Intel CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 19, 202015398042 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/398,042 01/04/2017 Franz P. Clarberg ITL.2659C1US (P42561USC) 3737 47795 7590 02/19/2020 TROP, PRUNER & HU, P.C. PO Box 41790 HOUSTON, TX 77241 EXAMINER COBB, MICHAEL J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2613 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/19/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Inteldocs_docketing@cpaglobal.com tphpto@tphm.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FRANZ P. CLARBERG Appeal 2019-000759 Application 15/398,042 Technology Center 2600 Before JON M. JURGOVAN, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges. RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 25–36. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Intel Corporation. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-000759 Application 15/398,042 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims relate to graphics processing, and in particular, sampling using a rasterizer. Spec. ¶¶ 2, 3, 6–7. Claim 25, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 25. An apparatus comprising: a rasterizer to generate samples over a polygon, the rasterizer to: generate a bounded polygon; rasterize the bounded polygon into a number of primitives; rasterize the primitives to the samples; and determine whether the samples are inside or outside the polygon; and a storage coupled to said rasterizer. REJECTIONS Claims 25–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception. Final Act. 7. Claims 25–36 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Nehab (“Stratified Point Sampling of 3D Models,” 2004), Cook (“Stochastic Sampling in Computer Graphics,” 1986), Fatahalian (“Data-Parallel Rasterization of Micropolygons with Defocus and Motion Blur, Assn for Computing Machinery, Inc., 59–68 (2009)), and Crow (US 9,117,309 B1, Aug. 25, 2015). Id. at 8. ANALYSIS We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See id. Appeal 2019-000759 Application 15/398,042 3 Rejection under § 101 I. Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. Appeal 2019-000759 Application 15/398,042 4 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. After the docketing of this Appeal, the USPTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101 (“Guidance”). See, e.g., USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”); USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Update”), 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notice). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and Appeal 2019-000759 Application 15/398,042 5 (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure “MPEP” §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. II. Step 2A, Prong One (Judicial Exception) The Examiner determines that claim 25 is directed to an abstract idea, identifying the abstract idea by quoting the majority of the claim limitations. Final Act. 7. Appellant contends that the claims relate to improving computer technology and are therefore not abstract. Appeal Br. 6. We agree the claims do not recite an abstract idea. The Specification describes an improvement to sampling for computer graphics processing. Spec. ¶¶ 2–3, 6, 7. The Specification explains that many sampling methods generate samples using graphics processing unit (GPU) shader cores. Id. ¶ 6. In contrast, the Specification states, “we exploit the built-in rasterizer to perform all or parts of the sampling Appeal 2019-000759 Application 15/398,042 6 operations.” Id. As a result, sample generation uses power more efficiently than in prior systems. Id. Claim 25 specifically recites “a rasterizer to generate samples over a polygon,” thereby tying the claim to the specific technical benefits described in the Specification. We disagree with the Examiner that claim 25, including this limitation, represents an abstract idea. The Examiner merely states the abstract idea is what is recited in the claim. Final Act. 7. The Examiner, however, does not identify an abstract idea in the claim that falls in one of the enumerated categories of abstract ideas. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Specifically, the Examiner points to nothing in claim 25 that recites a mathematical concept, such as a mathematical relationship between variables or numbers, a mathematical formula or equation, or mathematical calculations. See Update, 3–4. Nor has the Examiner demonstrated that the claim recites organizing human activities or mental processes. Based on the record before us, we are, therefore, persuaded that the Examiner erred at Step 2A, Prong 1 in determining that claim 25 recites an abstract idea. Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25 and its dependent claims, as well as similar claims 29 and 33 and their dependent claims, under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Rejection under § 103 Appellant contends that the combination of Nehab, Cook, Fatahalian, and Crow fail to teach or suggest “a rasterizer to generate samples,” as recited in claim 25. Appeal Br. 7–8; Reply Br. 2–4. Appellant contends that “in the prior art, the samples were generated before rasterization.” Appeal Br. 7. Specifically, Appellant contends that in Nehab, “the primitives were Appeal 2019-000759 Application 15/398,042 7 defined before rasterization.” Id. at 8. Appellant also contends that Fatahalian “teaches only a conventional rasterizer that receives already generated samples.” Id. Appellant points to Fatahalian’s teaching that “[m]odern rasterizers leverage efficient data-parallel execution by testing a block of samples” as indicative of using, not generating samples. Id.; see also id. at 7 (“[T]he cited references use samples in rasterization but there is no indication that the samples were ever generated by the rasterizer.”). The Examiner finds that Nehab teaches “a rasterizer to generate samples over a polygon” by disclosing “a form of stochastic sampling.” Ans. 16 (citing Nehab, 1–2) (emphasis omitted); see also Final Act. 5, 8–9. However, the Examiner later concedes that Nehab “does not explicitly mention a . . . rasterizer” and instead relies on Fatahalian as disclosing a rasterizer. Final Act. 10–12 (citing Fatahalian §§ 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 5.2). The Examiner relies on Fatahalian’s teaching that “[m]odern rasterizers leverage efficient data-parallel execution by testing a block of samples.” Final Act. 12 (citing Fatahalian § 2.1). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to combine Nehab, Fatahalian, and the other references “to incorporate different operations in a rasterizer as taught by Fatahalian into Nehab’s modified stratified point sampling system.” Id. at 12. We agree with Appellant. First, the Examiner concedes that Nehab does not disclose a rasterizer and relies on Fatahalian for that teaching. Final Act. 10–12. But we agree with Appellant that Fatahalian teaches a rasterizer that only receives samples, rather than generating samples. See Appeal Br. 8. Fatahalian discloses that modern rasterizers “test[]” a block of samples, which presupposes that those samples have already been generated. Appeal 2019-000759 Application 15/398,042 8 See Fatahalian §§ 2.1, 3.1. It is improper to base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only through hindsight, as the Examiner has done here. The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made. Sensonics Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). We note the Examiner has not relied on any of the other cited references to teach this element. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25 and its corresponding dependent claims. Similarly, each of claims 29 and 33 recites similar language to the above- quoted limitation of claim 25. Accordingly, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 29 and 33 and their corresponding dependent claims. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 25–36 101 Eligibility 25–36 25–36 103 Nehab, Cook, Fatahalian, Crow 25–36 Overall Outcome 25–36 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation