Homer D. Bronson Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 16, 2007

349 N.L.R.B. 512 (N.L.R.B. 2007)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
349 NLRB No. 50
512
Homer D. Bronson Company and United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, Region 9A, AFL–CIO and Jozef
Odorczuk. Cases 34–CA–9499, 34–CA–9514,
34–CA–9829, and 34–CA–9748
March 16, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On October 10, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Mi-
chael A. Marcionese issued the attached decision. The
Respondent and the General Counsel each filed excep-
tions, a supporting brief, and an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions1 and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions3
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.4

1 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s dismissal of allegations that
the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by discharging Supervisor Jozef
Odorczuk for refusing to commit an unfair labor practice, and by the
following alleged conduct directed at employee Viterbo (Tony) Pimen-
tel: (1) promising him increased benefits; (2) imposing more onerous
working conditions on him; (3) impliedly promising him a job promo-
tion; and (4) threatening him with loss of light duty work, plant closure,
and other unspecified reprisals in response to his union activity. In
addition, there is no exception to the judge’s dismissal of the allegation
that Pimentel’s discharge violated Sec. 8(a)(4).
The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s dismissal of the allega-
tion that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) when its president of
manufacturing, Joseph Blancato, promised employee Jaroslav Og-
niewski improved benefits if Ogniewski renounced support for the
Union. We find it unnecessary to pass on this allegation because, as
stated in fn. 3, infra, we agree with the judge that Blancato impliedly
promised employee Dale Schaffer improved benefits in violation of
Sec. 8(a)(1). Therefore, an additional 8(a)(1) finding regarding Blan-
cato’s alleged promise to Ogniewski would be cumulative and would
not affect the remedy.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that there is no Sec. 10(b) bar to the
orally amended complaint allegation that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by delaying wage increases to some employees until May and
June 2001, we do not rely on his analysis under Redd-I, Inc., 290
NLRB 1115 (1988). Rather, we find that the amended allegation was
sufficiently encompassed by the charge that was timely filed on Sep-
tember 11, 2001.
3 We agree with the judge that Blancato’s statement to Pimentel, that
he knew Pimentel was talking with employees about the Union, vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(1) by creating the impression that employees’ union
activities were under surveillance. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary
to pass on the judge’s further findings that Blancato’s statement to
1. Threats of Plant Closure
Facts
The judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent—
in campaign speeches and posters—unlawfully threat-
ened employees with plant closure and job loss if they
chose union representation. In adopting the judge’s find-
ings that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1), we rely
particularly on speeches made by senior managers of the
Respondent on November 22 and December 5, 2000.
The Respondent conducted about 10 meetings with
employees during the organizing campaign. In a No-
vember 22 meeting, Charles Spencer, president of the
Respondent’s Auto Group, spoke to employees about the
Respondent’s history. Spencer prefaced his remarks by
telling employees that “those who cannot read history are
bound to repeat it.” He then told the employees that at
one time the Company had manufacturing plants in Chi-
cago and Beacon Falls, Connecticut, but—after repeated
strikes by the Steelworkers Union, which represented the
employees—both plants closed and the Beacon Falls
operation was relocated to its present Winsted, Connecti-
cut site. Spencer reminded employees that “Winsted of
course has always been a non-union facility.” He con-
cluded his speech by stating that the “history of [the Re-
spondent] and unions has not been a good one,” and sug-
gested that employees ask themselves, “will this Union
help us to be responsive, flexible and competitive as re-
quired by our customers? Or will this Union do to this
new Homer Bronson what it did to the old Homer Bron-
son.”
Spencer and Blancato, the Respondent’s president of
manufacturing, both spoke at the December 5 employee

employee Roberta Tyree, and Supervisor John Kisiel’s statement to
employee Carol Ann Winegar, also violated Sec. 8(a)(1) because they
created the impression that employees’ union activities were under
surveillance. These additional findings would be cumulative and would
not affect the remedy. Member Walsh agrees not to pass on Kisiel’s
statement to Winegar because it would be cumulative, but he would
adopt the judge’s finding that Blancato’s statement to Tyree violated
Sec. 8(a)(1).
For the same reason, we need not pass on the judge’s finding that
Blancato impliedly promised Tyree benefits in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1),
because we agree with the judge that Blancato’s statement to employee
Schaffer constituted an implied promise of benefits violation. Finally,
because we agree with the judge that Blancato and Supervisor Kisiel
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) and (3) by telling Tyree, Schaffer, and Winegar
that they were prohibited from discussing the Union and from soliciting
union support during company time, we find it unnecessary to pass on
the judge’s additional finding that Plant Manager David Abraham in-
structed Pimentel not to speak to employees about the Union during
company time. This additional finding would be cumulative and would
not affect the remedy.
4 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to the
Board’s standard remedial language. We shall also issue a new notice
that conforms to the Order.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 513
meeting. In his speech, Blancato summarized the Un-
ion’s recent “strike history” at several area companies.
He stated that the Union’s actions had resulted in some
employees losing their jobs through subcontracting or
plant closure. Blancato told employees that although
“strikes are not inevitable” after a union is selected as a
bargaining representative, “where there are unions . . .
there are strikes.” He added that the union seeking to
organize the Respondent’s employees was “strike
happy.”5 Spencer, during his portion of the meeting,
presented a slide show that included a chart purporting to
“show that over the last 15 years, 13 companies have
closed, putting 4141 employees who used to be repre-
sented by the UAW out of work.” Spencer told the em-
ployees that the closings showed that “not only can the
Auto Workers Union not guarantee job security but, in
fact, the opposite may be true.”
Employee Schaffer testified that, in response to Blan-
cato’s litany of union-represented companies that had
closed, he sought clarification by asking whether Blan-
cato was “saying that we will move or close if the Union
comes in.” Blancato replied, “[N]o, I’m saying we could
move or we could close if the union comes in.”
During the election campaign, in addition to delivering
those speeches, the Respondent displayed posters
throughout the plant highlighting 5 of the 13 closed
companies discussed in the December 5 slide show. The
posters contained the statement, “These are just a few
examples of plants where the UAW used to represent
employees,” and posed the question: “Is this what the
UAW calls job security?”
Analysis
The law has been well settled since the Supreme
Court’s 1969 decision in Gissel Packing6 that an em-
ployer is free to predict the economic consequences it
foresees from unionization, so long as the prediction is
carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to con-
vey [its] belief as to demonstrably probable conse-
quences beyond [its] control. . . . If there is any implica-
tion that an employer may or may not take action solely
on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic
necessities and known only to him, the statement is no
longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts
but a threat of retaliation . . . without the protection of
the First Amendment.

5 In fact the “strike happy” union referred to by Blancato was Local
376 of the United Auto Workers. The Petitioner in this case is Region
9A of the United Auto Workers.
6 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Id. at 595, 618. Absent the necessary objective facts, em-
ployer predictions of adverse consequences arising from
unionization are not protected by Section 8(c); rather, they
constitute threats that violate Section 8(a)(1).
The judge found that the Respondent’s speeches and
posters contravened Gissel’s guidelines in two respects.
First, they contained no objective facts to support the
Respondent’s clear implication that the referenced plant
closings were caused solely by the fact that the “strike
happy” UAW represented those employees. Second, the
Respondent told its employees that “where there are un-
ions, there are strikes,” and that two of its own plants had
closed following a series of strikes. Through these mes-
sages, the judge found that the Respondent created the
impression in the minds of employees that there was an
“inevitable linkage between unionization and job loss.”
The judge ultimately found that employees would rea-
sonably infer from the Respondent’s speeches and post-
ers that “a vote for the Union will threaten [the employ-
ees’] future employment.” Accordingly, the judge con-
cluded that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by
implicitly threatening employees with plant closing and
job loss if they voted for union representation.
We agree with the judge that the Respondent’s
speeches and posters, taken as a whole, conveyed unlaw-
ful threats of adverse consequences from unionization,
rather than lawful, fact-based predictions of economic
consequences beyond the Respondent’s control.7 We
also find that Stanadyne Automotive Corp., 345 NLRB
85 (2005), and Smithfield Foods, Inc., 347 NLRB 1225
(2006), on which the dissent relies, are distinguishable in
several respects.8 Although the employer’s campaign

