Imagination Technologies Limited

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 1, 2021

2020005225 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/368,809 12/05/2016 Chaitanya Tata 8059-105940-01 8155
24197 7590 12/01/2021
KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP
121 SW SALMON STREET
SUITE 1600
PORTLAND, OR 97204
EXAMINER
DANIEL JR, WILLIE J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2462
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/01/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@klarquist.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHAITANYA TATA
_____________

Appeal 2020-005225
Application 15/368,809
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1–11, 13–16, and 18–20, which constitute all the claims pending in
this application. Claims 12 and 17 are canceled. We have jurisdiction over
the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We Reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, the real party in interest in this
appeal is the Imagination Technologies Limited of Kings Langley, United
Kingdom. See Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 15/368,809

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
Introduction
Embodiments of Appellant’s claimed subject matter relate generally
to “devices and methods for saving power and reducing latency at a wireless
transceiver.” Spec. 1, ll. 5–6.
Independent Claim 1
1. A device capable of communicating according to a
wireless communications protocol, the device comprising:
a transceiver configured to receive packets from a remote
device, each packet comprising an indication of whether or not
the remote device has a further packet to transmit, the
transceiver being operable in a first mode or a second mode,
wherein:
in the first mode the transceiver is configured to: (i) send
a polling message to the remote device in response to receiving
the indication of the remote device having a further packet to
transmit; and (ii) listen for that further packet; and
in the second mode the transceiver is configured to: (i)
not send a polling message to the remote device in response to
receiving the indication of the remote device having a further
packet to transmit; and (ii) listen for packets regardless of
whether a received packet indicates that the remote device has a
further packet to transmit or not; and
a controller configured to:
[L1] monitor an activity level for the transceiver by
measuring over a period of time the number of packets received
indicating that the remote device has further packets to
transmit;

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed June 3, 2019 (“Final
Act.”); the Appeal Brief, filed January 25, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); the
Examiner’s Answer, mailed May 6, 2020 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief,
filed July 6, 2020 (“Reply Br.”).
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[L2] compare the monitored activity level with a
threshold; and
[L3] cause the transceiver to operate in the first mode or
the second mode in dependence on said comparison.
Appeal Br. 13. Claims App. (disputed claim limitations emphasized
and bracketed as L1, L2, and L3).
Prior Art Evidence Relied Upon by the Examiner
Name Reference Date
Vitamäki et al.
(“Vitamäki”)
EP 1 473 951 A2 Dec. 22, 2003
Rejection
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
1–11, 13–16,
18–20 102(a)(2) Vitamäki

ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are forfeited
or waived.3 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(2013). Throughout this

3 See In re Google Technology Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (some internal citation omitted):
It is well established that “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture.”
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). “Whereas
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
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opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation
(BRI) consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We highlight and address specific findings and
arguments for emphasis in our analysis below.

Anticipation Rejection of Independent Claim 1
Issue: Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, did the Examiner err by finding that
the cited Vitamäki reference expressly or inherently discloses the disputed
claim 1, L1 limitation, that we find is dispositive to this appeal:
[L1] monitor an activity level for the transceiver by
measuring over a period of time the number of packets received
indicating that the remote device has further packets to
transmit;
Claim 1 (bracketing and emphasis added regarding disputed dispositive
limitation L1).
Limitation L1
Appellant contends that the Examiner:
has not addressed the actual claim limitation of a controller
configured to monitor an activity level for the transceiver by
measuring the number of packets received over a period of time
that indicate that the remote device has further packets to
transmit. The claims thus require a specific type of activity level
monitoring, which is simply not disclosed in Vitamäki. Simply
“monitoring a level of activity” to indicate a higher activity state

