0606/62399.
Decided by Board September 10, 1954.
Inadmissibility — Section 212 (a) (19) of Immigration and Nationality Act — Applications for extension of stay not "other documentation" within the meaning of that section.
The phrase "or other documentation" in section 212 (a) (19) of the Immigration and Nationality Act refers to documents required at the time of an alien's application for admission to the United States, as for example, a reentry permit, border-crossing identification card or United States passport fraudulently obtained. Applications for extension of stay are not "documentation" within the meaning of that section.
EXCLUDED:
Act of 1952 — Admits committing acts which constitute essential elements of a crime — 18 U.S.C. 1001.
Act of 1952 — Procured documentation by fraud or misrepresentation.
BEFORE THE BOARD
Discussion: This case is before us on appeal from the decision of a special inquiry officer on August 16, 1954, excluding the appellant on the grounds stated above.
The appellant is a 19-year-old male, native and citizen of Cuba, who applied for admission for permanent residence on August 6, 1954, at which time he was in possession of a valid passport and a nonquota immigrant visa. The two grounds for exclusion stem from the fact that the appellant, during a previous sojourn in the United States as a visitor for pleasure from September 1953 to July 8, 1954, had been employed for a major portion of that period but had stated in two applications for extension of stay that he had not been employed.
We have carefully considered the representations of counsel in his brief on appeal. He contends that the appellant cannot read or speak English; that he did not know what statements appeared in the applications for extension of stay but merely signed them; that one application was prepared by an attorney and the other by a friend of the family; and that the appellant was not aware that the applications contained statements that he had not been employed in the United States. It appears that the appellant's mother was then also in the United States as a temporary visitor; that she and the appellant had their applications prepared at the same time; that she paid the filing fees for all of the applications as well as the fee of the attorney who prepared the applications about November 4, 1953; and that the appellant, who was then 18 years of age, relied upon his mother who appeared as a witness on his behalf.
The special inquiry officer's first conclusion of law is that the appellant is excludable under section 212 (a) (9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because he admits having committed the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the crime is indicated as that set forth in the last clause of 18 U.S.C. 1001, namley, "* * * makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, * * *." The special inquiry officer did not believe the appellant's claim that he did not know his applications for extension of temporary stay contained the statement that he was not employed. We need not express an opinion as to the factual question, that is, whether the appellant did or did not know that this statement was contained in each of his applications. One of the essential elements of the crime set forth in the last clause of 18 U.S.C. 1001 is knowledge of the falsity of the statement. Since the appellant has made no admission that he knew that his applications contained this false statement, he is not inadmissible under section 212 (a) (9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
With respect to the remaining ground of excludability, the special inquiry officer relied on that portion of section 212 (a) (19) which reads, "Any alien who * * * has procured a visa or other documentation * * * by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact." He held that the two applications for extension of temporary stay became "documentations" when approved by the appropriate immigration officer. We do not agree with this interpretation and hold that the phrase "or other documentation" in section 212 (a) (19) refers to documents required at the time of an alien's application for admission to the United States, as for example, a reentry permit, border-crossing identification card or a fraudulently obtained United States passport. The applications for extension of stay are not "documentation" and the appellant is, therefore, not excludable under section 212 (a) (19). Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained.
Order: It is ordered that the appeal be sustained and that the alien be admitted for permanent residence.