Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJan 23, 1985

273 N.L.R.B. 1540 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

1540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Indiana & Michigan Electric Company and Local Union No. 1392, International Brotherhood Of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 25-CA- 10346 23 January 1985 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS HUNTER AND DENNIS On 17 December 1979 Administrative Law Judge Michael 0. Miller issued the attached deci- sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the judge's decision. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The stipulated facts in brief are as follows. The Union and the Respondent have a collective-bar- gaining agreement which covers, inter alia, the line department of the Respondent's Marion-Muncie Division. This agreement contains an article enti- tled "Mutual Responsibilities," to wit: MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITIES Section 1. It is the mutual desire of both parties hereto to provide for uninterrupted and continuous service; therefore, a. The Company agrees that while this Con- tract is in effect, there shall be no lockout of the Employees of the Company. b. The Union agrees that while this Contract is in effect none of its members will cause, di- rectly or indirectly or participate in any strike, or stoppage of work of the Company. Section 2. The Union agrees that, in the event of a violation (other than lockout) of the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, it will in good faith and without delay publicly dis- avow such violation, exert itself to bring about a quick termination of such violation and insist that the employee or employees involved cease such violation. To that end the Union will promptly take whatever affirmative action is necessary. If the Union has not authorized, participated in or condoned such violation and fulfills its obligations under this paragraph with respect to any such violation, the Compa- ny agrees that it will not sue the Union for any damages resulting from such violation. On 21 August 1978 about 15 employees in the line department engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. The Union's highest official at the divi- sion, Unit Chairman Baldridge, along with two stewards, Maxwell and Ridley, participated in the work stoppage. Baldridge and Maxwell ceased work shortly after the walkout began. Ridley failed to report to work after discovering that the line de- partment employees had left the premises. None of the union officials instigated the work stoppage. On 25 August 16 line employees received sus- pension notices and/or warning slips from the Re- spondent. Baldridge received only a written warn- ing for failing to report to his supervisor before leaving, but was not suspended because the Re- spondent's investigation revealed that his failure to report to work on 21 August was for the purpose of attempting to get the striking employees to return to work. Two employees received 5-day suspensions because they induced other employees to participate in the work stoppage. The remaining employees, except for Maxwell and Ridley, re- ceived 3-day suspensions essentially for participat- ing in the work stoppage. Maxwell and Ridley re- ceived 5-day suspensions for participating in the stoppage in "total disregard of your obligation as a Union Steward." The judge in effect concluded that by holding the union stewards to a higher standard of conduct than other rank-and-file employees the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. We dis- agree. The issue was considered recently by the Su- preme Court in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983). In Metropolitan Edison, the Court held that an employer may impose greater discipline on union officials only when the collec- tive-bargaining agreement and circumstances sur- rounding the collective-bargaining relationship in- dicate the union has waived its officials' Section 7 rights to the extent that the officials have an affirm- ative duty to prevent illegal work stoppages.1 There the parties' collective-bargaining agreement contained a general no-strike/no-lockout clause. Two earlier arbitration awards had interpreted a similar clause as imposing a higher duty on union officials to enforce the no-strike obligation. These arbitration awards, however, were rendered under prior contracts, and the agreement in force at the time of the alleged unfair labor practice contained a provision stating that "[a] decision [by an arbitra- tor] shall be binding . . . for the term of this agree- ment" (emphasis added). 460 U.S. at 709. In this context the Court held that the union had not clearly and explicitly waived the Section 7 rights ' Metropolitan Edison, 460 U S at 698 273 NLRB No. 193 INDIANA & MICHIGAN,ELECTRIC CO. 1541 of its employee officials. Therefore, the employer violated Section 8(a)(3) by disciplining the employ- ee officials for failing or refusing to take affirma- tive steps to end the unlawful work stoppage. While finding that the union had not bound the union officials to enforce the no-strike clause, the' Court concluded that since II-do-strike provisions, central to national labor policy, often have proven difficult to enforce" 2 a "union and an employer reasonably could choose to secure the integrity of a no-strike clause by requiring union officials to take affirmative steps to end unlawful work stop- pages." 