7 We disagree with the judge’s statement that the Board’s decisions
in Sheraton Hotel Waterbury, 312 NLRB 304 (1993), enfd. in part 31
F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994), and EDP Medical Computer Systems, 284
NLRB 1232 (1987), “are of limited precedential value” because, in his
view, it was unclear whether the 8(a)(1) allegations in those cases re-
garding employer campaign posters were presented to the Board. In
each of those cases, the Board affirmed the judge’s finding that the
employer did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) by displaying poster illustrations
of unionized companies that had closed, accompanied by the question,
in Sheraton, “Is this union job security,” and in EDP, “Is this job secu-
rity?” Nevertheless, Members Liebman and Walsh find that the Re-
spondent’s posters constituted unlawful threats of plant closure when
considered in conjunction with the speeches to employees discussed
below.
Chairman Battista finds that the Respondent’s posters, which are
nearly identical to those in Sheraton and EDP, are lawful for the rea-
sons explained in those cases and, further, as explained below, that the
speeches to employees did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1).
8 Member Liebman dissented in Stanadyne and Smithfield on this is-
sue and she adheres to those dissents. Member Walsh did not partici-
pate in those cases but he agrees with Member Liebman. However,
although Members Liebman and Walsh conclude that Stanadyne and
Smithfield were wrongly decided, they nevertheless find, as discussed
below, that those cases are distinguishable.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD514
speeches and posters in Stanadyne also referred to closed
facilities where employees had been represented by the
petitioning union, the Board majority in that case empha-
sized that the employer “repeatedly made clear” and
“said several times” that it was not making predictions.
Id. at 90, 91. Similarly, in Smithfield, the Board majority
found it significant that the employer several times “ex-
pressly disclaimed any certainty about the connection
between the previous closures” and the union. Id. at
1228. Here, by contrast, Spencer, the president of the
Respondent’s Auto Group, told employees on November
22 that two of its facilities had closed because the Re-
spondent was “fed up and tired of strikes,” and that em-
ployees should ask themselves, “will this Union do to
this new [company] what it did to the old [company].”
(Emphasis added.) Through those statements, the Re-
spondent indicated to employees that strikes by “this
Union” were the cause for the closure of its Chicago and
Beacon Falls facilities.9 The Respondent did not, more-
over, “repeatedly” emphasize that it was not making pre-
dictions for the future.10 Rather, by reminding employ-
ees in this speech of the adage that “those who cannot
read history are bound to repeat it,” a statement missing
from the speeches in Stanadyne and Smithfield, the Re-
spondent left no doubt in employees’ minds that, in the
event of another series of strikes, history would repeat
itself, and the Respondent would, on its own initiative,
choose to close or move. The Respondent’s labeling the
Union “strike happy” was a way of emphasizing that, if
the employees elected representation, it would inevitably
lead to plant closure and resulting job loss.
Stanadyne and Smithfield are further distinguishable
from this case by virtue of Spencer’s remarks on Decem-
ber 5. Spencer stated that, not only was the Union un-
able to guarantee job security, as evidenced by the clo-
sure of numerous named companies whose employees it
represented, but that those closures demonstrated that
selecting the Union might actually “guarantee” the loss
of jobs. None of the statements made in Stanadyne or
Smithfield so clearly threatened job loss.11

9 In fact, the Steelworkers, not the Auto Workers, represented em-
ployees at those two facilities.
10 The record indicates that Blancato, during only one of seven pres-
entations to employees, may have said that strikes were “not inevita-
ble.” (This was according to his notes, which he admittedly did not
read verbatim.) On the same occasion, however, his visual display
categorically stated that “[w]here there are unions . . . there are strikes,”
and he said nothing else at any time to disclaim that he was predicting
what would happen if employees voted for the Union. Spencer never
made any such disclaimer at any time.
11 See Wausau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir.
1967) (“one who engages in ‘brinksmanship’ may easily overstep and
tumble into the brink,” quoted with approval in Gissel, supra, 395 U.S.
at 620.
Finally, in Stanadyne and Smithfield there was no em-
ployee-management interchange like that between em-
ployee Schaffer and Blancato, the Respondent’s presi-
dent of manufacturing, in which Blancato, in response to
Schaffer’s question about the possibility of moving or
closing if the Union became the employees’ bargaining
representative, stated that it “could” happen. We agree
with the judge that Schaeffer’s question presented Blan-
cato with “an opportunity to disavow any implication of
a threat,” but that Blancato instead used the question as
an opportunity to reiterate an implied threat of plant clo-
sure if employees chose union representation.12 Thus,
we find the totality of the speeches and posters in the
instant case to be qualitatively more coercive than those
in Stanadyne and Smithfield.
Contrary to the dissent, we find that the Respondent
was not merely informing employees of the potential
negative effects of unionization based on any objective
facts. Rather, the speeches implied that a vote for the
Union might cause the Respondent to close “on its own
initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities.”
Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 618. The Supreme Court has
found such statements to be threats of retaliation unpro-
tected by the First Amendment.
In sum, we find that the Respondent’s speeches, rather
than containing reasonable, fact-based predictions of the
consequences of unionization, constituted threats of plant
closure in retaliation for the unionization of its facility.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1).13

12 See, e.g., Tellepsen Pipeline Services Co., 335 NLRB 1232, 1233–
1234 (2001), enfd. in relevant part 320 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2003).
13 Contrary to the judge and his colleagues, Chairman Battista does
not find this violation. In his view, Sec. 8(c) permits an employer to
cite to its employees plant closings and strikes at other plants where a
union was the bargaining representative. Smithfield Foods, Inc., above
at 1227; Stanadyne, above at 80.
Here, the Chairman finds that there is nothing in the Respondent’s
campaign posters or speeches indicating that it would penalize employ-
ees for choosing union representation by closing its facility. Rather, its
communications accurately recounted that, in recent years, numerous
unionized facilities, including two of its own, had closed. The Respon-
dent correctly pointed out that most of the closed plants were in Con-
necticut, where its facility was located, and that all of the closed com-
panies employed work forces that had been represented by the same
labor organization whose affiliate was now seeking to represent its
employees—the UAW.
The Chairman further finds that, as in Stanadyne, these were undis-
puted facts that the Respondent lawfully could bring to the attention of
its employees so that they were aware of the “potential negative effects
of their upcoming vote. Id. at 80. Here, as in Stanadyne, the Respon-
dent simply cited history and urged employees to consider what might
happen if they selected the Union. In doing so, the Respondent made
no prediction that if they chose union representation, the inexorable
consequence was plant closure.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 515
2. Remedy
Although the judge found that the Respondent’s unfair
labor practices were of the “type that have been found
sufficiently serious to support a bargaining order” under
Gissel Packing, he declined to recommend such an order.
Instead, the judge found that the Board’s traditional
remedies, supplemented by a special remedy discussed
below, were sufficient to erase the effects of the viola-
tions. The General Counsel excepts, arguing that a Gis-
sel bargaining order is warranted.
For the following reason only, we agree with the judge
that a Gissel bargaining order is not appropriate here. In
Smithfield Foods, Inc., supra at 1223, we concluded that,
because of the delay in processing that case, “a Gissel
bargaining order would likely be unenforceable.” See
also Wallace International de Puerto Rico, 328 NLRB
29 (1999).14 Here, too, given the length of time spent in
the processing of this case, it is doubtful that a Gissel
bargaining order would be enforced. The unfair labor
practices occurred in 2000–2001, about 6 years ago. The
delay at the Board following issuance of the judge’s de-
cision exceeds that in Wallace, and the 6 years that have
elapsed since the commission of most of the unfair labor
practices approaches the 7-year span in Smithfield Foods
between the unlawful conduct and issuance of the
Board’s decision.
We believe that there are several explanations for the
delay, including the number and complexity of the is-
sues, the length of the record, and the turnover and va-
cancies on the Board throughout the period. We recog-
nize, however, that a reviewing court could reasonably
conclude that the delay was unjustified. Accordingly, as

