In the Matter of S

Board of Immigration AppealsJun 11, 1953
5 I&N Dec. 289 (B.I.A. 1953)

VP 17-882

Decided by the Board June 11, 1953

Visa petition — Section 205, Immigration and Nationality Act — Adopted child — Section 101 (b) (1), Immigration and Nationality Act — Ineligible to nonquota status under section 101 (a) (27) (A), Immigration and Nationality Act.

There is no provision in the definition of the term "child" in section 101 (b) (1) as used in titles I and II of the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding adopted children. Adoption proceedings do not confer the status of legitimacy for immigration purposes when the adopting party is other than a natural parent. Therefore, a child adopted by an individual who is not his natural father is not eligible for nonquota status under section 101 (a) (27) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

BEFORE THE BOARD


Discussion: The case comes forward on appeal from the order dated March 17, 1953, of the District Director, Honolulu, T.H., denying the petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary.

The record sets forth that the citizen petitioner, a member of the armed forces of the United States, married the mother of the beneficiary on December 18, 1952, at Kobe, Honshu, Japan, but that the beneficiary, the wife's child, was born out of wedlock on March 24, 1949. The beneficiary is an illegitimate child. A child born out of wedlock prior to the marriage of the mother to a citizen of the United States is not a "stepchild" within the meaning of section 101 (b) (1) (B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Matter of M----, 0300-433026, Int. Dec. No. 441 (A.G., June 2, 1953).

In connection with the appeal the petitioner sets forth that he legally adopted the beneficiary in the Kobe Family Court in Japan on February 20, 1953; and that pursuant to Article 860 of the Civil Code of Japan, an adopted child acquires the status of a legitimate child of the adoptive parent(s) as from the day of adoption. While the Civil Code of Japan is not available to us, there is no provision in the definition of the term "child" in section 101 (b) (1) as used in titles I and II of the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding adopted children. There is no claim that the petitioner is the natural father of the beneficiary, and while the adoption proceedings may confer the status of legitimacy as to the natural parent, we are unaware that it can do so for immigration purposes as to the other parent. Accordingly, the beneficiary does not appear to qualify for nonquota immigrant status under title I, section 101 (a) (27) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The beneficiary would appear to be within the holding of the Attorney General in Matter of M----, supra, despite the adoption, and cannot be regarded as a stepchild within the meaning of section 101 (b) (1) (B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act or as a legitimate child within the provisions of section 101 (b) (1) (A) of that act. Inasmuch as the alleged son does not appear to be entitled to nonquota status, the appeal will be dismissed.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.