A-7940390
Decided by Board May 28, 1957
Pardon — Granted by State board meets requirements of section 241 (b) of the 1952 act when such board is the supreme pardoning authority provided in the constitution of the State.
An unconditional pardon granted by a State board under a constitutional provision designating such board as the supreme pardoning authority of the State is recognized as an effective pardon within the meaning of section 241 (b) of the act.
CHARGE:
Order To Show Cause: Act of 1952 — Section 241 (a) (4) [ 8 U.S.C. 1251 (a) (4)] — Convicted within 5 years of entry of crime involving moral turpitude.
BEFORE THE BOARD
Discussion: An order entered April 18, 1957, by the special inquiry officer in the above-captioned case terminates the proceedings. The case has been certified for a review of the decision and the entry of a final order. A brief in support of the special inquiry officer's opinion has been submitted by counsel.
The record relates to a native and citizen of Greece, male, unmarried, who entered the United States for permanent residence at the port of New York on January 11, 1951. He was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, to wit, simple larceny in the City Court of Macon, Georgia, on March 12, 1955, and sentenced to confinement for a term of 12 months, with provision for the sentence to be served on probation. The respondent was granted an unconditional pardon by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles of Georgia on April 4, 1957, for the offense stated above. The special inquiry officer concludes that since the Board of Pardons and Paroles is the supreme pardoning authority in the State of Georgia, the respondent is not deportable under section 241 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because of the provisions of section 241 (b) of the same act.
The only issue presented by the case is whether an executive pardon issued by the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles meets the test provided in section 241 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1251 (b)) that it be granted by the Governor of a State. The special inquiry officer concludes that since the pardon here under consideration is unconditional and is an executive pardon duly granted by supreme authority as provided in the constitution of the State of Georgia, it meets the requirement of that portion of section 241 (b), supra, limiting the grant of a pardon to the President of the United States or the Governor of a State. The limiting provisions of section 241 (b), supra, were designed by Congress to eliminate the effectiveness of a legislative pardon ( Matter of R----, E-080924, 5 IN Dec. 612). The pardon here under consideration is the only unconditional executive pardon that can be obtained in the State of Georgia. We agree with the special inquiry officer that it was not the intent of Congress to fail to recognize any executive pardon granted by a State which has a constitutional provision for executive pardons to be issued by other than the Governor of the State.
The opinion of the special inquiry officer is hereby adopted as the Board's opinion and the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the order entered will be affirmed.
Order: It is directed that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the order entered in the above-captioned case by the special inquiry officer on April 18, 1957, be and the same are hereby affirmed.