IEH Auto Parts LLCv.SSP Otomotiv Sanayi Ve Dis Tic. A.S.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 19, 2020

91235734 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2020)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: March 19, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

IEH Auto Parts LLC
v.

SSP OTOMOTİV SANAYİ VE DIŞ TİC. A.Ş.
_____

Opposition No. 91235734
_____

Marsha G. Gentner of Dykema Gossett PLLC,
for IEH Auto Parts LLC.

John Alumit of ALUMIT IP,
for SSP OTOMOTİV SANAYİ VE DIŞ TİC. A.Ş.
_____

Before Zervas, Wolfson and Ritchie,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Zervas, Administrative Trademark Judge:
SSP OTOMOTİV SANAYİ VE DIŞ TİC. A.Ş. (“Applicant”) seeks to register the
mark

on the Principal Register for the goods and services set forth below:
Opposition No. 91235734
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Motor land vehicles included in this class; motors and
engines for land vehicles; motorcycles; mopeds bicycles and
their bodies; handlebars and mudguards for bicycles
vehicle bodies; tipping bodies for trucks, trailers for
tractors; frigorific bodies for land vehicles; trailer hitches
for vehicles; tipping bodies for vehicles; vehicle seats; head-
rests for vehicle seats, safety seats for children, for
vehicles, seat covers for vehicles; shaped vehicle covers;
sun-blinds adapted for vehicles, direction signals and arms
for direction signals for vehicles, windscreen wipers and
wiper arms for vehicles, windows for vehicles, safety
windows for vehicles, rearview mirrors and wing mirrors
for vehicles, luggage carriers for vehicles, bicycle and ski
carriers for cars; saddles for bicycles or motorcycles, anti-
theft alarms for vehicles, horns for vehicles, safety belts for
vehicle seats, air bags being a safety device for
automobiles, baby carriages, wheelchairs, pushchairs,
wheelbarrows; shopping carts, single or multi-wheeled
wheelbarrows; shopping trolleys; grocery carts; handling
carts, locomotives; trains; trams; wagons; cable cars;
chairlifts (International Class 12); and
Advertising, marketing and public relations; organization
of exhibitions and trade fairs for commercial or advertising
purposes, office functions; secretarial services; arranging
newspaper subscriptions for others; compilation of
statistics, rental of office machines; systemization of
information into computer databases; telephone answering
for unavailable subscribers, business management,
business administration and business consultancy,
accounting; commercial consultancy services; personnel
placement; employment agencies; personnel recruitment;
import-export agencies, business appraisal services for
commercial or industrial products, auctioneering, the
bringing together, for the benefit of others, motor
land vehicles and their parts, motors and engines for land
vehicles, motorcycles, mopeds, bicycles and their bodies,
handlebars and mudguards for bicycles, vehicle bodies,
tipping bodies for trucks, trailers for tractors, frigorific
bodies for land vehicles, trailer hitches for vehicles tipping
bodies for vehicles, tipping apparatus, parts of land
vehicles, vehicle seats, head-rests for vehicle seats, safety
seats for children, for vehicles, seat covers for vehicles,
shaped vehicle covers, sun-blinds adapted for vehicles,
direction signals and arms for direction signals for vehicles,
Opposition No. 91235734
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windscreen wipers and wiper arms for vehicles, windows
for vehicles, safety windows for vehicles, rearview mirrors
and wing mirrors for vehicles, anti-skid chains for vehicles,
luggage carriers for vehicles, bicycle and ski carriers for
cars, saddles for bicycles or motorcycles, anti-theft alarms
for vehicles, horns for vehicles, safety belts for vehicle
seats, air bags being safety devices for automobiles, baby
carriages, wheelchairs, pushchairs, wheelbarrows,
shopping carts, single or multi-wheeled wheelbarrows,
shopping trolleys, grocery carts, handling carts, rail
vehicles, locomotives, trains, trams, waggons, cable cars,
chairlifts, vehicles for locomotion by water and their parts,
other than their motors and engines, vehicles for
locomotion by air and their parts, other than their motors
and engines, enabling customers to conveniently view
and purchase those goods, such services may be
provided by retail stores, wholesale outlets, by means of
electronic media or through mail order catalogues
(International Class 35).1 (emphasis added).
The mark is described as “consist[ing] of the wording ‘APPLUS’ in stylized form
with the ‘A’ and top ‘P’ connected and the two ‘P’s overlapping, with the wording
‘AUTOMOTIVE PARTS’ below. The color red appears in the connected ‘A’ and ‘P’; the
color orange appears in ‘PLUS’, and the color black appears in ‘AUTOMOTIVE
PARTS’. The color white represents background area and is not part of the mark.”
Applicant disclaimed AUTOMOTIVE PARTS.
IEH Auto Parts LLC (“Opposer”) opposed registration of Applicant’s mark
claiming likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1052(d), pleading ten AUTO PLUS formative marks including the standard