3 Indeed, the Court found that a union law- fully may bargain away the statutory protection ac- corded union officials in order to secure gains it considers of more value to its members, and that such contractual obligations promote labor peace and clearly fall within the range of reasonableness accorded bargaining representatives. With regard to the specificity required for a find- ing that a union has waived union officials' rights, the Court found on the record before it that there was no showing that the parties intended to incor-, porate the two prior arbitration decisions into the subsequent agreement, particularly in light of the provision restricting the binding effect of arbitra- tion decisions to the term of the agreement. Ac- cordingly, the Court considered that the general no-strike clause alone was insufficiently clear to constitute a waiver. Nevertheless, the Court stated that arbitration decisions may be relevant to estab- lishing waiver of the statutory right in question either when an arbitrator has stated that the bar- gaining agreement clearly and unmistakably im- poses an explicit duty or when there is a clear and consistent pattern of arbitration decisions which may be said to have been incorporated in subse- quent , agreements. 4 The Court thus held that a waiver may be established by circumstances sur- rounding the collective-bargaining relationship as well as by the language of the agreement itself. "Assessing the clarity with which a party's duties have been defined . . . will require consideration of the specific circumstances of each case." Turning to the instant case, we find a contract clause which unequivocally requires the Union to disavow publicly an unlawful strike and take what- ever affirmative action is necessary to bring about a quick termination of such a strike. To find that this clause imposes no greater duty on union offi- cials than they would have without it would be to misconstrue both the scope and intent of the Su- 2 Id at 707 3 Id at 707 4 Id at 709 fn 13 5 Id at 709 preme Court's opinion in Metropolitan Edison. Nothing in:the Supreme Court's opinion in Metro- politan , Edison or the Third Circuit decision which it affirmed indicates that the courts intended to re- quire specificity with regard to , the naming of union7,officials as opposed to specificity regarding what affirmative action can be expected of the union by:and through its officials in the event of an unlawful- strike. Indeed, all indications are to the contrary.. The Supreme Court defined the question before it as ' follows: "[W]hether an employer unilaterally may define the actions a.union official is required to take to enforce a no-strike clause and penalize him for his failure to comply."- (Emphasis added.) One need only look at the facts in Metropolitan Edison to interpret this statement. There, unlike here, the no-strike clause was merely a general clause which imposed no affirmative obligation on the union. Moreover, the union -officials who were disparately diselplined, unlike those in the instant case, did take conscientious affirmative steps to bring the walkout to an end—though ' not the steps the employer deemed necessary. In particular, the courts focused on the employer's decision that the union officials must-cross the picket line, a requirement the courts regarded as especially problematical for union offi- cials and possibly counterproductive in terms of ending the walkout. Nowhere is there any indica- tion that the courts were concerned with an em- ployer unilaterally determining which officials, if any, should represent the union. That the courts did not express such a concern is not surprising—it has long been well established that a union, like an employer, acts through its agents. 7 Indeed, it would be a radical departure from longstanding precedent to hold that contractual or other obliga- tions imposed on unions or employers must be ex- plicitly designated as the responsibility of specified officials or agents. Nor is it surprising that the courts consistently used the term "union officials" instead of "union" when describing the specificity necessary for a waiver of Section 7 rights. The union'dannot act but through its agents.8 6 Id at 700 3 Indeed, since the 1947 amendments to the Act, Sec 2(2) has defined the term "employer" as including "any person acting as an agent," and Sec 8(b) has applied to acts committed by "a labor organization or its agents" As Senator Taft stated, "What is a labor organization ? It is an organization with officers, exactly like a corporation" 93.Cong Rec 4142 (1947), reprinted in 2 Leg Hist 1026 (LMRA 1948) 8 Although the Board specifies that a union's "officers, agents, and rep- resentatives" are responsible for effectuating the Board's order, this fact is of little relevance since the Board Inserts a similar provision referring to 'officers, agents, successors, and assigns" in its orders against employ- ers And, no one would question seriously the responsibility of an em- ployer's officials for carrying out the employer's obligations, contractual or otherwise See Riley Aeronautics Corp, 178 NLRB 495, 501 (1969) 1542 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Thus, we conclude that the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison found that affirmative action cannot be required of the union and its officials unless such a requirement is bargained for. Never- theless, in our view the Court clearly left open the question of what contractual language would suf- fice to constitute such a waiver. The Court merely held that the general "no-strike" language in that case was not enough. Here, the contract unequivo- cally imposed an affirmative duty to take steps to terminate the unlawful walkout. Since Union Stew- ards Maxwell and Ridley here not only took no action to halt the work stoppage but actually par- ticipated in it, we need not speculate as to what particular language would be necessary to require those union officials to take particular actions. Clearly, Maxwell and Ridley have not fulfilled their contractual obligations even under the most narrow construction of this contract. In view of the foregoing, we find that the Union has clearly assumed the duty to attempt to prevent unlawful strikes and has thereby waived its em- ployee officers' Section 7 protection from the Em- ployer's disparate discipline for failing to do so. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent has not violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by disparately disci- plining Stewards Maxwell and Ridley, and we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER The complaint is dismissed. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MICHAEL 0. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge. This case was heard in Fort Wayne, Indiana, on August 27, 1979, based on an unfair labor practice charge filed on November 13, 1978, by Local Union No 1392, Interna- tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (the Union), and a complaint issued by the Regional Di- rector for Region 25 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) on December 20, 1978 1 The complaint alleges that Indiana & Michigan Elec- tric Company (Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discriminatorily disciplining union stewards for their participation in an unprotected work 1 Pursuant to an Order dated August 3, 1979, this case was consolidat- ed for hearing with Case 25-CA-8593 involving the same parties but dis- tinct issues, and the two cases were presented seriatim However, as reso- lution of the issues involved in Case 25-CA-8593 may potentially be af- fected by, and must therefore await, disposition of the Employer's peti- tion to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in the substantially similar case of Indiana & Michigan Electric Co, 229 NLRB 576 (1977), Supplemental Decision and Order at 235 NLRB 1128 (1978), enfd 599 F 2d 185 (7th Cir 1979), and as the issues of this case arise under Sec 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, affect individual employees, and are subject to immediate resolution, I have determined, sua sponte, to sever the two cases for decisional purposes in order to avoid unnecessary delay stoppage. Respondent, by its timely filed answer, denies the substantive allegations of the complaint. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses, and to argue orally. Briefs were filed by Respondent and the General Counsel and have been carefully considered. On the entire record, including the stipulations entered into by the parties, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AND THE UNION'S LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS—PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Respondent is an Indiana corporation engaged at Fort Wayne, Indiana, and other locations within the States of Indiana and Michigan in the production, sale, and trans- mission of electrical energy as a public utility. Jurisdic- tion is not in issue. The complaint alleges, Respondent has admitted, and I find and conclude that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The complaint alleges, Respondent has admitted, and I find and conclude that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Stipulated Facts The Union represents certain employees of Respond- ent in four separate units, each having its own collective- bargaining agreement. The events involved in this case occurred in Muncie, Indiana, at Respondent's Marion- Muncie Division. The collective-bargaining agreement for Marion- Muncie in effect at the time involved herein provided at article III as follows: MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITIES Section 1. It is the mutual desire of both parties hereto to provide for uninterrupted and continuous service, therefore, a. The Company agrees that while this Contract is in effect, there shall be no lockout of the Employ- ees of the Company. b The Union agrees that while this Contract is in effect none of its members will cause, directly or indirectly or participate in any strike, or stoppage of work of the Company. Section 2. The Union agrees that, in the event of any violation (other than lockout) of the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, It will in good faith and without delay publicly disavow such violation, exert itself to bring about a quick termination of such violation and insist that the employee or em- ployees involved cease such violation. To that end the Union will promptly take whatever affirmative action is necessary. If the Union has not authorized, INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC CO. 1543 participated in or condoned such violation and ful- fills its obligations under this paragraph with re- spect to any such violation, the Company agrees that it will not sue the Union for any damages re- sulting from such violation The Union's highest official at the Marion-Muncie Di- vision was its unit chairman Phillip Bald ridge. Six em- ployees served as union stewards. Baldridge and two of the stewards, Robert Maxwell and Keith Ridley, worked in the line department, the department involved in the in- stant dispute On August 21, 1978, 2 about 15 employees in the line department engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. The work stoppage lasted from 8 a.m. until 7:30 the following morning. Baldndge and Maxwell participated in the work stop- page to the extent that both ceased work and left Re- spondent's premises shortly after the walkout began. Ridley participated to the extent that he failed to report to work at his scheduled starting time on that day after discovering, on his arrival, that the line department em- ployees had left the premises. The work stoppage was not instigated by either Baldndge, Maxwell, or Ridley. On August 25, Respondent issued disciplinary suspen- sion notices and/or warning slips to 16 line department employees (a 17th discipline was issued in error and was subsequently rescinded). Of these, Unit Chairman Bal- dridge received merely a written warning for failing to report to his supervisor before leaving the premises, but no suspension because the Company's investigation re- vealed that his failure to work on August 21 was for the purpose of attempting to secure the return to work of the striking employees Two employees, not union offi- cers or stewards, received 5-day suspensions because the Employer believed that they had induced other employ- ees to participate in the work stoppage. The remaining employees, except for Ridley and Maxwell, received 3- day suspensions for "Participating in a stoppage of work on August 21, 1978, in direct violation of Article III of the Agreement and the Company's Rules of Conduct" Union Stewards Ridley and Maxwell received 5-day sus- pension notices stating: Participating in a stoppage of work on August 21, 1978 in direct violation of Article III of the Agree- ment and the Company's Rules of Conduct. Your participation indicated a total disregard of your ob- ligation as a Union Steward, to uphold the provi- sions of the Agreement to which the Union is a party and to refrain from condoning, by your own actions, the violation of that Agreement. During the investigative interviews conducted with Ridley and Maxwell, Respondent informed them that, as stewards, they had a greater responsibility than the rank- and-file employees to stop an unauthorized work stop- page in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement and to secure the return of the striking employees. Based 2 All dates hereinafter are 1978 unless otherwise spec ified on those interviews, it was stipulated, Respondent had reason to believe that neither Ridley nor Maxwell took any action to secure the return to work of the striking employees. 3 The employees served the suspensions assessed against them. B. The Prior Case The parties stipulated that Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 237 NLRB 226 (1978), enf denied 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir 1979), involved the same parties and the same issue, arising from an earlier unauthorized work stoppage in violation of the collective-agreement at a different loca- tion and in a different bargaining unit 4 In that earlier case, the Board, adopting the administrative law judge's decision, rejected Respondent's contention that "stew- ards and the union officials have a greater responsibility to the Employer than do ordinary rank-and-file members to uphold the collective-bargaining agreement particular- ly Article III, and that Article III should be construed as to set forth that union officials are to be subject to a more severe punishment for breach of same" It refused to require, as urged by Respondent, that the contract should be read so as to require stewards to take positive action to halt unauthorized work stoppages. The Board decision was based on its earlier holding in Precision Castings Co, 233 NLRB 183 (1977). Therein, the Board had stated, at 183-184, as follows: The fact that the disciplined employees participated in an unauthorized strike in breach of a valid con- tract provision does not legitimatize Respondent's action in this situation Respondent's freedom to dis- cipline anyone remained unfettered so long as the criteria employed were not union-related. In the case before us, however, Respondent admits that the reason for selecting these five employees for dis- cipline was that each held the position of shop steward and, therefore, under the terms of the con- tract, could assertedly be held to a greater degree of accountability for participating in the strike. However, discrimination directed against an em- ployee on the basis of his or her holding union office is contrary to the plain meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and would frustrate the policies of the Act if allowed to stand. 3 In a similar unauthorized work stoppage in violation of the contract occurring on April 24, among other employees of the Marion-Muncie Di- vision, all participating employees, including stewards, received warning notices The steward of that department, who participated in the work stoppage, received no greater discipline than the other employees "since the Respondent has reason to believe that the steward took efforts to secure the return to work of striking employees" 4 The only distinguishing factor between that case and the Instant case was that in the "Mutual Responsibilities" article of the contract Involved in the earlier case there was no language requiring the Union to "prompt- ly take whatever affirmative action is necessary to "bring about a quick termination of' a work stoppage in violation of the agreement The arti- cle involved in the earlier case provided that the Union agreed "that the employees covered by this Agreement, or any of them WILL NOT be called upon or permitted to cease or abstain from the continuous per- formance of the duties pertaining to the position held by them with the Company" 1544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD As noted, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement to the Board's Order in the Indiana & Michigan Electric case The court stated (599 F.2d at 232): Differentiating between union officers and rank- and-file in meting out discipline for participating in a clearly illegal strike did not penalize or deter the exercise of any protected employee right. We be- lieve the employer was entitled to take into account the union officials' greater responsibility and hence greater fault, and that the resulting different treat- ment of union officials could not be reasonably con- sidered inherently destructive of important employ- ee rights The Board did not seek certiorari review in the Supreme Court. C. Analysis and Conclusions The Board has repeatedly stated, "Under [our] consist- ent policy it is the Administrative Law Judge's duty to apply established Board precedent which the Board or the Supreme Court has not reversed." Club Cal-Neva, 231 NLRB 22, 23 fn. 5 (1977), and cases cited therein. See also Ford Motor Co., 230 NLRB 716 (1977), 5 where the Board, at 718 fn. 12, stated: By relying on U.S. court of appeals' decisions which are contrary to applicable Board precedent, the Administrative Law Judge in this case has com- mitted an error. It is not for an Administrative Law Judge to speculate as to what course the Board should or would follow where a circuit court has expressed disagreement with the Board's views. That is the province of the Board alone. It remains the Administrative Law Judge's duty to apply es- tablished Board precedent which the Supreme Court or the Board has not reversed I am therefore bound to follow the relevant Board precedent on the issues raised herein. While, as noted, the Board in the earlier case herein found Precision Castings controlling and determinative of an 8(a)(3) and (1) violation, Respondent contends that the Board's most recent decision on this question, Mid- west Precision Castings Co., 244 NLRB 597 (1979), evi- dences a modification of the Board view. Respondent argues, based on that latter case, that "all members of the Board now appear to recognize that a union steward may, under appropriate circumstances, be held to 'a higher standard of conduct than rank-and-file employ- ees." I cannot agree that this is the import of Midwest Precision Castings. The Board expressly distinguished the steward's conduct in that case from the conduct of the union officers in both Precision Castings and Gould Co., 237 NLRB 881 (1978). In Midwest Precision Castings the Board specifically found that the steward "urged support of and sought to induce employee participation in an un- authorized, illegal work slowdown" and held that the 5 Both Club Cal-Neva and Ford Motor Involved decisions of the circuit courts of appeals for the circuits in which the employers' facilities were located employer did not violate Section 8(a)(1) or (3) of the Act by disciplining the steward for engaging in such conduct. No such involvement existed in the original Precision Castings case or in the Gould case and none exists herein. I must therefore conclude that this case is governed by the Board decisions and rationale in Precision Castings and Gould. In the instant case, unlike the situation in the prior In- diana & Michigan case, the contract provided that "the Union will promptly take whatever affirmative action is necessary" to bring about a quick termination of any vio- lation of the no-strike, no-work-stoppage clause. That language is similar to the contract language involved in Precision Castings, supra, which required the union to "take all reasonable steps to restore normal operations" in the event of a work stoppage. It is less precise than the language contained in the Gould contract, which spe- cifically provided that the union, its officers, and repre- sentatives should immediately order employees partici- pating in an unlawful work stoppage to return to work. The Board in both Precision Castings and Gould held that the greater discipline assessed upon the union officers was not validated by such contractual provisions. In Gould it stated: The contract is binding between the Employer and the Union, but does not grant the Employer the power to enforce it by discharging union officials. The Employer's recourse is against the union entity rather than against the individuals who serve the unit by holding union office. Employer self-help against individual union officials for a union's breach of contract can only undermine the peaceful settling of disputes and clears a path for employer intervention in a union's internal affairs in a way that is specifically barred to unions in the corollary situation by Section 8(b)(1)(B), which prohibits re- straint or coercion of an employer in the selection of his representatives for collective bargaining or adjusting grievances. That rationale is specifically supported by the contract language involved herein, which provides: "If the Union has not authorized, participated in or condoned such vio- lation and fulfills its obligations under this paragraph with respect to any such violation, the Company agrees that it will not sue the Union for any damages resulting from such violation." It is implicit from such contract language that the contemplated recourse available to the Employer for breach of the Union's no-strike obligations is through the courts in an action against the Union, as an entity, and not in such self-help measures as Employ- er-imposed discipline on union officers and stewards. It is axiomatic that organizations, such as labor unions, must have officers in order to function. Individuals assume the responsibilities of organizational office ex- pecting to shoulder certain burdens and to denve certain tangible and intangible benefits from the organization. In so doing, they subject themselves to the discipline of the organization. They should not have to fear that those with whom they must deal as representatives of their or- ganization will similarly have the power to unilaterally INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC CO. 1545 impose discipline. The Board has recognized this, stating (in the context of grievance processing) that the master- servant relationship does not carry over to the dealings between the employer and the employee when the em- ployee is acting as a union representative; at such times, there are only company representatives on the one side and union representatives on the other. See Crown Cen- tral Petroleum Corp., 177 NLRB 322, 323 fn. 4 (1969). The possibility that an employee might suffer a penalty exacted out of his or her job tenure for what an employ- er perceives to be a misuse of union office or a breach of its contract with the union would, I am convinced, act as a powerful deterrent to an employee's willingness to assume or actively pursue a leadership role in a union. Accordingly, I find that by holding union officers and stewards to a higher standard of conduct than other, rank-and-file, employees, and by disciplining Maxwell and Ridley more severely than it disciplined rank-and-file employees who engaged in identical improper conduct, Respondent has discriminated against them because of their roles in the Union and has necessarily discouraged employees from holding union office. Such conduct is in- herently discriminatory and destructive of important Sec- tion 7 rights and, even absent any showing of specific union animus, violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailer, 388 U.S. 26 (1967), and NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967). See also Crown Central Petroleum Corp., supra. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW who participated in the August 21, 1978 violation of the contractual no-strike provision, because said Robert Maxwell and Keith Ridley were stewards for Local Union No. 1392, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 2. The unfair labor practice enumerated above is an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY It having been found that Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, it will be recommended that Re- spondent be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that Respondent discriminatorily assigned greater discipline to Robert Maxwell and Keith Ridley by suspending them for longer periods of time than other employees who participated in the work stop- page of August 21, 1978, Respondent shall be required to make them whole for any loss of pay they suffered by reason of this discrimination. Any backpay found to be due shall be computed, with interest, in the manner pre- scribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).6 [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 1. By giving more severe discipline to Robert Maxwell and Keith Ridley than was given to other employees 6 See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).