Ingress-Plastene, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1969

177 N.L.R.B. 481 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. 481
Ingress-Plastene , Inc. and International Union, Allied Respondent of its desire to negotiate for a new
Industrial Workers of America , AFL-CIO. Case contract. On September 21, 1967, Respondent
25-CA-2969 offered to meet at an agreeable time for that
June 30, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND ZAGORIA
On March 24, 1969, Trial Examiner Lowell
Goerlich issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent
and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the
Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner ' s Decision , the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, with the following additions and
qualifications.
1. The Trial Examiner found that during the
period from late September 1967 to early December
1967, the Respondent engaged in extensive unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. The Trial Examiner detailed many incidents of
such illegal conduct, including instances of (1)
interrogation of employees , (2) soliciting and
assisting withdrawals of checkoff authorizations, (3)
impressing upon employees the futility of continued
adherence to the Union, (4) creating of the
impression of surveillance, (5) announcement and
promises of beneficial changes in wages and working
conditions, and (6) disparagement of the Union by
unilateral action. We agree with the Trial
Examiner ' s findings and conclusions in this regard.
2. The Trial Examiner also found that the
Respondent illegally refused to bargain by
withdrawing recognition and by unilaterally
instituting changes in wages and conditions of
employment , all in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act. We believe that these conclusions are
amply sustained by the evidence in the record.
The Union was certified on September 30, 1966,
and the first and only contract provided a term from
April 24, 1967, to November 30, 1967. On
September 13, 1967, the Union timely notified
purpose. On October 18, 1967, the Respondent
withdrew recognition, and on October 21 filed an
RM petition which was dismissed on October 30.
Thereafter, not only did Respondent refuse to
recognize or negotiate with the Union, on November
1 it notified its employees it would put into effect on
December 1 a number of beneficial changes which
would be announced later. On November 10,
Respondent announced that, effective December 1,
employees would receive at least a 10-cent-per-mile
wage increase, insurance improvements , and a bonus
for a certain "four-crew" operation. On November
17, Respondent announced that certain noneconomic
conditions would become effective on December 1.
On December 1, these changes in wages and
working conditions were placed into effect.
It is well settled that a certified union, upon
expiration of the first year following its certification,
enjoys a rebuttable presumption that its majority
representative status continues.' This presumption is
designed to promote stability in collective-bargaining
relationships, without impairing the free choice of
employees.: Accordingly, once the presumption is
shown to be operative, a prima facie case is
established that an employer is obligated to bargain
and that its refusal to do so would be unlawful. The
prima facie case may be rebutted if the employer
affirmatively establishes either (1) that at the time
of the refusal the union in fact no longer enjoyed
majority representative status;3 or (2) that the
employer's refusal was predicated on a good-faith
and reasonably grounded doubt of the union's
continued majority status. As to the second of these,
i.e., "good-faith doubt," two prerequisites for
sustaining the defense are that the asserted doubt
must be based on objective considerations" and it
"must not have been raised in the context of illegal
antiunion activities, or other conduct by the
employer aimed at causing disaffection from the
union or indicating that in raising the majority issue
the employer was merely seeking to gain time in
which to undermine the union."'
Respondent does not contend that it has rebutted
the presumption of majority status of the Union; it
contends, rather, that it has demonstrated that it
had reasonable grounds for doubting that the Union
continued to enjoy majority support, and that its
'Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, 671-672.
'Id.
"Majority representative status" means that a majority of employees in
the unit wish to have the union as their representative for
collective-bargaining purposes. Id.
See Laystrom Manufacturing Company, 151 NLRB 1482, 1484,
enforcement denied on other grounds (sufficiency of evidence) 359 F.2d 799
(C.A. 7); Terre!! Machine Company, 173 NLRB No. 230; N L R B v.
Gulfmont Hotel Company, 362 F.2d 588 (C.A. 5), enfg 147 NLRB 997
And cf. United States Gypsum Company, 157 NLRB 652.
'Celanese Corporation of America, supra at 673 . See also Terre!!
Machine, supra;Bally Case and Cooler, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 106, C & C
Plywood Corporation , 163 NLRB No. 136.
177 NLRB No. 70
482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
good faith in withdrawing recognition from the
Union has been shown by the fact that it filed a
petition in order to have the question of
representation resolved in accordance with the
Board's election procedures. Considering all the
circumstances , we find this defense to be without
merit.
Assuming, arguendo, that the facts concerning the
small number of unit employees participating in the
dues checkoff program, and the Union's purported
lack of aggressiveness in asserting contractual rights
and privileges, coupled with attempts to increase its
membership among unit employees , constitute the
type of objective considerations which reasonably
could have led Respondent to doubt the Union's
continued majority status,' it is apparent that
Respondent was not willing to have the question
concerning the Union's representative status which it
claims existed resolved by the election machinery
provided in the Act. Though it is true that
Respondent filed a petition for an election, that
petition was filed during the last 60 days of its
contract with the Union and was subject to
dismissal under the normal application of the
Board's contract-bar rules. Although Respondent
argued before the Regional Director that the
petition should nevertheless be processed, it did not
appeal to the Board from the Regional Director's
dismissal of the petition. Instead, it intensified its
unfair labor practice campaign , a campaign initiated
even before it filed the petition, in a patent effort to
dissipate employee support of the Union and to
destroy the conditions necessary to a free election.
Quite clearly Respondent has not conformed its
conduct to the requirements of the Act as spelled
out in relevant Board decisions.' Accordingly, as
Respondent has not rebutted the presumption
flowing from the Union's certification, and as it, in
any event , has engaged in substantial independent
unfair labor practices tending to preclude the
holding of a fair election, we find that Respondent,
by withdrawing recognition from the Union on
October 18, 1967, and thereafter refusing to bargain
with the Union, violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
`There is, of course, no necessary correlation between the number of
employees who are willing to give financial support to a union and the
number of employees who wish to be represented by a union . See, e.g.,
Gulfmont, supra Nor does the fact that the Union may not have been
aggressive in asserting certain contractual rights on behalf of employees
necessarily give rise to the inference that it lacked majority status. Clearly
the Union was not a dormant organization. Cf. Dietz Forge Company of
Tennessee , 173 NLRB No. 5. As to Respondent's contention that Union
President Sheets conceded to one of Respondent 's officials that the Union
represented only those employees who had signed checkoff authorizations,
we note that Sheets denied having so stated , and the Trial Examiner did
not resolve the issue of credibility raised by the conflicting testimony
Without attempting to resolve that issue ourselves, we note that even
Respondent's version of the discussion between Furgeson , its personnel
director , and Sheets demonstrates that they were discussing additional
checkoff cards in the possession of the Union , when Furgeson asked Sheets
if that is all the employees you represent at this time In this context, it is
highly likely that Sheets understood the inquiry as relating to union
membership rather than the number of employees represented by the
Union In any event , Respondent does not rely on Sheet's response as
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, we shall order that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act. We expressly disavow the Trial
Examiner's discussion in that section of his Decision
entitled "Recommended Remedy."
AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW
Delete Conclusion of Law 6 and insert in its place
the following:
6. By unilaterally changing wages and other terms
and conditions of employment on December 1, 1967,
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
modified below, and orders that Respondent,
Ingress-Plastene, Inc., Crawfordsville, Indiana, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as so modified:
Delete paragraph 1(b) and insert in its place the
following:
"(b) Unlawfully changing working conditions
unilaterally."
proof that the Union did not represent a majority of the employees when
Respondent withdrew recognition , and its later unfair labor practice
demonstrates to our satisfaction that Respondent did not in good faith
withdraw recognition from the Union.
'See cases cited in fn 5 See also N L.R B v. Gissel Packing Company,
395 U.S. 575. Though the decision in that case did not discuss the issue
involved herein , namely, the circumstances in which an employer is
privileged to withdraw recognition from a certified incumbent union, we
are satisfied that its teachings concerning the circumstances in which it is
appropriate for the Board to find that an employer's refusal to recognize
and bargain with a union which claims majority status on the basis of
authorization cards signed by a majority of unit employees violates Sec.
8(ax5) supports our decision in this case
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE.CASE
LOWELL GOERLICH , Trial Examiner : The original charge
was filed by International Union, Allied Industrial
Workers of America , AFL-CIO, herein referred to as the
Union , on November 9, 1967, and served on Respondent,
Ingress-Plastene , Inc., by registered mail on November 9,
1967. Complaint and notice of hearing was issued on
February 27, 1968. The complaint charged that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended : ( 1) by refusing to bargain
collectively with the Union on and after October 18, 1967;
(2) by engaging in conduct designed to undermine the
Union's majority; and (3) by unilaterally instituting
INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC.
various changes in employment conditions on December 1,
1967. The complaint further alleged that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by certain specified
acts of surveillance , interrogation ,' and threats and
inducements , all designed to dissuade employees from
becoming or remaining members of the Union.
The Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it
had engaged in or was engaging in the unfair practices
alleged.
In its answer the Respondent, admitted that on
September 30, 1966, the Union was certified by the
Regional Director for Region 25 as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative , for the following unit
of the Respondent's employees:
All production, maintenance and warehouse employees
of Respondent employed at its Crawfordsville, Indiana
plant and warehouse exclusive of administrative
executives , salesmen , office clerical employees,
professional employees , foremen , assistant foremen,
guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
The Respondent further admitted that on April 24,
1967, it executed a collective -bargaining agreement with
the Union which remained in effect until November 30,
1967.
Affirmatively, the Respondent alleged that on or about
October 18, 1967, and on or about November 1, 1967, it
refused to recognize the Union for purposes of negotiating
a new contract effective December 1, 1967. Respondent
further stated that in good faith it believed the Union did
not represent a majority of employees after October 1,
1967;= that the Union in fact did not represent a majority
of employees after October 1, 1967; and that by
recognizing and bargaining with the Union on the dates
alleged in the complaint , Respondent would have violated
the Act. Respondent also stated that it lawfully instituted
certain changes in wages and conditions of employment on
December 1, 1967.
The case came on for hearing on April 15 through 19,
and July 23 and 24, 1968, and January 14, 1969, at
Crawfordsville, Indiana .' Each party was afforded a full
opportunity to be heard , to call, examine and
cross-examine witnesses , to argue orally on the record, to
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions, and to
file briefs. All briefs have been carefully considered by the
Trial Examiner.
Upon the whole record,' and upon his observation of
the witnesses , the Trial Examiner makes the following:
'At the hearing the complaint was amended to list additional
interrogations , allegedly violative of Sec. 8 (a)(1).
'Respondent stated in its answer , " Respondent states that it was and is
the Respondent ' s good faith belief that the Union at all times on and after
about October 1, 1967, did not and does not represent a majority of
employees in the unit ......
'This matter was delayed pending enforcement of a subpoena ad
testificandum
'There being no opposition thereto , the Respondent ' s motion to amend
transcript in the particulars stated therein is granted.
'In making his findings of fact and conclusions the Trial Examiner has
considered the demeanor of the various witnesses who appeared before him
and has passed upon their credibility . As to those witnesses who testified in
contradiction to the Trial Examiner 's findings, the Trial Examiner has
discredited their testimony , either as having been in conflict with the
testimony of credible witnesses or because it is in and of itself incredulous
and unworthy of belief . In this respect the Trial Examiner is not unmindful
of the Supreme Court' s observation in N.L. R.B. v Walton Manufacturing
Company, 369 U.S. 404, 408•
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS'
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
483
Respondent is now , and has been at all times material
herein, an Indiana corporation, with place of business at
Crawfordsville, Indiana. It is engaged in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of custom injection moldings.
Respondent, during the past 12 months, which period is
representative of all times material herein, manufactured,
sold, and shipped from its Crawfordsville plant finished
products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside
Indiana . The Trial Examiner finds, as is admitted by the
Respondent, that at all times material herein the
Respondent was an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, as admitted by the Respondent, is
and has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
First: The Union was certified on September 30, 1966.
Negotiations commenced and, on January 23, 1967, a
complete contract proposal was offered by the
Respondent. The proposal was rejected by the Union and,
an impasse having been effected, the Employer placed its
proposal in effect on January 23, 1967, at 4 p.m.
Thereafter the Union engaged in a strike which concluded
with the execution of the contract, dated April 24, 1967.
The contract, by its terms, among other things, provided
that it would remain in full force and effect until midnight
November 30, 1967, and "shall automatically renew itself
thereafter from year to year unless written notice to
terminate or amend the Agreement is given by either
party to the other not less than 60 days prior to the
expiration date (or any renewal expiration date)."6
On May 26, 1967, the parties agreed on a checkoff
form (checkoff of dues to the Union was provided in the
contract) and the first executed checkoff authorization was
received by the Respondent on August 27, 1967.
On September 13, 1967, by letter, the Union requested
the Respondent to enter into negotiations for a new labor
agreement . A part of the letter read, "The Union wishes
to amend and add to the labor agreement and if an
agreement cannot be reached by November 30, 1967, the
agreement between the parties will be terminated."
On September 21, 1967, the Respondent answered the
Union's letter in which was included: "We hereby offer to
meet and confer with you for the purpose of negotiating a
new contract. Please notify us when you would like to
meet." The letter also stated that it would serve as the
Respondent' s notification to the Union of its termination
of the agreement at midnight November 30, 1967.
On September 30, 1967, the Union's certification
reached the end of its first year of being and on October
For the demeanor of a witness
.. may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the witness' testimony is not
true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story; for the denial of one,
who has a motive to deny , may be uttered with such hesitation,
discomfort, arrogance or defiance , as to give assurance that he is
fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to assume the
truth of what he denies." Dyer v. MacDougall. 201 F.2d 265, 269.
The contract signed on April 24, 1967, conforms in all respects to the
proposal instituted on January 23, 1967, except for the provisions
concerning pensions and insurance benefits.
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2, 1967, the 60-day insulated period "during which the
parties may negotiate and execute a new or amended
agreement without the intrusion of a rival petition"'
commenced.
On October 2, 1967, the Union addressed a
communication to "All Production and Maintenance
Employees" of the Respondent ' s employees enclosing
therewith a checkoff-authorization form. In the
communication employees were encouraged to sign
checkoff authorizations, and (after noting that the present
contract expired on November 30, 1967), employees were
urged to 'join and support the Union ," in order that
employees might "work UNITED for the benefit of all
employees."'
On October 17, 1967, Britton Gene Furgeson , personnel
director,' conferred with Treve K. Cramer, chairman of
the board , and Verne Waldon , president, in respect to the
current majority status of the Union . Furgeson ' s meeting
with Cramer on this subject occurred shortly after he had
engaged in conversation with John Sheets , president of
Local 480 . As a result of such conversation Furgeson had
directed a note to Cramer which , in part, related,
John stated he had two forms (checkoff-authorization
forms) in his car but since it was raining he would bring
them to me later unless I wanted them at this time. I
informed John it would not be necessary to go out in
the rain to get them . John stated he would bring them
in the following day. I also asked John if the forms we
have are all the people they represented at this time.
John replied, "Well, I have the two in the car ...." At
this point , I interrupted John and asked , "Including the
two in the car, this is all you represent at this time?"
John ' s reply was, "Right . With the two in the car, this
is all at this time ." To this, I replied , "O.K. So at this
time, this is all the Union represents ." The note
concluded , "At this time , the Union represents by their
own claim , at the most, 50 people out of a total
bargaining unit of 155."
According to Furgeson , the conferees discussed the
event " referred to in his note on October 17, 1967, as well
as other alleged indicia of the Union ' s lack of majority
status . During the discussion Furgeson noted that there
were 49 employees on checkoff and of these , 34 were
those of the 72 employees who were on the payroll at the
time of the election and 15 were of the 84 new employees
hired since the election . The conferees also reviewed the
fact that the Union had filed a number of grievances but
had taken none of them to arbitration. It was observed
that this was an "indication that this is not a majority
representation of the people" or "a vigorous majority
representation."
'Deluxe Metal Furniture Company , 121 NLRB 995, 1000
'Among other things the communication included:
You permitted the Company to make decisions that was not in your best
interest because you did not support your local Union or your fellow
workers.
I urge each one of you to join and support the Union ....
To improve the conditions that now exist you should sign the enclosed
Check -off Authorization form and drop it into the Union
Communication Box . . Or you may give the Check -off Authorization
to the President, John Sheets , Financial Secretary , Mary Chesterson ...
Moore ... Cox ... Alexander .. Moore ... McClure ... Keller . .
White . . McCloud ... Burnside ... Shanklin .... These people will
see that the Authorization is given to John Sheets, President of Local
Union 480
'Furgeson was also "director of purchasing , customer relations,
production control , material or handling and security."
"Sheets recollected the meeting with Furgeson on October 17, 1%7, but
denied that Furgeson had asked him the question mentioned by Furgeson
The conferees also commented on the fact that they had
not received a reply setting forth superseniority employees
selected by the Union until after May 26, 1967. The
conferees attributed this to lack of union majority. The
conferees also considered that while the Employer's
proposal had been put into effect on January 23, 1967, the
Respondent received no names from the Union for the
union safety committee until May 26, 1967. They
concluded that such inactivity on the part of the Union
did not attract new employees as members. The conferees
further noted that the Union had refused to accompany
management on safety tours.
Another matter which was discussed was the fact that
that the Union submitted no checkoff authorizations until
August 29, 1967. The conferees attributed such lack of
submission as a failure to show a majority and noted that
the Company had 48 checkoff forms in its possession out
of a unit of 150." The conferees further observed that the
Union had taken no advantage of the job promotion
privileges under the proposal of January 23, 1967. The
conferees also discussed the fact that some of the
Respondent' s supervisors had reported that they had heard
that the checkoff authorizations had been obtained by
coercion.
