement of rules, and filing of contractual complaints against the
longshoremen individually. According to the Unions, these and certain other actions by ICTSI—
cutting the longshoremen’s paid time by quarter hours if they arrived late, paying for certain 40

25 For the same reasons, therefore, I discredit Bitz’ testimony that the July 19 injunction was
discussed at union meetings.
26 See NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 611 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1979). Whether the
Unions had a right to post such notices with the district court’s injunctions, or otherwise
adequately complied with the court’s orders, is not at issue in this proceeding, and is for the court
itself to decide.
JD(SF)–24–14
13
occasional longshore work at a lower skill level and pay rate ($37.08 rather than $39.35/hr), and
removing the gearlocker television and vending machine—reduced morale among the
longshoremen, which in turn impacted their production.
There is some record support for this argument, as it is undisputed that these changes 5
occurred during the relevant period and upset the workforce. See Tr. 637, 1561, 1718–1722,
1797–1798; R. Exh. 57 (video cameras); Tr. 342–347, 449–442, 460, 606–607, 692–694, 757–
759, 834, 898–901, 1030 (closer supervision, stricter enforcement of rules, and filing of
complaints); 629–631, 1723–1726; R. Exhs. 10–11 (cutting time for late arrival); Tr. 441–442,
1740–1744, 1763, 1808–1810 (paying for occasional work at lower skill rate); and Tr. 633–634, 10
1732–1734; R. Exh. 12 (removing gearlocker tv and vending machine).27 However, it is clear
that the first two changes above were instituted by ICTSI in response to the Unions’ work
stoppages, slowdowns and other unlawful conduct in June 2012 regarding the reefer dispute.
Thus, as indicated by the following colloquy with Local 8 crane operator Cox, to the extent the
longshoremen reduced their production in response to those changes, they did so indirectly 15
because of the reefer dispute.
Q. [The] failure to babysit ICTSI started as a direct result of the labor dispute in
June of 2012, correct?
A. I would say so, yes.20
Q. And it’s continued ever since, correct?
A. I would say so, probably, yes.
Q. And the continued failure or refusal to babysit ICTSI, in your opinion and
based on your experience, is a direct result of the labor dispute regarding the
plugging and unplugging of reefers, correct?25
A. I wouldn’t say directly no. I would say it’s a lot to do with being harassed on
the job, cited for issues that you shouldn’t be – wouldn’t have been [cited] for
prior to. (Tr. 693.)
See also Dr. Ward’s February 26, 2013 report, GC Exh. 45, p. 19 (noting that “the union’s 30
perception of changes in climate or a change in management attitude may be the byproduct of the
labor dispute and not the source of the decline in labor productivity”). To disregard such a
connection or relationship in evaluating the object of union action would ignore industrial

