E-082158
Decided by the Board February 11, 1954
Constitutional psychopathic inferiority — Public charge within 5 years after entry — Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.
(1) For immigration purposes, the development of a psychosis is not to be taken as conclusive evidence that the condition is a hereditary or constitutional matter. It is necessary to determine whether the mental breakdown occurred from proximate causes or whether the life history reveals an abnormal person who can properly be excluded or deported as one who was of constitutional psychopathic inferiority at the time of entry or mentally defective.
(2) Where it is established that insanity occurred for the first time after entry apparently as the result of mental stress and organic change after entry, the respondent is not deportable as a person who has become a public charge within 5 years after entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen after entry.
CHARGES:
Warrant: Act of 1917 — Public charge within 5 years after entry.
Act of 1917 — Constitutional psychopathic inferiority at time of entry.
Act of 1917 — Likely to become a public charge at time of entry.
BEFORE THE BOARD
Discussion: Appeal from the order of the special inquiry officer finding respondent deportable only on the first charge set forth above; denying her application for suspension of deportation; and granting voluntary departure.
The sole issue before us is whether the respondent became a public charges within 5 years after entry for causes not affirmatively shown by her to have arisen subsequent to her entry into the United States. The charge that respondent was a person of constitutional psychopathic inferiority at the time of entry and one likely then to become a public charge were not sustained by the special inquiry officer.
In December 1941, respondent was confined to a mental institution maintained by the State of New York at public expense. Her condition is diagnosed as dementia praecox, paranoid type.
Respondent is a 33-year-old single female, a native and last a citizen of Germany, allegedly now stateless, whose only entry occurred in 1939 when she was admitted for permanent residence together with her father, mother, and brother. The record establishes by substantial evidence, including the affidavit of a physician who knew respondent and her family from the time of her birth and maintained a social and professional relationship with her until 1940; and an affidavit of a woman, now in the United States, with whom respondent resided for 5 years prior to her entry into the United States, that respondent had never shown any signs or symptoms of mental illness or peculiarities abroad or in the United States until the onset of her present illness and that she appeared, until that time, to be a healthy normal person. Respondent was an honor student in high school; she earned her livelihood since she was 14 years of age; and her employers abroad have given her high praise. No member of her family has ever been confined to a mental institution and her first confinement occurred in December 1941 when she was admitted to a mental institution maintained by the State of New York at public expense. Her employer in the United States for 10 months starting in 1940 gave it as his unqualified opinion that during the period she was employed by him, she appeared normal.
Certification by the United States Public Health Service and the State of New York reveals that respondent cannot be certified as being a person of constitutional psychopathic inferiority at the time of her entry. The State certification shows the following in connection with the cause of her affliction:
Patient was a refugee from Germany and living in a strange country under strange conditions with a new language undoubtedly contributed to patient's breakdown.
The State certification further shows that about 1940, respondent's menstrual period became irregular and that she became nervous and upset.
Respondent's latest reports reveal that she has had two lobotomy operations and her prognosis is fair and guarded. She was released on a trial visit of 4 days in December 1952 and counsel states that she has now been discharged in the care and custody of her parents with whom she now resides. Her brother is now a citizen of the United States. He served in the Armed Forces of this country for 4 years and was honorably discharged. Abroad, respondent has a 72-year-old aunt.
Until March 1945, respondent's parents, who speak no English, were of the opinion that the costs of hospitalization were being paid by a refugee service. They state that no demand for payment was made upon them prior to April 1945. While there is some evidence to the contrary, the latest report of the unit charged with responsibility for receiving payment states that maintenance charges were not established prior to April 1945 when the State and the respondent's parents entered into an agreement whereby the sum of $225 was made payable to the State to be applied toward "hospitalization indebtedness incurred by" respondent; and her parents agreed to pay $30 a month for her maintenance. Such maintenance appears to have been paid until at least April 1952. By notice dated August 21, 1952, respondent's father was informed that the State had canceled in full the charges for the cost of her care and treatment and had also discontinued future charges. The State reserved the right to collect in the future.
Counsel contends that respondent is not deportable because she has affirmatively established that her condition arose from causes subsequent to her entry. He questions whether proper demand for payment was made prior to 1945 and urges that proceedings be canceled since there was payment after due demand; and finally believes proceedings should be terminated on the ground that the entire indebtedness has been canceled.
If the development of a psychosis is to be taken as conclusive evidence that the condition is a hereditary or constitutional matter, then there could never be shown that the condition arose from causes arising after an alien's entry into the United States. For, whatever was shown as contributing to the breakdown, could merely be regarded as being merged in the real cause — the predisposition to insanity. Such an interpretation, whether or not it commands medical respect, is obviously not what was intended by Congress. Congress did provide that if the life history revealed an abnormal person, that person could properly be excluded or deported as one who was of constitutional psychopathic inferiority at time of entry or mentally defective. But, Congress afforded the alien who had become a public charge the opportunity to show that the condition which made him a public charge arose as a result of circumstances which occurred after his entry. In the view adopted by Congress, therefore, it is the proximate cause that is the important factor and our search into the past of the alien is one to determine whether the grounds urged by the alien as being the proximate causes are in fact such.
Insanity is a legal term rather than a medical diagnosis (Public Health Service Manual for Medical Examination of Aliens, pt. II-1-4.
Insanity is expressly mentioned as one of these conditions (p. 12, S. Rept. 335, 63d Cong., 2d sess., March 17, 1914, referred to in S. Rept. 352, 64th Cong., 2d sess., April 17, 1916, to accompany H.R. 10384).
We believe that on this record, the respondent has successfully established that the cause of her condition arose subsequent to her entry. Despite the fact that her life abroad appears marked with considerable tension involving conflict with the Nazis and separation from her fiance, she revealed no sign of abnormality. After her entry, she behaved normally. Insanity occurred for the first time in her life only after entry and the record reveals that her condition appears to be the result of the mental stress and organic change after her entry. The proceedings will therefore be terminated. In view of our action, we need not further discuss the claim that no debt now exists which would make the respondent a public charge.
Order: It is ordered that the proceedings be and the same are hereby terminated.