56094/542
Decided by Board November 17, 1944. Approved by Attorney General November 22, 1944.
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude — Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor — Section 21, Juvenile Court Law of California.
Contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of section 21 of the Juvenile Court Law of California does not necessarily involve moral turpitude and where the conviction record does not show that the offense complained of actually caused the minor to lead an idle, lewd, dissolute or immoral life, or was of such a character as to be certain to have that effect, or that such effect was intended, this offense is not deemed to be one which involves moral turpitude.
CHARGES:
Warrant: Act of 1924 — Immigrant without immigration visa.
Lodged: Act of 1917 — Convicted of and admits commission of crime prior to entry-contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
BEFORE THE BOARD
Discussion: The presiding inspector found the respondent to be deportable on both of the charges stated above. The district director and the central office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service do not agree that the lodged charge is sustained.
The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico, 41 years old. He testified that he last entered the United States in March or April 1935 at El Paso, Tex., and was admitted as a visitor upon presentation of a border-crossing card. He stated that he came to the United States to live here and to work and that he did not have an immigration visa. According to his testimony, he had previously entered the United States in 1917 and again in 1918. Following the latter entry he resided here until December 1931, when he went to Mexico for permanent residence, accompanied by his wife and children. He came to the United States for a visit in December 1932, remaining here until December 1933. He then lived in Mexico until his last entry. Since the respondent last entered the United States for permanent residence and was not a returning legal resident, he was required to have an immigration visa. The warrant charge is therefore sustained.
The record establishes that on June 8, 1925, the respondent pleaded guilty in the Superior Court of Tulare County, Calif., to a charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. On June 17, 1925, sentence for that offense was suspended for one year and the defendant was placed on probation for that period. It appears, therefore, that prior to his last entry the respondent was convicted of the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. This raises a question whether that was a crime involving moral turpitude. We have recently had occasion to consider this offense, which is defined in section 21 of the Juvenile Court Law of California. We held in the Matter of V---- T----, 55857/963 (now A-5963331) (Nov. 17, 1944), that this offense does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. We found the statutory definition of the crime to be so broad as to include many different offenses, some of which do not involve moral turpitude. This was demonstrated by certain California decisions relating to the crime which we considered in the V---- T---- case (See preceding case). Assuming then that contributing to the delinquency of a minor in California does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, the remaining question is whether the particular crime of which the respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude. It was alleged in the information that
Section 21 of the Juvenile Court Law insofar as pertinent provides: "Any person who shall commit any act or omit the performance of any duty, which act, or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of twenty-one years to come within the provisions of any subdivisions one to thirteen inclusive of section one of this act, or which act or omission contributes thereto, or any person who shall, by any act or omission, or by threats, or commands, or persuasion, induce or endeavor to induce any such person to become or to remain a person coming within the provisions of any of subdivisions one to thirteen inclusive of section one of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, or may be released on probation for a period not exceeding five years; * * *"
The said F---- C----, on or about the 14 day of April, A.D., One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-five, at the County of Tulare, State of California, and before the filing of this Information, did wilfully and unlawfully induce one T---- M----, a female under the age of twenty-one years, to-wit, of the age of about fourteen years, to run away from school and remain away from school in company with the said defendant, which act on the part of the said defendant tended to cause and encourage the said T---- M---- to become an habitual truant from school and to lead a dissolute, lewd, and immoral life, and to become a person coming within the provision of subdivision 10 of section I of the Juvenile Court Act of the State of California, contrary to the form, force and effect of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of California.
Subdivision 10 of section 1 of the Juvenile Court law referred to in the information, relates to a person "who is an habitual truant from school within the meaning of any law of this State."
With what then was the respondent charged? It appears that the respondent, who was then 22 years old, induced a girl 14 years old to absent herself from school to be with him. It does not appear how long she was with him-whether it was for several hours, or one school day, or longer. It might be that they had one or more "dates" together. There is no allegation that he had or attempted to have sexual relations with the girl or otherwise to seduce her. It would be hard to say that the mere fact that a young man "dated" a girl during school hours involved moral turpitude. But what is the significance of the allegation that the defendant's acts "tended to cause and encourage the said T---- M---- to become an habitual truant from school and to lead a dissolute, lewd, and immoral life * * *"? As interpreted by the California code, these phrases are very broad. In People v. Calkins, 48 C.A. 2d 33, 36, 11 p. 2d 142 (1941), the court stated:
It is not necessary for the prosecutor to establish that the defendant's acts or omissions resulted in the minor's actual entry upon an idle or immoral course of conduct. The prosecutor establishes his case when he proves acts or omissions on the part of the defendant which tend to cause or encourage the minor to lead an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life.
It had previously been held in People v. Baker, 38 Cal. App. 28, 34, 175 p. 88 (1918):
We do not think the court intended to hold, nor do we think it should be held, that the effect of the act complained of must have an absolutely certain and unmistakable tendency to cause the minor to lead an idle, dissolute, and immoral life.
In the Baker case, supra, it was also stated at page 33:
The intent moving the defendant to sell him (the child) the beer is immaterial. It is the effect of selling and the tendency in selling to cause the minor to become delinquent that the law contemplates and not the motive or intent of the seller. * * *
It appears then that it is not necessary that the defendant's acts have actually caused the minor to lead an idle, lewd, dissolute, or immoral life, or that they have been of such a character as to be certain to have that effect, or that the defendant had intended such effect. Applying these principles to the present case, the defendant would have been guilty of the offense if he took the girl out during school hours having no intentions other than innocent entertainment, and even though his taking her out had no bad effect on the girl's character, so long as it might have had such an effect. We do not believe that such an offense involves moral turpitude.
The respondent admitted committing the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, but added that all it consisted of was his giving a young girl a ride. Findings of Fact: Upon the basis of all the evidence presented, it is found:
(1) That the respondent is an alien, a native and citizen of Mexico;
(2) That the respondent last entered the United States in March or April 1935 at El Paso, Tex.;
(3) That the respondent last entered the United States for permanent residence;
(4) That at the time of his entry the respondent did not have an immigration visa;
(5) That the respondent was convicted in California in June 1925 of the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor;
(6) That the respondent admits the commission of this offense.Conclusions of Law: Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, it is concluded:
(1) That under sections 13 and 14 of the Immigration Act of 1924, the respondent is subject to deportation on the ground that at the time of his last entry he was an immigrant not in possession of an immigration visa;
(2) That the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in California of which the respondent was convicted is not a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) That under section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, the respondent is not subject to deportation on the ground that he was convicted of and admits the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude, to wit: Contributing to the delinquency of a minor.Suspension of Deportation — Factors: The presiding inspector recommends that respondent be given voluntary departure under a warrant of deportation. The central office recommends suspension of deportation. The respondent first applied for suspension. Later when he learned that one of his daughters, who was also a subject of deportation proceedings, would not be eligible for that privilege, he changed his application to one of voluntary departure. On further consideration he decided that if he and his wife (L---- H---- de C----, 56113/710) are granted suspension, arrangements will be made to send the daughter, now 12 years old, to a Government school in Mexico until arrangements can be made for her legal admission to the United States.
The respondent and his wife were married on October 14, 1925, in Fresno, Calif. In addition to their daughter, who was born in Mexico, they have 4 children born in the United States whose ages range from 3 to 18 years. The respondent is employed as a laborer on a ranch earning 40 cents an hour. Although it appears from the wife's testimony that one or two of the older children contribute to the family income from their earnings from farm labor, the family is primarily dependent upon the respondent for support. His deportation would therefore result in serious economic detriment to his minor citizen children.
Respondent's testimony and his Federal Bureau of Investigation record indicate no arrests in Mexico or in the United States other than for the aforementioned offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor committed 19 years ago. An independent character investigation conducted in the neighborhood where the respondent resides and the testimony of persons in California who know him establish that he has been a person of good moral character for the past 5 years.
The alien is a person of the white race and is not ineligible to naturalization, in the United States, nor is the alien subject to deportation under any provision of law mentioned in section 19 (d) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as amended.
Suspension of Deportation — Findings of Fact: Upon the basis of all the evidence presented, it is found:
(1) That the alien is a person of the white race and is eligible for naturalization in the United States;
(2) That the alien has been of good moral character for the preceding 5 years;
(3) That deportation of the alien would result in serious economic detriment to his citizen minor children;
(4) That after full inquiry, no facts have been developed which would indicate that the alien is deportable under any of the provisions of law specified in section 19 (d) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.Suspension of Deportation — Conclusion of Law: Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, it is concluded:
(1) That the alien is eligible for suspension of deportation under the provisions of section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.Order: It is ordered that deportation of the alien be suspended under the provisions of section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.