HOSHIKO LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 17, 2021

2020000498 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 17, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/652,419 10/15/2012 Gary Stephen Shuster 6657-19201 8385
35690 7590 06/17/2021
KOWERT, HOOD, MUNYON, RANKIN & GOETZEL, P.C.
1120 S. Capital of Texas Hwy
Building 2, Suite 300
Austin, TX 78746
EXAMINER
GMAHL, NAVNEET K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2166
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/17/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent_docketing@intprop.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________

Ex parte GARY STEPHEN SHUSTER and
BRIAN MARK SHUSTER
_______________

Appeal 2020-000498
Application 13/652,419
Technology Center 2100
_______________

Before JUSTIN BUSCH, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 21–37, 39, and 40, which constitute
all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to content filtering. Abstract; Spec.
1:10–3:9; Figs. 1, 3.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies
Intellectual Ventures I LLC as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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Claims 1, 28, and 35 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is representative2 of the subject matter on appeal
(emphases added):
1. A method for content filtering, comprising:
receiving, by a computer system, from two or more users,
a plurality of requests for review of various content items,
wherein each of the various content items is accessible via a wide
area network;
removing at least some identifying information from one
or more of the plurality of requests, wherein identifying
information includes information that can identify a user
generating a corresponding request of the plurality of requests;
prioritizing the plurality of requests, including by
postponing at least one request for review of a particular content
item until a certain number of requests for the particular content
item have been received;
transmitting, by the computer system, the prioritized
plurality of requests for review to a reviewing resource that
comprises a network-connected device configured to present
content to a human reviewer;
receiving, by the computing system, a respective
classification corresponding to at least one of the various content
items from the reviewing resource;
associating, by the computer system, the at least one of the
various content items with the respective classification provided
by the reviewing resource based on review of the respective
content items by the human reviewer; and
designating, by the computer system, the at least one of the
various content items associated with the respective
classification provided by the reviewing resource as acceptable
for viewing by users having a particular type of authorization
credential, but unacceptable for viewing by users having a
different type of authorization credential.

Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App’x).

2 Appellant’s arguments are directed to claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–20; Reply
Br. 2–5. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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REJECTIONS3
Claims 1, 21–37, 39, and 40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 8–9.

ANALYSIS
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.
There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “‘[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
70 (2012) (brackets in original).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77).
In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the
claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us

3 In the Final Action, the Examiner states “claims 1, 21–37, and 39–40 are
allowable subject matter in view of prior art if the 101 rejection and Double
Patenting can be overcome.” Final Act. 9–10. In the Answer, the Examiner
states “the double patenting rejection is withdrawn.” Final Act. 3–5; Ans. 3.
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are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third
party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic
concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
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commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published
guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).
“All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management,
expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at
1 (October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility).
Under this guidance, we first determine whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated, then the
claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent eligible under
§ 101. Id.
The § 101 Rejection of Claims 1, 21–37, 39, and 40
In the Final Action, the Examiner determined the claims are directed
to the abstract idea of methods of organizing human activity and
[t]hese claim recite “receiving request, removing information
according to request, prioritizing requests, requests being sent to
a human reviewer, classifying, associating and designating for
display” which are equivalent of identifying information,
determining and analyzing information and rendering an analysis
result which may be regarded as an abstract idea under “Certain
methods of Organizing Human Activity”. “Certain methods of
Organizing Human Activity” has been found by courts (e.g.
Electric Power Group, Classen) to be abstract ideas. The claims
do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount
to significantly more than the judicial exception because it recites
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elements such as the computer system, transmitting by computer
system, receiving by the computer system, which are routinely
known common in the art.

Final Act. 6.
The claims do not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because the additional elements are simply receiving
request, removing information according to request, prioritizing
requests, requests being sent to a human reviewer, classifying,
associating and designating for display. Taking the elements both
individually and as a combination, the claim as a whole does not
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea of methods
of organizing human activity.

Id. at 9.
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in determining the claims are
directed to ineligible subject matter. Appeal. Br. 9–19; Reply Br. 2–5.
According to Appellant, the claims are an improvement to content filtering
on networked terminals and therefore are not directed to an abstract idea
(also referred to as “argument (1)”). Appeal Br. 12–14. Appellant argues
the claims amount to significantly more than the alleged abstract idea (also
referred to as “argument (2)”). Id. at 14–17. Appellant argues the Final
Office Action fails to establish a prima facie case of unpatentability, and
fails to follow the guidance of the Berkheimer Memo4 (also referred to as
“argument (3)”). Id. at 17–19.