It is for this reason that Chairman Battista disagrees with his col-
leagues’ attempt to distinguish Stanadyne. In none of the statements on
which they rely did the Respondent state what would happen were its
facility unionized. The Respondent was asked the specific question of
whether the plant “will close” if the Union was selected. The Respon-
dent replied that the plant involved herein “could close” if the Union
became the representative. Further, the Respondent did not say that the
mere selection of the Union could result in closure. Rather, the Re-
spondent made it clear that a strike could cause a closure. And, the
Respondent explained a strike is “not inevitable.” In addition, the
Respondent simply asked the question, “will this Union do to this new
Homer Bronson what it did to the old Homer Bronson?” Finally, as to
the “guarantee” given by the Respondent, the statement was the truthful
statement that a union cannot guarantee job security, and “may” bring
about a loss of job security. In sum, the Respondent was not saying
that it would close to retaliate against selection of the Union. Rather,
the Respondent, citing recent history, was saying that a strike “could”
lead to the economic consequences of plant closure.
Accordingly, the Chairman would reverse the judge’s finding that
the Respondent threatened plant closure and dismiss this aspect of the
complaint.
14 In Wallace, the Board declined to issue a Gissel bargaining order
because of the delay in the processing of that case.
in Smithfield Foods and Wallace, “rather than possibly
engender further litigation and delay over the propriety
of a Gissel bargaining order,”15 we shall primarily rely
on the Board’s traditional remedies to erase the effects of
the Respondent’s unfair labor practices.16
Nevertheless, we agree with the judge that a special
remedy is warranted in order to dissipate as much as pos-
sible any lingering effects of the Respondent’s unfair
labor practices. Specifically, we find that the Respon-
dent’s unfair labor practices are sufficiently serious and
widespread to warrant having the attached notice to em-
ployees read aloud to the employees, so that they “will
fully perceive that the Respondent and its managers are
bound by the requirements of the Act.” Federated Logis-
tics & Operations, 340 NLRB 255, 258 (2003), affd. 400
F.3d 920, 929–930 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See also McAllister
Towing & Transportation Co., 341 NLRB 394, 400
(2004), enfd. 156 Fed.Appx. 386 (2d Cir. 2005); Block-
buster Pavilion, 331 NLRB 1274, 1276 (2000). The
reading of the notice “will ensure that the important in-
formation set forth in the notice is disseminated to all
employees, including those who do not consult the Re-
spondent’s bulletin boards.” Federated Logistics, above
at 258, quoting Excel Case Ready, 334 NLRB 4, 5
(2001). The “public reading of the notice is an ‘effective
but moderate way to let in a warming wind of informa-
tion and, more important, reassurance.’” McAllister,
above at 400.
The notice must be read by the Respondent’s president
of manufacturing, Blancato (who was directly and per-
sonally involved in many of the violations) or, at the Re-
spondent’s option, by a Board agent in the presence of
Blancato. As we stated in Federated Logistics, the
“presence of a responsible management official when a
government official informs employees of the terms of
[the] remedial order is not demeaning, but only a mini-
mal acknowledgment of the obligations that have been
imposed by law.” Id. at 258 fn. 12. The employees in
this case are “entitled to at least that much assurance that
their organizational rights will be respected in the fu-
ture.” Id.17

15 Smithfield Foods, supra at 1233.
16 Because a Gissel remedy is not being imposed, the Respondent’s
motion to reopen the record in order to offer evidence of changed cir-
cumstances is moot.
17 The Respondent shall also provide for Spanish and Polish inter-
preters to be present to translate the notice as it is read to employees.
Consistent with his dissent in Federated Logistics & Operations,
above at 261, Chairman Battista would not impose this extraordinary
remedy. In his view, the Respondent is not a recidivist and the viola-
tions it committed were not so egregious as to render insufficient the
Board’s traditional cease and desist and notice posting remedies.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD516
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Homer
D. Bronson Company, Winsted, Connecticut, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraphs 2(e) and
2(f).
“(e) Make Roberta Tyree whole for any loss of earn-
ings suffered as a result of the discriminatory denial of
overtime, which began on or about October 10, 2000, in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s
decision.
“(f) Make whole the employees who were denied wage
increases in fall 2000 because of the union campaign, as
set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s decision.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(i).
“(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, hold a
meeting or meetings, scheduled to ensure the widest pos-
sible attendance, at which the attached notice is to be
read to the employees by the Respondent’s president of
manufacturing, Joseph Blancato or, at the Respondent’s
option, by a Board agent in Blancato’s presence, with
translation available for Spanish- and Polish-speaking
employees.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT promulgate and maintain overly broad
and discriminatory solicitation and distribution rules,
including rules prohibiting employees from discussing
the Union at work.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that we are watch-
ing your activities on behalf of United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica, Region 9A, AFL–CIO (the Union), or any other un-
ion.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with job loss, the closing of
our facility, or other unspecified reprisals if you support
the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten to and withhold wage increases
from you because you have sought union representation.
WE WILL NOT impliedly promise you raises and im-
proved benefits to get you to stop supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT give you wage increases in order to con-
vince you not to support the Union.
WE WILL NOT take away your overtime or light duty
work because you support the Union.
WE WILL NOT fire you because you support the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
under Federal labor law.
WE WILL rescind the overly broad and discriminatory
rules promulgated during the union campaign that pro-
hibit employees from engaging in union solicitation and
distribution and from discussing the Union at work.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Viterbo (Tony) Pimentel full reinstatement
to his former light duty job or, if that job no longer ex-
ists, to a substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges pre-
viously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Viterbo (Tony) Pimentel whole for any
wages and benefits he lost because we denied him light
duty work and fired him.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to Pimentel’s
unlawful discharge, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereaf-
ter, notify Pimentel in writing that this has been done and
that the discharge will not be used against him in any
way.
WE WILL make Roberta Tyree whole for any wages she
lost because we denied her overtime on or after October
10, 2000, plus interest.
WE WILL make whole those of you who lost wages be-
cause we held back on giving you your wage increases
during the union campaign, plus interest.
HOMER D. BRONSON COMPANY
Terri A. Craig, Esq. and Thomas E. Quigley, Esq., for the Gen-
eral Counsel.
Edward F. O’Donnell Jr., Esq. and Nicholas J. Grello, Esq.
(Siegel, O’Connor, Zangari, O’Donnell & Beck), for the
Respondent.
Thomas W. Meiklejohn, Esq. (Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meik-
lejohn & Kelly), for the Charging Party.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 517
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. MARCIONESE, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard this case in Hartford, Connecticut, on December 3, 4, 5,
and 6, 2001; January 7, 8, 9, and 10; and February 14, 2002.
The charges in Cases 34–CA–9499 and 34–CA–9514 were
filed by United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, Region 9A, AFL–CIO (the Union)
on December 1 and 13, 2000, respectively.1 Jozef Odorczuk, an
individual, filed the charge in Case 34–CA–9748 on July 3,
2001. An amended consolidated complaint issued, based on
these charges and amended charges, on August 22, 2001.2 On
September 11, 2001, the Union filed a new charge, in Case 34–
CA–9829, which it amended on November 14, 2001. Based
upon this amended charge, a complaint was issued on Novem-
ber 15, 2001. The amended consolidated complaint and the new
complaint were further consolidated by order dated November
15, 2001. The General Counsel further amended the complaints
several times at the hearing.3
The complaints, as amended, allege that Homer D. Bronson
Company (the Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
through various supervisors, by threatening employees, promis-
ing and granting benefits to employees, making statements to
employees that created the impression of surveillance and sug-
gested that union representation would be futile, promulgating
and discriminatorily enforcing rules that unlawfully restricted
employees’ right to engage in union activities, and by discharg-
ing its supervisor, Odorczuk, because he refused to commit
unfair labor practices. The complaints allege further that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by denying over-
time to employee Roberta Tyree and denying light-duty work to
employee Viterbo (Tony) Pimentel. The Respondent’s subse-
quent termination of Pimentel is alleged as a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). As a remedy for these alleged unfair
labor practices, the General Counsel seeks a bargaining order
under NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The
General Counsel alleges that the Respondent’s grant of benefits
also violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) if a bargaining order is
warranted.
The Respondent filed its answers to the complaints on Sep-
tember 4 and November 28, 2001, respectively. The Respon-
dent amended its answers at the hearing in response to the
amendments to the complaints.4 In its answers, as amended, the
Respondent denied that it committed any of the alleged unfair
labor practices or otherwise violated the Act. The Respondent