known right.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)) (additional citations omitted). The two scenarios can
have different consequences for challenges raised on appeal, id.
at 733–34, and for that reason, it is worth attending to which label
is the right one in a particular case.
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to allow faster transmission rate does not correspond to the
claimed subject matter.
Secondly, Vitamäki discloses in paragraph [0059], lines 32-37
that after a doze state the terminal switches into the active state
and controls whether the base station has buffered data for it. If
not, then the terminal again switches into the doze state as before.
If data has been buffered the device can switch into a more active
state and begin to receive data. This does not correspond
monitoring an activity level for the transceiver by measuring the
number of packets received over a period of time that indicate
that the remote device has further packets to transmit, as required
by claim 1. Instead, in this paragraph, Vitamäki simply discloses
switching between states based on whether a base station has
buffered data.
Appeal Br. 10.
Appellant additionally addresses the “hatch” closing mechanism that
initiates a WLAN power save mode, as described in paragraphs 59 and 64 of
Vitamäki. Appellant contends:
Vitamäki describes in paragraph [0064] that an aggressive
WLAN power save mode is used when the hatch or mechanism
is closed. The device can receive data, although
at a rate which is slower than normally. When a faster
transmission rate for WLAN data or a more rapid reaction is
required the user can leave the hatch or mechanism open,
even if he would not actively use the device, or the power
saving properties can be bypassed when required, for instance
in a programmed way. The “hatch” referred to in this
paragraph seems to be a mobile phone cover, which the user of
the device manually opens and closes, e.g. the cover of a flip-
phone or a PDA (see Figures 4a and 4b, and paragraph [0059]).
That is, paragraph [0064] discloses determining a level of
power saving based on whether the hatch or cover of a mobile
device is open or closed. This is not a disclosure of monitoring
an activity level for the transceiver by measuring the number of
packets received over a period of time that indicate that the
remote device has further packets to transmit, as required by
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claim 1.
Appeal Br. 11.
Turning to the evidence, we note that paragraph 59 and Figure 4a of
Vitamäki clarify the “hatch” mechanism, as follows:
Figure 4a shows a mechanism, which can be opened and
closed, in the closed state, which mechanism can be found in
some WLAN or Bluetooth terminals, such as in certain mobile
phone models, particularly in mobile stations of the
communicator type, and in certain mobile phones. A
mechanism of this type can also be a hatch, a cover or the like,
which covers the keys. A device utilising [Br. sp.] a screen
saver for preventing accidental user input works basically the
same way. When a mechanism of this type is closed, or a
screen saver is activated or locked, the device is generally in a
passive state, in other words applications using the WLAN or
Bluetooth features or other features in the device are not used,
or cannot be used because the keys and/or the display needed
for the use are covered. When the hatch or closing mechanism
is closed the terminal (station) will then in an embodiment of
the invention switch into the power save mode, in which it will
not receive the beacons transmitted by the base station during a
certain period, for instance during the next 30 frames.
Vitamäki ¶ 59 (emphasis added).
In support of the anticipation rejection of limitation L1 of claim 1, the
Examiner relies upon Vitamäki at paragraphs 29, 55, 59, 64, 65, 79, 81, and
Figures 1 and 2.4 See Final Act. 11. In the Answer, the Examiner adds new
citations to paragraph 61 and Figure 5 of Vitamäki. See Ans. 11.

4 See the mapping rule: 37 C.F.R § 1.104(c)(2)(2013) (“When a reference is
complex or shows or describes inventions other than that claimed by the
applicant, the particular part relied on must be designated as nearly as
practicable. The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be
clearly explained and each rejected claim specified.” (emphasis added).
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Based upon our review of the evidence, we find paragraph 81 of
Vitamäki provides the closest teaching of the “monitor” function recited in
claim 1:
According to an embodiment of the invention the method for
determining the activity of WLAN or Bluetooth utilisation
[Br.sp.] and the setting the level of the power save mode is to
monitor the level of WLAN or Bluetooth so communication
during a certain period. If no data has been transmitted during a
certain time through the WLAN or Bluetooth, or if only a small
amount of data has been transmitted, then the WLAN or
Bluetooth system would switch into the power save mode, and
the interval between received beacons would become longer.
On the other hand, an increased amount of transmitted data
would cause the WLAN or Bluetooth to switch into a more
active state (lower power save mode).
Vitamäki ¶ 81 (emphasis added).
Appellant addresses paragraph 81, and disagrees with the Examiner’s
finding of anticipation:
Vitamäki discloses monitoring the level of WLAN
communication during a certain period for setting the level of
the power save mode. See paragraph [0081]. If no data has
been transmitted during a certain time through the WLAN, or if
only a small amount of data has been transmitted, then the
system would switch into the power save mode, and the interval
between received beacons would become longer. On the other
hand, an increased amount of transmitted data would cause the
WLAN to switch into a more active state (lower power save
mode) (see Id.). Thus, in this embodiment Vitamäki sets a level
of the power save mode based on the amount of data
transmitted during a certain time, and does not monitor
indications of whether there are further frames/packets to
transmit.