4 USPTO Commissioner for Patents Memorandum to the Patent Examining
Corps, “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.)” (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF.
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Regarding argument (1), Appellant argues the Specification sets forth
a technical problem of known content filtering approaches of automatic key
word analysis and image pattern recognition as compared to human review.
Appeal Br. 12–13 (citing Spec. 1:10–2:6). According to Appellant, claim 1
presents a technical solution to the identified technical problems in content
filtering. Id. Appellant argues the claims “improve computer-related
technology by providing ‘network filtering that is more accurate in filtering
out undesired content’ by improving ‘the accuracy and efficiency of human
review’ and ‘with the detection and removal of undesirable information.’”
Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted) (citing Spec. 2:24–25, 12:18–21).
Regarding argument (2), Appellant argues, even assuming that the
claims are directed to an abstract idea, the claims amount to significantly
more than the alleged abstract idea (“identifying information, determining
and analyzing information and rendering an analysis result”) and, as such,
constitute patent-eligible subject matter. Id. at 14. Appellant compares
claim 1 to a representative patent eligible claim in Bascom and asserts claim
1 is similar. Id. at 15 (Bascom Global Internet Serv., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). In particular, Appellant quotes
portions of the Federal Circuit’s Bascom decision, stating:,
“[t]he claims do not merely recite the abstract idea of filtering
content along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet,
or to perform it on a set of generic computer components. Such
claims would not contain an inventive concept.” “Nor do the
claims preempt all ways of filtering content on the Internet;
rather, they recite a specific, discrete implementation of the
abstract idea of filtering content.” Instead, the patent “describe[d]
how its particular arrangement of elements [was] a technical
improvement over prior art ways of filtering [] content,” and the
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claims were therefore “read to ‘improve[] an existing
technological process.’”

Id. at 15–16 (alterations in original) (emphasis and internal citations omitted)
(quoting Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350–51).
According to Appellant, as in Bascom, claim 1 recites “a specific,
discrete implementation” of any underlying abstract idea, and operates in a
“non-conventional and non-generic” manner that improves the area of
content filtering on networked terminals. Id. at 16–17.
Regarding argument (3), Appellant argues the Final Action does not
explain why the identified claim limitations correspond to the identified
abstract idea in Electric Power Group or Classen. Id. at 17–18 (citing Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
Appellant argues the Examiner’s Step 2B analysis is procedurally deficient
and its brevity does not adequately address why the additional elements do
not add significantly more to the exception. Id. at 18. Appellant also argues
the Final Action fails to follow the guidance in the Berkheimer Memo that
“an additional element (or combination of elements) is not well-understood,
routine or conventional unless the examiner finds, and expressly supports a
rejection in writing with, one or more” of a list of supporting factors. Id. at
19 (emphasis omitted) (citing Berkheimer Memo at 3).
In the Answer, regarding argument (1), the Examiner determines the
claims are not directed to an improvement in the computer-related
technology because the invention, at best, improves the human review
process by prioritizing the requests and classifying the content items based
on the result of human review. Ans. 16–17. According to the Examiner, the
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claims and the teaching in the Specification are not improving the computer
or technology, instead, the Appellant is introducing human intervention to
overcome the asserted problem in the computer technology. Id. at 17. The
Examiner refers to Appellant’s response below as an admission:
[t]he claimed technical solution provides an improvement to
computer functionality. For example, in at least some
embodiments, the instant claims improve computer-related
technology by providing “network filtering that is more accurate
in filtering out undesired content” by improving “the accuracy
and efficiency of human review” and “with the detection and
removal of undesirable information.”

Id. (quoting Appeal Br. 14).
Regarding argument (2), the Examiner refers to the limitations of
claim 1 and determines that it recites a process that, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitations in the mind
but for the recitation of generic computer components. Id. at 17–18.
According to the Examiner,
other than reciting “by the computer system,” nothing in the
claim element precludes the step from practically being
performed in the mind. For example, but for the “by the
computing system” language, “associating” and “designating” in
the context of this claim encompasses the human reviewer
classifying the information and categorizing as acceptable or
unacceptable for view. If a claim limitation, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in
the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components,
then it falls within the “Mental Processes” grouping of abstract
ideas. Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea.

Id. at 18.
The Examiner determines the judicial exceptions are not integrated
into a practical application because the additional elements (computer
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system and network connected device) are recited at a high level of
generality such that they amount to no more than instruction to apply the
exception using a generic computer component. Id.
The Examiner then determines the claim does not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because, as discussed above with respect to integration of the
abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element of using a
computer system and a network-connected device configured to present
content to a human reviewer amounts to no more than mere instructions to
apply the exception using a generic computer component. Id. at 18. The
Examiner states that mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic
computer component cannot provide an inventive concept. Id. The
Examiner then notes the courts have recognized the following computer
functions as well-understood, routine, and conventional functions when they
are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or
as insignificant extra-solution activity, see MPEP § 2106.05(a)(I)(iii). The
Examiner notes that merely using a computer to perform an abstract idea
does not render a claim patent eligible. Id. at 18–19 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)).
The Examiner then parses claim 1 and explains how the claim recites
the use of a generic computer system to automate a process and the limitations
(underlined) can be performed by a human being:
receiving from two or more users, a plurality of requests
for review of various content items, wherein each of the various
content items is accessible via a wide area network, the content
items could be documents submitted by two or more people[;]
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removing at least some identifying information from one
or more of the plurality of requests, this can be done by blacking
out or whiting out information[;]
wherein identifying information includes information that
can identify a user generating a corresponding request of the
plurality of requests, prioritizing the plurality of requests,
including by postponing at least one request for review of a
particular content item until a certain number of requests for the
particular content item have been received; this too can be done
by humans where requests are tabled till a quota is met[;]
transmitting, the prioritized plurality of requests for
review to a reviewing resource that comprises a network-
connected device configured to present content to a human
reviewer; here the information is being reviewed by a human
reviewer and the pile of requests can be delivered to this
reviewer[;]
[r]eceiving, a respective classification corresponding to at
least one of the various content items from the reviewing
resource; the reviewer can classify data as any type of categories
of classification such as topic wise mathematics/physics/
chemistry/biology or quality wise acceptable/unacceptable, and
so on[;]
[a]ssociating, the at least one of the various content items
with the respective classification provided by the reviewing
resource based on review of the respective content items by the
human reviewer; this can be done by putting them in different
folders/sections/tables/piles[;] and
designating, the at least one of the various content items
associated with the respective classification provided by the
reviewing resource as acceptable for viewing by users having a
particular type of authorization credential, but unacceptable for
viewing by users having a different type of authorization
credential, [d]ocuments that are classified by the human reviewer
who has the authority by classifying it designates it as
acceptable/unacceptable.

The claims when considered in order of writing and in
combination are an abstract idea and the generic use of a
computer system to automate the process does not add
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significantly more to the abstract idea. Appellant states claim 1
recites “a specific, discrete implementation” of any underlying
abstract idea, and operates in a “non-conventional and non-
generic” manner that improves the area of content filtering on
networked terminals but this is not further explained as to how
the filtering is non-conventionally or non-generically done. The
claim is using human mental process for review and filtering.

Id. at 19–20 (paragraph returns added for clarity).
Regarding argument (3), the Examiner determines the evidence
establishes a prima facie case of unpatentability. Id. at 20–21. The
Examiner finds the additional elements of computer system and network
connected device are well-understood, routine, and conventional elements
when analyzed under Step 2B. The Examiner identifies applicable computer
functions, such as a computer system, transmitting and receiving by the
computer system that are considered well-understood, routine, and
conventional and cites case law and the MPEP. Id.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the claims provide improvements
to a specific technical field of content filtering on networked terminals, and
Appellant asserts that improvements to the user experience as described in
the Specification may be considered improvements to a technical field
because they improve the user experience. Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant refers
to the patent eligible improved interface of Core Wireless as supportive of
claim 1 patent eligibility. Id. (citing Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Appellant argues claim 1 is
similar to the claims in Core Wireless, which “were ‘directed to a particular
manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices’ in
a way that ‘improve[d] the efficiency of using the electronic device,’ and, as
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a result, the claims were found to be patent-eligible.” Id. at 3–4 (alteration
in original).
Below, pursuant to the USPTO Guidance, representative claim 1 is
reviewed with regard to reciting the abstract ideas of mental processes and
organizing human activity. The claim 1 limitations may be parsed as set
forth below wherein elements that reflect recitation of these abstract ideas
are italicized:
1. A method for content filtering, comprising:
receiving, by a computer system, from two or more users,
a plurality of requests for review of various content items,
wherein each of the various content items is accessible via a wide
area network;
removing at least some identifying information from one
or more of the plurality of requests, wherein identifying
information includes information that can identify a user
generating a corresponding request of the plurality of requests;
prioritizing the plurality of requests, including by
postponing at least one request for review of a particular content
item until a certain number of requests for the particular content
item have been received;
transmitting, by the computer system, the prioritized
plurality of requests for review to a reviewing resource that
comprises a network-connected device configured to present
content to a human reviewer;
receiving, by the computing system, a respective
classification corresponding to at least one of the various content
items from the reviewing resource;
associating, by the computer system, the at least one of the
various content items with the respective classification provided
by the reviewing resource based on review of the respective
content items by the human reviewer; and
designating, by the computer system, the at least one of
the various content items associated with the respective
classification provided by the reviewing resource as acceptable
for viewing by users having a particular type of authorization
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credential, but unacceptable for viewing by users having a
different type of authorization credential.

In addition to the Examiner’s finding that much of the claim
limitations are directed to the abstract idea of “certain methods of organizing
human activity” (Final Act. 6), each of the italicized limitations can be
performed as mental processes (Ans. 17–18). If a method can be performed
by human thought alone, or by a human using pen and paper, it is merely an
abstract idea and is not patent eligible under § 101. CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “That
purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a
computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v.
Benson.” Id. at 1375. See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
839 F.3d 1138, 1146–47 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, the claim is broadly written and directed to content filtering.
We adopt the findings of the Examiner that the limitations can be done
mentally and by pen and paper. Ans. 18–19. Additionally, we note
Appellant does not persuasively dispute these findings.
In view of the above, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites
the abstract idea of mental processes, and is analogous to Electric Power
Group, 830 F.3d 1350. Additionally, we note that the italicized limitations
also recite the abstract idea of organizing human activity, such as “managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people,” such as
“social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions.” See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The Federal Circuit explains the “directed to” inquiry is not simply
asking whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept:
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The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, [566 U.S. at 71] (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of
the specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2, of the Guidance to
determine whether additional elements recited in the claims beyond the
judicial exception of claim 1 integrate the abstract ideas (“certain methods of
organizing human behavior” and “mental processes”) into a practical
application. Such additional elements may reflect an improvement to a
technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
As discussed below, there are no additional limitations recited beyond
the judicial exception itself that integrate the exception into a practical
application. More particularly, the claims do not recite: (i) an improvement
to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see
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MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial
exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an
article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other
meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See also 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
We refer to the additional elements below (emphases added):
receiving, by a computer system . . . accessible via a wide area
network;
transmitting, by the computing system . . . to a reviewing
resource that comprises a network connected device;
receiving, by the computer system;
associating, by the computer system;
designating, by the computer system.
These additional elements merely perform, or apply the abstract idea.
The claim is broadly written and the improvement, if any, of the claim is in
the abstract idea itself, not in the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field. No particular machine, no transformation, and
no other meaningful limitation is persuasively argued by Appellant. Nor do
the additional elements use the alleged abstract idea in a meaningful way
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP §
2106.05(e).
The additional elements merely implement an abstract idea using
known computer systems, wide area networks, and network connected
devices as tools to perform the abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(f). The
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limitations add insignificant extra-solution activity to the abstract idea. See
MPEP § 2106.05(g). The limitations merely use the abstract idea by linking
it to a particular technological environment. See MPEP § 2106.05(e).
Because the additional elements of claim 1 do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application, we determine representative claim
1 is directed to an abstract idea. See Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2.
Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
analyze the claims under Step 2B of the Guidance (step two of Alice ) to
determine whether there are additional limitations that individually, or as an
ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than
the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–
73, 77–79). As stated in the Guidance, many of the considerations to
determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two
of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining
whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical
application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Thus, at this point of our analysis, we
determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of
limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a
high level of generality. Id.
As with the integration into a practical application analysis discussed
above, an inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of
nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic Techs. Ltd.
v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after determining a claim
is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the
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claims before us?’” (emphasis added, brackets in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is furnished by an element
or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the
judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim as a whole amounts to
significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–
19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc.,
899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in
Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s
use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood,
routine and conventional” (emphasis added)).
On the record before us, the claims fail to recite specific limitations
(or a combination of limitations) that are not well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Rather, the additional elements (i.e., computer system, wide
area network, and network connected device) are recited at a high level of
generality or are basic computer functions, none of which Appellant
persuasively argues is beyond what was well-understood, routine, and
conventional in the art. See Spec. 22:7–14, 27:16–30, 39:9–29; see also
Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314,
1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (generic computer components such as an
“interface,” “network,” and “database” fail to satisfy the inventive concept
requirement).
To the extent Appellant argues the claim recites a solution to a
problem in computer technology that adds significantly more, we note that
these steps are part of the ineligible abstract idea. “If a claim’s only
‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using conventional
and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a
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patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.” BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at
1290–91 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2018)). “[I]t is irrelevant whether [the claimed abstract idea] may have been
non-routine or unconventional as a factual matter . . . narrowing or
reformulating an abstract idea does not add ‘significantly more’ to it.” BSG
Tech, 899 F.3d at 1291.
Regarding case law cited by Appellant, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments. In McRO, the claimed process used a combined
order of specific rules that rendered information in a specific format that was
applied to create a sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO,
837 F.3d at 1315. But, unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved
how the physical display operated to produce better quality images, the
claimed invention here merely uses generic computing components to
facilitate content filtering that can be performed by humans. See Appeal
Br. 21 (representative claim 1). This generic computer implementation is
not only directed to certain methods of organizing human activity or a
mental process, but also fails to improve a display mechanism as was the
case in McRO. See also SAP Am. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven if a process of collecting and analyzing
information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that
limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract”).
By contrast, the claims are, at best, an improvement to content filtering by
humans. Abstract; Spec. 2:24–27. Considering the claim as a whole,
Appellant’s invention lacks a technical solution to a technical problem like
the claims in these cases.
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Appellant’s reliance (see Appeal Br. 15–17) on Core Wireless is
unavailing. In Core Wireless, the court concluded the claims were not
directed to an abstract idea, but rather were “directed to an improved user
interface for computing devices.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362. More
particularly, the court noted it was clear that the “claims are directed to an
improvement in the functioning of computers, particularly those with small
screens.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363 (emphasis added). Here, the
claims do not provide a solution to a technical limitation of a graphical user
interface, but merely use the computer related components to process the
content. See also Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084,
1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (distinguishing between an alleged improvement to
the way a computer operates versus an improvement to assist the end user).
Additionally, “merely adding computer functionality to increase the
speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an
otherwise abstract idea.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank
(USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
As discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
(1) (i.e., that the claims are directed to an improvement to content filtering
and, therefore are not directed to an abstract idea) and (2) (i.e., that the
claims recite significantly more). Regarding argument (3) (i.e., the
Examiner’s alleged failure to establish a prima facie case of unpatentability
and failure to follow Berkheimer Memo), we are also not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments. Here, the Examiner’s rejection is sufficient and does
not prevent the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the
grounds for rejection. Our reviewing court, regarding the notice requirement
as set forth by 35 U.S.C. § 132, explains:
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[T]he PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima
facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in
“notify[ing] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its]
rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” 35
U.S.C. § 132. That section “is violated when a rejection is so
uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and
seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” Chester v. Miller,
906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Regarding the Berkheimer Memo, as discussed supra, the Examiner
identified court cases and MPEP sections to support the findings. Ans. 19–
20. This is not persuasively argued by Appellant.
For the above reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner
error, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 21–37, 39, and 40
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We note much of Appellant’s arguments are unsupported by factual
evidence. For example, the asserted improvements in content filtering
recited in the Specification and argued by Appellant are unsupported by
factual evidence in the record before us. Mere attorney arguments and
conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled
to little probative value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir.
1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ex parte
Belinne, Appeal 2009-004693, 2009 WL 2477843, at *3–4 (BPAI Aug. 10,
2009) (informative).
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of representative claim
1, independent claims 28 and 35, and dependent claims 21–27, 29–34, 36,
37, 39, and 40.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 21–37, 39, and
40 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 21–37,
39, 40
101 Eligibility 1, 21–37,
39, 40

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED