A-6429531
Decided by Board February 11, 1949 Decided by Attorney General June 21, 1949
Suspension of deportation — Section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended — Discretion — Grant of motion under 8 C.F.R. 90.11 (b) by Board of Immigration Appeals is discretionary.
1. In cases of recently arrived aliens, a marriage to a United States citizen or legal resident entered into after the institution of deportation proceedings does not justify the exercise of discretion in granting suspension of deportation.
2. A motion to reopen deportation hearing (under 8 C.F.R. 90.11 (b)) to permit application for suspension of deportation may be denied where no further hearing is deemed warranted because on the facts of record and those alleged in the motion proceedings the favorable exercise of discretion to grant suspension of deportation is not indicated.
3. A motion to reopen a hearing to permit application for suspension of deportation was denied in the case of an alien who came here in October 1946, was admitted as a visitor for 3 months, received permission to extend his visit to February 1948, violated his visitor's status by working as laborer in January 1947, was ordered deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in March 1948, was permitted to depart voluntarily by the Board of Immigration Appeals in June 1948 (instead of being deported) and married a citizen of the United States on July 26, 1948. (It was stated he had known the woman since January 1947, she had secured a divorce on June 7, 1948, he hoped to make a good home for her and her two minor children and this "marriage was not solely just "to keep" him in the United States.)
CHARGE:
Warrant: Act of 1924 — Failure to maintain status of visitor.
BEFORE THE BOARD
Discussion: This case is before us now on a motion filed by the alien asking that he be granted suspension of deportation because of his marriage on July 26, 1948, to a citizen of the United States.
The alien was admitted to the United States on October 1, 1946, at Norfolk, Va., as a visitor for 3 months. This admission was later extended to February 1, 1948. According to the alien's testimony he came here to study, to do research in geology and to recuperate from an overwrought condition resulting from war experiences. It is asserted he went "underground" rather than comply with a Gestapo order requiring every student in the Netherlands to sign a pledge of loyalty to Germany. In January 1947, 3 months after arrival, the alien accepted employment in the United States as a laborer, thus violating the conditions of his admission and rendering him subject to deportation.
After a hearing accorded the alien under a warrant of arrest, while finding him deportable because of failure to maintain a visitor's status, the presiding inspector proposed that voluntary departure within 60 days be granted. The Acting Commissioner, on March 25, 1948, approved the findings of the presiding inspector as to deportability, but disagreed in regard to granting discretionary relief and ordered the alien's deportation to the Netherlands. On appeal to us on June 14, 1948, we granted voluntary departure within 90 days of notification of decision.
As previously indicated, the alien now wants suspension of deportation rather than voluntary departure. The motion includes a photostat copy of a marriage certificate showing the alien's marriage to M---- O---- at Reno, Nev., on July 26, 1948. Birth certificate of the wife is not filed but from correspondence in the record it is said she was born in Nebraska City, Nebr., on February 24, 1905. The alien was born in Soengei Doday, Netherlands East Indies, on April 12, 1921. He is of the Dutch race and is chargeable to the quota of the Netherlands.
From correspondence in the record, it appears that the alien's wife was previously married and secured a divorce on June 7, 1948, about a month and half prior to her marriage to the alien. She had two sons by her prior marriage, now 14 and 13 years old, who are with her. The alien says that he has known his wife since January 1947. He expresses the hope that he will be able to make a good home for her and her sons.
The Board has taken the position that in cases of recently arrived aliens a marriage entered into after the institution of deportation proceedings does not justify suspension of deportation. Unless there is adherence to this policy, effective administration of the immigration laws will be seriously impeded. If after a recent entry into the United States an alien can look forward to legal permanent residence if successful in marrying an American girl, we must expect an increasing wave of aliens securing admission to the United States as nonimmigrants — visitor, etc., or illegally, hoping in their cases too an American girl can be found who will marry them and thus solve their immigration problems. That the alien in this case was aware that if he married a citizen of the United States his immigration status would be helped is evidence by the following excerpt from his motion, "I further wish to state that I have known my wife since January 1947 (the wife did not secure a divorce until June 7, 1948), and that my marriage was not solely just to keep me in the United States."
We conclude, therefore, to deny reopening of this case to receive an application for suspension of deportation. The alien was given voluntary departure on June 14, 1948. There is some indication that he was considering going to Mexico. We will assume that the alien was duly appreciative of the leniency heretofore extended to him and that he has been making arrangements diligently to effect his departure. Now, as the husband of a citizen, he is entitled to a preference under the quota. According to the latest information we have from the Department of State, no waiting period is involved for applicants for first preference quota visas under the Netherlands quota. We will, however, extend the period of voluntary departure for 90 days.
Our attention has been called to dictum in the recent decision of Judge Swygert in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana in the case of Kavadias v. Cross, decided November 3, 1948 ( 82 F. Supp. 716), in support of the proposition that we are required to direct a rehearing to consider suspension of deportation before an immigrant inspector in any case where an application therefor is made, based on a marriage after the original deportation hearing. In that case a rehearing to take testimony in support of an application for suspension of deportation because of a recent marriage was refused by this Board. The court denied the application for a writ of habeas corpus pointing out that the alien had not proved good moral character during the past 5 years.
The regulations permit an alien at any time to file a motion with this Board for reconsideration or reopening of a case (sec. 90.11 (b), title 8, Code of Federal Regulations). The grant of the motion is discretionary with us. Nowhere in the regulations does an alien have a right to a rehearing at the Immigrant Inspector level. We feel that the court in the Kavadias case was concerned primarily with substantive rights, not procedures, and was in effect saying that the alien was entitled to present an application for suspension of deportation, based on the change in his status, to the authority having power of decision, and that a decision on the application must be made "honestly and in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously."
The conclusion we have reached is in accord with the recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Zabadlija v. Garfinkel, decided January 27, 1949 (173 F. (2d) 222). The court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment of the district court ( 77 F. Supp. 751) in discharging the writ of habeas corpus, and in its opinion approved of the Kavadias ruling. The Zabadlija case involved a situation similar to that now before us. That alien effected admission to this country as a transit and remained. He was found subject to deportation. No issue of good moral character was raised. After the deportation hearing, he married a resident alien. A motion was made to this Board to reopen the hearing on the ground that his marriage made him eligible for discretionary relief under section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917. As pointed out by the court, this Board denied the motion, saying: "Upon further consideration of the record, we are of the opinion that no useful purpose could be served by reopening, notwithstanding the respondent's marriage to an alleged lawfully resident alien." In its opinion, the district court stated:
It is plain that the relator was unlawfully in this country on a fraudulent visa; and it is equally plain that he appealed to the Board of Appeals for the exercise of its discretionary power. It is not for the court, when a statute has conferred such power on an executive department, to attempt to interfere with the exercise of it.
We are concerned primarily with substantive rights, and involved procedures should be avoided where permissible. If a rehearing before an immigrant inspector were directed, the procedure applicable in a new deportation hearing would have to be followed. Testimony would be taken which would establish what in substance is now before us, since the regulations (sec. 90.11 (b), title 8, Code of Federal Regulations) require that "a motion to reopen shall state the new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material." Then the hearing officer prepares his discussion of the evidence, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law which are served on the alien or his counsel with opportunity to file answer thereto. After a review at the field district headquarters, the case is forwarded to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. He considers the entire record and makes his decision. If unfavorable to the alien (and that is inevitable on past precedents, both of the Commissioner and of this Board) an appeal lies to this Board. Thus, after going through this involved procedure we would have a record containing the same basic facts as now before us and the same problem to decide. If we are not today prepared to authorize suspension of deportation on the facts established in the record and alleged in the motion, a further hearing before an immigrant inspector is entirely unwarranted. A hearing before an immigrant inspector would be justified only if we are prepared to grant suspension if the facts alleged in the motion can be supported adequately at the hearing.
It is ordered, That the motion to reopen the case to receive an application for suspension of deportation be denied.
It is further ordered, That the order of this Board of June 14, 1948, be amended to extend the period of voluntary departure for a period of 90 days from notification of this decision, conditioned upon consent of surety, under bond.
The decision and order of the majority of the Board of Immigration Appeals dated February 11, 1949, are hereby approved.
I disagree with the decision of the majority in the above-named case and I am of the opinion that the proceedings should be reopened to permit the respondent to file an application for suspension of deportation. Section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended July 1, 1948, Public Law 863, permits suspension of deportation where "such deportation would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen * * * who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien." The respondent is the spouse of a citizen of the United States and has two minor stepchildren, whom he is supporting. This marriage occurred on July 26, 1948. His wife has two minor citizen children of a prior marriage. It is obvious therefore, that respondent is eligible under the statute for suspension of deportation. That he should be permitted so to apply, in my opinion, is something that this Board should permit as a matter of course. In support of this view, I desire to refer to the recent Kavadias case No. 904 Civil, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, file A-5052962 (56081/104), in which the court stated that ( 82 F. Supp. 716):
But regardless of this, it would seem that the Board of Immigration Appeals would necessarily have to consider this motion and exercise the discretion allowed in suspension applications "honestly and in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously." U.S. ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, ( 166 F. (2d) 369). And this is so despite the fact that at the time of his marriage the petitioner was and had been for many years fully aware of the deportation order. The statute fixes no time limit within which the Attorney General or his delegate must invoke his discretionary power to suspend the deportation of an alien. And if, as has already been indicated, an alien has the right to have his application for suspension considered and determined on an equitable basis, this right abides with the alien throughout the deportation process.
The majority in its opinion has gone into great detail in an effort to show that it has complied with the decision of the court in the Kavadias case. Its contention is to the effect that consideration of the motion to reopen was sufficient in that respect. In support thereof it states in effect that the motion contained all the information that was needed to decide whether the respondent should or should not be granted suspension of deportation and that to grant a reopening of the hearing to permit an application for suspension to be filed would be giving emphasis to form instead of substance.
It is presumed that the majority in so doing concedes to the principle expressed by the court that "respondent is entitled to have his application for suspension of deportation considered at any time throughout the deportation process."
That this was not what was intended by the court is indicated where it stated that:
In the instant proceeding, no hearing was conducted in connection with the petitioner's request that his deportation be suspended under the provisions of section 155 (c). It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether the petitioner, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, had a right to the use of the administrative proceeding provided by the regulations and whether the Board abused its discretion by denying the petitioner's motion of reconsideration of his deportation order without first giving the petitioner a right to substantiate at a hearing the matters contained in his motion."
Thereafter the court pointed out that respondent had had a deportation hearing but had not applied for suspension of deportation under the provisions of section 155 (c) because since he was at that time single, he was not eligible therefor, but it then goes on to state that regardless of when during the deportation process respondent was married:
And if, as has already been indicated, an alien has the right to have his application for suspension considered and determined on an equitable basis, this right abides with the alien throughout the deportation process.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the court did not have in mind that mere consideration by this Board of a motion to reopen would be sufficient. What it had in mind was a hearing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service at which time the respondent would have full opportunity to present all of his evidence not only in substantiation of his marriage but also with regard to the bona fides and good faith thereof and other essential elements which would permit us intelligently to reach a decision whether the case contained such merit as would justify suspension of deportation as contemplated by Congress.
Section 90.11 (b), title 8, Code of Federal Regulations — "A motion to reopen shall state the new facts to be presented at the reopened hearing and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material." The same procedure is outlined in paragraph 150.8 and thereafter the procedure outlined in paragraph 150.10 will apply.
Although the court denied the petition in the Kavadias case, such petition was denied on the ground that in the court's opinion this Board had reached its conclusion on the basis that respondent lacked good moral character and this being true no purpose would be served in reopening to consider respondent's eligibility for suspension of deportation. In the instant case no question of lack of good moral character has been raised by the majority. Therefore, it is presumed to be conceded.
The basis for the majority's denial of respondent's motion to reopen in order that he may present evidence as to his eligibility for suspension of deportation is contained in the fourth paragraph on page 2, which I quote:
The Board has taken the position that in cases of recently arrived aliens a marriage entered into after the institution of deportation proceedings does not justify suspension of deportation. Unless there is adherence to this policy, effective administration of the immigration laws will be seriously impeded. If after a recent entry into the United States an alien can look forward to legal permanent residence if successful in marrying an American girl, we must expect an increasing wave of aliens securing admission to the United States as nonimmigrants — visitors, etc., or illegally, hoping in their cases too an American girl can be found who will marry them and thus solve their immigration problems. That the alien in this case was aware that if he married a citizen of the United States his immigration status would be helped is evidence by the following excerpt from his motion, "I further wish to state that I have known my wife since January 1947 (the wife did not secure a divorce until June 7, 1948), and that my marriage was not solely just to keep me in the United States."
In my opinion this reasoning of the majority is not well taken. Congress in enacting this legislation stated nothing therein nor was anything stated in the discussion and debate preceding the enactment thereof which would justify the conclusion of the majority that it can arbitrarily and without even permitting presentation of the evidence deny to a certain group the privilege of making application for a remedy so clearly and plainly granted by the Congress. Nor in my opinion does the trend in our present immigration policy justify the position taken by the majority. We are today admitting many displaced persons, a considerable portion of whom have no ties in the United States, who are no worse off than some of these aliens who have recently acquired citizen wives. This is done due to war conditions which are equally applicable to the respondent in this proceeding. But despite this the majority's decision would deny to a native born citizen woman and her minor children her right to maintenance and the company of her alien husband solely on the ground that he but recently entered the United States. In other words, the decision of the majority proposes in effect to punish the respondent for having married an American citizen. That this is true is indicated in the discussion of the first paragraph of page 492 of the majority decision, where it is pointed out that respondent having preference under the quota and since it is alleged that there is no waiting list involved for the quota for his country, he would be able to return promptly to the United States. Presumably under this reasoning, respondent would be permitted to return to this country shortly, the punishment consisting of him having to absent himself for the period of time necessary to secure a visa and with a considerable financial outlay involved, an outlay which a man in his position with a citizen wife and two citizen children to maintain can ill afford to pay. The majority in the paragraph cited, supra, alleges that it is necessary to take this action to prevent aliens from entering the United States temporarily solely with the view of securing American wives in order that they may circumvent our immigration laws, but, if as here such alien in so marrying can immediately secure a preference status which will permit him promptly to return to the United States, provided he is a citizen of those countries wherein the quota is not preempted, I fail to see where denial of suspension of deportation under the provisions of section 19 (c), supra, will act as a deterrent to this practice.
There is nothing in our past immigration policy which justifies the attitude taken by the majority. In fact, as was stated by the Attorney General in the case of L---- (56019/808), Immigration and Naturalization Decisions, volume I, at page 5, in discussing a similar situation where a condition could have been corrected at the time the alien applied for admission to the United States but was not and who was at that time in the United States: (1, I. N. Dec. 5.)
If I were to hold that the time for an exercise of my discretion has therefore passed, respondent will be compelled to leave the country and thereafter to apply for admission in order to be able to present his appeal in a subsequent exclusion proceeding. * * * I cannot conclude that Congress intended the immigration laws to operate in so capricious and whimsical a fashion. * * * No policy of Congress could possibly be served by such irrational result. * * * To require him to go to Canada and reenter will make him no better resident of this country.
This is not an isolated case confronting the Board. There have been many such during the past several months which have greatly troubled us. That some of them were born in fraud has been apparent but that many of them are in the utmost good faith is to me likewise apparent. No small number involved aliens from countries where the quota is preempted for years to come, where in effect even a requirement of voluntary departure would have the practical result of permanently breaking up the marriage of an American citizen woman. However, the majority of the Board has made no distinction. Its policy has been adamant, to wit: That it will not in these cases reopen to permit filing for an application for suspension of deportation. The most it has permitted has been voluntary departure without the issuance of an order of deportation. The only exceptions have been in one or two cases where evidence was submitted that the citizen wife was pregnant. It is my opinion that the action of the majority of this Board in denying to a group as in the instant case the privilege of filing an application for suspension of deportation is not an exercise of its power of decision as stated in the Kavadias case: "honestly and in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously." The majority has stated that in addition to the reasons cited in this memorandum that these cases are too susceptible to fraud to permit an intelligent decision as to the marriages that are bona fide and as to those that are born in deception. With this I take sharp issue. I firmly believe that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, through its competent and skilled officers, can and will separate those that are fraudulent from those that are bona fide. And, if as indicated by the majority, they are conceived in fraud, why should even voluntary departure be granted? Certainly that is no deterrent, particularly for nationals of countries where the quota preference for husbands of American citizens is open. As stated by the court in the Kavadias case, supra, I believe that "if as has already been indicated an alien has the right to have his application for suspension considered and determined on an equitable basis, this right abides with the alien throughout the deportation process." It is submitted that the only way in which this application may be "considered and determined on an equitable basis" is to reopen the hearing and permit such application.
I note the citation of the majority of the recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Zabadlija v. Garfinkel (173 F. (2d) 222). Contrary to the belief of the majority, it is obvious that the district court in the Zabadlija case rested its decision on the belief that the refusal of the Board to reopen the case was based on the fact "that the relator was unlawfully in this country on a fraudulent visa," which in the court's opinion in itself would justify the Board in denying discretionary relief. See also the decision of Judge John W. Clancy, in the case of Migg v. Watkins, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Civ. 47/161, dated December 15, 1948 (as yet unreported), wherein the court stated:
"Whether this plaintiff be German, Austrian, or Italian or any other citizenship or nationality, he was entitled to apply for a continuation of the suspension of his deportation and the Department is forbidden by law to make or maintain an arbitrary determination of the issues involved in such an appeal. They are: (1) Whether or not his deportation would work economic detriment to citizen relatives; and (2) whether or not he was of good character during the 5 preceding years (8 U.S.C.A. 155 (c))."
See also United States v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643, where the court stated with regard to the refusal of the Commissioner to admit an alien to bond in order that he might pursue an application for a pardon which would prevent his deportation that:
"On all the facts here present we cannot help but conclude that the action of the Service in denying petitioner's application is arbitrary, capricious, and unwarranted. Such denial is an abuse of discretion and should be corrected by judicial action."
In my opinion, these decisions indicate an increasing trend on the part of the courts to insist that where an alien under deportation proceedings has a further possible remedy, the Immigration Service and this Board should not place obstacles in his way to taking advantage of such possible remedy.
The respondent entered the United States in the utmost good faith. He has lived here 2 years and 4 months. He is well educated and has been studying hard to improve himself since his entry. No question is raised as to the bona fides of the marrige. His wife, under date of October 25, 1948, wrote the Commissioner at length indicating the hardship that would result to her and her children were he required to leave the United States. Senator Pat McCarran under date of July 30, 1948, wrote the Commissioner speaking most strongly in his letter in behalf of the respondent and stated that upon his return to Washington, it was his intention to introduce a special bill for M----'s relief. In the reply thereto under date of August 9, 1948, the Commissioner advised Senator McCarran in part as follows:
If it is Mr. M----'s belief that his enforced departure from the United States would result in an economic detriment to his citizen wife, he may apply for suspension of deportation under section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 (8 U.S.C. 155). An application for such relief should be made by Mr. M---- to the Board of Immigration Appeals in the form of a motion for reconsideration or reopening of his case prepared in accordance with part 90.11 (b) of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Mr. M---- did file a motion to reopen as provided by the regulations and as outlined to him by the Commissioner asserting serious economic detriment and it is this application that this Board proposes now to deny.
To require this man to leave the United States for the purpose of securing a visa when a remedy is open to him without such departure at a heavy financial outlay would, in my opinion, as stated in the Matter of L----, supra, "make him no better resident of this country" in fact, "will make him a worse one."
I concur in the dissenting decision of Robert E. Ludwig, member, wherein he indicates that the respondent's motion to reopen the hearing to permit him to introduce new, material evidence not heretofore available, in order to enable him to apply for suspension of deportation pursuant to the provisions of section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended by Public Law 863, Eightieth Congress, approved July 1, 1948 (8 U.S.C., sec. 155) should be granted.
8 U.S.C., section 155 provides in part as follows:
In the case of any alien (other than one to whom subsection (d) is applicable) who is deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding 5 years, the Attorney General may * * * (2) suspend deportation of such alien if not racially inadmissible or ineligible to naturalization in the United States if he finds that such deportation would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien.
In the instant case the respondent married subsequent to the hearing accorded him in the present expulsion proceeding. Obviously the foregoing portion of the statute intended that aliens qualified thereunder should have their cases appropriately considered for suspension of deportation or for such other remedial relief as may be warranted by the evidence. The only method whereby evidence not theretofore available may be made of record is to reopen the case and to deny that privilege results in an arbitrary and capricious application of the law and certainly this is not the democratic principle of this nation in according equal justice under the law.
This position is fortified by the unreported decision of the court in the Matter of Kavadias v. Cross, etc., 904 Civil, decided by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.
See also the indication of the courts in the cases of U.S. ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F. (2d) 369; Ex parte Panagopoulos, 3 F. Supp. 222 and U.S. ex rel. Salvetti et al. v. Reimer, 103 F. (2d) 777; U.S. ex rel. U.S. Lines on behalf of Colovis v. Watkins, 170 F. (2d) 998. ( Kavadias reported, 82 F. Supp. 716.)
"As to marriage that is certainly a fact to be considered." The interpretation here is, in my opinion, confirmed in U.S. ex rel. Zabadlija v. Garfinkel, W.D. Pa., January 27, 1949 (173 F. (2d) 222), lower court, 77 F. Supp. 751).
It can only be emphasized that in order to determine whether or not an alien under deportation proceedings is qualified for suspension of deportation that he be given the privilege of presenting competent evidence that he is so qualified. Unless that opportunity be granted him the record remains incomplete and he would not therefore have that due process of law which is contemplated. Moreover, to require the departure of an alien from the United States to foreign territory in order that he or she may obtain an immigration visa from an American Consul in foreign territory whereby he may return to the United States immediately would seriously disrupt the family life so much cherished as the backbone of this nation and would subject the alien to unnecessary hardship which the Congress intended to eliminate by the passage of the legislation hereinabove set forth. This is especially true with quotas in preempted conditions as today and with consequent delays in adjustments by protracted stay outside of the United States. Congress intended that the family head should be entitled to have his application for relief fully considered. Any other application of the law is arbitrary.
The majority opinion would indicate that marriage of female citizens of the United States to male aliens are contracted for the purpose of perpetrating fraud and to circumvent the immigration laws. Such application of the law is whimsical and capricious and the bona fides of an individual's representations can only be determined by evidence properly introduced in the record. To hold fraud in this type of case must be supported by evidence and he who alleges fraud must necessarily prove that fraud. Without evidence of fraud there is mere suspicion and mere suspicion is not evidence. Final determination of an alien's rights cannot be met without proper evidence introduced upon a complete and careful investigation of all of the facts.
To enforce departure of an alien before he has had a full opportunity to present all of the evidence in his case would appear to me to be contrary to the principles enunciated by the Attorney General in the Matter of L----, decided August 29, 1940, 56019/808, cited by Member Ludwig.
It is my opinion that without the privilege of presenting all of the evidence in the case the matter cannot be fully and properly determined administratively. Consequently, it is my opinion that the hearing in this case should be reopened for all of the reasons set forth in the dissent of Member Ludwig as well as for the reasons herein emphasized. In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that the motion to reopen the proceeding to permit the alien to introduce additional evidence and thereupon to apply for suspension of deportation pursuant to the provisions of 8 U.S.C., section 155, supra, should be granted inasmuch as this is the only equitable method in which to develop the case in its entirety.
In accordance with section 90.12, title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, the Board certifies its decision and order to the Attorney General for review.