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Appeal Br. 9 (underline in original, italics and bold added for emphasis).
We have reviewed the Examiner’s responses in the Answer, including
the Examiner’s reliance on purported “admissions” by Appellant, as found
by the Examiner’s review of the record. See Ans. 10.5 However, we find
Appellant persuasively rebuts the purported admissions on page 3 of the
Reply Brief. Although we have reviewed all the admissions found by the
Examiner (Ans. 10), and the multiple paragraphs and figures in Vitamäki
cited by the Examiner in support, on this record we nevertheless find some
degree of speculation would be required to affirm the Examiner’s finding of
anticipation regarding at least disputed limitation L1 of claim 1.
We emphasize the Examiner’s burden of proving non-patentability is
by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674
(Fed. Cir. 1985); see also In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967)
(“The Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its
rejection. It may not, because it may doubt that the invention is patentable,
resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions . . . to supply deficiencies in its
factual basis.”). We decline to engage in such speculation.
And to the extent the Examiner is relying upon any purportedly
inherent feature in Vitamäki, “[i]nherency . . . may not be established

5 “A statement by an applicant in the specification or made during
prosecution identifying the work of another as ‘prior art’ is an admission
which can be relied upon for both anticipation and obviousness
determinations, regardless of whether the admitted prior art would otherwise
qualify as prior art under the statutory categories of 35 U.S.C. 102.” MPEP
§2129(I.), citing Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc., 848 F.2d
1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

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by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result
from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169
F.3d 743, 745, (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
To anticipate under § 102, the prior art reference “must not only
disclose all elements within the four corners of the document, but must also
disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Net MoneyIn, Inc. v.
Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Thus, it is not enough that the prior art reference
discloses part of the claimed invention, which an ordinary artisan might
supplement to make the whole, or that it includes multiple, distinct teachings
that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.”
Id. at 1371 (emphasis added).
Here, as noted above, the Examiner maps limitation L1 of claim 1 to
multiple paragraphs and figures of Vitamäki (paragraphs 29, 55, 59, 64, 65,
79, 81, Figures 1–2; see Final Act. 11). In the Answer (p. 11), the Examiner
adds new citations to paragraph 61 and Figure 5 of Vitamäki.
Based upon our review of the record, we find the closest teaching
found in Vitamäki (i.e., the description of a monitor function at paragraph
81) does not provide an express or inherent disclosure of the claim 1
limitation L1, so as to meet the rigorous requirements of anticipation under
35 U.S.C. § 102. And we decline to express any view as to whether at least
claim 1 might be obvious over Vitamäki, because we have no obviousness
rejection before us on appeal.6

6 Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so.
See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02 (9th ed. Rev.
10.2019, rev. June 2020).
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Therefore, on this record, we find a preponderance of the evidence
supports Appellant’s argument in the Appeal Brief (p. 9, last paragraph) that
Vitamäki “does not monitor indications of whether there are further
frames/packets to transmit” as required by the language of claim 1, which
recites “a controller configured to:”
[L1] monitor an activity level for the transceiver by
measuring over a period of time the number of packets received
indicating that the remote device has further packets to
transmit;
Claim 1 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, for essentially the same reasons argued by Appellant in
the Briefs, as further discussed above, we are constrained on this record to
reverse the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1,
because the Examiner has not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that any cited portions of Vitamäki’s description (including the
cited figures) anticipates Appellant’s disputed limitation L1, as recited in
claim 1. We note remaining independent claims 16 and 20 both recite
similar language of commensurate scope to limitation L1 of independent
claim 1. Therefore, we are constrained on this record to reverse the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claims 16 and 20.
Because we have reversed the anticipation rejection for all
independent claims 1, 16, and 20 on appeal, for the same reasons, we also
reverse the anticipation rejection of each dependent claim.

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CONCLUSION
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–11, 13–16, and 18–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) over Vitamäki.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11, 13–16,
18–20
102(a)(2) Vitamäki
1–11, 13–16,
18–20
REVERSED