Huck Store Fixture Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 29, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 119 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

HUCK STORE FIXTURE CO. 119
Huck Store Fixture Company and Mid-Central Illi-
nois District Council of Carpenters affiliated
with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, AFL–CIO. Case 14–CA–
24484
May 29, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND TRUESDALE
On March 19, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Karl
H. Buschmann issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions and
supporting briefs, the General Counsel filed an answer-
ing brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions2 and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions as
modified4 and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-
fied and set forth in full below.5

1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied
as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and
the positions of the parties.
2 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s findings that the Respon-
dent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by Supervisor Trimpe’s interroga-
tion of employees about their union activities on February 13, 21, 26,
and 28, 1997, his threatening employees with discharge on February 21
and 26, 1997, his creating the impression that employees’ union activi-
ties were under surveillance on February 21, 1997, and his threatening
employees with physical violence on February 28, 1997.
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawfully en-
gaged in surveillance of employees’ union activities by Supervisors
Gibbs’ and Lockett’s appearing at and attempting to gain admission to
a union meeting, we note that the record shows that at least one em-
ployee attending the meeting saw Gibbs there and that Gibbs observed
two employees arriving at the meeting.
In adopting the judge’s finding that Supervisor Mock’s questioning
of employee Boone violated Sec. 8(a)(1), we find, contrary to the
judge, that Mock’s questions indicating that the Respondent knew
about the union activities of two employees did not in themselves con-
stitute surveillance. In agreement with the judge’s Conclusion of Law
3(h), however, Members Truesdale and Liebman find that the questions
unlawfully gave the impression that the employee’s union activities
were under surveillance. Chairman Hurtgen finds that the questions
were coercive interrogations in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) and finds it
unnecessary to pass on the allegation of conveying the impression of
surveillance, inasmuch as such additional violation would be cumula-
tive and would not affect the remedy or Order.
We find merit in the Respondent’s exception to the judge’s finding,
in sec. II of his decision, that the Respondent hired “many” of the em-
ployees who had been employed by the predecessor company when the
Respondent began operations in November 1995. The Respondent
hired only about 15 employees at that time, while the predecessor com-
pany had employed 150 to 200 employees. Our correction of this error,
however, does not affect the legal conclusions reached by the judge.
1. We agree, for the reasons set forth by the judge, that
the Respondent’s decision in late February 19976 to re-
duce its work force by 20 percent, and its resulting lay-
offs and discharges of 33 employees in early March,
were motivated by the union organizing activities of its
employees and that the layoffs and discharges violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The facts on which
these findings are based, set forth more fully by the
judge, are outlined as follows.
The Respondent manufactures and sells store display
fixtures and related products. The Respondent’s owner
and president, Dennis Prock, announced to his assembled
employees in mid-January that the Company’s outlook
was good for 1997 and that business had built up quicker
than he had anticipated. In early February, a group of the
Respondent’s employees, meeting with a union business
representative, formed an organizing committee and be-
gan distributing union authorization cards. On February
13, Prock called a meeting of all employees and, waving
a union authorization card in his hand, told the employ-
ees that the Respondent was aware of the cards and was
strongly opposed. He added that if anyone would like to
ask for their cards back and tear them up they could have
them. Beginning later that day and continuing for the rest
of the month, the Respondent’s supervisors committed a
series of 8(a)(1) violations, as set forth by the judge, in-
cluding interrogating employees about their union activi-
ties, threatening employees with discharge, plant closure,
relocation, and other reprisals because of their union ac-
tivities, creating the impression that the employees’ un-
ion activities were under surveillance, engaging in sur-
veillance of union activities, and circulating an antiunion
petition and assisting in obtaining employees’ signatures
on the petition. Thereafter, between March 4 and 11, the
Respondent laid off or discharged 33 of its employees.

4 We correct the judge’s inadvertent error in finding, in Conclusion
of Law 3(f), that Supervisor Winking threatened employees with physi-
cal violence. As the judge correctly indicated in sec. III,A(M) of his
decision and in Conclusion of Law 3(b), it was Supervisor Trimpe, not
Winking, who threatened employees with physical violence. We further
modify Conclusion of Law 3(f) to reflect the judge’s finding, set forth
in sec. III,A(C) of his decision, that Winking threatened employees
with plant relocation on February 19. The judge’s conclusions of law
inadvertently omitted this finding.
5 We have modified the notice posting and mailing provision of the
recommended Order in accordance with our decision in Excel Con-
tainer, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997).
6 All dates are in 1997, unless otherwise indicated.
334 NLRB No. 20
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 120
We agree that the General Counsel carried his Wright
Line7 burden of showing that the employees’ protected
activity was a motivating factor in the Respondent’s de-
cision to lay off or discharge these employees. Thus, the
General Counsel established that employees engaged in
union activity, that the Respondent had knowledge of
that activity, and that the Respondent demonstrated union
animus.8 As the judge noted, the Respondent conceded
that Prock learned on February 13 that authorization
cards were being circulated among employees. Further,
as the judge also noted, the evidence showed that the
Respondent was aware that a union meeting was held on
February 12 and that employees Steffen, Willis,
Schieferdecker, Budde, and Stice served on the union
organizing committee.9 The judge found that strong anti-
union animus was established by Prock’s announcement
to his assembled employees that he opposed the Union
and by the numerous 8(a)(1) violations committed by the
Respondent’s supervisory hierarchy, including threats of
plant closure and loss of jobs, coercive interrogations,
and surveillance of employees’ union activity. The judge
further found that the timing of the discharges and lay-
offs soon after the Respondent became aware of the un-
ion drive also suggested an unlawful motive.
We further agree with the judge that the Respondent
failed to carry its Wright Line burden of showing that it
would have laid off and discharged the employees even
in the absence of the protected union activity. The Re-
spondent denies that the layoffs and discharges were in-
stituted for antiunion reasons. Rather, it contends that
information learned during meetings with its customers
on February 18 and 19 led it to conclude that it needed to
sharply reduce production and, therefore, to lay off and
discharge employees. However, as the judge detailed, the
Respondent’s projection of orders following its February
customer meetings varied little from those on which
Prock’s upbeat January announcement to employees was
based. Even Prock admitted, as the judge noted, that the
“difference between the first part of January and the end
of February was not that significant.” However, the ac-
tion that the Respondent took purportedly due to this
difference—the layoff or discharge of 33 employees con-
stituting 20 percent of the Respondent’s work force—
was drastic. Thus, we agree with the judge that the Re-
spondent’s jettisoning of one-fifth of its work force was
not plausibly explained by the small change in the Re-
spondent’s projected orders following its February cus-
tomer meetings, and we concur in his rejection of this
explanation.10

7 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
8 As the Board explained in Regal Recycling, Inc., 329 NLRB 355,
356 (1999) (footnotes omitted):
Under the test set out in Wright Line, in order to establish that
the Respondent unlawfully discharged the . . . employees based
on their union activity, the General Counsel must show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the protected activity was a moti-
vating factor in the Respondent’s decision to discharge. Thus, the
General Counsel must show that the employees engaged in union
activity, that the Respondent had knowledge of that activity, and
that the Respondent demonstrated antiunion animus. Once the
General Counsel has made the required showing, the burden shifts
to the Respondent to demonstrate that it would have taken the
same action even in the absence of the protected union activity.
9 The Respondent’s knowledge of employees’ union views and ac-
tivities is further detailed in fn. 11, below.
We also agree with the judge in rejecting the Respon-
dent’s additional contention that its reduction in force
was due to the Respondent’s purported exhaustion of its
bank line of credit or its lack of cash. Three of the Re-
spondent’s officials, President Prock and Vice Presidents
Ronald Hamann and Gene Soebbing, made the decision
to institute the 20-percent reduction of the Respondent’s
work force at a meeting in February. In their testimony
concerning this meeting, none of them mentioned ex-
haustion of the Respondent’s line of credit or lack of
cash as a reason for their decision. Moreover, while evi-
dence was introduced to show that the Respondent at
certain times was using all of its bank line of credit, there
was no evidence that the Respondent requested the bank
to increase its line of credit prior to the layoffs and dis-
charges or sought at any time to obtain a line of credit
from any other bank. Additionally, in its February 18
meeting with Domino’s, one of the Respondent’s princi-
pal customers, Domino’s offered to pay the Respondent
for approximately 100 stores’ worth of Domino’s fix-
tures that the Respondent was holding in stock. The Re-
spondent, however, declined payment, saying that it was
not necessary. If the Respondent truly had been con-
cerned about its cash-flow position and the purported
exhaustion of its line of credit in February, it is unlikely
that the Respondent would have declined Domino’s offer
of payment for this substantial amount of inventory. Fi-
nally, as the judge noted and as we discuss below in sec-
tion 5, the Respondent’s grant of wage increases to ap-
proximately 30 employees on March 17 further belies its
argument that it had a cash-flow problem that required a
reduction in payroll.
Accordingly, we agree with the judge that the Respon-
dent’s explanations for its decision to layoff or discharge
20 percent of its work force are not supported by the re-
cord and are simply unconvincing. Thus, we agree with
10 We find it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s supplemental reason-
ing that, if the Respondent had really faced a business slowdown, it
could have reduced the work hours of all its employees rather than
conducting layoffs and discharges.

HUCK STORE FIXTURE CO. 121
the judge that the Respondent failed to establish that em-
ployees Tom Boone, Owen Brown, Gary Chapman,
James Ende, James Gallaher, Marty McClauhen, James
Payne, Jerry Schieferdecker, Brandon Schroder, Wayne
Steffen, Dennis Tarpein, Roger Willis, Quentin Brace,
Dan Byington, James Cannon, Joe Chitwood, Kyle
Daggett, Jack Doran, Greg Hultz, Crystal Jenkins, Wes
Massengill, Daniel Werneth, John Boaerson, Robert
Booher, Leonard Brooks, Ed Fruit, Jeremy Fruit, Sam
Hutton, John Jacobs, Tom Killday, Tyson Mauck, Kevin
McAffee, and Pierre Parrish would have been laid off or
discharged in the absence of union activity. See We Can,
Inc., 315 NLRB 170, 173 (1994) (finding employer’s
explanation for drivers’ discharges highly implausible,
Board found employer failed to show that it would have
discharged drivers in the absence of union activity).
2. While the judge found that the Respondent’s layoffs
and discharges of 33 employees between March 4 and 11
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, the General
Counsel excepts to the judge’s failure to find that the
Respondent’s adoption of a new attendance policy and its
preparation of employee evaluations in late February and
early March independently violated the Act. We find
merit in these exceptions.
After deciding in February to reduce its work force by
20 percent, the Respondent conducted new evaluations of
employees as part of its process of implementing this
decision, even though it had evaluated all of its employ-
ees in November 1996, only 4 months earlier. In the new
evaluations, supervisors graded employees on each of
five criteria—attitude, absenteeism, work habits, quality
of work, and knowledge. To grade absenteeism (also
referred to as attendance), the Respondent devised a new,
more stringent scoring system than it had previously
used. As a result, many employees received much lower
ratings for absenteeism in the new evaluations than they
had received in their November 1996 evaluations.
As discussed above, the General Counsel demon-
strated, under the Wright Line test, that the employees’
protected union organizational activity was a motivating
factor in the Respondent’s decision to lay off and dis-
charge employees, and the Respondent failed to show
that it would have made the same decision in the absence
of the protected union activity. The Respondent’s Febru-
ary–March 1997 employee evaluations and adoption of a
new absenteeism policy were undertaken expressly to
carry out the Respondent’s unlawful decision to lay off
and discharge employees and would not have been un-
dertaken but for this decision. Accordingly, we find that
the Respondent’s ad hoc evaluations and application of
the new absenteeism policy violated Section 8(a)(3). See
Pace Industries, 320 NLRB 661, 662 (1996), enfd. 118
F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 1997) (Sec. 8(a)(3) violated by em-
ployer’s use of employment screening criteria to avoid
successorship obligation, where screening criteria would
not have been adopted except for the employees’ union
activities).
We further find that the evaluations were also unlawful
because they were used to target union supporters for
layoff or discharge. Because the evaluations employed
subjective criteria, such as “attitude,” they could be
scored so as to obtain desired results. The Respondent
knew which employees supported the Union and which
did not. It had unlawfully assisted in the circulation of
antiunion petitions among the employees.11 The evalua-
tions resulted in the Respondent’s laying off or terminat-
ing 27 percent of the employees (21 out of 79) who had
not signed the antiunion petitions but only 6 percent of
the employees (5 out of 81) who had signed an antiunion

11 The importance of the antiunion petitions, circulated February 26
and 27—after the Respondent decided to reduce its work force by 20
percent but before it imposed the layoffs and discharges—was reflected
in the interest that the Respondent’s supervisors and managers showed
in assuring the petitions’ successful circulation. Thus, when Supervisor
Gibbs noticed that the circulating petition was missing, he contacted
Production Coordinator Smith, and they jointly notified Vice President
Soebbing. Smith and Soebbing then went to Supervisor Mock’s de-
partment in search of the petition and found that it had been located.
Supervisor Winking subsequently “kept an eye on” the petition as it
circulated through his department. Winking noticed that the petition’s
circulation ceased when it reached employee Gallaher, who had put it
in his toolbox. Winking insisted that Gallaher relinquish the petition,
but Gallaher refused. Gallaher’s sidetracking of the petition apparently
was of great concern, as it prompted Winking to page Smith and Soeb-
bing over the intercom. Smith and Soebbing went to Winking’s office,
and he informed them that Gallaher was holding the petition. A second
antiunion petition thereafter circulated. When its circulation was com-
pleted, Supervisor Winking gave the petition to President Prock.
The antiunion petitions systematically provided knowledge of the
employees’ union sentiments to the Respondent. However, the Respon-
dent also knew the identity of some union supporters through other
means. For example, Supervisor Winking learned from employees that,
in his department, employees Budde, Schieferdecker, Steffen, Stice,
and Willis supported the Union, and he passed this information along to
Production Coordinator Smith. Winking also discussed the identity of
union supporters with Supervisors Gibbs, Mock, and Trimpe. Smith
observed Budde and Willis distributing union authorization cards.
Smith also testified that he knew employees’ views supporting or op-
posing the Union because he was on the plant floor all day and heard all
the comments. The Respondent also learned employees’ union views
through Winking’s, Trimpe’s, and Mock’s unlawful interrogations of
employees and through Supervisors Gibbs’ and Lockett’s observation
of employees when they appeared at and attempted to enter a union
meeting. Moreover, the questions that the supervisors asked in the
interrogations often reflected prior knowledge of employees’ union
views.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 122
petition.12 Moreover, 5 of the 11 employees13 who were
discharged on March 4 had signed authorization cards
and 10 of the 12 employees14 laid off March 11 had
signed authorization cards. Additionally, four of the
seven members of the union organizing committee were
among those laid off on March 11.15 Accordingly, we
find that the Respondent’s conducting evaluations in
February–March 1997 also violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) on the basis that the evaluations were used to dis-
criminate against employees because of their union ac-
tivities. See Federal Screw Works, 310 NLRB 1131,
1141–1143 (1993) (employer unlawfully gave employees
poor evaluations and discharged them because of union
activities); see also American Wire Products, 313 NLRB
989, 994 (1994) (disproportion in union and nonunion
employees laid off or discharged may be persuasive evi-
dence of discrimination); Baker Mfg. Co., 269 NLRB
794, 816 (1984), enfd. in relevant part 759 F.2d 1219
(5th Cir. 1985) (lopsided percentage favoring layoff or
termination of union supporters is indicative of unlawful
motivation); Holding Co., 231 NLRB 383, 390 (1977)
(disproportionate number of union adherents discharged
is persuasive evidence of discrimination). 16
3. We also find merit in the General Counsel’s excep-
tion to the judge’s failure to find that the Respondent’s
March 10 hiring of 10 employees violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1). As of February 28, the Respondent em-
ployed 26 temporary employees who it had obtained
through Snelling Personnel Services, a personnel agency.
Even though the Respondent had decided in February to
reduce its work force by 20 percent, on March 10 it hired
10 of the Snelling employees as its own employees. The
Respondent had already discharged 11 employees on
March 4 and laid off 10 employees on March 7. Further,
on March 11, the day after the Respondent hired the 10
Snelling employees, the Respondent unlawfully laid off
an additional 12 of its own employees.17 Thus, by hiring
the 10 Snelling employees, the Respondent avoided a
significant work force reduction while getting rid of
many union supporters. Moreover, had the Respondent’s
decision to reduce its work force been lawfully moti-
vated, it logically would have terminated all temporary
employees so as to minimize the number of its own em-
ployees who would be terminated.18 That the Respondent
did not do so underscores its unlawful motive for its
work force reduction.

12 These figures do not include seven temporary employees who
were laid off or discharged because they had not worked at the Respon-
dent’s plant for 300 hours and thus were not eligible for hire. At the
time of the layoffs and discharges, the Respondent was employing
temporary employees through Snelling Personnel Services, a personnel
agency. The Respondent converted some of the temporary employees
to be directly employed by the Respondent, and it terminated the re-
maining temporary employees. Under its agreement with Snelling, the
Respondent could not hire as its own employee any temporary em-
ployee who had worked fewer than 300 hours.
13 Employees Brooks, Jeremy Fruit, William Fruit, Hutton, and Par-
rish had signed authorization cards.
14 Employees Boone, Brown, Chapman, Gallaher, McGlauchlen,
Payne, Schieferdecker, Tarpein, and Willis had signed authorization
cards.
15 As the judge found, the members of the organizing committee
were employees Brown, Budde, Schieferdecker, Steffen, Stice, Van-
dermaiden, and Willis. Brown, Schieferdecker, Steffen, and Willis were
included in the March 11 layoff. The record does not support the Re-
spondent’s contention that the organizing committee had a different
composition that which the judge found.
16 Chairman Hurtgen agrees with his colleagues that the Respon-
dent’s preparation of evaluations prior to the unlawful layoff and dis-
charge of employees violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) because they were
undertaken to carry out the Respondent’s unlawful decisions to lay off
and discharge these employees and would not have been undertaken but
for those decisions. He therefore finds it unnecessary to pass on
whether the evaluation procedure violated the Act on the additional
basis that it allegedly disproportionately affected union supporters.
As discussed above, the General Counsel demon-
strated, under the Wright Line test, that the employees’
protected union organizational activity was a motivating
factor in the Respondent’s decision to lay off and dis-
charge employees, and the Respondent failed to show
that it would have made the same decision in the absence
of the protected union activity. The Respondent’s hiring
of the 10 Snelling employees on March 10 was an inte-
gral part of the Respondent’s unlawful scheme to dis-
charge and lay off employees who engaged in union ac-
tivities. Moreover, the Respondent’s hiring of the 10
Snelling employees would not have occurred but for the
Respondent’s decision to discharge and lay off other em-
ployees. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent’s hir-
ing of the 10 Snelling employees on March 10 violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) the Act.
4. In his remedy, the judge ordered the Respondent to
reinstate and make whole all 33 employees who it unlaw-
fully laid off or discharged between March 4 and 11,
including the 10 Snelling employees discharged March 7.
17 As noted above, of the 12 employees laid off March 11, 10 had
signed union authorization cards and 4 were members of the organizing
committee.
18 The Respondent contends that it hired some of the Snelling em-
ployees while terminating its own employees simply because it wished
to retain the most qualified employees. However, the Respondent pre-
viously had hired 11 Snelling employees as the Respondent’s own
employees in December 1996. In doing so, the Respondent selected the
best qualified of the Snelling employees who had worked at its facility
at least 300 hours. Snelling subsequently sent the Respondent addi-
tional new temporary employees in January and February. Thus, when
the Respondent hired 10 additional Snelling employees as its own
permanent employees on March 10, the only Snelling employees avail-
able were ones who had been passed over for hire as permanent em-
ployees in December 1996 or had been working at the Respondent’s
facility only a short period of time.

HUCK STORE FIXTURE CO. 123
The Respondent excepts, contending that the judge erred
in extending this remedy to the employees of Snelling
Personnel Services, who were working at the Respon-
dent’s facility as temporary employees. We agree, in
part, with the Respondent’s exception.
The appropriate remedy here is governed by Vemco,
Inc., 314 NLRB 1235 (1994). In that case, the employer
unlawfully discharged certain of its own employees as
well as temporary employees supplied by a labor con-
tractor. While the Board ordered the employer to make
whole all the unlawfully discharged employees, it or-
dered the employer to reinstate only its own employees.
As to the temporary employees, the Board ordered the
employer to notify the labor contractor that it had no ob-
jection to their employment at the plant. Id. at 1242.
In accord with this precedent, we shall modify the
judge’s remedy to omit the requirement that the Respon-
dent reinstate employees of Snelling Personnel Services,
but we shall order the Respondent to notify Snelling Per-
sonnel Services that it has no objection to employees
Quentin Brace, Dan Byington, James Cannon, Joe Chit-
wood, Kyle Daggett, Jack Doran, Greg Hultz, Crystal
Jenkins, Wes Massengill, and Daniel Werneth being em-
ployed at the Respondent’s facility. The appropriate ter-
mination date for the make-whole remedy for the unlaw-
fully discharged Snelling Personnel Services employees
shall be determined in compliance proceedings.
5. We adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent’s
granting of wage increases violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1). Employees’ dissatisfaction with wages was a princi-
pal issue in the union organizing effort. On February 13,
the day on which Prock informed the employees that he
was aware that union authorization cards were being cir-
culated and that he strongly opposed the Union, Prock
also held a meeting with his supervisors. At the supervi-
sory meeting, Prock asked if employees had revealed
why they wanted a union, and one or more of the super-
visors responded that employees had expressed dissatis-
faction with low wages.19 Thereafter, on March 17, the
Respondent granted wage increases to the approximately
30 employees whose hourly rate was less than $8. These
wage increases followed closely on the heels of the Re-
spondent’s unlawful layoffs and discharges of March 4,
7, and 11.
The Respondent contends that these wage increases
were based on length of service and established pay
scales, but the record does not support this contention.
The Respondent’s only evidence concerning what
prompted the wage increases was the testimony of Vice
President Soebbing. When asked why the wage increases
were given right after the layoffs, Soebbing stated that
Vice President Hamann and Production Coordinator
Smith had come to him and said that the Respondent had
a number of employees who had been there for a long
time and were earning $7 or 7.50 per hour and Hamann
and Smith wanted to move these employees up to a
minimum of $8 and “that’s what we did.” Wage in-
creases had been given only 4 months earlier, in Novem-
ber 1996. Thus, the Respondent’s testimony shows that
the March 17 wage increases were given on an ad hoc
basis rather than on the basis of any predetermined
schedule and that the wage increases had not been
planned before the Respondent became aware of its em-
ployees’ union activity and the role that the employees’
dissatisfaction with low wages played in that activity.
Consequently, under these circumstances, and given the
wage increases’ close proximity to the unlawful March
layoffs and discharges, we agree with the judge that the
March 17 wage increases violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act, as we find that they were motivated by the
Respondent’s desire to discourage the employees’ union
activities and would not have been made in the absence
of such activities. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (Sec. 8(a)(1) “prohibits not only
intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immedi-
ately favorable to employees which is undertaken with
the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of
choice for or against unionization and is reasonably cal-
culated to have that effect”); Holly Farms Corp., 311
NLRB 273, 274 (1993), enfd. 48 F.3d 1360 (4th Cir.
1995), affd. 517 U.S. 392 (1996) (inference of improper
motivation and interference with employee free choice
drawn from evidence and “failure to establish a legiti-
mate reason for the timing of the increase”).

19 These facts are established by the uncontroverted testimony of two
supervisors present at the meeting, Vice President Soebbing and Pro-
duction Coordinator Smith.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Huck Store Fixture Company, Quincy, Illi-
nois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Coercively interrogating employees about their un-
ion activities, sympathies, and the union activities of
other employees.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge, loss of
jobs, physical violence, and unspecified reprisals because
of the employees’ union activities.
(c) Threatening employees with plant closure or plant
relocation because of their union activities.
(d) Creating the impression that employees’ union ac-
tivities are under surveillance and engaging in surveil-
lance of employees’ union activities.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 124
(e) Telling employees to find another job if they sup-
port the Union and telling employees that they must ob-
tain permission from management to engage in union
activities.
(f) Circulating and assisting in obtaining signatures on
antiunion petitions.
(g) Maintaining rules that prohibit solicitation by em-
ployees on nonworktime and prohibit distribution of lit-
erature by employees on nonworktime and in nonwork
areas of its facility.
(h) Discharging, laying off, and reassigning employees
because of the employees union activities.
(i) Granting pay raises to employees in order to dis-
courage union activities.
(j) Conducting new employee evaluations and adopt-
ing a new attendance policy in order to unlawfully dis-
charge and lay off employees.
(k) Hiring new permanent employees in order to
unlawfully discharge or lay off other employees.
(l) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Tom Boone, Owen Brown, Gary Chapman, James Ende,
James Gallaher, Marty McClauhen, James Payne, Jerry
Schieferdecker, Brandon Schroder, Wayne Steffen, Den-
nis Tarpein, Roger Willis, John Boaerson, Robert Boo-
her, Leonard Brooks, Ed Fruit, Jeremy Fruit, Sam
Hutton, John Jacobs, Tom Killday, Tyson Mauck, Kevin
McAffee, and Pierre Parrish full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if these jobs no longer exist, to substan-
tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their sen-
iority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed.
(b) Make whole Tom Boone, Owen Brown, Gary
Chapman, James Ende, James Gallaher, Marty McClau-
hen, James Payne, Jerry Schieferdecker, Brandon
Schroder, Wayne Steffen, Dennis Tarpein, Roger Willis,
John Boaerson, Robert Booher, Leonard Brooks, Ed
Fruit, Jeremy Fruit, Sam Hutton, John Jacobs, Tom Kill-
day, Tyson Mauck, Kevin McAffee, and Pierre Parrish
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them in the manner
set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s decision.
(c) Make whole Quentin Brace, Dan Byington, James
Cannon, Joe Chitwood, Kyle Daggett, Jack Doran, Greg
Hultz, Crystal Jenkins, Wes Massengill, and Daniel
Werneth, for any loss of earnings and other benefits suf-
fered as a result of the discrimination against them in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s
decision, provided, however, that termination dates of
their respective backpay periods shall be determined in
compliance proceedings.
(d) Notify Snelling Personnel Services that it has no
objection to Snelling Personnel Services’ referring Quen-
tin Brace, Dan Byington, James Cannon, Joe Chitwood,
Kyle Daggett, Jack Doran, Greg Hultz, Crystal Jenkins,
Wes Massengill, and Daniel Werneth to work in its facil-
ity.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful layoffs, dis-
charges, employee evaluations, and attendance policy,
and within 3 days thereafter notify the affected employ-
ees in writing that this has been done and that the layoffs,
discharges, employee evaluations, and attendance policy
will not be used against them in any way.
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of back-
pay due under the terms of this Order.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Quincy, Illinois, copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”20 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respon-
dent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since February 13, 1997.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.

20 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

HUCK STORE FIXTURE CO. 125
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees
about their union activities, sympathies, or the union ac-
tivities of other employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge,
loss of jobs, physical violence, or unspecified reprisals
because of the employees’ union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with plant closure
or plant relocation because of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that employees’
union activities are under surveillance or engage in sur-
veillance of employees’ union activities.
WE WILL NOT tell employees to find another job if
they support the Union or tell employees that they must
obtain permission from management to engage in union
activities.
WE WILL NOT circulate or assist in obtaining signa-
tures on antiunion petitions.
WE WILL NOT maintain rules that prohibit solicita-
tion by employees on nonworktime or prohibit distribu-
tion of literature by employees on nonworktime or in
nonworkareas of our facility.
WE WILL NOT discharge, lay off, or reassign em-
ployees because of the employees’ union activities.
WE WILL NOT grant employees pay raises in order to
discourage union activities.
WE WILL NOT conduct new employee evaluations or
adopt a new attendance policy in order to unlawfully
discharge and lay off employees.
WE WILL NOT hire new permanent employees in or-
der to unlawfully discharge or lay off other employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Tom Boone, Owen Brown, Gary Chapman,
James Ende, James Gallaher, Marty McClauhen, James
Payne, Jerry Schieferdecker, Brandon Schroder, Wayne
Steffen, Dennis Tarpein, Roger Willis, John Boaerson,
Robert Booher, Leonard Brooks, Ed Fruit, Jeremy Fruit,
Sam Hutton, John Jacobs, Tom Killday, Tyson Mauck,
Kevin McAffee, and Pierre Parrish full reinstatement to
their former jobs or, if these jobs no longer exist, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed.
WE WILL make whole Tom Boone, Owen Brown,
Gary Chapman, James Ende, James Gallaher, Marty
McClauhen, James Payne, Jerry Schieferdecker, Brandon
Schroder, Wayne Steffen, Dennis Tarpein, Roger Willis,
John Boaerson, Robert Booher, Leonard Brooks, Ed
Fruit, Jeremy Fruit, Sam Hutton, John Jacobs, Tom Kill-
day, Tyson Mauck, Kevin McAffee, and Pierre Parrish
for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from
their layoff or discharge, less any net interim earnings,
plus interest.
WE WILL make whole Quentin Brace, Dan Byington,
James Cannon, Joe Chitwood, Kyle Daggett, Jack Doran,
Greg Hultz, Crystal Jenkins, Wes Massengill, and Daniel
Werneth, for any loss of earnings and other benefits re-
sulting from their layoff or discharge, less any net in-
terim earnings, plus interest, provided, however, that the
termination dates of their respective backpay periods
shall be determined in compliance proceedings.
WE WILL notify Snelling Personnel Services that we
have no objection to Snelling Personnel Services’ refer-
ring Quentin Brace, Dan Byington, James Cannon, Joe
Chitwood, Kyle Daggett, Jack Doran, Greg Hultz, Crys-
tal Jenkins, Wes Massengill, and Daniel Werneth to work
in our facility.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful layoffs, discharges, employee evaluations, and atten-
dance policy, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter,
notify the affected employees in writing that we have
done so and that we will not use the layoffs, discharges,
employee evaluations, and attendance policy against
them in any way.

HUCK STORE FIXTURE COMPANY

Christal J. Gulick, Esq., for the General Counsel.
John T. Gazzoli Jr., Esq. (Lewis, Rice & Fingers, L.C.), of St.
Louis, Missouri, for the Respondent.
William McCleary Jr., Esq. (Kamp, Roberts & Mitchell), of
Quincy, Illinois, for the Respondent.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 126
Gerald Kretmar, Esq. (Appleton, Kretmar & Beatty), of St.
Louis, Missouri, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Quincy, Illinois, on June 17–20, and on July 7
and 8, 1997. On a charge filed by the Mid-Central Illinois Dis-
trict Council of Carpenters (the Union) on March 12, as
amended on April 30, 1997, the General Counsel issued a com-
plaint against the Huck Store Fixture Company charging it with
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (the Act). More specifically, the complaint alleges
that the Respondent committed numerous independent acts of
8(a)(1) misconduct, such as coercive interrogations of employ-
ees, threatening employees with plant closure, discharge, and
unspecified reprisals, creating the impression of surveillance,
and circulating and assisting in obtaining signatures on an anti-
union petition. The Company also stands accused of 8(a)(3)
violations, devising a new attendance policy and new evalua-
tions for employees and discharging and laying off numerous
employees because of their union activity.
The Respondent’s answer admits the jurisdictional aspects of
the complaint, as well as the supervisory hierarchy consisting
of Dennis Michael Prock, president; Gene Soebbing, vice
president for administration; Ronald J. Hamann, vice president
of production; Kent A Smith, production coordinator; as well as
Supervisors Jeffrey Gibbs, Steve Lockett, Paul Lowe, Ronald
Mock, Dave Schnelbacher, Roger J. Trimpe, and James E.
Winking. However, the Respondent’s answer denied the com-
mission of any unfair labor practices.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Respondent,1 I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Huck Store Fixture Company, an Illinois corporation located
in Quincy, Illinois, is engaged in the manufacture and nonretail
sale of store display fixtures and related products. With sales to
and purchases from points outside the State valued in excess of
$50,000, the Company is admittedly an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Union is admittedly a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to November 1995, the Respondent’s facility was
owned by K-Mart Corporation and known as Huck Fixture
Company. It employed approximately 150 to 200 employees
whose production and maintenance employees were repre-
sented by the Union. K-Mart’s decision to close the facility
prompted Dennis Prock to purchase the Company on Novem-
ber 1, 1995.

1 The General Counsel’s motion to strike the Respondent’s letter of
September 23, 1997, with enclosures is granted.
Prior to the actual purchase of the facility, Prock had con-
tacted the Union. The parties met several times in September,
but an effort to reach an agreement failed. The Union’s effort
to resume negotiations in October and thereafter remained un-
successful.
When the Company under Prock’s control began operations
in November 1995, it hired many of the employees who had
been employed by the predecessor company, including carpen-
ters, finishers, and laborers. In January 1996, the Company
experienced a downturn in orders which lasted about 2 months.
In order to reduce production, Prock decided to cut the hours of
all employees rather than laying off any employees.
In January 1996, the Respondent engaged Snelling Personnel
Services in order to provide the Company with temporary em-
ployees. The agreement included a proviso that the Respondent
could hire a Snelling employee after he or she had worked for
300 hours. Snelling referred four employees in January 1996
and another four in April 1996. The Respondent also hired
employees directly in 1996 and 1997, reaching a complement
of about 200 production and maintenance employees. In De-
cember 1996, the Company hired a number of Snelling em-
ployees who had worked for the Respondent more than 300
hours.
In mid-January 1997, Prock assembled his employees, in-
cluding supervisors and informed them as follows (Tr. 117,
1002):

He was telling us that our, the work for the year was,
outlook was. . . . The workload was well covered for the
year of ‘97. That they were working, looked like they
were going to get orders from fourteen new Borders stores
and that they were working with Phillips 66 and that the
outlook was good and there wasn’t much to worry about.
And that the business had built up quicker than he had an-
ticipated.

On January 20, 1997, the Union held its first meeting with
interested employees. Employee Cecil Wayne Steffen, who
initially had been employed by Snelling and then transferred as
a Huck employee in December 1996, contacted the Union on
January 1, 1997. The Union’s business representative, Roger
Schoenekase, advised Steffen to solicit other employees for a
union meeting to be held on January 20. A second meeting was
held on January 30, 1997. During the third meeting on Febru-
ary 6, 1997, the attending employees signed union authoriza-
tion cards and formed an organizing committee which included:
Wayne Steffen, Jerry Schieferdecker, Roger Willis, Roger
Stice, Owen Brown, Lenny Vandermaiden, and Rich Budde.
Additional employees signed cards which they received from
the members of the organizing committee.
Management became aware of the organizational efforts by
its employees on or before February 13, 1997. On that day,
Prock assembled his employees and spoke to them as recalled
by employee Steffen (Tr. 54):

Yes, he jumps up on a work bench and he had a Union au-
thorization card in his right hand. And he was waving it over
his head and he said, himself and management was aware of
this and they strongly opposed and if anybody would like to

HUCK STORE FIXTURE CO. 127
ask for their cards back and tear them up they could have
them.

And that he’d treated us fairly and with open door policy and
at that time he jumped off the bench and left the door.

Prock held several meetings with his management staff
where, according to several of his supervisors’ testimony he
advised them not to threaten employees or to interrogate them
about the Union. They were not to speak about the Union with
the employees unless they were asked. Prock indicated to his
management team that he was opposed to the Union. He asked
them why the employees wanted to organize. One of the su-
pervisors responded, saying that the employees resented
Prock’s large house and his expensive way of life while paying
his employees low wages.
On February 20, 1997, four union representatives, including
Shoenekase distributed union literature, including information
about a union meeting to the employees at the Respondent’s
facility. Supervisor Jeffrey Gibbs approached the union offi-
cials. They provided him with the union literature. The union
meeting on February 22, 1997, was attended by about 17 em-
ployees. Supervisors Gibbs and Steve Lockett went to the
meeting but were denied access by the Union’s business agent.
On February 26, 1997, employee Mark Smith, brother-in-law
of Vice President Gene Soebing, initiated an antiunion petition.
He and Supervisor Trimpe signed the petition and circulated it
among the employees (GC Exh. 10). When employee James
Gallaher received the petition, it already contained numerous
signatures. He did not circulate the petition, but hid it in his
toolbox and gave it to the Union. Smith circulated another anti-
union petition among the employees after Gallaher had re-
moved the first one. This petition was also signed by several
supervisors (GC Exh. 11). Supervisor Ronald Mock signed the
petition and passed it to the employees in his department.
Winking received the petition and gave it to Prock.
The Respondent also engaged in numerous other antiunion
activities many of which went beyond any legitimate bounds of
conduct.
On February 20, 1997, the Respondent made a personnel de-
cision to reduce the payroll. As a result, the Respondent dis-
charged 11 employees on March 4, 1997, and laid off 10 of the
Snelling employees on March 7, 1997, as well as 12 of its own
employees on March 11, 1997. On March 10, 1997, the Re-
spondent hired 10 Snelling employees into permanent posi-
tions. The Respondent also gave pay raises to a number of
employees on March 17, 1997. Employees were selected for
discharge or layoff on the basis of a point system which in-
cluded an employee’s absenteeism record, as well as evalua-
tions prepared by supervisors.
In June 1997, the Respondent decided that production had to
be increased and that employees had to work overtime in cer-
tain departments, and that additional employees had to be hired.
The General Counsel argues emphatically that the Respon-
dent’s layoffs and discharges were motivated by the Com-
pany’s antiunion animus and were not justified by business
reasons, and that the Respondent manipulated the evaluation
and point systems so as to target union supporters. The Re-
spondent’s position is that it fairly selected employees for the
reduction in its work force and that the Company experienced a
slowdown in orders which made it unavoidable to reduce its
work force. The Respondent also argues that all supervisors
with the exception of Trimpe denied having made the unlawful
statements attributed to them.
III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Independent 8(a)(1) Conduct
(A) As alleged in the complaint on February 13, 1997, Su-
pervisor Trimpe admittedly spoke to several employees after
Dennis Prock, president of the Company, had expressed to the
assembled employee his unequivocal opposition to the Union.
Trimpe approached five employees who were eating by their
workstation and asked them what they thought about the Union.
On the following day, February 14, Trimpe spoke with two
employees about his own past experience with the Union.
Trimpe walked by employee Jeremy Fruit’s workstation and
asked Fruit what he thought he could get from the Union.
When Fruit replied that he would expect higher wages, Trimpe
replied that he might get a 10-cent raise but that Fruit would not
be better off because he would have to pay union dues.
Interrogating employees about the Union violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act if the interrogation was coercive under the
surrounding circumstances. Here, the coercion is not directly
apparent, but the questioning occurred twice, once after the
chief executive’s strong expression of his opposition to the
Union. The questions were bluntly directed at the employees’
union activity rather than in the context of a casual conversa-
tion. Under these circumstances, I find such conduct suffi-
ciently coercive so as to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(B) On February 14, 1997, Supervisor James Winking, ap-
proached employee Jerry Schieferdecker at his workbench.
Initially speaking about baseball, Winking spoke about the
Union. Schieferdecker asked if he wanted to speak seriously or
merely “chit chat.” Winking said that he was seriously inter-
ested what the employees thought of the Union. Schieferdecker
responded that it was time something was done about the em-
ployees’ pay. Winking responded that if confronted with the
Union, the Company would close the doors and leave the area.
Ten or 15 minutes later, Winking returned and inquired if
Schieferdecker had heard anything about any actual organizing
by the employees. Winking added that it was just too early for
the employees to organize.
In his testimony, Winking denied that he threatened this em-
ployee with plant closure. However, I did not credit Winking’s
testimony in this regard, based on my observation of his de-
meanor and his inconsistent testimony. For example, he ex-
pressed his desire to join the Union. Yet he had already signed
a petition opposing it. Under these circumstances, the record
supports the allegations in the complaint that Winking coer-
cively interrogated the employee and unlawfully threatened him
with plant closure. The questions, accompanied by threats,
obviously create a coercive atmosphere in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
(C) Winking also spoke with employee James Gallaher. On
February 19, 1997, Winking told Gallaher that Prock would
move the plant elsewhere if the employees were to organize a
union. Again, I credit Gallaher’s testimony rather than Wink-

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 128
ing’s denial of the conversation. A statement that the plant
would be moved or relocated because of the employees’ union
activity has long been considered a violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act unless the remark was based on objective facts or
probable consequences beyond management’s control. Wink-
ing made the statements without any basis of such facts. The
allegation in the complaint is accordingly substantiated by the
record.
(D) On February 17, 1997, Thomas Boone, an employee as-
signed to Supervisor Ronald Mock’s department, had a conver-
sation with his supervisor. Mock did not deny in his testimony
that the conversation occurred. Boone testified credibly that
Mock asked him at his workstation whether he had attended the
last union meeting. Boone answered that he did. Mock then
inquired how many people were present at the meeting. Boone
replied six or seven. Mock continued asking questions about
the Union, wanting to know who was behind the organizing
effort. Boone replied that he could find out by attending the
union meetings. Mock then asked whether Richard Buddy or
Roger Willis were organizing the Union. Boone refused to
answer the question and the conversation ended.
Mock’s series of questions about Boone’s and the other em-
ployee’s union activities were coercive, particularly in the light
of Mock’s persistent manner of interrogation.
Moreover, the inquires about the union activities of the two
specific employees constitutes a form of surveillance. Neither
employee was known as an open union supporter. Neverthe-
less, Mock’s questions about the union activities of two union
organizers shows that the Company knew about their activity,
giving rise to a presumption that the employees’ union activi-
ties were under surveillance. This conduct and the coercive
interrogation violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(E) A similar scenario occurred on February 21, 1997, when
Supervisor Trimpe admittedly spoke with employees Jason
Mooneyham and Jeremy Fruit. Trimpe asked them if they were
going to attend the next scheduled union meeting. Fruit said
that he did not know. Trimpe then said that they better not go
because he would recognize their car. If he drove by the meet-
ing place and saw their car he would have to fire them. Fruit
replied that it sounded illegal to him. Trimpe stated that Fruit
could not be fired for his union activity but that he could be
fired for his performance on the job.
Coupled with threats of discharge, Trimpe’s questions were
coercive. Moreover, Trimpe conveyed the impression that he
would recognize the employees’ cars at the union meeting.
This message has the tendency to discourage these employees
from attending union meetings. Accordingly, not only was the
interrogation coercive and violative of the Act, Trimpe’s threat
of discharge and the impression he created that employees’
attendance at union meetings were under surveillance also con-
stitute 8(a)(1) violations, as alleged in the complaint.
(F) On February 22, 1997, the Union held an employee
meeting at its union hall. Approximately 17 employees at-
tended the meeting. The record shows that Supervisors Jeffrey
Gibbs and Steve Lockett went to the union hall and tried to gain
admission to the union meeting. Gibbs had earlier obtained a
written notice of the meeting which the Union had passed out to
the Respondent’s employees. Gibbs had approached Schoene-
kase and requested the flyer addressed to “Huck Employees.”
Because he, as a supervisor, is considered a member of Re-
spondent’s management, he was not admitted to the meeting,
nor were supervisors invited. Appearing at a union meeting
and attempting to gain entry is considered unlawful surveil-
lance of employees’ union activity because employees would
be reluctant to attend such a meeting knowing that they would
be seen by management. The Respondent thereby violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(G) Supervisor Paul Lowe initiated a conversation on Febru-
ary 25, 1997, at about 12:15 with employee Richard Budde. In
a confrontational manner, he inquired why Budde was trying to
organize the Union. Budde testified that he stood there and
asked what Lowe was talking about. Lowe said that he
[Budde] “knew what in the hell [Lowe] was talking about, that
[Budde] was sneaking around under the table, trying to get
cards signed and that if [he] was a real man, [he] would stand
up and talk to everyone and not just one at a time” (Tr. 1089).
Lowe also asked whether Budde did not feel guilty about the
possibility that employees would loose their jobs for what he
was doing and added that employees could lose their jobs, their
livelihood and their ability to support their families because of
Budde. Lowe finally said that if Buddy didn’t like working
there, that he “should get the hell out, actually quit, before” he
cost everybody their jobs.
This conversation, the substance of which was not contra-
dicted, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in several respects as
alleged in the complaint. First, Lowe threatened the employee
with the loss of jobs because of his union activity; second,
Lowe’s observation about the hidden activity to obtain signa-
tures on union cards created the impression of unlawful surveil-
lance; third his inquiry occurred under clearly coercive circum-
stances because of Lowe’s aggressive attitude and his threats.
Lastly, the remark that Budde should look for another job, be-
cause of the union activity, is clearly coercive.
(H) On February 26, 1997, Supervisor Trimpe admittedly in-
formed Mark Smith, an employee, that he had to obtain the
permission of Gene Soebbing to circulate an antiunion petition.
Requiring an employee to obtain permission from management
to engage in a union activity, albeit against the Union, is unlaw-
ful. Accordingly, Trimpe’s statement violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
(I) Smith circulated the antiunion petition among the em-
ployees for their signatures (GC Exh. 10). Trimpe took the
petition, signed it, and then proceeded to pass it around to about
eight employees in his department urging them to sign the peti-
tion. Trimpe not only urged employees to sign, but he also
threatened them with discharge if they refused to sign the peti-
tion. He ultimately handed the signed document to David
Schnelbacker, the shipping department supervisor.
The Respondent’s conduct in this regard violated Section
8(a)(1) in several respects, first a supervisor’s solicitation of an
antiunion drive among his subordinates amounts to unlawful
interrogation because employees are required to disclose their
reaction to the Union. Secondly the threat of discharge in con-
nection with the antiunion petition as well as a supervisor’s
participation in its circulation constitute unlawful interference
with the employees’ Section 7 rights.

HUCK STORE FIXTURE CO. 129
(J, K.) During the middle of the day, Supervisor Jeffrey
Gibbs contacted Kent Smith, coordinator of production, to in-
form him that the petition had disappeared. They informed,
Gene Soebbing of the petition’s disappearance. Soebbing went
to Supervisor Ronald Mock’s department where they discov-
ered that the petition had surfaced. Supervisor James Winking
who had found the petition promptly signed it in front of the
employees. He admitted during his testimony that he kept an
eye on the petition, but that it disappeared again. Employee
James Gallaher had taken it and placed it in his toolbox. Wink-
ing confronted Gallaher ordering him to produce it. But Gal-
laher refused. Smith promptly prepared a second antiunion
petition (GC Exh. 11). Winking assisted in the circulation of
the second petition, and handed it to Mock for his signature.
Mock passed the petition around among the employees in his
department.
On the following day, February 27, Smith took the second
petition and handed it to Soebbing who in turn placed it on
Prock’s desk.
According to the complaint, the following management offi-
cials engaged in unlawful interrogation: Soebbing, Smith,
Winking, Mock, and Gibbs. They also stand accused of circu-
lating the petition and obtaining signatures on an antiunion
petition. When the supervisors put the employees on the spot
by circulating the petition to them, management was able to
observe who among the employees favored the Union and who
was willing to sign the document. This form of conduct was
obviously coercive and amounted to unlawful interrogation. It
is also clear that supervision in aiding and abetting the circula-
tion of an antiunion petition violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Finally, Winking by keeping an eye on the petition, observing
its circulation and its subsequent disappearance as Gallaher
placed the petition into his toolbox, his stern questioning of
Gallaher about it and his request that the petition be returned,
constitute unlawful surveillance and coercive interrogation in
violation of Section 8(a)(1).
(L) A conversation on February 26 between Winking and
employee Carl Steffen concerning the Union was alleged as a
violation of Section 8(a)(1). The record shows that Winking
approached Steffen and spoke initially about a basketball game.
Winking then inquired about the Union. Steffen responded that
he was interested in anyone who could help improve his pay
and benefits. Winking said that he lost his job with the prede-
cessor company, because of the Union, and that he would do
whatever it took to keep his job. Winking suggested that
Steffen speak to someone who could counsel him better like his
father-in-law. When Steffen replied that his father-in-law, an
IBEW representative, had just organized his workplace, Wink-
ing abruptly left.
Winking violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening the em-
ployee with unspecified reprisals, when he threatened to do
anything to keep the Union out. In this context the interroga-
tion was coercive and also in violation of the Act.
(M) Supervisor Trimpe had a confrontation with Gallaher on
about February 28 or 29, 1997, in the presence of two other
employees near the coffee machine. Trimpe looked at Gallaher
and speaking in a loud voice said: “What do you boys think
about this Union shit?” (Tr. 570.) The employees did not re-
spond and Trimpe continued saying, “I think we ought to take
you boys out who signed union cards, and kick your asses.”
Trimpe’s conduct amounted to a threat of physical violence
and coercive interrogation in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
(N) The Huck Store Fixture Company Employee Handbook
provides in pertinent part:

No one may distribute literature or post notices on
company premises without written permission from man-
agement. All request for such activities will be in accor-
dance with these standards.

The policy provides further that employees are subject to
discipline including discharge for violations of the policy. The
policy is presumptively invalid as it prohibits the solicitation by
employees on their own time. Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 394
(1983). The Respondent has not shown that the policy was
either not enforced or provided for exceptions to the blanket
prohibition. Accordingly, it is clear that the Company’s main-
tenance of such a policy violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. LAYOFFS AND DISCHARGES
The complaint alleges that the Company violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act when on March 4, 1997, it discharged
11 employees based on an attendance policy and job evalua-
tions which were applied retroactively because the employees
engaged in union activities. On March 7, 1997, the Company
laid off 10 employees and on March 11, 12 more employees
were laid off. Yet on March 10, 1997, 10 employees who had
held temporary positions with Snelling were converted into
permanent employees. These personnel actions occurred, ac-
cording to the General Counsel, not for legitimate business
reasons, but for reasons relating to the Union.
The Respondent argues that the Respondent under the lead-
ership of Dennis Prock resurrected a failed company through
his investments and that he was encouraged by local civic lead-
ers to reopen that facility. The Respondent grew substantially
in a relatively short time. The Company hired a substantial
number of employees, including supervisors from the predeces-
sor company. In mid-January 1997, Prock informed the em-
ployees that the outlook for the business was excellent and that
it exceeded his expectations. He explained that the current goal
was to build up the inventory in order to avoid overtime sched-
ules which the Company had experienced in the prior year.
The Respondent further agrees that in spite of Prock’s ex-
pressed optimism for the balance of 1997, inventories were
building up and the Company increasingly resorted to the bank
credit line in order to finance the operation. By March 1, 1997,
so argues the Respondent, the Company had exhausted its
credit line and was unable to finance further inventory or pay
wages or raw material costs for new production without reve-
nue from product deliveries. Moreover, according to the Re-
spondent, Prock learned in early February, while visiting Phil-
lips 66, a customer located in Oklahoma, that it had taken its
store construction in house, resulting in a substantial reduction
in business from that source. In addition, other customers like
Dominos and Borders had not committed themselves to produc-
tion and delivery schedules all of which convinced manage-
ment on February 20, 1997, that it was overstaffed by 20 to 25

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 130
percent. The Company then proceeded to devise a formula
designed to evaluate the work force and to retain the most
qualified and productive employees. Among the various de-
partments, the staffing in the cabinet rooms were particularly
targeted for reductions. As a result employees were evaluated
by their supervisors on the basis of a point system. Also in-
cluded in the overall evaluation was the individual’s absentee-
ism record which was assembled by senior management. The
Respondent does not contest that the individuals named in the
complaint were laid off or discharged.
Based on my analysis of the record, including the financial
information, I find that the Respondent’s personnel actions
were motivated by union animus inconsistent with and unjusti-
fied by the state of Respondent’s business. Under the Respon-
dent’s evaluation system a greater number of prominent union
activists lost their jobs than the number of union supporters
who remained employed, although several employees who had
no history of union activity also became unemployed.
A logical discussion of the reasons for the reduction in the
work force starts with Prock’s announcement to the assembled
employees in the second half of January that business looked
good, that the Company was building inventory because it had
commitments and was trying to reduce overtime work which
was necessary in the prior year. Prock indicated that business
had improved quicker than anticipated.
The Respondent’s two largest and important customers Bor-
der and K-Mart, had already made commitments for products
which were at least as large as those in 1996. In addition, the
Respondent had two other customers, Domino’s and Phillips
66, For example, in 1996, Respondent’s business with Borders
consisted of about $4 million worth of fixtures. This compared
with orders in 1997 exceeding $5 million in fixtures. Similarly,
Respondent’s business with K-Mart which in 1996 amounted to
almost $2.5 million was expected in January to grow to almost
$3.4 million in 1997. Respondent expected to sell $500,000
worth of fixtures to Dominos. Another customer was Phillips
66 which in 1996 ordered almost $300,000 worth of products.
On February 20, 1997, the Respondent anticipated to obtain
orders from that customer worth about $480,000 in sales. This
was the only reduction in anticipated business, because in Janu-
ary 1997, projected sales to Phillips 66 were $750,000 in or-
ders. In addition, the Respondent was able to obtain a new
customer, Highsmith, and expected $500,000 worth of new
business. In sum, as pointed out by the General Counsel, the
Respondent hoped to exceed its 1996 sales, by $1.5 million
from Borders, $1 million from K-Mart, $500,000 from Dom-
ino’s and Highsmith, and $180,000 from Phillips 66.
In the middle of February, the two senior executives, Prock
and Soebbing, went out to visit their customers to obtain firmer
commitments. Meetings on February 18 and 19 with officials
of Dominos, K-Mart, and Borders substantiated Respondent’s
projections, although Borders had not formally committed it-
self. Only Phillips 66 was “the wild card” in this scenario be-
cause it had indicated a reduction in its orders, from a high of
$750,000 to $480,000.
This scenario supports the optimism expressed by Prock in
January 1997 to the employees that business looked good. The
Respondent’s meetings with its four major customers in Febru-
ary should have confirmed the optimism, because only one of
the customers, Phillips 66, projected fewer orders than that
expected, and that decrease—$270,000—was relatively small
in comparison to the increase in orders from the other custom-
ers, constituting approximately 3 percent of the anticipated
orders for 1997.
In his testimony, Prock conceded that his business outlook in
early January and his business outlook in February 1997 had
not changed significantly. For example, he testified as follows
(Tr. 1315):

I figured we had the core business of Phillips, Borders,
K-Mart and Dominos to sustain the number of workers
there plus going out and getting some business. I thought
it looked—I know it looked a lot better and I made this
comment—than it did a year earlier.
. . . .
So the difference between the first part of January and
the end of February was not that significant but yet it was
enough that we had to make some changes.

The Respondent, however, made not only “some changes”
but drastic changes. Respondent’s brief refers to “factual in-
formation currently available from the four major customers
. . . determined that Respondent had 20–25 percent more pro-
duction workers than required” (R. Br. p. 6). Accordingly 33
employees were discharged and laid off.
The Respondent’s assertion with regard to the overstaffing is
plainly inconsistent with the record evidence summarized
above. Instead, the record shows that the personnel action was
made, as alleged in the complaint, because of the employees’
union activity.
The Respondent had solid information that the Union was at-
tempting to organize the employees. It is conceded that on
February 13, 1997, Prock learned that authorization cards were
being circulated. The record shows that the Company was
aware that a union meeting was held on February 12, 1997.
Moreover, the Respondent admitted knowing these principal
union activists who served on the organizing committee,
Steffen, Willis, Schieferdecker, Budde, and Stice. Prock had
obtained a union card and supervisors had obtained information
from the employees through interrogations and surveillance.
The record shows the Respondent’s strong and unequivocal
antiunion animus. Prock announced to the employees, espe-
cially assembled to listen to his message that he was opposed to
the Union. In addition, the Company’s supervisory hierarchy
committed numerous independent 8(a)(1) violations, such as
threats of plant closure and the loss of jobs, coercive interroga-
tions and surveillance of employees’ union activity. Supervi-
sors were involved in circulating antiunion petitions and so
informed Prock. In short, the Respondent’s antiunion animus
was strong, clear, and unambiguous.
The timing of the massive discharges and layoffs suggests an
unlawful motive. On February 13, Prock had knowledge of the
union drive and within days Prock and Soebbing made the de-
cision to reduce the work force by 20 percent. Management
promptly devised a method to evaluate its employees. On
March 4, 10, and 11, 1997, the Company effectuated its plan
and discharged and laid off 33 employees. It is well recognized

HUCK STORE FIXTURE CO. 131
that timing is an important factor in assessing motivation. The
Board frequently infers that an asserted justification is a pretext
and that an adverse personnel action was discriminatorily moti-
vated. Causley Pontaic v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980).
On March 17, 1997, the Company granted wage increases to
those employees who were earning less than $8. Approxi-
mately 33 employees were affected by the increase in pay.
If in reality the Respondent had faced a business slowdown,
it could have done what was done in January of the prior year
and reduced the working hours of all of its employees. At that
time the Respondent was not faced with a union drive of its
employees. Moreover, if the Respondent had actually been
overstaffed in March, it would have been unnecessary to aug-
ment its employee complement by the same number of employ-
ees already in June 1997. Similarly, the Respondent would not
have had to start a second shift so soon in the mill room and
have the entire work force work overtime. And finally, the pay
raises granted within days of the discharges and layoffs belies
the argument that the Respondent’s cash flow problem required
a reduction in the payroll.
Clearly, the Respondent’s justification for the discharges and
layoffs in March were totally unjustified by business reasons.
Instead, the Respondent was motivated by its union animus. I
cannot credit Prock’s or Soebbing’s testimony that the decision
for the layoffs and discharges were business related2 and find
that the business justification amounted to a pretext, and that
the discharges and layoffs violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act. The Respondent clearly failed to establish a business
justification and any suggestion that these 33 individuals would
have been laid off or discharged even in the absence of the
employees’ union activity is simply unconvincing and not sup-
ported by the record. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980),
enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982).
The General Counsel argues not only that the adoption and
enforcement of the evaluation policy was unlawful because it
was used in response to the employees’ union activity, but she
also submits in great detail that the evaluation policy was de-
signed to target individual union supporters. Evidence of this
effort was Respondent’s concentrated layoffs in the cabinet
rooms where the majority of union supporters worked, and the
selection of production workers rather than laborers. Lower
scores were given to employees who did not sign the antiunion
petition, and skilled employees were selected rather than the
less skilled.
The records shows that the Respondent was advised by legal
counsel in the planning of this job action. Once the decision
was made to reduce the employee complement, the Respondent
used a method which appeared lawful and nondiscriminatory
on its face. Supervisors assigned a numerical score to each
employee, based on five categories, attitude, work habit, quality
of work, absenteeism, and knowledge (GC Exh. 3). In addition,
the Respondent devised an attendance policy and a formula
designed to evaluate the employees’ attendance. The record
shows that some union supporters lost their jobs pursuant to the
policy and some did not. Similarly, some employees who did
not support the union lost their jobs. Most of the employees
laid off on March 11 had signed union cards and half of the
ones discharged March 4 had signed union cards. For example,
employees Brooks, William Fruit, and Jeremy Fruit, Hutton,
and Parrish were discharged. The General Counsel may be
correct that the evaluation system was set up in such a way so
as to include as many union supporters as possible. Why for
example, did the process include evaluations for the Snelling
temporary employees. That relationship could simply have
been canceled in order to save the jobs of as many of Respon-
dent’s employees as possible. The Respondent counters by
stating that it wanted to retain the most productive employees.
The record also shows that relatively more skilled employees
were laid off, which included many of the union supporters.
Known union supporters who were laid off were Willis,
Steffen, Brown, Schieferdecker, and Gallaher. The evaluation
process lent itself to a subjective appraisal of each employee,
which could have been used to the disadvantage of union sup-
porters. These and other arguments tend to support the General
Counsel’s theory, although I believe that the evaluation policy
was not discriminatory on its face and not unlawful per se.

2 For the reasons stated in the General Counsel’s detailed brief, I find
unreliable and implausible the Respondent’s lack of cash argument.
Domino’s negotiator, for example, offered to pay for the built up inven-
tory in February 1997.
However, the unlawfulness of Respondent’s entire job action
of discharges and layoffs is well supported by the record. The
Respondent’s effort to target union supporters through the
evaluation process substantiates the finding of the 8(a)(3) and
(1) violations.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
each of the following acts and practices.
(a) Supervisor Trimpe coercively interrogating employees
about their union activities on February 13, 21, 26, and 28,
1997;
(b) Trimpe threatening employees with discharge on Febru-
ary 21 and 26, and with physical violence on February 28,
1997, because the employees engaged in union activities.
(c) Trimpe creating the impression that the employees’ un-
ion activities are under surveillance on February 21.
(d) Trimpe telling employees that they must obtain permis-
sion from the Respondent to engage in union activities.
(e) Supervisor Winking coercively interrogating employees
about their union activities on February 14 and 26, 1997.
(f) Winking threatening employees with plant closure and
relocation on February 14, with unspecified reprisals on Febru-
ary 26 and with physical violence on February 28, 1997, be-
cause the employees engaged in union activities.
(g) Supervisor Mock coercively interrogating employees on
February 20 and 26, 1997, about their union activities.
(h) Mock creating the impression that employees’ union ac-
tivities were under surveillance on February 20, 1997.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 132
(I) Supervisors Gibbs and Lockett engaging in surveillance
of employees’ union activities.
(j) Supervisor Lowe coercively interrogating employees
about their union activities on February 25, 1997, and creating
the impression that union activities were under surveillance.
(k) Lowe threatening to discharge employees because of
their union activities.
(l) Lowe telling an employee that he should find another job
if he wanted to engage in union activities.
(m) Supervisors Soebbing, Smith, Winking, Mock, and
Gibbs coercively interrogating employees about their union
sympathies, by soliciting them to sign an antiunion petition and
unlawfully circulating and assisting in obtaining signatures on
an antiunion petition.
(n) Maintaining an overly broad solicitation policy which
prohibits any solicitations on company property without prior
approval by management.
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by its job actions and changes made on March 4, 7, 10, and
11, 1997, because of the employees’ union activities, including
discharging the following employees on March 4, 1997:

John Boaerson John Jacobs
Robert Booher Tom Killday
Leonard Brooks Tyson Mauck
Ed Fruit Kevin McAffee
Jeremy Fruit Pierre Parrish
Sam Hutton

and laying off the following employees on March 7

Quentin Brace Jack Doran
Dan Byington Greg Hultz
James Cannon Crystal Jenkins
Joe Chitwood Wes Massengill
Kyle Daggett Daniel Werneth

March 11

Tom Boone James Payne
Owen Brown Jerry Schieferdecker
Gary Chapman Brandon Schroder
James Ende Wayne Steffen
James Gallaher Dennis Tarpein
Marty McGlauchen Roger Willis

6. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
granting wage increases to about 30 employees because of the
employees’ union activities.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged and laid off the above referenced employees, I shall
recommend that the Respondent offer them immediate and full
reinstatement to their former jobs or a substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
them. All backpay provided shall be computed with interest on
a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed by the Board in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and with interest com-
puted in the manner and amount prescribed in New Horizons
for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]