1 Serial No. 79180978, filed on October 22, 2015, pursuant to Section 66(a) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1141f(a), as a Request for Extension of Protection for International
Registration No. 1256563.
Opposition No. 91235734
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character mark AUTO PLUS (with a disclaimer of AUTO) of Registration
No. 5006010 (“’010 Registration”) for the following International Class 35 services:
Retail store services featuring automotive parts and
accessories, batteries, tools and equipment, chemicals,
paints and body repair products; on-line retail store
services featuring automotive parts and accessories,
batteries, tools and equipment, chemicals, paints and body
repair products; Wholesale distributorships featuring
automotive parts and accessories, batteries, tools and
equipment, chemicals, paints and body repair products;
Wholesale store services featuring automotive parts and
accessories, batteries, tools and equipment, chemicals,
paints and body repair products; retail automotive parts
and accessories stores.2
Applicant, in its Answer,3 denied the salient allegations of the Notice of
Opposition. While Opposer filed a brief, Applicant did not file a brief.
I. The Trial Record
In addition to the pleadings, the trial record automatically includes the involved
application file pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.122(b), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b). The trial
record also includes the following:
A. Submitted by Opposer.

1. Opposer’s Notice of Reliance (“NOR”) No. 1 submitting TESS
printouts of Opposer’s registrations showing current status and
Opposer’s ownership from the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search
System (“TESS”) database.

2. NOR No. 2: Trial Declaration of Joseph Wesolowski, Vice
President Finance-Parts of IEH (15 TTABVUE – Confidential; 16
TTABVUE – redacted public version).

2 Registered July 26, 2016.
3 4 TTABVUE.
Opposition No. 91235734
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3. NOR No. 3: Trial Declaration of Danielle Porto Parra, Senior Vice
President – Chief Marketing Officer of IEH (18 TTABVUE – redacted
public version; 19 TTABVUE – Confidential), and exhibits, including a
Wikipedia definition for “Automotive aftermarket,” photos, advertising,
webpages, sales brochures, catalogs, flyers, radio advertising scripts,
video commercials and press releases.

4. NOR No. 4 (20 TTABVUE), submitting Applicant’s Amended
Responses to Opposer’s First Request for Admissions Nos. 1-7, 15-23, 25,
34 and 36, Opposer’s First Request for Admissions Exhibit A and
Applicant’s Amended Response to Opposer’s Interrogatories Nos. 6 & 17.

B. Submitted by Applicant.
1. Affidavit of Mehmet Aydin (23 TTABVUE), with one exhibit.
2. Applicant’s Notice of Reliance (22 TTABVUE), submitting news
articles, third party registrations, third party websites and Applicant’s
website.
II. Evidentiary Issues
Opposer has raised two objections to Applicant’s evidence, one on the basis of
illegibility and the other on the basis that certain webpages contain hearsay. With
regard to the first exhibit (at 22 TTABVUE 176-77), it appears a large portion of it is
cut off; it hence has very limited probative value. With regard to the other webpages
(at 22 TTABVUE 178-85), because we may consider the webpages only for what they
state on their face and not for the truth of any assertion contained therein, Opposer’s
objection is moot. See Ayoub, Inc. v. ACS Ayoub Carpet Serv., 118 USPQ2d 1392, 1399
n.62 (TTAB 2016) (citing Couch/Braunsdorf Affinity, Inc. v. 12 Interactive, LLC, 110
USPQ2d 1458, 1467 n.30 (TTAB 2014) (Internet webpage evidence admissible only
to show what has been printed and not for the truth of what has been printed);
Hornby v. TJX Companies Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1411, 1416 (TTAB 2008) (“statements
made on website might otherwise be considered hearsay”)).
Opposition No. 91235734
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III. Standing
Standing is a threshold issue that must be proven by a plaintiff in every inter
partes case. To establish standing in an opposition or cancellation proceeding, a
plaintiff must show “both a ‘real interest’ in the proceedings as well as a ‘reasonable
basis’ for its belief of damage.” Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753
F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting ShutEmDown Sports,
Inc., v. Lacy, 102 USPQ2d 1036, 1041 (TTAB 2012)); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d
1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982).
Opposer made the ‘010 Registration and two other registrations comprising or
containing AUTO PLUS of record by submitting TESS printouts for the ‘010
Registration and the two other registrations with its Notice of Opposition. Trademark
Rule 2.122(d)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1). Opposer’s standing is established by its
pleaded registrations, which Opposer has entered into the record, showing Opposer’s
ownership and current status. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55
USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (party’s ownership of pleaded registration
establishes standing).
IV. Priority
Because Opposer’s pleaded registrations are of record and there is no pending
counterclaim to cancel the registrations, priority is not at issue with respect to the
mark and services covered by the registrations. See Id., 55 USPQ2d at 1844; King
Opposition No. 91235734
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Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA
1974); Penguin Books Ltd. v. Eberhard, 48 USPQ2d 1280, 1286 (TTAB 1998).
V. Likelihood of confusion
We now consider Opposer’s claim of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of
the Trademark Act. Our determination of Opposer’s claim of likelihood of confusion
is based on an analysis of all of the facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors
bearing on the issue of likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In considering
the evidence of record on these factors, we keep in mind that “[t]he fundamental
inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential
characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). “[W]e need to
consider only the factors that are relevant and of record.” M2 Software Inc. v. M2
Commc’ns Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
If confusion is likely between the marks and services in the application and the
‘010 Registration, there is no need for us to consider the likelihood of confusion with
the marks and services of any of the other asserted registrations, while if there is no
likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark and the mark and services in the
‘010 Registration, then there would be no likelihood of confusion with the marks and
services of any of the other asserted registrations because those marks are further
removed from Applicant’s mark than the mark in the ‘010 Registration.
Opposition No. 91235734
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A. The Good and Services, Channels of Trade and Classes of Purchasers
The nature and scope of a party’s goods or services must be determined on the
basis of the goods or services recited in the application or registration. See, e.g., Stone
Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157,
1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d
937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Where an identification of services is
broad, the Board “presume[s] that the services encompass all services of the type
identified.” Southwestern Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025
(TTAB 2015).
Opposer’s services encompass (i) retail store, on-line retail store, wholesale
distributorships, and wholesale store services, all featuring automotive parts and
accessories, batteries, tools and equipment, chemicals, paints and body repair
products; and (ii) retail automotive parts and accessories stores.
International Class 35 Services
We consider first Applicant’s and Opposer’s International Class 35 services.
Applicant’s services include “the bringing together, for the benefit of others, motor
land vehicles and their parts, … enabling customers to conveniently view and
purchase those goods, such services may be provided by retail stores, wholesale
outlets, by means of electronic media or through mail order catalogues.” These
services are legally identical to Opposer’s services, summarized above.
Because the services are legally identical, we presume that the channels of trade
and classes of purchasers for those services are also the same. See In re Viterra Inc.,
Opposition No. 91235734
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671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though there was no
evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was
entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); In
re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531, 1532 (TTAB 1994) (“Because the goods [or
services] are legally identical, they must be presumed to travel in the same channels
of trade, and be sold to the same class of purchasers.”). The ultimate purchaser of
Opposer’s and Applicant’s services is a member of the general purchasing public
requiring automotive parts.
International Class 12 Goods
We turn next to Applicant’s International Class 12 automotive goods and
Opposer’s retail store, on-line retail store, wholesale distributorships, and wholesale
store services involving automotive goods. It is well recognized that confusion may be
likely to occur from the use of the same or similar marks for goods, on the one hand,
and for services involving those goods, on the other. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic
Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding DETROIT
ATHLETIC CO. for sports apparel retail services and DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB
for clothing likely to cause confusion); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463,
6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding BIGG’S (stylized) for retail grocery and
general merchandise store services and BIGGS and design for furniture likely to
cause confusion); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986)
(holding 21 CLUB for various items of clothing and THE “21” CLUB (stylized) for
restaurant services likely to cause confusion); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707
Opposition No. 91235734
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(TTAB 1985) (holding CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for retail women’s clothing store
services and CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms likely to cause
confusion); Steelcase, Inc. v. Steelcare, Inc., 219 USPQ 433, 435 (TTAB 1983) (holding
STEELCARE INC. and design for refinishing of furniture, office equipment, and
machinery and STEELCASE for office furniture likely to cause confusion).
In addition, Applicant’s identifications suggests that the goods and services are
related to one another. See In re Country Oven, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 443903, *6 (TTAB
2019) (“[T]he identifications in the application [services in International Classes 35
and 40] and registration [goods in International Class 30] themselves support finding
the goods and services are related.”). For example, vehicle accessories such as trailer
hitches, vehicle seat covers, windscreen wipers, rearview mirrors and bicycle and ski
carriers, are typically sold in “brick and mortar” and online stores. We find that
Applicant’s automotive goods and Opposer’s retail and wholesale store services are
commercially related.
Where one party uses its mark on goods that are sold in retail stores that
customarily vend those goods, it is clear that the trade channels and customers
overlap. See, e.g., Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), 6 USPQ2d at 1026 (finding that “applicant’s
‘general merchandise store services’ would include the sale of furniture,” the goods in
the cited registration).
The DuPont factors regarding the goods and services, trade channels and
purchasers favor a finding of likelihood of confusion for the goods and services in both
International Classes 12 and 35.
Opposition No. 91235734
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B. Strength/Fame of the Opposer’s Mark
In examining the strength of Opposer’s mark, the applicable viewpoint is that of
the relevant market, that is, of consumers of like products or services. Joseph Phelps
Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734-
35 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[A] mark’s renown within a specific product market is the proper
standard.”). The fame of a mark is not “an all-or-nothing measure” when considered
in the context of likelihood of confusion. Id. Rather, likelihood of confusion fame
“varies along a spectrum from very strong to very weak.” Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d
at 1694 (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1063 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)). The “stronger” or more “well known” a plaintiff’s mark, the greater the
likelihood that use or registration for even minimally related products will cause
confusion. “The stronger the mark, the more likely it is that encroachment on it will
produce confusion.” Champions Golf Club v. Champions Golf Club, 78 F.2d 1111, 38
USPQ2d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir. 1996). See generally, 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 11:73 (Author’s Note: (“The Federal Circuit
uses the term ‘fame’ instead of ‘strength.”; § 24:49 (4th ed. June 2017)).
Therefore, when an opposer’s mark is exceedingly strong or famous, that “plays a
‘dominant role in the process of balancing the DuPont factors,’ ... and ‘[f]amous marks
thus enjoy a wide latitude of legal protection.” Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc.,
293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Recot, Inc. v. Benton,
214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). It is settled that a strong
Opposition No. 91235734
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mark “casts a long shadow which competitors must avoid.” Kenner Parker Toys, Inc.
v. Rose Art Inds., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
In the absence of direct evidence of fame such as through a consumer survey, Bose,
63 USPQ2d at 1305, fame or strength “of a mark may be measured indirectly, among
other things, by the volume of sales and advertising expenditures of the goods
traveling under the mark, and by the length of time those indicia of commercial
awareness have been evident.” Id. at 1305. Other relevant factors include “length of
use of the mark, market share, brand awareness, licensing activities, and variety of
goods bearing the mark.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
101 USPQ2d 1713, 1720 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Here, while Opposer has designated most of its evidence of fame/strength as
“confidential,” and we therefore only discuss it generally, suffice it to say that
Opposer, with its 271 company retail “brick and mortar” stores located throughout
the United States, and its roadside billboard advertisements, promotional items
(hats, pens, t-shirts, mouse pads, cups, tumblers and gloves), local phone book
advertisements, radio and television advertisements, sponsorships, online and social
media presence, has been successful in selling services identified in the ‘010
Registration under its pleaded AUTO PLUS mark.4 Opposer has advertised these
AUTO PLUS services fairly extensively, and, as reflected by its gross revenues,
successfully.

4 Parra Decl., 18 and 19 TTABVUE.
Opposition No. 91235734
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Nevertheless, “[w]e have no context for opposer’s advertising and sales figures,”
or its other evidence of strength/fame, such as how the figures for AUTO PLUS retail
and wholesale services featuring automotive parts and accessories compare with that
for other sellers of automotive goods. Lebanon Seaboard Corp. v. R&R Turf Supply
Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1826, 1831 (TTAB 2012); see also Bose, 63 USPQ2d at 1309 (“some
context in which to place raw statistics is reasonable”). Moreover, while Opposer has
offered additional evidence of the strength of AUTO PLUS besides its sales and
advertising figures, it is also without context, such as circulation figures for print
publications. Opposer therefore has not established that AUTO PLUS is at the
highest possible level of strength/fame. However, Opposer’s evidence easily
establishes that AUTO PLUS is “renowned” in connection with services identified in
the ‘010 Registration, and a commercially strong mark entitled to a broad scope of
protection. See Joseph Phelps Vineyards, 122 USPQ2d at 1734-35.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are mindful that AUTO is at best merely
descriptive of Opposer’s services, since it identifies the category of goods that Opposer
sells under its mark, and it has been disclaimed.5 PLUS is an inherently weak source
indicator for Opposer’s services inasmuch as it is defined as “an added quantity.”6

5 “Automotive” is defined as “relating to cars and other motor vehicles[;] the automotive
industry[,] automotive parts” at (American English) https://www.macmillandictionary.com/
dictionary/american/automotive (accessed March 12, 2020). We take judicial notice of this
definition. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of Notre Dame
du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217
USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983), including online dictionaries that exist in printed format or
regular fixed editions. In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377 (TTAB 2006).
6 We also take judicial notice of the word “plus” at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/plus (accessed March 12, 2020).
Opposition No. 91235734
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“Because trademark rights are not static [however], an inherently weak mark may
become a strong mark through extensive promotion.” Safer, Inc. v. OMS Invs., Inc.,
94 USPQ2d 1031, 1036 (TTAB). See also Jiffy, Inc. v. Jordan Inds., Inc., 481 F.2d
1323, 179 USPQ 169, 170 (CCPA 1973) (“a weak mark need not remain a weak mark
forever. Development of association with the user as a source of the goods through
continued sales and advertising of the goods may turn a ‘weak’ mark into a strong,
distinctive trademark”); Standard Int’l Corp. v. Am. Sponge and Chamois Co., 394
F.2d 599, 157 USPQ 630, 631 (CCPA 1968) (“a mark which is initially a weak one
may, by reason of subsequent use and promotion, acquire such distinctiveness that it
can function as a significant indication of a particular producer as source of the goods
with which it is used”). We find that Opposer’s mark, when considered as a whole,
while perhaps not conceptually very strong, is nevertheless inherently distinctive,
and, as mentioned above, is a commercially strong mark entitled to a broad scope of
protection.
This factor therefore weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. The Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks.
We now turn to the DuPont factor concerning the similarities or dissimilarities of
the marks, and compare the marks for similarities and dissimilarities in appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1692.
While marks must be compared in their entireties and the analysis cannot be
predicated on dissecting the marks into their various components, different features
may be analyzed to determine whether the marks are similar. See In re Nat’l Data
Opposition No. 91235734
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Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic
that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be
considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”); Joel Gott Wines LLC
v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013) (citing Price Candy
Co. v. Gold Medal Candy Corp., 220 F.2d 759, 105 USPQ 266, 268 (CCPA 1955)).
Similarity in any one of the elements of sound, appearance, meaning, or commercial
impression is sufficient to support a determination of likelihood of confusion. See, e.g.,
Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 390 F.2d 728, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (CCPA 1968); In
re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1089 (TTAB 2016); Eveready Battery Co. v.
Green Planet Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1511, 1519 (TTAB 2009). In addition, because
Opposer’s and Applicant’s International Class 35 services are legally identical, “the
degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines” as
to these services. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874,
23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
There are similarities between Opposer’s and Applicant’s marks but there are also
differences. For ease of reference in following our analysis, we display Applicant’s
mark below, which Applicant described as “consist[ing] of the wording ‘APPLUS’ in
stylized form with the ‘A’ and top ‘P’ connected and the two ‘P’s overlapping, with the
wording ‘AUTOMOTIVE PARTS’ below”:
Opposition No. 91235734
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Applicant has described the larger, top portion of its mark as APPLUS. Because
AP and PLUS are in different colors, highlighting that they are different elements,
and because AP is clearly an abbreviation for AUTOMOTIVE PARTS, we agree that
AP and PLUS are distinct. Consumers will therefore perceive the mark as
“automotive parts plus” or “plus automotive parts,” which is similar in connotation to
AUTO PLUS. The commercial impressions of the marks therefore are similar.
We note too that Opposer’s mark is in standard character form. As such, its
display is not limited to any particular font style, size or color. See Viterra, 101
USPQ2d at 1909-10; Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98
USPQ2d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d
1181, 1186 (TTAB 2018) (literal elements of standard character marks may be
presented in any font style, size or color). Opposer’s mark hence may be displayed in
the same coloring as Applicant’s mark, with the term AUTO in black and the word
PLUS in the same orange coloring. Therefore, and because of the shared or related
wording, we find the marks to be similar in appearance.
The shared term PLUS creates a similarity in the overall sound of the marks,
especially if Applicant’s mark is abbreviated to A PLUS or AP PLUS. Consumers tend
to shorten or abbreviate marks. See Fiserv, Inc. v. Elec. Transaction Sys. Corp., 113
USPQ2d 1913, 1919 (TTAB 2015) (while there was no indication that the mark
Opposition No. 91235734
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PMONEY had any particular meaning other than the letter “P” plus the term
“Money,” the Board found it likely that with overlapping services, consumers will
perceive PMONEY as an abbreviation for POPMONEY); Barbara’s Bakery, Inc. v.
Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1288 (TTAB 2007) (BARBARA’S BAKERY is similar
to BARB’S BUNS BAKERY in short because Barb is a nickname or shortened version
of Barbara).
With regard to the meaning of the marks, Applicant introduced third-party
registrations containing A+ or A PLUS “to suggest high quality and grading.”7 Only
one registration has probative value because it pertains to vehicle parts or services
involving vehicle parts (Registration No. 5191144 for goods including “lights for
vehicles”). The other registrations are for unrelated goods or services and hence have
limited probative value. In addition, Applicant submitted the following third-party
uses:8
● A+ Brakes & Suspension (http://brandonflautoservice.com/)9
listing “Brakes, Alignments, Belts & Hoses” and stating “Located in
Brandon, Florida. A local family owned auto repair shop.”

● A+ AUTOCARE, Poway’s premier auto service center
(http://www.aplusautocare.com/)

● A+ Automotive Inc. “Trusted Automotive repair since 2010 Fair
Prices + Expert Service = A+ Automotive Inc.”
(http://www.aplusautomotiveservice.com/)

● A+ Auto Repair (https://dykstrasauto.com/a-plus-automotive-
4450-stauffer-kentwood/)

7 Applicant’s Notice of Reliance, 22 TTABVUE 2; Applicant’s Notice of Reliance Exh. 2, 22
TTABVUE 96-115.
8 Id. at TTABVUE 111-12.
9 Applicant’s Notice of Reliance Exh. 3, 22 TTABVUE 117-76.
Opposition No. 91235734
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● A+ Motor Vehicle Services
(https://www.yellowpages.com/chandler-az/mip/a-motor-vehicle-serv...)

● A Plus Auto Styling - Vehicle Protection Specialists in Maryland
“With over 10 years [of] experience in window tinting and protective film
installation, the Vehicle Protection Specialists at A-PLUS provide our
customers with high quality, state of the art, vehicle protection products
and services.” (https://aplusautostyling.com/)

● A-Plus Auto Service (https://southbendautorepair.net/auto-repair-
services/)

● A+Auto Glass (https://aplusautoglass.org/)

● A+ Auto Repair (https://aplusauto.net)

● A+ Japanese Auto Repair

The examples Applicant submitted do not include the term “Automotive Plus”
which in Applicant’s mark produces a different meaning than that offered by the
third-party websites. Also, Applicant’s mark includes a second letter “P” which is not
in the examples. We therefore are not persuaded by Applicant’s argument. Rather,
we find that because of the phrase AUTOMOTIVE PARTS under the letters “AP,”
consumers will perceive the letters AP and APPLUS as an arbitrary designation as
opposed to A PLUS.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the DuPont factor concerning the similarity
of the marks weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
D. Improper Intent
Opposer argues that Applicant has manifested an improper intent by proceeding
with the opposed application, relying on an email sent by Mr. Aydin to Opposer’s
Opposition No. 91235734
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counsel.10 Because a party may not offer evidence concerning settlement negotiations
directed towards a party's claim, see Fed. R. Evid. 408(a), Opposer’s argument is
without evidentiary support and unpersuasive.
E. Conclusion.
We have considered all of the evidence of record pertaining to the likelihood of
confusion. The parties’ International Class 36 services are legally identical in part,
and we presume that the trade channels and classes of consumers for these services
are identical. The International Class 12 goods are related to Opposer’s services and
the trade channels and customers for such goods and services are related to one
another. Although there are differences in the marks, on balance, the marks are
similar. We therefore conclude that Applicant’s mark for its goods and services is
likely to be confused with Opposer’s mark for its services. To the extent that we have
any doubts in our conclusion, we have resolved them against Applicant. See Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (doubts resolved against newcomer “because the newcomer has the opportunity
and obligation to avoid confusion”).
Decision: The opposition is sustained and registration to Applicant is refused for
goods and services in both International Classes.

10 Opposer’s Notice of Reliance No. 4, 20 TTABVUE 11, 19 and 22.