The Union's October 2, 1967, communication noted
above came under discussion . The conferees interpreted it
as a renewed effort to organize and the Union' s admission
that it lacked a majority. As stated by Furgeson, "It
expresses the fact that the Union knows that the people
are dissatisfied, they have been disappointed. That in view
of this fact this was further reason for us to believe at that
point that the Union was not a majority representative."
In the afternoon of October 17, after a consideration of
the matters which had been raised during the discussion,
Board Chairman Cramer made the decision "that he was
going to withdraw recognition of the Union but he would
continue to honor all of his commitments under the
contract until midnight of November 30."
On October 18, 1967, the Respondent directed the
following letter to the Union signed by T. K. Cramer."
Based on substantial information which we have
received (including information received just yesterday),
it is our belief that Allied Industrial Workers
International Union and its Local 480 no longer
represents a majority of our employees in the
production , maintenance and warehouse collective
bargaining unit . We must therefore respectfully decline
to recognize the Union for purposes of negotiating a
new contract effective December 1, 1967. We will, of
course , continue to recognize the Union for purposes of
administration of the current contract which expires
midnight , November 30 (and will continue to honor all
of our contract obligations thereunder).
On October 20, 1967, Employer filed a representation
petition requesting that the National Labor Relations
Board "precede under its proper authority pursuant to
Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act."
Submitted with the petition was the statement , "Although
we understand that the Board does not normally process
Petitions filed within 60 days of the contract expiration
date , we request that the enclosed Petition be processed in
or that he had made answer to such a question.
"By October 17, 1967, six employees had revoked their checkoff
authorizations and four other employees who had signed checkoff
authorizations had been terminated from employment . After October 17,
1967, several other employees revoked their checkoff authorizations. (See
infra.)
"Cramer did not appear for testimony.
INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC.
view of the unusual circumstances as disclosed on
Attachment A" to the Petition . Please notify us
immediately in the event you wish additional data such as
information showing you the basis for our good faith
belief that the Union no longer represents a majority of
employees in the bargaining unit."
By letter dated October 30, 1967, Respondent' s counsel
was informed by the Regional Director for Region 25:
"As a result of the investigation , it appears that, because
the collective-bargaining agreement currently in effect,
from April 24, 1967 to November 30, 1967, between the
Employer and International Union, Allied Industrial
Workers of America, AFL-CIO and its Local 480,
constitutes a bar to investigation of representatives,
further proceeding are not warranted at this time. I am,
therefore , dismissing the petition in this matter."
The letter advised the Respondent:
Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Board
Rules and Regulations , you may obtain a review of this
action by filing an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Board , Washington , D.C., 20570. A copy of
such appeal must be served upon each of the other
parties to the proceeding , including the undersigned.
This appeal must contain a complete statement setting
forth the facts and reasons upon which it is based. The
appeal (8 copies) should be filed with the Board in
Washington , D.C., 20570, by close of business
November 13, 1967, except that the Board may, upon
good cause shown, grant special permission for a longer
period within which to file.14 A copy of any request
for extension of time should be submitted to me.
By letter dated October 31, 1967, the Union again
requested the Employer to meet for the purpose of
negotiating a new agreement . By letter dated November 1,
1967, the Respondent again advised the Union that it
declined "to recognize [the] Union for purposes of
negotiating a new contract effective December 1" and
declined to meet with [the Union] for that purpose. On
the same date the Employer placed in employees' pay
envelopes a general notice announcing among other things
that the Employer anticipated "placing into effect on
December 1st a number of changes which [were]
beneficial" to its employees and which it intended to
announce as the month progressed.t6
On November 9, 1967, the Union filed Section 8(a)(1),
(3), and (5) unfair labor practice charges which were
received by the Respondent on November 10, 1967. Also
on November 10, 1967, the Respondent posted economic
changes for production , maintenance, and warehouse
employees "to become effective December 1." Each
employee was granted at least a 10-cent-an-hour wage
increase and improved group insurance . Additionally there
"The unusual circumstances were set out as follows in Attachment A:
The above named union was certified on September 30, 1966. The
current contract expires on November 30, 1967, and employer notified
union by letter on October 18 that it declines to recognize union for
purposes of negotiating a new contract effective December 1 . Union by
letter of September 13th claimed recognition for purposes of negotiating
a new contract effective December 1, 1967.
'The appeal period having expired on November 13, 1967, and no
appeal having been filed , the case was closed on November 14, 1967.
"The full notice was as follows:
GENERAL NOTICE
Monthly Union dues in the amount of $4.00 have been deducted from
the enclosed paychecks of the minority of employees who have signed
checkoff authorizations . (We understand that even some of those who
signed the authorizations did so under pressure and scare tactics.) No
deduction has been made from the pay of the large majority who have
not signed these authorizations. Under the Union contract , which ends as
of November 30th , dues and fees of authorizing employees are deducted
485
was provided an attendance bonus for four-crew
operation.
On November 13, 1967, the period for filing an appeal
from the Regional Director' s dismissal of the
Respondent' s RM petition expired.
On November 17, the Respondent posted the following
noneconomic conditions effective December 1, 1967:
1. Full seniority, as currently established, will be
continued except for super-seniority for Union officials
and notices to the Union.
2. Provisions for no discrimination and no lockout by
the Company, as currently established, will be
continued.
3. Limitations on production, maintenance and
warehouse work by supervisors, as currently
established , will be continued.
4. Grievance and arbitration procedures , as currently
established, will be continued but revised to provide for
employee handling of grievances at all steps and for
arbitration by mutual agreement of the grievant and the
Company.
5. The work week and hours of work, as currently
established , will be continued.
6. Current rest period policy, and other current
written practices, will be continued.
7. Current provisions relating to the Union such as
recognition, notices to the Union, checkoff (previously
announced), strikes, Union Stewards, Union
representation , Union bulletin board and
communication box, and Union safety committee will
be deleted.
The policies as outlined above will be written up and
placed in the standard practice manual on December 1.
On the same date the Respondent addressed a letter to
"Dear Fellow Employee":
The Allied Industrial Workers Union apparently is
getting desperate in its attempt to organize our
employees. As you know, the Union does not represent
a majority of our people and therefore it is making all
kinds of promises in an effort to get your support.
We think that you should have the true facts. Here
are some of them:
1. The Union is making "pie in the sky" statements
about "demands" it will make if it ever gets in here
again . Those of you who were at Ingress-Plastene
during the AIW ' s organizing drive last year will
remember that they made the same kind of promised
demands then. Well, performance is better than
promises -- and the current "Union Contract" does not
contain many of those old promised demands. Frankly,
we don't understand why the Union is squawking so
much about things which are in the contract which
they, themselves signed just a few months ago.
2. The Union claims it will demand back pay and
retroactive benefits to December 1, 1967 from the
Company if it gets in . Of course, it takes a Company to
agree before a Union's demands can come true. And
apparently the Union doesn 't realize that a fine new
wage program is going into effect on December 1.
from the first paycheck of the month; consequently the checkoffs being
made today are the last ones under that expiring contract.
We anticipate placing into effect on December 1st a number of changes
which are beneficial to our employees - and which we intend to announce
as this month progresses. The first change which we are happy to
announce is the elimination of checkoff for Union dues and initiation
fees. No authorizations currently on file will be recognized for December
checkoff and commencing December I there will be no checkoff of
Union dues and initiation fees for anyone.
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. The Union threatens that it will go to the Labor
Board and the court to enforce some of its economic
demands. This is just a lot of talk. When a Union is in
a plant, economics are settled in bargaining and not by
anyone else.
4. The Union has sent a pamphlet on what foreman
allegedly can't do. All we can tell you is that Unions
can't discriminate either . Remember you are protected
by law from discrimination by either a Company or a
Union.
5. The Union status is clear - the Company is
recognizing it for purposes of administering the current
contract which expires November 30th - but the
Company is not recognizing the Union for purposes of
negotiating a new contract because the Union does not
represent a majority of our employees in the bargaining
group.
6. The Union has filed another charge with the
NLRB. This is the third time they've done this since
last January. The Union wasn't successful the first two
times and we don't think they'll be this time either.
Don't let your self be deceived - we will keep you
posted on development."
Wage increases were made effective on December 1,
1967. Second: During the period when the foregoing
events were occurring, certain supervisors of the
Respondent engaged in activities which the General
Counsel claims violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
A. The Activities of Supervisor Guerney Williams
About 2 weeks before Shirley York signed a union
authorization card on November 30, 1967, Supervisor
Guerney Williams asked her whether she had signed a
union card . She truthfully answered , "No" to which
Williams responded that he "wished no one on his shift
would throw in it." York replied, "that was just the
breaks of life."
About a week or two after York had signed her union
authorization card Williams again asked York whether
she "belonged to the Union." She falsely answered, "No."
He also inquired whether Barbara Blotgett , an employee
who worked on the same shift as did York, "belonged" to
the Union. York replied that she didn't know; that "he
would have to ask her.""
On October 16, 1967, the date employee Alice Anna
Cary revoked her union checkoff authorization, Williams,
as verified by his testimony, inquired of her whether she
"really" had dropped out of the Union. Cary answered,
"Yes." Continuing the conversation he asked her for her
reasons . While he did not remember her reply, he recalled
saying to her, "I 'm glad you did; I wish everyone on the
night shift would."
Cary signed a new union authorization card on
November 25, 1967. About a week later Williams came to
her press and said, "I heard you belonged to a union.""
Cary answered, "Yes." Williams continued, "The Union
won't do you any good." Cary replied, "I don't know, I
have to find out for myself." Williams then asked her
whether her mother belonged to the Union. Cary
responded, "I don't know, Guerney, you will just have to
ask her.s 19
B. The Activities of Supervisor Charles Grady
On or about November 1, 1967, when employees
Margaret McClure, Rosemary Bowles, and Rebecca Jane
White opened their pay envelopes in which was enclosed
the Respondent's notice to employees that the first change
beneficial to the employees would be that "commencing
December 1, there will be no check off of union dues and
initiation fees for any one," Supervisor Charles Grady
remarked, "Aren't you glad you don't have to pay your
$4 union dues any more."'" Employee McClure responded
that they would pay their union dues in cash. During the
conversation Grady remarked that the Union would not
do the employees "any good." He further commented that
"the Company would not bargain with the Union
anymore ." Employee White responded, "They have to
bargain that is the law." Finally Grady said that "they
would bargain , but there would never be another contract
signed in the plant." Grady admitted that he "possibly did
tell employees that the Company would never again
bargain" at the time he had passed out employee
paycheck envelopes with the above-mentioned notice
included.
Norma A. Cronke related a conversation which
occurred between Charles Grady and Rosemary Bowles
during the first week of December 1967. Grady was
quoted as saying , "It is my opinion when you go on strike
and when you come back you will be fired. . . . This
Company is not so dumb. It is going to tie up this
proceeding for two to five years, and when they do get
around to it, they will negotiate a contract because by that
time all your back pay and benefits will be down the drain
and we will start out fresh." The latter portion of the
above statement was modified to relate "the slate will be
wiped clean ." Rosemary Bowles , who was present at the
conversation, disputed Cronke's version. Bowles had been
asked to give a statement in regard to her version to the
NLRB representative and she said that after having read
the statement of Cronke, she did not give a statement
because "it would be different from hers and it would hurt
the Union that [she] wanted to help." Patricia Keller, who
was called by the General Counsel, testified that she could
not recall that Grady said that "those that went on strike
would be fired." However, she testified that Grady said
"The Respondent' s letter was apparently in response to union leaflets
which , among other things , stated
The International Union , Allied Industnal Workers of America,
AFL-CIO has filed charges against Ingress-Plastene Inc. for refusal to
bargain . The National Labor Relations Board is processing the charges
If the Company continues its unfair practices of refusing to bargain, the
Union will demand from the Company back pay and retroactive benefits
to the December 1, 1967 Also an additional 6% interest penalty on the
Company for holding the benefits from the Employees
"Williams denied that he had questioned York but admitted he had said
to her, "I wonder if Blotgett belonged to the Union " and that York
responded , "Why don ' t you ask her " Williams also admitted that York
had said , " I guess those are the breaks of life ." In view of Williams'
admissions and the considerations noted in fn 5, the Trial Examiner
credits York.
"The card signed by Cary on November 25, 1967, was an
"Authorization for Collective Bargaining " Unlike the checkoff card there
is no credible evidence that this card was lodged with the Respondent.
Thus, the inference is that Williams' knowledge of the card must have
come to him through a rank-and-file employee
"Williams denied that he had asked Cary whether she belonged to the
Union but admitted that he "could have" told her "the Union wouldn't do
her any good " Williams did not deny that he had asked Cary whether her
mother belonged to the Union.
Williams' admissions together with the considerations noted in footnote
5 persuade the Trial Examiner that where there is a conflict between the
testimony of Cary and Williams, Cary's testimony is to be credited.
"Employee McClure quoted Grady as saying, "aren't you glad there
won't be any more taken out."
INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC.
that "the Company was not going to negotiate the
contract"; that it wanted "to take the matter to trial";
that the Company "wasn't dumb"; that "was why they
had their smart lawyer"; that "they would take it and
drag it out to two to five years"; and that "after that it
wouldn ' t matter. 1121
Grady did not specifically deny the remarks attributed
to him by employee Keller. In respect to the conversation
which was overheard by Patricia Keller and Norma A.
Cronke which involved Grady and Bowles , the Trial
Examiner is of the opinion that Cronke placed an
emotional interpretation on the words used by Grady and
that he did not actually state that if the employees went
on strike they would be fired when they returned.
However, the Trial Examiner credits witness Keller, whom
he found to be honest and forthright.
C. The Activities of Joseph Gill
Supervisor Joseph Gill remarked to employee Terrie
Miles 2 or 3 days after she had signed a union-checkoff
authorization on September 25, 1967, that he did not
think she would benefit from the Union and that if she
"wanted to drop off he would get the papers for [her] to
sign ." Thereafter , unlike prior practice , she was
transferred from press to press. Although the work on the
presses to which she was transferred was not more
difficult, upon some of the presses to which she was
assigned , she had had no experience.
On October 12, 1967, Miles had another conversation
with Gill at which time he told her that "Burns" wanted
to see [her] in the office." She went to the office where
Burns said to her that "Joe had told her that [she, Miles]
wanted to drop out of the Union and she had the papers
ready for [her] to sign ." Miles was instructed by Burns to
copy the following words, "I hereby revoke this check off
authorization" which she was directed to place at the
bottom of her checkoff authorization and sign her name.
This she did.
In November Miles was discharged for absenteeism.2J
About 2 weeks after employee Patrina Ford executed
her checkoff-authorization card on October 7, 1967, Gill
"Grady's version of the conversation was as follows.
. . she asked me if the company or me - I don ' t remember how she
worded it would fire usif we wentout on strike . I said , "Why would
you want to go out on strike before not being represented by any
union?" and she said , "Yes, we are ." I said, "Are you paying dues?"
She said, "No." Then the conversation led into the amount of time to be
involved if it went to court.
* *
I believe she had mentioned about going to court and I said , "Well, if
-", as I mentioned earlier there , I asked her if she was still paying dues
and she said no , so I wouldn ' t hardly think so. She said , "Something
like this could be tied up in court ." She had mentioned going to court
from , they say, two to five years.
"Marge Burns was secretary and assistant to Personnel Director
Furgeson.
"Gill denied that he had asked Miles to revoke her checkoff. Burns
testified she had never offered the revocation clause to any employee
before it was requested , and had never sent for an employee to come to her
office to execute a revocation. Burns did not specifically deny that she had
said to Miles that "Joe had told her that she wanted to drop out of the
Union and she had the papers ready for [her] to sign."
Gill impressed the Trial Examiner as an unreliable witness . Thus where
his testimony is in contradiction with that of other credible witnesses, it is
discredited . In view of this fact and the fact that a number of employees
had similar experiences in connection with the revocation of their checkoff
authorizations, and in view of the lack of specificity in Burns' denials, the
Trial Examiner credits Miles as to the events which occurred in connection
487
asked her "if he had done anything to - that made [the
employees] want to join the Union." Ford told him that
he had done nothing to her or any of the other girls as far
as she knew. She stated that the reason the employees
joined the Union was because they "were tired of working
this seven-day shift and not getting paid for it." Two or
three days later Gill again conversed with Patrina Ford at
which time he asked her whether she had taken her name
off the checkoff list. She replied that she had not. Gill
said, "Well, you and Jennifer Cook, you are the only ones
left in it. Don't you think you ought to get up there?"
Ford asked him why she should do this and he answered
that he did not want the employees "to go out on strike or
anything like that." About half an hour later Ford went to
Burns' office and said to her "I heard you have a paper
that you want me to sign." Burns answered, "Yes." Burns
handed Ford her checkoff authorization with the comment
"Here, this is for you to sign ." The revocation wording
was furnished by Burns who directed Ford to write it on
the bottom of her checkoff authorization.24
Sometime prior to October 27, 1967, and after
September 8, 1967, the date Sandra K. Beck executed a
union card, Gill remarked to her that there were "only
two people that was still in the Union," and that "they
were fools for being in there." Later, according to Beck,
Gill approached her and asked her whether she was
"going to drop out of the Union." As explained by Beck
"he kept coming around wanting to know when I was
going to drop out of the Union. I didn't say anything. He
just kept coming around and coming around. I finally got
tired of it and I went up and signed off," on October 27,
1967.