27 Contrary to ICTSI’s posthearing brief (pp. 95–97), Bitz’ testimony that other
longshoremen complained to him about several of ICTSI’s changes is not barred by the hearsay
rule, as his testimony was offered to show their state of mind, not to prove the truth of the facts
underlying their state of mind. See Wagner v. County of Maricopa, --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL
7219510 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2013) (discussing FRE 803(3)), amended and petition for rehearing
denied, 706 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 133 S.Ct. 1504 (2013). Moreover, as reflected
by the record citations above, Bitz’ testimony about the longshoremen’s unfavorable reaction to
the changes was corroborated by other evidence, including testimony by other longshoremen and
ICTSI’s own managers. See generally Midland Hilton & Towers, 324 NLRB 1141, fn. 1 (1997)
(hearsay evidence may be admitted in NLRB proceedings “if rationally probative in force and if
corroborated by something more than the slightest amount of other evidence”).
JD(SF)–24–14
14
realities and potentially discourage employers from engaging in self-help efforts to prevent or
document continued unlawful conduct.28
In any event, as indicated by the text of Section 8(b)(4), a violation is sufficiently
established if an objective of the conduct is secondary; it need not be the only objective. See 5
Laborers District Council (Lake Area Fence), 357 NLRB No. 29 (2011), enfd. 688 F.3d 374 (8th
Cir. 2012); Food and Commercial Workers Local 367, 333 NLRB 771,773 fn. 15 (2001); NLRB
v. Ironworkers Local 272, 427 F.2d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1970), and cases cited therein. Even
considering management’s various post-June 2012 changes as separate events unrelated to the
reefer dispute, the Unions have failed to adequately rebut the strong inference, discussed above, 10
that forcing ICTSI to support Local 8 in that dispute did, in fact, continue to be a direct object of
the slowdowns during the relevant period.
C. Whether the Respondent Unions are responsible for the slowdowns
15
This leaves the issue of whether the Unions are responsible for the above-described
slowdowns during the relevant period. In ILWU I, Judge Schmidt found that there was strong
evidence that all three Unions—the International, Local 8, and Local 40—were responsible for
the slowdowns and other secondary conduct in June 2012 given the explicit threats and direct
participation in much of the conduct by their admitted agents and other circumstantial evidence. 20
JD. at 45–46. As discussed above, there are no similar explicit threats during the period at issue
in this case. And the General Counsel has failed to prove the only new complaint allegation
directly involving Local 40 officers and members.
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that Local 8 and the ILWU were responsible for 25
the subject slowdowns by Local 8’s members. As discussed above, Bitz, an admitted agent of
Local 8, overtly supported the longshoremen’s refusal, on pretextual safety grounds, to operate
cranes in bypass mode and to move twin 20s on older carts. Further, there is compelling
circumstantial evidence, particularly in light of the recent history described by Judge Schmidt,
that the longshoremen’s other conduct was directed or coordinated by Local 8 and the ILWU as 30
well. Thus, as indicated above, Roby and Mullen observed multiple Local 8 truckdrivers in one
or more gangs deliberately taking the “scenic route” around the yard at the same time in late
2012. Similarly, Arbitrator Holmes found that three of four Local 8 crane operators deliberately
operated their cranes more slowly on the same shift in April 2013. And Dr. Ward’s statistical
analysis of the entire period revealed that the productivity of every crane and nearly every crane 35
operator remained depressed throughout—“a remarkable coincidence” (GC Exh. 45, pp. 4–5, 16,
22; GC Exh. 47, pp. 4–5, 17, 23). Cf. Iron Workers Local 272 (Presstress Erectors), 172 NLRB
207 (1968), enfd. 427 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding union responsibility for work stoppage
based on circumstantial evidence alone).
40
Moreover, even if Local 8 and the ILWU did not affirmatively support or direct all of the
subject conduct during the relevant period, they were undisputedly aware of it and took no action
to stop it. Rather, in response to the increasing number of slowdown complaints filed by ICTSI,
the Unions tried to coerce the Company into dropping the complaints (by refusing to resume

28 There is no record evidence that any of ICTSI’s post-June 2012 changes violated either the
coastwise agreement or ICTSI’s bargaining obligations under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
JD(SF)–24–14
15
operating cranes in bypass mode unless it did so), urged the longshoremen to document other
causes of delays, and continued to blame the Company for the terminal’s productivity
problems.29 There is no evidence that the Unions reminded the longshoremen of the district
court’s July 19 injunction (indeed, as discussed above, there is no credible evidence that they
ever informed all the longshoremen of the injunction), or took any other significant actions to 5
ensure that the injunction was not violated. In these circumstances, Local 8 and the ILWU
effectively condoned or ratified the conduct, and are therefore properly held accountable for it.
See NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 9 fn. 7 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied
97 S.Ct. 736 (1977); NLRB v. Bulletin Co., 443 F.2d 863, 865–867 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied
92 S.Ct. 682 (1972); and Seattle Times Co. v. Seattle Mailer’s Union Local 32, 664 F.2d 1366, 10
1369 (9th Cir. 1982). See also New York State Nurses Assn., 334 NLRB 798, 799 fn. 6 (2001);
and Laborers Local 616, 302 NLRB 841, 843 (1991).
The complaint also alleges that the relatively long delay in processing ICTSI’s slowdown
complaints is evidence of condonation and ratification. However, while there is some evidence 15
that supports the allegation, the record as a whole does not. Rather, the record indicates that the
delays have been due primarily to many other factors during the relevant period, including: (1)
an unusually large number of slowdown complaints were filed and arbitrations scheduled in a
relatively short period of time (Tr. 1642–1643, 1854–1858, 1866, 1917–1918); (2) Bitz and other
members of the Local 8 LRC were also full-time working longshoreman (Tr. 1674, 1863–1864); 20
(3) Local 8 was also involved in contentious contract negotiations and resulting labor disputes
with other companies (Tr. 1673–1674, 1863–1864, 1930, 2127–2130; GC Exh. 39; R. Exh. 54);
(4) the PMA itself had a difficult time handling all of the slowdown complaints on behalf of
ICTSI and had to cancel and reschedule meetings with the Local 8 LRC (Tr. 1858, 1865, 1922;
CP Exh. 9); and (5) various other matters on the meeting agendas had priority, including 25
previously filed complaints and availability and registration issues (Tr. 1649, 1660, 1664, 1860–
1862, 1920). Accordingly, this allegation is dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
30
1. By inducing and encouraging, since September 2012, longshoremen employed by
ICTSI Oregon, Inc. at the Port of Portland to unnecessarily operate cranes and drive trucks in a
slow and nonproductive manner, refuse to hoist cranes in bypass mode, and refuse to move two

29 As the ILWU concedes (Br. 69), an international union may be held liable for the actions
of an affiliated local if it instigated, supported, ratified, or encouraged them. Carbon Fuel Co. v.
Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 217 (1979). Here, although there is no evidence that the ILWU
directly participated in some of Local 8’s actions, ILWU Coast Committeeman Leal Sundet (who
Judge Schmidt found was a key player in the reefer dispute and made several explicit threats to
“fuck” and shut down ICTSI over the dispute in May 2012) acknowledged, consistent with the
documentary evidence, that he talked to Local 8 daily, and assisted, advised, and guided it with
respect to ICTSI’s slowdown complaints during the relevant period. See Tr. 2064–2065, 2078–
2082; and GC Exhs. 60–70. See also his July 20, 2012 and August and November 2013 public
comments about the dispute, GC Exhs. 57–58; and CP Exh. 1. As indicated by the General
Counsel and ICTSI, it is reasonable and appropriate in these circumstances to infer and find that
the ILWU authorized, directed, condoned, and/or ratified Local 8’s actions. See, e.g., Meat
Cutters Local 222 (Iowa Beef Processors), 233 NLRB 839, 849–851 (1977).
JD(SF)–24–14
16
20-foot containers at a time on older carts, in order to force or require ICTSI and carriers who
call at terminal 6 to cease doing business with the Port, Respondents ILWU and Local 8 have
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5
2. Respondents ILWU and Locals 8 and 40 have not otherwise violated the Act in the
manner alleged in the amended complaint.
REMEDY
10
The appropriate remedy for the violations found is an order requiring the ILWU and
Local 8 to cease and desist from engaging in such unlawful secondary conduct. Like Judge
Schmidt’s previous order, this order, if adopted by the Board and enforced by a court of appeals,
may provide a basis for seeking contempt sanctions against the Unions in the event of
subsequent unlawful secondary conduct. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ironworkers Local 118, 908 F.2d 15
977 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 1309 (1991).
As requested in the complaint, the ILWU and Local 8 will be required to post a notice
regarding the cease and desist order at their offices and dispatch hall and to mail a copy of the
order to all of their members who have worked at terminal 6 since September 1, 2012. The 20
Unions shall also be required to distribute and post the notices electronically, such as by email or
on their intranet or internet sites, to the extent the Unions customarily communicate with their
members by such means. In addition, the Unions shall be required to provide sufficient signed
copies of the notices to the NLRB Regional Office for posting by ICTSI and the carriers who call
at terminal 6, if willing.3025
Accordingly, on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire
record, I issue the following recommended31
ORDER30
The Respondents, International Longshore and Warehouse Union, AFL-CIO, San
Francisco, California, and its affiliate ILWU Local 8, Portland, Oregon, their officers, agents,
and representatives, shall
35
1. Cease and desist from inducing or encouraging employees of ICTSI Oregon, Inc. or
any other employer to engage in a slowdown or otherwise refuse to handle or work on goods or
refuse to perform services if an object is to force ICTSI Oregon, Inc., the carriers who call at
terminal 6, or any other person to cease doing business with the Port of Portland.

30 The complaint requests notice remedies that are even broader with respect to both location
(all facilities in Oregon) and time period (since March 9, 2012). However, the General Counsel
has offered no rationale or justification for broadening the notice remedies in this manner. In
any event, the foregoing notice remedies are sufficient and appropriate under the circumstances.
31 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules,
be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)–24–14
17
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at the Local 8 dispatch hall and their
offices in Portland, Oregon and San Francisco, California, copies of the attached notice marked 5
“Appendix.”32 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19,
after being signed by the Respondents’ authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondents and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or 10
an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondents customarily communicate with
their members by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, mail copies of the notice, at their own 15
expense, to all members who have been employed by ICTSI Oregon, Inc. at terminal 6 since
September 1, 2012. The notice shall be mailed to the last known address of each of the members
after being signed by the Respondents’ authorized representatives.
(c) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the notice for physical 20
and/or electronic posting by ICTSI Oregon, Inc. and the carriers who call at terminal 6, if
willing, at all places or in the same manner as notices to employees are customarily posted.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that 25
the Respondents have taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 30, 2014
30
________________________________
Jeffrey D. Wedekind
Administrative Law Judge

32 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage employees of ICTSI Oregon, Inc. or any other employer to
engage in a slowdown or otherwise refuse to handle or work on goods or refuse to perform
services where an object is to force ICTSI Oregon, Inc., the carriers who call at terminal 6, or
any other person to cease doing business with the Port of Portland.
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION, AFL-CIO
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 8, AFL-CIO
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
915 2nd Avenue, Room 2948, Seattle, WA 98174-1078
(206) 220-6300, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CC-100903 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (206) 220-6284.