Imagination Technologies Limited

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 8, 2020

15000197 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 8, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/000,197 01/19/2016 Steven Fishwick 2645-0246US01 2792
125968 7590 09/08/2020
Potomac Law Group PLLC (IMGTEC)
8229 Boone Boulevard Suite 430
Vienna, VA 22182
EXAMINER
IMPERIAL, JED-JUSTIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2612
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/08/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Eofficeaction@appcoll.com
Patents@potomaclaw.com
vdeluca@potomaclaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN FISHWICK
Appeal 2019-002902
Application 15/000,197
Technology Center 2600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, MAHSHID D. SAADAT, and
DONNA M. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4, 6–8, 10–12, and 15–22. Claims 5
and 9 are canceled. Claims 13 and 14 are objected to as being dependent
upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a) (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Imagination Technologies Limited. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 15/000,197
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to rendering views of a scene in a graphics
processing unit where groups of views may be rendered together such that
tiles from a group of views are rendered in an interspersed order such that at
least one tile from each of the views in the group is rendered before any of
the views of the scene in the group are fully rendered. Abstract. Similar
tiles from different views within a group may be rendered sequentially, and
if a particular rendered tile is similar to the next tile to be rendered then data
stored in a cache for rendering the particular tile is likely to be useful for
rendering the next tile. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative
of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of rendering views of a scene in a graphics
processing unit which is configured to use a rendering space that
is subdivided into a plurality of tiles, the method comprising:

rendering, in an interspersed order, tiles of the views of the
scene such that, for each group of a plurality of groups of views
of the scene, at least one tile from each of the views of the scene
in the group is rendered before any of the views of the scene in
the group are fully rendered, wherein the view from which a tile
is rendered switches between different views in the group, and
wherein at least some of the views of the scene in the group are
frames representing instances of the scene at a sequence of
different time instances
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Heggelund et al. US 2014/0354682 A1 Dec. 4, 2014
Pfaffe US 2014/0375663 A1 Dec. 25, 2014

Appeal 2019-002902
Application 15/000,197
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3, 6–8, 10–12, 15, 16, and 19–22 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Pfaffe.
Claims 4, 17, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Pfaffe as applied to claim 3 above, and further in view of
Heggelund.
OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 102
With respect to independent claims 1, 2, 19, and 20, we note that the
claims contain similar limitations, and we address independent claim 1 as
the illustrative claim for review.
Appellant contends that the Pfaffe reference fails to disclose frames
representing instances of the scene at a sequence of different time instances.
Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues that the relied upon portions of the Pfaffe
reference disclose that two views (i.e., left and right images) of the same
scene are processed together, and then left and right images are displayed
alternately on a display for a stereoscopic object at relatively high speeds
(e.g., 120 frames per second). Appeal Br. 8. Consequently, the left and
right images of Pfaffe are not “frames representing instances of the scene at
a sequence of different time instances” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 8.
Appellant also argues Pfaffe discloses that the left and right images are
images of an object captured simultaneously, but from two distinct
viewpoints. Appeal Br. 8.
The Examiner interprets the disclosure of the Pfaffe reference and the
Examiner finds that
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Application 15/000,197
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the left eye image/frame and the right eye image/frame may be
viewed as representing instances of the scene (i.e. an instance of
the left view of the scene and an instance of the right view of
the scene), and since the left and right views are displayed
alternately, the two views may be viewed as representing those
instances of the scene at a sequence of different time instances
as the scene is being rendered.

Ans. 4. (Emphases added.) But, the language of independent claim 1
requires “at least some of the views of the scene in the group are frames
representing instances of the scene at a sequence of different time
instances.”
In response to Appellant’s argument concerning the left and right
views, the Examiner finds that although the left image/frame and the right
eye image/frame represent the scene at the same point in time since they a
recaptured simultaneously from two distinct viewpoints, “it is because those
viewpoints are displayed one after the other that it may be viewed that the
views, when being displayed/rendered, represent instances of the scene at a
sequence of different time instances.” Ans. 4 (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Examiner “believes that Appellant is arguing
features that are not necessarily claimed” and “it seems that Appellant is
arguing that the different views of the scene correspond to different
instances of time in the scene, instead of ‘representing the instances of the
scene at a sequence of different time instances’ (which Examiner interpreted
as the instances of the scene being represented/displayed at different
times).’” Ans. 4.
In response to the Examiner’s broad and unreasonable interpretation,
Appellant asserts that because the two views (of the same scene) are
displayed to the left and right eyes of the viewer at different times, they
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Application 15/000,197
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correspond to “instances of the scene at a sequence of different time
instances.” Reply Br. 1–2. Appellant contends that if the scene includes a
moving object, that moving object will be in the same position in the scene
in both the left and right views because the left and right views represent the
scene at the same time instant.
Appellant argues that the Pfaffe reference displays different views of
the same instance of a scene to each eye of a viewer from slightly different
viewpoints where the difference between these two frames thus is a spatial
difference, not a temporal difference. Reply Br. 2.
We agree with Appellant that the portions of the Pfaffe reference
relied upon by the Examiner disclose stereoscopic images at the same
instance in time, but the claim requires
rendering, in an interspersed order, tiles of the views of the
scene such that, for each group of a plurality of groups of views
of the scene, at least one tile from each of the views of the scene
in the group is rendered before any of the views of the scene in
the group are fully rendered, wherein the view from which a tile
is rendered switches between different views in the group, and
wherein at least some of the views of the scene in the group are
frames representing instances of the scene at a sequence of
different time instances.

(Emphasis added).
We find the Examiner’s anticipation rejection to be speculative, and
we agree with Appellant that the Pfaffe reference generally stores and
displays data representing an instance of the scene at a single time instance
rather than representing instances of the scene at a sequence of different time
instances. (Appeal Br. 8–10; Reply Br. 1–4.)
Here, the Examiner’s anticipation rejection is not well supported by
the express disclosure of the Pfaffe reference. Accordingly, we agree with
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Appellant that the Examiner’s anticipation determination is in error because
it is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Caveney,
761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Examiner’s burden of proving non-
patentability is by a preponderance of the evidence); see also In re Warner,
379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) (“The Patent Office has the initial duty
of supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not, because it may
doubt that the invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded
assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual
basis.”). We will not resort to such speculation or assumptions to cure the
deficiencies in the factual basis in order to support the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection. Consequently, we do not sustain the rejection of
independent claim 1 and its dependent claims based on anticipation.
Independent claims 2, 19, and 20 contain similar limitations, and we do not
sustain the anticipation rejection of these claims and their dependent claims
for the same reasons.

35 U.S.C. § 103
With respect to dependent claims 4, 17, and 18, Appellant relies upon
the arguments set forth with respect to independent claim 2 which are the
same as the arguments with respect to independent claim 1. Because the
Examiner has not identified how the Heggelund reference remedies the
deficiencies noted above, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of dependent claims 4, 17, and 18 for the same reasons.

CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner’s anticipation and obviousness rejections are reversed.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6–8,
10–12, 15,
16, 19–22
102 Pfaffe 1–3, 6–8,
10–12, 15,
16, 19–22
4, 17, 18 103 Pfaffe, Heggelund 4, 17, 18
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–8,
10–12, 15–
22

REVERSED