Employee Betty Woodcock accompanied Beck to
Burns' office. Beck told Burns she wanted to drop out of
the Union. Burns gave her a paper with the revocation
wording on it.25 Personnel Relations Director Furgeson
was present at the time. When Beck returned, according
to Woodcock, Gill asked her, "Did you do it?" and she
answered, "Yes" and "smiled at him."
Later Gill phoned Beck and told her that she "wasn't
supposed to say anything about him asking [her] to drop
out of the Union," if the "union people" appeared at her
home. 26
On October 25, 1967, Gill approached Betty Houchens
and said, "Thanks." She said, "For what?" He answered,
with the revocation of her checkoff authorization
"Burns did not specifically deny that Ford said to her, "I heard you
have a paper that you want me to sign ," and that she answered "Yes."
Gill generally denied the testimony of Ford . He told of a parking lot
incident which occurred after an Ingress-Plastene club party at which Ford
had been drinking "Slow Gin Fizzes " He said that Ford told him , "I will
get even with you" a number of times . Her only explanation for the
remark was "You will find out one of these days."
As to the events in connection with the revocation of Ford's checkoff,
Ford is credited.
"Employee Woodcock testified that Burns "pulled out some papers and
laid it on the desk and told Sandy to copy this here and sign your name toIC,
'.Gill testified that it was Beck who phoned him and said that Union
Representatives Sheets and Walker were "out to pin some stuff" on him
and that they were "going around the houses trying to collect information
about [him] on this grievance views "
Gill generally denied Beck 's testimony. Bad blood apparently existed
between Beck and Woodcock at the time of the hearing. Woodcock
testified that she told Beck , "Let me tell you one thing, Sandy, if they take
me to court and I become a nervous wreck and have to go to the hospital,
you might as well figure your ass belongs to me " Woodcock continued,
"Yes, if I have to come to the plant and drag you out."
As between Gill, Woodcock, and Beck the Trial Examiner credits Beck
as to the above events.
488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"For signing that paper ." She then said , "Oh, you mean
the union paper ." Thereupon he wanted to know what he
had done to her. He said that he "didn 't think his girls
would cut him like that" and asked Houchens what her
reason was for cutting him off. She answered that she
"thought it was the best thing to do."
On October 27, 1967, Gill again approached Houchens
and told her that she and Jennifer Cook where the only
ones left in the unit and that they might as well drop out
too. Houchens replied that she "knew better"; Gill said,
"they dropped out this morning ." He further advised
Houchens that if she "went up stairs before Tuesday" and
signed "off this slip" the union dues would not be taken
out of [her] check.
On October 30, 1967, Gill again approached Houchens.
He asked her whether she had been "upstairs yet." She
answered , "No." He inquired whether she was going. She
replied , "If it would make you feel any better ." He said,
"It would." Houchens said , "O.K." Gill replied, "Get
yourself upstairs and see Marge." Houchens went upstairs
and signed a checkoff revocation , the words for which
were furnished by Burns . During the conversation with
Gill, Houchens told him that she "didn ' t really want to
revoke her checkoff."
On November 1, 1967, Gill asked Houchens if Walker
and Sheets had been around and whether she had talked
to them . She answered in the affirmative."
Lois Marie Gaines testified,
[Gill] said , "Hey! ... I didn ' t know that you belonged
to the Union .... Marge tells me these things." And I
said, "Yes. Does it make any difference?" He said no,
and I said, "Well, I never worked in a factory before."
"But," he says , "you and Cookie are the only ones that
belong." He said , "If you want to get out, sign out by
tomorrow and it won 't be taken out of your check, the
four dollars."
On November 2, 1967, Gaines rejoined the Union. On
November 3, 1967, Gill asked Gaines whether Union
Representatives Sheets and Walker had been to see her
the prior afternoon . She responded affirmatively. Gill
inquired , "What did they say? Did they ask if I pressured
you into dropping out of the Union?" Gaines responded
that she "told them no ." Gill added that he tried to get in
touch with her but could not. He said that "some girl"
had called him and told him that the union representatives
were coming to see Gaines."
Alvin Vosten Clayton testified that on the Saturday
following November 29, 1967, Gill said that he had driven
past the city building when the Union was holding a
meeting . He related that he had observed "only six or
seven cars at the union meeting ." Gill observed that "the
Union surely wasn't very strong in the plant or there
would have been more people there."
Third.- The Trial Examiner finds, upon the
consideration of the record as a whole, that the
Respondent interfered with, restrained , and coerced
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act in that:
"Gill was asked, "Did you ever tell Mrs. Houchens that it would make
you feel better if she revoked her checkoff." He answered, "Well, if I did
say it to her, I don't remember, if I had, it would have been in a joking
way." Gill denied that Houchens had informed him that she had revoked
her checkoff, but admitted that he had asked her "if Sheets had her sign a
paper against [him]" Houchens is credited.
"Gill denied that he had discussed checkoff cards with Gaines but
admitted he asked her if "John Sheets got her to sign a paper against
[him]." Gaines is credited.
1. Supervisor Williams unlawfully interrogated
employee York concerning her union membership and the
membership of employee Blotgett.29
2. Supervisor Williams unlawfully inquired of employee
Cary whether she "really" dropped out of the Union and
her reasons therefore in the light of his comment that he
was glad she had dropped out of the Union and he wished
"everyone on the night shift would."
3. Supervisor Williams unlawfully interrogated
employee Cary concerning her union membership and the
membership of her mother. J0
4. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee
Ford concerning whether he had done anything to make
employees join the Union and whether she had taken her
name off the checkoff list.
5. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee
Beck concerning when she was going to drop out of the
Union and whether she did drop out of the Union.
6. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee
Houchens concerning her reason for her cutting him off
and what he had done to her to cause her to affiliate with
the Union.
7. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee
Houchens concerning whether she had been "upstairs yet"
to sign a union-checkoff revocation and whether Union
Representatives Walker and Sheets had been around and
whether she had talked to them.
8. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee
Gaines concerning whether Union Representatives Sheets
and Walker had been to see her, what they said, and
whether they asked if Gill pressured her into dropping out
of the Union."
9. Supervisor Gill and Marge Burns restrained
employee Miles in her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act by their part in effecting the withdrawal of her
union-checkoff authorization.
10. Supervisor Gill and Marge Burns restrained
employee Ford in her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act by their part in effecting the withdrawal of her
checkoff authorization.
"The Board has said in Abex Corporation-Engineered - Products
Division , 162 NLRB 328, "interrogation which seeks to place an employee
in the position of acting as an informer regarding the union activity of his
fellow employees is coercive."
"Such interrogation may not be dissociated from Williams' remark,
"The Union won't do you any good."
"The interrogations of the Respondent's supervisors, as noted above,
included in their scope inquiries of employee union membership , inquiries
of employees' reasons for dropping out of the Union , whether employees
had removed their names from the union-checkoff list, whether Supervisor
Gill had done anything to cause employees to join the Union, whether
employees had been visited by union representatives, and whether the union
representatives asked if Supervisor Gill had pressured an employee into
dropping out of the Union . These interrogations, some accompanied by
encouragement to execute checkoff withdrawals , not only disclosed the
Employer ' s hostility to union membership, but were calculated and had the
natural tendency to frustrate union affection by instilling fear of
anticipated retaliatory tactics . "It is enough that employer interrogation
has a tendency to inhibit the free exercise of rights protected by the Act."
Winchester Spinning Corporation v. N.L.R .B.. 402 F.2d 299 (C.A 4).
Moreover, the Employer has shown no proof that such questioning was
pursuant to the Employer's legitimate business interests. On the other
hand, the inquiries elicited information most useful for discrimination as
well as a basis for assisting the Employer in separating its employees from
union affection and bolstering up a competitive advantage for its own
interests, one of which it appears was to make stick its withdrawal of
union recognition.
The aggravated demeanor of the questioned employees and their
responses buttress the conclusion that the questioning was coercive.
INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. 489
11. Supervisor Gill restrained employee Beck in her
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by his part in
effecting the withdrawal of her checkoff authorization and
telling her that she "wasn ' t to say anything about him
asking [her] to drop out of the Union" if the "union
people" appeared at her home.
12. Supervisor Gill restrained employee Houchens in
her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by his part
in effecting the withdrawal of her union-checkoff
authorization.
13. Supervisor Gill restrained employee Gaines in her
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by his part in
effecting the withdrawal of her union-checkoff
authorization."
14. Supervisor Grady unlawfully interfered with
employees' Section 7 rights by impressing upon employees
the futility of continuing adherence to the Union by his
remark that the Employer would "never again" bargain
with the Union and another contract would "never" be
signed.
15. Supervisor Grady unlawfully interfered with
employees Section 7 rights by impressing employees with
the futility of continuing adherence to the Union by his
remarks "the company was not going to negotiate the
contract," that it "wanted to take the matter to trial";
that "the company wasn ' t dumb , that was why they had a
smart lawyer"; "that they would take it and drag it out to
two to five years and that after that it wouldn ' t matter.""
"In soliciting the withdrawal of union-checkoff authorizations and by
assisting various employees in withdrawing their union-checkoff
authorizations during a period in which the Employer knew that the Union
was attempting to increase its strength , the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act . Priced-Less Discount Foods , Inc.. 157 NLRB 1143,
affd. 405 F .2d 67 (C.A. 6).
In Porter County Farm Bureau Co-operative Association , Inc.. 133
NLRB 1019, 1024 , the Board said:
We find that the assistance to employees in effectuating withdrawals
from the Union at a time when the Respondent was raising a question of
the Union' s majority status and while the RM petition was pending
cannot be viewed as a, ministerial act . . . but constitutes an effort to
undercut the Union ' s majority status and is itself violative of 8(a)(1).
The reversed Trial Examiner 's comments and findings were as follows
(at 1050):
It should be kept in mind that there is no evidence in the instant
matter of any antiunion animus on the part of the Respondent. There is
also no pattern of related unfair labor practices . Nor was there any
instigation of these resignations by the Respondent or any showing that
Miller' s activity in connection therewith went beyond the kind of
customary assistance rendered other employees by this then
nonsupervisory employee . As to Cooper 's suggestion about working,
while it may well be that these resignations ultimately were couched in
approximately the wording suggested by Cooper, his suggestion was
made in response to a request for assistance by the oil drivers, who were
owners of their own trucks and of both common and preferred stock of
the Respondent , who were working on a commission basis which had not
been covered by union contracts , and who were accustomed to getting
office services and assistance . Further , these oil drivers patently wanted
to go back to work and to get out of the Union , which had called a
strike against their wishes and to the detriment of what they considered
their own businesses . Hence the initiative came from employees whose
employment relationship materially differs from the usual
employee-employer pattern ; the request was only for assistance in
performing a ministerial act which the employees themselves had decided
should be done ; and the assistance rendered, when considered in the light
of all of the circumstances, was minimal . Accordingly, I am of the
opinion that the evidence does not warrant a finding of violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because of assistance rendered in effectuating
these withdrawals.
"An employer's remarks which are calculated and tend to impress upon
employees the futility of selecting a bargaining representative" are in
violation of Sec. 8 (a)(1) of the Act . Brandenburg Telephone Company. 164
NLRB No . 26, Orkin Exterminating Company of Florida . Inc.. 152
16. Supervisor Gill created an unlawful impression of
surveillance when he advised employee Clayton that he
had driven past the city building and observed "only six or
seven cars at the union meeting" and that the Union
"surely wasn 't very strong in the plant.""'
Fourth: As noted above the Union on October 2, 1967,
addressed a communication to the Respondent's
employees in which, among other things, the Union urged
each employee "to join and support the Union" and to
sign the "enclosed check-off authorization form." On
November 8, 1967, the Union addressed another
communication to the Respondent's employees, in which,
after referring to the dismissal of the Respondent's
representation petition and its promise of benefits to go
into effect on December 1, 1967, appealed to employees to
"re-affirm" their "position as a union member," and show
the Company they were "100 percent Union" by signing
the enclosed union-authorization card." On November 14,
1967, the Union addressed yet another communication to
the Respondent's employees , in which, referring to the
unfair labor practices filed by the Union, it urged "those
few employees" who had not signed cards to do so
"to-day and drop in the Mail Box ." While the Union
campaigned for additional checkoff authorizations and
100 percent union participation , the Respondent pressed
its refusal to bargain and, vieing with the Union for its
employees' allegiance , embarked on a campaign of its
own, the natural and probable consequences of which was
to discourage employees from union affiliation. Through a
supervisor , the Respondent unlawfully effected the
withdrawal of at least five employees' checkoff
authorizations on October 12, 14, 27, and 30, 1967. These
withdrawals were not without significance because,
according to Furgeson , out of a complement of 150
employees , he believed the number of employees
represented by the Union to be 48. Thus it is plain, that,
with the withdrawal of five employees, the Union would
have retained less than the 30-percent interest required by
the Board for the entertainment of a union's
representation petition (see Board's Statements of
Procedure , Sec. 101.18). Assuming that the Union had
garnered no more authorizations, the employer, by
NLRB 83.
"By confronting Clayton in this manner Respondent created the
impression that Gill had driven past City Hall for the purpose of
ascertaining the Union's strength . Surveillance of this character , in essence
coercive, is unlawful . See N L.R B. v. Ralph Printing and Lithographing
Company, 379 F.2d 687, 691 (C.A. 8).
"The card was as follows-
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL WORKERS
AUTHORIZATION FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1, the undersigned employee of the
Company City State
hereby authorize the International Union, Allied Industrial Workers
of America , through its agents or representatives , to act for me
as the collective bargaining agence in all matters pertaining to
wages, hours and all other conditions of employment.
Signature
Sign your name-don't print
Address City
Date-Department-Tel.
The AIW-AFL-CIO is an Industrial Union whose
policy is ONE UNION in the plant
490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
October 30 , had eliminated the Union ' s chance of
resolving its contested bargaining status by a
representation petition . Hence , the withdrawals effected by
the Respondent were of a crucial character , and may not
be treated with insignificance.
Additionally, however, the Respondent was engaged in
another campaign. It withdrew union recognition on
October 17, 1967. On November 1, 1967, it announced
beneficial changes in the offering , "the first change" the
"elimination of checkoff for union dues and initiation
fees." Next, it granted economic benefits on November
10, 1967, and noneconomic benefits on November 17,
1967, to take effect on December 1, 1967. To drive home
the Respondent' s point, Cramer wrote the employees on
November 17, 1967, among other things:
1. The Union is making "pie in the sky" statements
about "demands" it will make if it ever gets in here
again . Those of you who were at Ingress-Plastene
during the AIW' s organizing drive last year will
remember that they made the same kind of promised
demands then . Well, performance is better than
promises - and the current "Union Contract" does not
contain many of those old promised demands.
2. The Union claims it will demand back pay and
retroactive benefits to December 1, 1967 from the
Company if it gets in . Of course, it takes a Company to
agree before a union ' s demands can come true. And
apparently the Union doesn ' t realize that a fine new
wage program is going into effect on December 1.
[Emphasis supplied.]
With the reference to Union's lack of realization of the
"fine new wage program" to become effective December
1, 1967, Cramer stressed the superflousness of the Union
and the absurdity of its pressing any demands. By the
noneconomic offer granting to its employees benefits such
as full seniority (except superseniority for union officials
and notices to the Union), current provisions for
no-discrimination and no-lockout, current limitations on
work by supervisors , current grievance and arbitration
provisions (except revised "for employee handling of
grievances at all steps and for arbitration by mutual
agreement of the grievant and the Company "), current
workweek and hours of work , and current rest policy
written practices , together with the deletion of union
recognition , notices to the Union , checkoff, strikes, union
stewards, union representation , union bulletin board and
communication box, and union safety committee, the
Respondent pointed the uselessness of the Union and its
lack of need.
"An employer interferes with the right of
self-organization when he emphasizes to his employees
that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining
agent." N.L.R.B. v. Bailey Company, 180 F.2d 278, 279
(C.A. 6).
There is little doubt that the Respondent ' s grant of
these benefits offends the teachings in N.L.R.B. v.
Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405.'° The Respondent's
conduct which was immediately favorable to employees
and undertaken with the undisguised purpose of weaning
employees from union affection impinged upon their
freedom of choice and may reasonably be calculated to
have had that effect . The Respondent' s tactics, as
disclosed by its effectuation of checkoff withdrawals, grant
of benefits, and the stressing of the lack of need for union,
were employed for the clear purpose of annihilating the
Union as a contender for collective-bargaining
representative . Without other logical explanations it must
be concluded that by its machinations it sought to make
sure that the Union could not muster a majority or, in
any event , maintain a showing of employee interest.
The Respondent's grant of benefits effective December
1, 1967, had the effect of undermining the Union and were
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. "The danger
inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the
suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove." N.L.R.B. v.
Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 408-410. Accord:
Northwest Engineering Co., 148 NLRB 1136, 1144-45,
enfd. sub nom. United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 126 U.S. App. D.C. 215, 376 F.2d
770 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 389 U.S. 392; N.L.R.B. v.
Shelby Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 595, 595-596 (C.A. 6).
The unilateral action taken here could only result in the
disparagement of the Union' s position as the bargaining
representative of Respondent's employees. See Porter
County Farm Bureau Co-operative Association, Inc.,
supra, 1024.
The Trial Examiner finds that:
(1) The Respondent, by its announcement enclosed in
the employees' paycheck envelopes dated November 1,
1967, in which was promised beneficial changes for its
employees distributed during a period when the Union's
majority status was under challenge, interfered with,
restrained , and coerced employees in rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
(2) The Respondent, by its announcement on November
10, 1967, in which was promised increased wage and
group insurance and attendance bonus for four-crew
operation effective December 1, 1967, published during a
period when the Union's majority status was under
challenge , interfered with, restrained , and coerced
employees in rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
(3) The Respondent, by its announcement on November
17, 1967, in which was promised certain noneconomic
benefits effective December 1, 1967, published during a
period when the Union's majority status was under
challenge , interfered with , restrained , and coerced
employees in rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Fifth: While the good faith of the Respondent is
suspect" the Trial Examiner is of the opinion that the
question of the Respondent's good faith as it relates to the
alleged violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, under the
circumstances of the case , is immaterial.
"In N L.R. B v. Douglas & Lomason Co, 333 F 2d 510, 514 (C.A. 8),
it was stated
interferences, accomplished by allurements, are as much condemned
by the Act as is coercion.
"The Board has said:
It is the antithesis of good faith to insist upon the right to test a union's
majority in an election and then obstruct the election processes by
unilaterally granting increases in benefits which can only foreclose the
possibility of a fair election being held . Bally Case and Cooler, Inc . 172
NLRB No 106.
In this respect it is of significance that , while the Respondent, according
to its answer, possessed a good-faith doubt on October 1, 1967, at a time
when the Board would have entertained its RM petition , it came forward
with no plausible explanation as to why it waited until October 17, 1967,
to file its RM petition at a time when (as it wrote the Board ) the Board
would "not normally process petitions" because the petition was filed
"within 60 days of the contract expiration date ." It is of further
INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC.
The Respondent refused to bargain with the Union on
October 18, 1967 , well within the period 60 days prior to
the expiration of the contract on November 30, 1967.
During this period the Respondent attempted to raise a
question of representation . From an adverse ruling by the
Regional Director it did not appeal to the Board.
The Board has held in Nelson Name Plate Company,
122 NLRB 467, that "the rule in Deluxe Metal Furniture
Co., 121 NLRB 995, establishing a 60-day insulated
period during which petitions will not be entertained
applies to all petitions ." The rule in the Deluxe Metal
Furniture Co., case, supra, modified by Leonard
Wholesale Meats , Inc., 136 NLRB 1000, provides that
representation petitions filed more than 60 days but not
over 90 days before the terminal date of a valid labor
agreement will be timely and that a "petition filed during
the 60-day insulated period will be dismissed as untimely,
regardless of any conduct of the parties during that 60-day
period ." Deluxe ' Metal Furniture Co., supra, 1000.
Petitions filed during the 60-day insulated period are
dismissed in that "no question affecting commerce exists
concerning the representation of employees of the
Employer within the meaning of Section 9(c)(1) and
Section (2)(6) and (7) of the Act." Deluxe Metal
Furniture Co., supra, 1007.
If the procedure provided in Section 9(c)(1) of the Act
is not open to an employer , the employer has no
alternative but to continue to bargain with the certified
incumbent union . As a corollary , a union is entitled to
exclusive recognition at least for the period of a valid
contract even though the union may have lost its majority
status . Hexton Furniture Co., l l l NLRB 344, Shamrock
Dairy, Inc., 124 NLRB 494, 496. Hence, the Respondent
was under the duty to bargain during the 60 -day insulated
period immediately prior to November 30, 1967, the
terminal date of the contract . A contrary conclusion may
not be sustained for it would allow an employer to rely on
employees ' rights in refusing to bargain , a course of
conduct which is inimical to the underlying purpose of the
Act, industrial peace . See Ray Brooks v . N.L.R.B., 348
U.S. 96, 103.
The Respondent was not only obligated to bargain for
the reasons above detailed, but on and after October 20,
1967, the date its representation petition was filed, it was
the Employer ' s duty to continue to bargain in good faith
"at least until the Board ha[d] given some indication that
[its] claim ha[d] merit ." Ray Brooks v. N.L.R. B., 348
U.S. 96, 103. The Respondent was derelict in this duty.
An employer may not ignore, as here, the procedural
requirements of the Act which Congress has devised as a
means of securing industrial stability and industrial peace,
and resort to self-help.
Although the Board may, if the facts warrant, revoke
a certification or agree not to pursue a charge of an
unfair labor practice , these are matters for the Board;
they do not justify employer self-help or judicial
intervention . The underlying purpose of this statute is
industrial peace . To allow employers to rely on
employees ' rights in refusing to bargain with the
formally designated union is not conducive to that end,
it is inimical to it. Congress has devised a formal mode
significance that the board chairman , Cramer , as detailed above,
commenced a course of conduct which contributed to the creation of an
atmosphere incompatible with a free and unfettered expression of its
employees' choice of a bargaining agent even before the Respondent's RM
petition was dismissed and the time for appealing such dismissal had
expired.
491
for selection and rejection of bargaining agents and has
fixed the spacing of elections , with a view of furthering
industrial stability and with due regard to
administrative prudence.38
If all employers , sua sponte , determined the statutory
bargaining status of the bargaining representative certified
for their employees without the discipline of the
procedures approved by Congress for such purpose, chaos
in industrial relations would result and the uniform system
adopted by Congress for promoting industrial peace and
stability would be frustrated and flouted . Thus, if the
statutory purpose is to be accommodated, the procedural
requirements of the Act, which in this case the
Respondent pretermitted (including the failure to appeal
the Regional Director ' s dismissal of its RM petition),
must be adhered to.
That an employer accepts the duty to "recognize the
Union for the purpose of administration of the current
contract" does not relieve the employer of the obligation
to bargain as commanded by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The obligation to bargain does not exist piecemeal . Within
the duties imposed by the Act it is either plenary or it
does not exist at all. Moreover , if an employer during the
60-day insulated period is excused from its obligation to
bargain in respect to the negotiating of a new contract,
the policy which motivated the Board to institute the
60-day insulated period would be meaningless and
fruitless , for the 60-day insulated period was adopted so
that "the parties may negotiate and execute a new or
amended agreement ." Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121
NLRB 995, 1000.
The Act commands bargaining in good faith in respect
to "the negotiations of an ageement." (Sec. 8(d) of the
Act.) In this respect the Respondent has failed to fulfill its
statutory obligations . Accordingly the Respondent is
guilty of a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. See also
Siskin Steel and Supply Co., 160 NLRB 1038.
The lines drawn by the Board marking off the 60-day
insulated period have prevailed since 1958. These lines
drawn on rational considerations must be adhered to (see
10 East 40th Street Bldg ., Inc. v. Callus, et al. , 325 U.S.
578, 584) and are as fixed as the Board 's now ancient rule
that "absent unusual cirsumstances , the majority status of
a certified union is presumed to continue for one year
from the date of certification"" or as stated in
Kimberly-Clark Corporation , 61 NLRB 90, 92 (1945),
"in cases rising under Section 9(c), that a Board election
and certification must be treated as identifying the
statutory bargaining agent with certainty and finality for a
reasonable period of time - about a year, under ordinary
circumstances ." (Emphasis supplied.) The same pursuasive
reasons which have caused the Board to adopt this rule,
and which were approved by the Supreme Court and
allowed to stand by Congress, are equally pursuasive of
the appropriateness of the 60-day-insulated-period rule
which like the 1-year-certification rule binds the obligation
to bargain for a specified period under ordinary or usual
circumstances. 4'
"Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B, supra, 103
"Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664.
"The Trial Examiner has reviewed Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., 149
NLRB 910, and Hart Motor Express, Inc., 164 NLRB No. 60, cited by
the Respondent, and finds them inapposite . Unlike the instant case, these
cases involve circumstances in which there was proof that a majority of the
employer's employees had in fact repudiated the union or had in fact
selected a new bargaining agent and that such facts were known to the
union and to the employer . Here such facts were not credibly proved.
492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Moreover , an employer must be presumed to know the
rule," and , absent unusual circumstances , may rely upon
the representation of his employees that, by reason of
their failure to raise a question of representation either
through a union or by a decertification petition, they
choose the continued representation of the certified
incumbent union on their behalf for at least the 60-day
insulated period . By such inaction , employees manifest an
acquiescence in the continued agency of the certified
incumbent union . Absent unusual circumstances, the
employer may not assert otherwise during the 60-day
insulated period.
The Respondent specifically requested the Regional
Director to weigh the "unusual circumstances" which
prompted it to file its RM petition . Apparently the
Regional Director was not persuaded . By abandoning its
appeal the Respondent left the inference that it was in
agreement with the Regional Director.
The Trial Examiner , having reviewed the entire record,
finds no unusual circumstances which would have relieved
the Respondent from its obligation to bargain with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of its employees
during the 60-day insulated period.
It is settled law that an employer who is under a
statutory duty to bargain with the designated
representative of its employees violates that duty when it
unilaterally changes wages or other terms and conditions
of employment . N.L.R.B. v. Katz , 369 U.S. 736. The
employer violates that duty even if the changes instituted
are beneficial to the employees , because such unilateral
action in and of itself "amount [s] to a refusal to negotiate
about the affected conditions of employment . . . and
must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the
congressional policy ." N.L.R.B. v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S.
at 747. Since the Union remained the statutory bargaining
agent on and after October 18, 1967, the unilateral
institution of economic and noneconomic benefits
thereafter was a refusal to bargain in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Mid- West Towel and
Linen Service, Inc., 339 F.2d 958 , 963, 964 (C.A. 7).
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate , and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. RECOMMENDED REMEDY
The Supreme Court has lately said that "the business
of the Board , among other things, is to adjudicate and
remedy unfair labor practices ," and that the "grant of
remedial power is a broad one." N.L.R.B. v. Joseph T.
Strong, d/b/a Strong Roofing & Insulating, 393 U.S.
357. Justice Harlan has written:
The primary purpose of the provision for other
affirmative relief has been held to be to enable the
Board to take measures designed to recreate the
conditions and relationships that would have been had
17he Respondent wrote the Board , "Although we understand that the
Board does not normally process petitions filed within 60 days of the
contract expiration date, we request that the enclosed petition be processed
in view of the unusual circumstances. .."(Emphasis supplied.)
there been no unfair labor practice."
In Republic Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7,
10, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, said:
The remedial purposes of the Act are quite clear. It is
aimed , as the Act says (Sec. 1) at encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and at
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association , of self organization and of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection through their freely chosen
representative . [Emphasis supplied.]
The appropriate remedy which will effectuate the
policies of the Act is deemed to require the restoration of
the status quo ante which the employees would have
enjoyed except for the employers ' misconduct, for a
failure to restore the status quo ante "allows the employer
to retain the fruits of its unfair labor practices ." Beacon
Piece Dyeing and Finishing Co., Inc., 121 NLRB 953,
963. See also N.L.R.B. v. Armco Drainage & Metal
Products, Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (C.A. 6); Piasecki Aircraft
Corporation v. N.L.R. B., 280 F.2d 575, 591 (C.A. 3).
The Respondent in the instant case is presently enjoying
the fruits of its unfair labor practices. It has been
operating and continues to operate its business without
response to a collective -bargaining agent and is currently
enjoying benefits which come by reason of the Union's
forced impotency as a collective-bargaining agent. The
Respondent, by its tactics, has unlawfully interfered with
the balance of bargaining power which the Act anticipates
will be maintained. Moreover , the bargaining impotency
foisted upon the Union and the Employer ' s grant of
benefits, in total disregard of the Union's statutory role,
were and are powerful incentives for discouraging
employees' participation in union activities. On the other
hand , employees lost what benefits may have been gained
through collective bargaining during the period in which
the Respondent refused to assume and fulfill its statutory
duty to bargain . Additionally, by reason of the
Respondent's unfair labor practices , the Union was denied
the opportunity of increasing and retaining its membership
and, by its bargaining with the Respondent , demonstrate
to the employees that it was a satisfactory and desirable
collective-bargaining instrument . The language of the
Board in International Broadcasting Corporation
(KWKH), 99 NLRB 130, 133, seems appropos:
It was the duty of the Respondent to refrain from
disturbing the status quo by coercive conduct pending
the resolution of the representation question, and to
permit the Union to have a free opportunity to increase
and retain its membership by legitimate organizational
activity and to participate in a free and uncoerced
election, which would determine whether or not it was
the statutory representative International
Broadcasting Corporation (KWKH) , 99 NLRB 130,
133.
The Union had the right during the 60 -day insulated
period to press its bargaining prerogatives and the
employees had the right to enjoy any fruits which may
have resulted therefrom . The time open for testing the
majority status of the Union, if need be , was after the
Employer had fulfilled its statutory obligation to bargain
in good faith . Indeed, it may be anticipated that, if
bargaining in good faith had shown promise, employee
adherence to the Union may have been so demonstrated
as to have dispelled Respondent' s alleged good-faith
"Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters [Mechanical Handling
Systems] v. N.L.R. B., 365 U .S. 651, 657.
INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. 493
doubts as to the Union ' s majority status . Hence, the
procedures and practices of collective bargaining would
have been accommodated and the stability in industrial
relations envisioned by the Act maintained for the
Respondent' s plant.
The restoration of the status quo ante compels that the
Respondent be ordered to bargain in good faith at least
during a period equal to that during which the Respondent
unlawfully deprived its employees of the services of their
statutory bargaining agent . Such period was a minimum
of 44 days. (October 18, 1967, to November 30, 1967.)
Thus the Trial Examiner recommends that the
Respondent be required to bargain in good faith in
accordance with the duties imposed by the Act for a
period of 44 days and thereafter (in the event a question
of representation is asserted ) until such time as the Board
has given some indication that the claim has merit. The 44
days shall commence to run upon the Union ' s request for
bargaining but, not later than 10 days after the notice
herein recommended for posting is posted. If the
Employer "dilly- dallies" so as to exhaust the 44 days or
engages in tactics repugnant to the demands of good-faith
bargaining," the order to bargain shall continue until the
Respondent has discharged its statutory duty of good-faith
bargaining.
During the period established for good -faith bargaining,
if an understanding is reached, the understanding shall be
embodied in a signed agreement.
The purpose of the 44-day period referred to above is
to insure that the employees in the appropriate unit will
be accorded the services of their selected
collective-bargaining agent for the period provided by law.
The 44-day period will restore for the Union the time it
had left on October 18, 1967, in which to bargain and
prove the worth of its services prior to a lawful
presentment to the Board of a question of representation.
Thus the Trial Examiner further recommends that, if
Respondent fulfills its duty to bargain in good faith as
herein recommended , the order to bargain herein
recommended shall not constitute a bar to the resolution
of a question of representation , if one exists within the
meaning of the Act and the Board ' s Rules and
Regulations at the expiration of the 44 days."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5).
3. All production , maintenance , and warehouse
employees of Respondent employed at its Crawfordsville,
Indiana, plant and warehouse, exclusive of administrative
executives , salesmen , office clerical employees,
professional employees , foremen, assistant foremen,
guards, and all other supervisors as defined in the Act
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
""An unpretending , sincere intention and effort to arrive at an
agreement is required by statute "; N L.R.B. v. Stanislaus Implement and
Hardware, Ltd., 226 F.2d 377, 380 (C.A. 9). "[G]ood faith bargaining"
requires the parties to negotiate "with a desire to reach agreement,"
N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents ' International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488.
'The Trial Examiner is of the further opinion that the remedy for the
8(ax5) violations of the Act recommended by the Trial Examiner in
Stayer's Johnsonville Meats , Inc., 164 NLRB No. 94, is appropriate in this
case.
4. On October 18, 1967, and at all times thereafter, the
Union has been and is the exclusive representative of all
employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on October 18, 1967, and at all times
thereafter, to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of
Respondent in the appropriate unit, Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. By unilaterally granting wage increases on December
1, 1967, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
7. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case,
it is recommended that the Respondent, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International
Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees
in the following appropriate unit:
All production , maintenance and warehouse employees
of Respondent employed at its Crawfordsville, Indiana
plant and warehouse exclusive of administrative
executives, salesmen , office clerical employees,
professional employees, foremen , assistant foremen,
guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Unlawfully changing unilateral working conditions
of its employees.
(c) Unlawfully interrogating any of its employees.
(d) Unlawfully soliciting its employees to withdraw
their checkoff authorizations to the Union.
(e) Unlawfully engaging in surveillance of its
employees' union activities.
(f) Unlawfully threatening employees that it will not
enter into any contract with the employees' majority
representative.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the
International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all
the employees in the appropriate unit described above
with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment , including
changes in working conditions put into effect on
December 1, 1967, and thereafter and if an understanding
is reached embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
(b) Post at its Crawfordsville , Indiana, plant copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix.""' Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 25, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative , shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
days thereafter , in conspicuous places , including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by
any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in
writing , within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.'6
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other
than those found in this Decision.
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order "
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall he modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form and join or help unions
To bargain as a group through representatives
they choose
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all of these things
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these
rights.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL NOT interfere with the efforts of
International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, to negotiate for or represent as
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the
bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the
above-named Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees in the bargaining
unit described below with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and, other conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The
bargaining unit is:
All production, maintenance and warehouse
employees of Respondent employed at its
Crawfordsville, Indiana plant and warehouse
exclusive of administrative executives, salesmen,
office clerical employees, professional employees,
foremen , assistant foremen , guards and all
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the working
conditions of our employees.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our employees
about their union activities.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of our
em loyees' union activities.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully encourage employees or
persuade them in any manner to revoke any checkoff
authorizations which they have given to the Employer
on behalf of the Union.
All of you are free to become or remain , or refrain
from becoming or remaining , members of any labor
organization.
Dated By
INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, 614 ISTA
Center , 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis , Indiana
46204, Telphone 317-633-8921.