1 The Union amended its charge in Case 34–CA–9499 three times,
on December 14, 2000, and January 8 and March 22, 2001.
2 A consolidated complaint had previously issued in Cases 34–CA–
9499 and 34–CA–9514 on June 18, 2001. The allegations of that com-
plaint were incorporated in the amended consolidated complaint that
issued on August 22, 2001.
3 During a hiatus in the hearing, the General Counsel issued a second
amended consolidated complaint in Cases. 34–CA–9499, 34–CA–9514,
and 34–CA–9748 that incorporated all prior amendments that had been
approved at the hearing. The Respondent filed an answer to this com-
plaint on December 26, 2001.
4 See fn. 3, above.
asserted affirmatively that a majority of its employees had ex-
pressed their desire not to be represented by the Union. The
Respondent also asserted that several allegations in the com-
plaints, as amended, were barred by Section 10(b) of the Act.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, manufactures automobile
hinges and related products at its facility in Winsted, Connecti-
cut, where it annually purchases and receives goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of
Connecticut. The Respondent admits and I find that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
As noted above, the Respondent is a manufacturer of parts
used primarily in the automobile industry. Charlie Spencer was
the president of the Respondent’s auto group in the summer
2000.5 Joseph Blancato was the vice president of manufactur-
ing. In September, Blancato was promoted to president. In the
fall of 2000, the Respondent employed approximately 78 pro-
duction and maintenance employees at its Winsted manufactur-
ing facility. David Abraham was the Respondent’s plant man-
ager at the time. Odorczuk and Derek Ewing were the first-shift
supervisors and John Kisiel was the Respondent’s supervisor
on second and third shifts. The Respondent has admitted that
Spencer, Blancato, Abraham, Odorczuk, Ewing, and Kisiel
were its supervisors and agents within the meaning of the Act at
all times material to the complaint.
In early September, Dale Schaffer, an employee of the Re-
spondent, contacted the Union about representing the Respon-
dent’s employees. Donna Becotte, an organizer on the Union’s
staff, met with Schaffer and soon thereafter, an organizing drive
commenced. Employees first signed a petition authorizing the
Union to represent them at a meeting at the Log House Restau-
rant in Winsted, Connecticut, on October 5.6 The Union filed a
representation petition with the Board’s Regional Office in
Hartford on November 3. The Union filed with this petition, as
its showing of interest, an 11-page union authorization petition
bearing 48 signatures. On November 14, the Respondent and
the Union signed a Stipulated Election Agreement setting De-
cember 14 as the date on which employees could vote whether
to be represented by the Union. That election was never held
because the Union requested, based on the instant unfair labor
practice charges, that further processing of its petition be held
in abeyance.

5 All dates are in 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
6 The Union used this format, rather than the individual union au-
thorization card traditionally used, to gauge employees’ desire for
union representation.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD518
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent engaged in
an unlawful campaign to defeat the Union in October and No-
vember and that its unlawful conduct continued after the elec-
tion was canceled. The General Counsel argues that the Re-
spondent’s unfair labor practices were sufficiently egregious to
have destroyed the laboratory conditions necessary to conduct
an election and that the Board’s traditional remedies will not
cure the effects of these unfair labor practices. Under the Gen-
eral Counsel’s view of the case, the only meaningful remedy is
a bargaining order based on a card majority obtained by the
Union before the Respondent’s unlawful campaign had its de-
structive effect. The Respondent counters that the only evi-
dence that it committed the alleged unfair labor practices is the
testimony of witnesses who are not credible and that company
records demonstrate that it did not grant benefits or engage in
any other discriminatory conduct in response to the Union’s
organizing campaign. The Respondent argues further that, even
if the General Counsel can prove that unfair labor practices
were committed, a bargaining order is not the appropriate rem-
edy here because a majority of employees have already indi-
cated to the Respondent that they do not want the Union to
represent them. The Respondent contends that the Board’s tra-
ditional remedies are more than adequate to cure the lingering
effects of any unfair labor practices and that a Board-conducted
election is the best way to determine the true wishes of the
employees.
A. The Evidence
1. The October 5 union meeting
Becotte, Schaffer, and several other witnesses testified for
the General Counsel regarding the October 5 meeting at the
Log House Restaurant. All employees who attended this meet-
ing signed a sheet when they entered the room. This sign-in
sheet, which is in evidence, contains 28 signatures. Pimentel
testified that all but one of the individuals whose signature
appears on the sheet were at the meeting. According to Pimen-
tel, employee Jaroslaw Ogniewski was not at the meeting, but
his mother, Wladyslawa Ogniewska, was and she signed his
name on the sign-in sheet. The signatures of both Ogniewskis
appear to be the handwriting of the same individual, corroborat-
ing Pimentel’s testimony in this regard.
All of the witnesses who were at the meeting recalled that
Becotte spoke on behalf of the Union. Although there are some
variations in the recollections of the individual employees,
which is understandable in light of the passage of time, all were
consistent that Becotte discussed the advantages of union repre-
sentation and described the process for obtaining such represen-
tation. These witnesses also recalled that a good portion of the
meeting was consumed by the employees themselves voicing
their complaints and the problems they were having at work.
One of the chief complaints expressed was that many employ-
ees had not received a wage increase in a long time.
Toward the end of the meeting, Becotte distributed the peti-
tion and told the employees that they would have to sign it if
they wanted the Union to represent them. The “petition” con-
sists of 11 pages, each with the following statement:
WE ARE THE UNION!
We the undersigned employees of Homer Bronson7 authorize
the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, UAW to represent us in collective
bargaining. We also authorize the UAW to use our names and
this petition to show our support for the union.
Each page also contains 11 boxes where employees can fill in
their name and other identifying information, and sign, and date
the petition. The following statement also appears at the bottom
of each page:
It is the policy of the UAW to waive initiation fees for ALL
employees who join the union before thirty (30) days after the
signing of an initial collective-bargaining agreement.
Although some witnesses testified, on cross-examination,
that Becotte said that the petition would be used to get an elec-
tion, Becotte and the majority of witnesses who were at the
meeting recalled that she mentioned an election as only one
means to achieve representation. Schaffer, for example, re-
called that Becotte told the employees that the Respondent
could recognize the Union on the basis of the petition, but that
it was more likely that the employer would refuse to recognize
the Union and an election would be held. This is consistent
with Becotte’s testimony.
Each of the employees who testified authenticated their own
signature on the petition.8 In addition, Pimentel testified that he
observed most of the other employees who were at the meeting
sign the petition. Schaffer similarly testified that he observed
others sign the petition at the meeting, but he was unable to
recall specifically which signatures he observed. Dixon testified
that he saw three employees who were sitting at his table sign
the petition.9 These three signatures appear on the same page as
that of Dixon. Sochon testified that he saw Robert Grund-
walski, who was sitting next to him, sign the petition. A review
of the 11 petition sheets in evidence shows that 23 signatures
are dated October 5, the date of this meeting.
According to Becotte and Schaffer, a handful of employees
volunteered at the October 5 meeting to form the organizing
committee. These employees were given petition sheets to use
to obtain signatures from other employees. Pimentel was one of
the employees who took blank petitions. Pimentel identified all
the signatures on the 9th and 11th pages of the petition—a total
of 14—as those he obtained by visiting employees in their
homes.10 All but two of the signatures he obtained are from
Hispanic employees, many with common surnames. Pimentel
testified that, when soliciting employees to sign the petition, he

7 The name of the Respondent is handwritten in a blank space on the
preprinted form.
8 The signatures of Schaffer, Pimentel, Tyree, Carol Ann Winegar,
Michael Dixon, and Lee Sochon were authenticated in this manner.
9 Dixon identified the signatures of Gordon Marshall, Kevin Hackett,
and Maria Budney.
10 The signatures of Gregorio Rodriguez, Maritza Castano, Andres
de la Cruz, Jose Gonzalez, Wilson Perez, Jaroslaw Agniewski, Maria
Nova, Kurt Parsons, Juan Aponte, Rafael de la Cruz, Ramona de la
Cruz, Miguel de la Cruz, Rosa de la Cruz, and Juanita de Polanco were
identified by Pimentel.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 519
told the employees, “[W]e need something different. We don’t
have raise. We have to sign it. We needed the Union represent
us.” According to Pimentel, he gave one of the sheets to Red
Moran, the Union’s staff organizer, and the other to coworker
Schaffer.
Roberta Tyree testified that she obtained the signature of
employee Victoria Preato, whose name appears on the first
page of the petition. Tyree credibly testified that another em-
ployee approached her at work and told Tyree that Preato
wanted to sign the union petition. Tyree, who was a member of
the organizing committee, got a petition from Henry Archam-
bault, another member of the organizing committee and went
out to her car with Preato. After Preato signed the petition,
Tyree gave it back to Archambault. Although Preato’s signature
is undated, Tyree testified that Preato signed the petition on
November 2.
Schaffer testified that he solicited a number of signatures on
the petitions after the October 5 meeting, but he could not recall
the names of any employees he solicited and was unable to
authenticate any signature other than his own. Red Moran, the
Union’s organizer who joined the campaign in mid-October,
testified that he obtained two signatures on the petition during
home visits with other members of the committee. According to
Moran, he and Schaffer obtained Kurt Parsons’ signature on
October 21 when they visited Parsons’ home. This is the same
signature that Pimentel testified he obtained from Parsons in
downtown Winsted when he saw Parsons riding his motorcycle.
Moran testified that he also obtained the signature of Barry
Oliver, which is dated October 31. Although Moran was with
two members of the organizing committee, Pat Finn and Jean
Olivieri, his testimony regarding this solicitation was not cor-
roborated.
In addition to the above testimony, the General Counsel
placed in evidence W-4 and I-9 forms obtained from the Re-
spondent’s personnel files for the purpose of authenticating the
signatures on the Union’s petition by a handwriting compari-
son. The original 11-page petition that was filed with the Un-
ion’s petition on November 3 contains 48 signatures. The sig-
natures of two individuals, Henry Archambault and Jaroslaw
Ogniewski, appear twice.11 Although I am not a handwriting
expert, a comparison of the signatures convinces me that most
are genuine. A more detailed discussion of the authentication
issue will be saved for later in this decision.

11 Jaroslaw Ogniewski’s first signature is dated October 5 and ap-
pears on the same page as the signature of his mother. The handwriting
of both names appears similar and also resembles the handwriting for
both Ogniewskis signatures on the sign-in sheet for the meeting. Be-
cause Pimentel testified that Jaroslaw Ogniewski was not at the October
5 meeting and that his mother signed for him, I shall not count the
October 5 signature. As noted above, Pimentel testified that he obtained
Jaroslaw Ogniewski’s signature that appears on the ninth page of the
petition and is dated October 13. Archambault’s two signatures, which
appear on different pages, are identical. Both signatures are dated Oc-
tober 5. His two signatures will be counted as one.
2. The Respondent’s knowledge and response to the
Union’s campaign
Blancato testified that he learned from Schaffer’s supervisor,
in late September, that Schaffer was trying to organize a union.
Blancato immediately contacted his attorney and, within days,
held the first of a series of meetings with the employees to con-
vey the Respondent’s position on the Union. This first meeting
may have been held even before the employees signed the un-
ion petition at the Log House Restaurant. The Respondent’s
attorneys prepared scripts for all of the meetings. These scripts
are in evidence. According to Blancato, Spencer read the first
speech verbatim.12 Blancato did not speak at this first meeting.
According to the script of Spencer’s first speech, he opened
the meeting by telling employees that he was aware of the un-
ion talk and that he wanted to “set the record straight.” After
taking responsibility for any problems that might exist, Spencer
stated the Respondent’s position on the Union in unequivocal
terms:
1. We do not want a union here. It is our sincere belief
that bringing a union to this operation will not help
you, your families, me or this company.
2. We intend to oppose any attempt by any union to get
into this company with every proper and legal means
available.
3. No one who pushes any union in this company is go-
ing to receive any advantage or better treatment of
any sort over those who choose not to join a union or
vice versa.
Spencer then spoke about union cards and advised the employ-
ees to read the card carefully before signing it. He reminded the
employees of his open-door policy and urged them to come to
him to talk about any issues they had. Spencer then talked
about “changes” that the Company had gone through in the
preceding 2-1/2 years, in particular the conversion to a cell
manufacturing process. Spencer told the employees that these
changes were necessary for the Respondent to become “more
flexible, responsive and competitive.” He attributed a growth in
business with unionized customers in the automotive industry
to these changes, warning that unionization could cause the
Company to lose its “flexibility, responsiveness and competi-
tiveness.” He concluded the meeting with the following:
DO NOT sign a card or petition thinking that it is an
empty gesture. DO NOT sign a card or petition because a
friend asks you to. DO NOT sign a card or petition unless
you have thought about all the events that are likely to oc-
cur from it.
I can not tell you what to do
I can ask you to think—please think about the Route 8
corridor—ask yourself what happened to Scovill, Chase
Brass, Anaconda, Seymour Specialty Wire, Century Brass,
Plume and Attwood and Torin. All great companies that
are gone—every one of them a union shop.
According to Blancato, Spencer gave another prepared
speech to the employees a few days after the first. Blancato

12 Spencer did not testify at the hearing.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD520
testified that Spencer read the text of this speech verbatim as
well. In the text, Spencer opens the meeting by referring to the
previous meeting and acknowledging employees’ complaints
regarding the Respondent’s policy on raises. Spencer then ar-
ticulated for the employees the policy as follows:
Employees are reviewed once a year. Their review is
conducted by their immediate supervisor. As a result of
that review employees are given a wage increase.
Now under our policy it doesn’t mean that everyone
gets a raise. I personally believe that everyone should be
judged on their own merits. Frankly some people deserve
generous wage increases due to their hard work and com-
mitment to the job. On the other hand, and I’m sure each
one of you would agree with me, some folks don’t deserve
much of a raise, if any, because they don’t bring the same
commitment to the job as others do.
As I said the policy is pretty straightforward. However,
I have learned that the problems do not lie with the policy
so much as its implementation. It seems that not everyone
has had a review in a timely matter. From my perspective
there is no excuse for an employee not to receive a review.
I spent a little time looking into it and I am trying to de-
termine how this happened. I don’t have all the answers
yet, but I do know that some folks have not been reviewed
on a yearly basis. This is wrong and I apologize for any
mistakes that may have occurred.
Spencer then asked rhetorically why he didn’t solve the prob-
lem by giving everyone a raise, and responded by saying he
could not do that because it was against the law because of the
union situation. Spencer told the employees that, although his
hands were tied to that extent (giving employees raises), he
would insist that the Respondent’s policy on wage increases be
followed and he would insist that employees be reviewed on a
timely basis. Spencer ended this speech by referring to dis-
agreements among the employees over the union issue and
expressing his opinion that the union “causes distruction [sic]
and friction among folks that used to be friends.” Employee
witnesses who testified for the General Counsel regarding
Spencer’s speeches tended to corroborate the text version in
evidence.13
After this meeting, Blancato took steps to implement
Spencer’s pledge that the Respondent would follow its policy
on raises. In a memo to supervisors, dated October 20, Blancato
listed the employees who were “due or overdue for an annual
performance review.” He referred to the “commitment” that the
Respondent had made to its employees to enforce the annual
review policy and directed the supervisors to complete reviews
for the listed employees no later than October 31. Blancato
advised the supervisors further that the reviews “must be an
honest representation of the employees contribution to the
business since it is the basis for determining wage increases.”
There is evidence in the record that the Respondent’s supervi-
sors carried out these instructions. Carol Winegar testified that
her supervisor, Kisiel, told her in November that everybody

13 The General Counsel does not allege that anything Spencer said in
these two meetings violated the Act.
was going to be getting a review and a raise by the end of the
year. Winegar had not yet received a raise despite having
worked for the Respondent for more than a year. Claude
Thibodeau, a/k/a (Frenchie), testified that his supervisor, Ew-
ing, gave him a review in October.14 At the time, Ewing told
Thibodeau that he would probably be getting a raise. Thibodeau
had not received a raise in about 2 years. Odorczuk testified
that, upon receiving the October 20 memo, he began complet-
ing reviews for the five employees in his department. The Re-
spondent’s records show that Odorczuk completed these re-
views on November 16.
Odorczuk testified that, 6 months before the union campaign,
he had spoken to Blancato and Spencer on behalf of one of his
employees, Wladyslawa Ogniewska, who had not had a raise in
3 years. According to Odorczuk, this resulted in her being paid
less than new employees who were being hired at the time.
According to Odorczuk, Blancato, and Spencer would not give
Ogniewska a raise, telling him that if she didn’t like it, she
could leave.
3. Restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution
There is no dispute that, prior to the union campaign, the Re-
spondent either did not have, or did not enforce, any restrictions
on employee solicitation and distribution. According to the
uncontradicted testimony of the General Counsel’s witnesses, it
was not uncommon for employees to sell items like Avon
products and school fundraisers at work, including during peri-
ods when they were at their machines doing work. Blancato
himself acknowledged that the Respondent had no rules regard-
ing solicitation and distribution and that it had allowed this
activity to go on before the union campaign started.
Tyree testified that, sometime between the October 5 union
meeting and November 2, Blancato approached her at her ma-
chine and asked her to “do him a favor and not have people
sign union cards on company time.”15 When Tyree denied that
she was doing this, Blancato told her to tell whoever was doing
it not to sign cards on company time. Tyree testified further that
Blancato acknowledged to her that nothing had ever been said
about people selling Avon and other things, but that “with the
Union cards, it was something different.” On cross-
examination, Tyree was certain that Blancato did not say that
he had to allow her to solicit union cards because he had let her
sell Avon.
Schaffer testified to a similar conversation with Blancato in
early October. According to Schaffer, Blancato approached him
while he was working on the lift truck. Blancato asked Schaffer
not to promote the Union on company time. Schaffer and Blan-
cato then proceeded to discuss the issues in the plant that led
employees to seek union representation. Schaffer cited Respon-
dent’s “sloppy” approach to raises and the “belligerent” attitude
of some of the managers. Schaffer testified that Blancato ac-

14 Thibodeau’s review, which is in evidence, is dated October 31.
Thibodeau signed it on November 2.
15 The transcript contains an error at p. 383, LL. 4–5 where the word
“not” is omitted from the transcript of Tyree’s testimony about this
conversation. It is clear from the context of the testimony as well as
other portions of the transcript that Tyree used the word “not” when she
testified. I shall correct the transcript accordingly.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 521
knowledged there was a problem with employee reviews and
said that the Respondent was working on them. Odorczuk testi-
fied that Blancato told him and Ewing, the other first shift su-
pervisor with whom Odorczuk shared an office, that he didn’t
want employees talking in the shop anymore and that, if they
saw groups of employees talking, to break them up.
Blancato acknowledged speaking to Tyree and Schaffer
about union solicitation but disputed their versions of the con-
versations. According to Blancato, Supervisor Ewing com-
plained to him about Schaffer, Tyree, and Henry Archambault
“congregating” and spending a lot of time away from their
workstations. Blancato testified that Ewing told him he be-
lieved they were talking about the Union. Ewing corroborated
this testimony but recalled telling Blancato about a fourth, un-
named employee who was also involved in these union discus-
sions on the work floor. Blancato testified further that he ap-
proached Tyree at her machine in response to Ewing’s com-
plaint and told her that because the Respondent had allowed her
to solicit Avon in the past, she had a right to solicit for the Un-
ion, but, as with her Avon solicitation, she should not allow her
union solicitation to interfere with production. Blancato testi-
fied that he had a similar conversation with Schaffer. Blancato
testified that Schaffer was very open about his support for the
Union and spoke to Blancato about it on several occasions. He
acknowledged that Tyree, in contrast, had not been an open
union supporter prior to his conversation with her and that she
became upset when he spoke to her about union solicitation.
Pimentel testified that, sometime after the October 5 meet-
ing, but before November 3, Dave Abraham, the Respondent’s
plant manager, spoke to him about conversations he was having
with employees about the Union. According to Pimentel, Abra-
ham told him that the Respondent paid him to work, not to talk
to the people and that, while he was at work, he was to sit down
and work, not talk. Odorczuk also testified that Abraham in-
structed him not to let employees talk about the Union in the
shop. Abraham denied having any conversation with Pimentel
about the Union and denied telling Odorczuk or any employee
directly that employees could not talk about the Union.
Carol Ann Winegar testified that, within a week of the Octo-
ber 5 meeting, her supervisor on third shift, Kisiel, approached
a group of employees while they were outside on a smoking
break and told them that he didn’t want anyone on his shift to
discuss the Union on the premises. Kisiel denied this occurred.
He acknowledged talking to employees during smoking breaks
about the Union by expressing his opinion when asked for it,
but denied interfering with any employees conversations on the
subject.
4. Blancato’s conversations with Pimentel
Pimentel testified that he had several conversations with
Blancato after the October 5 union meeting. He was vague as to
the dates and times of these conversations. Pimentel testified
that the first meeting was in Blancato’s office shortly after he
signed the petition. According to Pimentel, Blancato called him
to the office and told him that he knew Pimentel was talking
with people in the Company about the Union. Blancato told
Pimentel that the Respondent didn’t want the Union and that if
the Union came in, Pimentel would have to pay $50–60 from
his pocket, presumably a reference to union dues. Pimentel
testified further that Blancato told him “now was the time” that
the Company could give employees anything they wanted.
Blancato then referred to a job in the office in which Pimentel
had previously expressed interest, telling Pimentel he had an
interview for it the following Monday. According to Pimentel,
he had learned from another employee, before this meeting, that
the Respondent was advertising for an accounting position in
the office. Because Pimentel had been an accountant in his
native Dominican Republic, he had already approached Blan-
cato and expressed interest in the job. Blancato had told him at
that time to talk to Cindy Murphy in human resources. Pimentel
testified that when he spoke to Murphy, she told him she would
speak to Blancato. Pimentel had not heard anything further
before being called to Blancato’s office after the union meeting.
Pimentel testified that he met with Blancato in his office on
another occasion regarding a problem another employee, Maria
Nova, was having with her leadperson, Mary Simmons. Ac-
cording to Pimentel, after discussing Nova’s problem, Blancato
told Pimentel that he was still speaking with the people about
the Union and that Blancato had told Pimentel he wanted him
to stop doing this. Blancato told Pimentel to remember that he
had a family to support and reminded him that he was on light
duty. Pimentel testified that Blancato also said, at both meet-
ings, that if the Union came in, the Respondent would close its
doors. On cross-examination, Pimentel acknowledged that he
did not include this last statement in the description of this con-
versation in his pretrial affidavit.
Pimentel testified that, after the October 5 meeting, he was
followed by Ewing or Simmons anytime he got up from his
work area, even when he went to the bathroom. According to
Pimentel, if he stopped to talk to someone, Ewing or Simmons
would tell him to get back to work. Pimentel claimed that this
occurred even on occasions when he had to drive the forklift to
get material in other parts of the plant. The evidence in the
record shows, however, that Pimentel did not drive the forklift
in the fall of 2000.
Blancato recalled having two conversations with Pimentel in
the fall of 2000, both of which were very different from Pimen-
tel’s testimony. According to Blancato, Pimentel first ap-
proached him on the shop floor in late September about an ad
that the Respondent had run in the local newspaper for an ac-
counting clerk. Pimentel told Blancato that he had accounting
experience from his native country and asked to be considered.
Blancato told Pimentel that the Respondent had received re-
sumes in response to the ad and was in the process of inter-
viewing. He told Pimentel that he would arrange with Murphy
for Pimentel to be interviewed by Bill Nemec, the Respon-
dent’s controller at the time who was hiring for that position.
Blancato testified that he spoke to Murphy after his conversa-
tion with Pimentel and that she told him that Pimentel had al-
ready talked to her about the job and that she had set up an
interview for Pimentel. According to Blancato, Pimentel did
not show up for the interview. Blancato denied there was any
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD522
mention of the Union in this conversation. Murphy corrobo-
rated Blancato’s testimony about this issue.16
Blancato testified that his second conversation with Pimentel
occurred in early October when Pimentel came into Blancato’s
office to complain about his supervisor, Ewing, and lead, Sim-
mons, being “on his back.” Blancato told Pimentel that he had
received reports from Ewing and Simmons about Pimentel
being out of his work area and not doing his job. He told Pi-
mentel to go back to work. When Pimentel repeated his com-
plaint that Ewing and Simmons were on his back, Blancato
again told him to go back to his area and do his job. Blancato
denied making any threats or promises to Pimentel and specifi-
cally denied making the alleged 8(a)(1) statements in his con-
versations with Pimentel. Ewing testified that Simmons com-
plained to him in October/November that Pimentel was con-
stantly out of his work area and that she could not get her pro-
duction out because of this. Ewing testified that he spoke to
Pimentel about this and told him to stay at his workstation.
Simmons did not testify.
5. Blancato’s conversations with other employees
As noted above, Blancato’s admonition to Tyree regarding
card solicitation upset her. Tyree testified that when Blancato
walked by her machine again, she called him over and told him
that she was upset that he was assuming that she did something,
i.e., solicited union cards, that she didn’t do. She then reminded
him of a recent incident in which another manager had yelled at
her. She told Blancato that when she complained about the way
she had been treated, nothing was done. Blancato then invited
Tyree into his office to talk further. According to Tyree, the
subject of the Union came up again during her conversation
with Blancato in his office. Tyree testified that Blancato told
her that he didn’t feel that employees needed a union. He told
her that he was in charge now and that things would be differ-
ent. The conversation also included a discussion of her boy-
friend who had also worked for the Respondent until he was
fired in the spring. Tyree denied rumors that her boyfriend was
the one behind the union drive. Tyree then asked if the rumors
she heard, that the Respondent wanted to get rid of her, were
true. Blancato told Tyree that the rumors were not true and
asked her why he would have offered her a cell leader position
if he wanted to get rid of her. Tyree testified that she herself did
not understand why the Respondent had offered her a cell
leader position because Spencer had already accused her of
saying bad things about the Company. Tyree became distraught
during her testimony about these interactions with Blancato,
crying while on the witness stand.
Blancato acknowledged having this meeting in his office
with Tyree after she became upset during their conversation on
the shop floor. He corroborated Tyree’s testimony that they
discussed her boyfriend’s termination and the “rumor” that he
wanted to fire her. Blancato testified that he told Tyree to come
see him if she ever heard rumors in the factory that upset her.
Blancato denied that there was any mention of the Union dur-

16 Pimentel never had an interview for this job. Pimentel testified
that, despite Blancato’s promise of an interview, he was never called
for an interview. Blancato and Murphy testified, in contrast, that Pi-
mentel did not show up for his scheduled interview.
ing this conversation. According to Blancato, he and Tyree both
said, at the beginning of the meeting, “this is not a conversation
about the Union.”
As noted above, Blancato told Schaffer in October that he
was aware of the employees’ concerns about raises not being
given and that he was working on the problem. Schaffer testi-
fied that he had another conversation with Blancato in mid-
December in which he asked about raises. According to
Schaffer, Blancato told him at that time that raises and anything
else “in a positive standing” could not happen while the “union
negotiations” were going on. Blancato did not specifically con-
tradict this testimony. He did generally deny threatening em-
ployees that Respondent would withhold wage increases or
other benefits because of the Union.
Odorczuk testified that he attended several meetings in Blan-
cato’s office with Jaroslaw Ogniewski, a Polish-speaking em-
ployee in his department. Odorczuk served as Blancato’s trans-
lator. According to Odorczuk, Blancato tried to convince Og-
niewski that he could get a better job and make more money
without the Union. Odorczuk testified that Blancato told Og-
niewski that “someday you could make more money than Joe
[Odorczuk].” Blancato also told Ogniewski that he didn’t want
Jaroslaw or his mother (Wladyslawa Ogniewska), or anyone
else to join the Union. Blancato admitted meeting with Jaro-
slaw Ogniewski and Odorczuk, but denied making any prom-
ises or otherwise violating the Act. According to Blancato,
Odorczuk brought Ogniewski to his office and said that Og-
niewski wanted to tell Blancato personally that he was not in
favor of the Union. Ogniewski then said the same thing. Blan-
cato admitted that he then reiterated the position expressed at
company meetings with employees that the Respondent did not
think the employees needed a union. It is undisputed that Og-
niewski eventually was promoted to a job on the hinge line that
paid more money than his job working for Odorczuk.
6. Roberta Tyree’s overtime
Tyree testified that, prior to the union meeting at the Log
House Restaurant, she routinely worked 1-1/2 to 2 hours of
overtime each day before the start of her regular shift at 7 a.m.
She had been working this overtime since April or May on the
hinge line to fill in for an injured employee. Her boyfriend,
John Collins, had been the foreman on the hinge line before his
termination. Tyree testified that she had also worked Saturday
overtime on the hinge line until June or July when she told her
supervisor, Ewing, that if she had to work on the hinge line, she
didn’t want to come in on Saturdays anymore.17 Tyree testified
further that, after she attended the union meeting, Ewing told
her to start reporting for work at 7 a.m., her normal start time.
The only explanation she received at the time was that Plant
Manager Abraham told Ewing that, if Tyree didn’t want to
work Saturday overtime, she could not work overtime during
the week. Tyree did not work any overtime again until after the
first of the year.
A computer printout showing the times Tyree punched in
and out on the timeclock supports her testimony. The printout
covers the period from July 31 through January 20, 2001, and

17 There is no dispute that overtime is voluntary.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 523
shows that she punched in by 6 a.m. the week of July 31 and
then began punching in before 5:30 every morning that she
worked through October 6. From October 10 through the end of
the period covered by the printout, Tyree never punched in
before 7 a.m. This record also shows that she worked only two
Saturdays between July 31 and October 10, i.e., September 9
and October 7, and did not work any Saturday again until the
first of the year. The printout shows that she worked every
Saturday in January 2001. Copies of Tyree’s pay stubs in evi-
dence show that she was paid overtime in every week from the
pay period ending June 9 through the pay period ending Octo-
ber 8, but received no overtime pay through the remainder of
the year.18 A summary of the Respondent’s payroll records
prepared by the General Counsel reveals that all employees
who were assigned to the hinge line were paid some overtime
during the period October 10 through December 2, and some
received a substantial amount of overtime during this period.
Odorczuk testified for the General Counsel that he was in the
office he shared with Ewing when Abraham came in and said to
Ewing, “Roberta Tyree and Hank Archambault are not working
one more hour of overtime.” According to Odorczuk, this oc-
curred after the Respondent became aware of the Union. As
previously noted, Archambault was another member of the
Union’s in-plant organizing committee.19
The Respondent did not deny that Tyree was not assigned
overtime after October 8. Ewing testified, however, that Tyree
worked hinge line overtime until she chose not to work it. He
testified that Tyree told him one time in October that, if she was
coming in that Saturday to work the hinge line, she was not
interested. Although Ewing acknowledged that she was only
talking to him about that particular Saturday, he stopped assign-
ing her any overtime after that. Abraham testified that Ewing
told him in early October that Tyree did not want to work Sat-
urday overtime on the hinge line anymore. According to Abra-
ham, he asked Tyree himself if she wanted to work the over-
time anymore and she said no. Abraham denied instructing
Ewing to take overtime away from Tyree because of the Union.
7. November 3 demand for recognition
On Friday, November 3, about noontime, a group of em-
ployees, including Schaffer and Pimentel, went to Blancato’s
office with a letter prepared by the Union and signed by the
employees on the organizing committee. The letter advised the
Respondent that a majority of employees had designated the
Union as their bargaining representative and sought recogni-
tion. Schaffer testified that he tried to hand the letter to Blan-
cato, saying that the letter was from the Union. Before he could
say anything else, Blancato told him to get out of his office and
to give the letter to the NLRB. The employees then went up-
stairs to Spencer’s office to try to give him the letter but Blan-

18 Paystubs for several weeks are missing. The computer printouts
from the timeclock show that she would have earned overtime during
some of the weeks that are missing in September. For the weeks ending
June 30 and July 7 and 28, there is no record in evidence that shows
whether she was paid overtime those weeks.
19 The Respondent’s records show that Archambault also suffered a
loss of overtime coincidental to the onset of the Union. This lends
credibility to Odorczuk’s testimony.
cato got there before they did and turned them away before
Schaffer could say anything. The employees then went back to
the shop floor and tried to give the letter to Plant Manager
Abraham and Supervisor Ewing and again were rebuffed. Pi-
mentel corroborated Schaffer regarding the employees’ efforts
to deliver the letter. Pimentel also testified specifically that he
was the one who spoke when the employees tried to present the
petition to Ewing. According to Pimentel, he told Ewing, in
heavily accented English, that a “mayoria” of the employees
had signed for the Union. Ewing apparently understood what
Pimentel was saying because he told the employees to get out
of his office and to go see Blancato.
Blancato admitted sending the employees away when they
tried to hand him a letter, but denied that Schaffer or the em-
ployees said anything. According to Blancato, he assumed
when he saw Schaffer with a piece of paper in his hands lead-
ing a group of employees that it was something from the Union.
He told Schaffer that he was not interested in what he had and
that they probably needed to bring the paper to the NLRB.
Blancato admits that he immediately went up to Spencer’s of-
fice to tell him what had happened. When Blancato saw the
same group of employees coming toward Spencer’s office, he
turned toward them and said, “I have already told you I am not
interested in whatever you have. You have to bring it to the
NLRB.” Ewing also admitted being confronted by a group of
employees with a piece of paper. He denied that Pimentel said
anything about a majority of employees supporting the Union,
testifying that Pimentel didn’t “get that far” before Ewing cut
him off and told them to bring whatever they had to Blancato.
The Union filed its petition and showing of interest with the
Board’s Regional Office the same day.
8. Movement of the EN-114 machine
There is no dispute that the Respondent, sometime in the fall,
subcontracted assembly of a glove box hinge for the Ford
Crown Victoria to a company called Summit Manufacturing.
As part of the subcontracting, the Respondent shipped the ma-
chine used to assemble this hinge, the EN-114, to Summit. The
first purchase order for hinges from Summit, which Blancato
testified is the only writing documenting the existence of a
contract, is dated November 7. Ralph Larson, the president of
Summit who testified for the Respondent, recalled that the ma-
chine was moved to his shop the weekend before Veteran’s
Day, which would be November 11–12. Schaffer recalled that
the EN-114 was moved around the time that he and the other
employees went to Blancato’s office with the letter from the
Union. Pimentel and employee Michael Dixon testified that the
machine sat on a forklift for several days before it was moved.
Abraham could not recall “how many days” the machine sat on
the forklift.
Pimentel testified that, one day while the machine was sitting
in the aisle, Ewing made a comment to him and the two em-
ployees who had been working on the EN-114, Jose Gonzalez
and Andre de la Cruz. Pimentel first testified, in his limited and
heavily accented English, that Ewing said, “[Y]ou see that ma-
chine going, the EN-114? Later, the 8096 going later. You’re
going too. That one is because we don’t want the Union over
here.” When Pimentel testified about this conversation in Span-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD524
ish, he was able to more eloquently express Ewing’s comment
expressing the same idea. Neither Gonzalez nor de la Cruz
testified at the hearing.
Employee Michael Dixon testified that he also saw the EN-
114 machine in the aisle, ready to be shipped. Dixon asked
Abraham what was going on. Dixon recalled that Abraham
responded, “It’s going out. These things happen” or “that’s the
kind of thing that can happen” and then referred to the Union.
At the hearing, Dixon appeared uncertain when asked what, if
anything, Abraham said about the Union. In his pretrial affida-
vit, Dixon also stated that Abraham said something about the
Union in connection with the movement of the EN-114, but he
could not remember what he said.
Odorczuk testified that he also heard Abraham comment
about the removal of the EN-114 machine in the presence of
employees. According to Odorczuk, Abraham said that the EN-
114 wasn’t the only machine going out, that all the assembly
machines would be going. Odorczuk testified that Abraham
pointed to Andre de la Cruz, one of the employees who worked
on the EN-114, and yelled out, “[T]his job is going out and
you’re next.”
Ewing and Abraham specifically denied making any state-
ments to Pimentel or any other employee linking the removal of
the EN-114 to the union campaign. Abraham admitted saying,
to no one in particular, when he saw the machine on a pallet in
the aisle outside his office, “well, there goes the EN-114 ma-
chine. These things happen.”
The Respondent offered the testimony of Blancato and Lar-
son regarding the negotiations that led to the subcontracting of
this work. These negotiations apparently began in August with
a general discussion of the possibility of subcontracting some
work to Summit. It was not until October that an agreement
was reached on the terms of the subcontract for the EN-114
assembly. Blancato testified that there were two reasons for his
decision to subcontract this work, i.e., cost and quality. In con-
trast, Larson recalled being told that the Respondent wanted to
subcontract because “they were having difficulty getting the
product out to customers due to a shortage of manpower and
difficulty in hiring employees.” The evidence in the record does
reveal that a significant cost savings has been achieved over
time as a result of this subcontract. The two employees who
had worked on the EN-114 were not laid off as a result of the
subcontracting of this work. Instead, they were reassigned to
hand assembly, the same work that Pimentel was doing.20
9. The denial of light duty to Pimentel
Pimentel was employed by the Respondent for approxi-
mately 3–4 years. His regular job was as a machine operator on
the shear machine. On March 3, he injured his back and was
out of work until March 8 under a note from his doctor. The
doctor stated that he could return to work, “as tolerated,” with a
lifting restriction of 25 pounds until his next visit to the doctor.

20 Although there is evidence in the record that the employment of
one of these two employees, Juan Gonzalez, ended within 2 months of
the subcontracting, there is no evidence that his termination was a result
of it. On the contrary, Ewing testified without contradiction that Gon-
zalez left voluntarily to return to Puerto Rico. De la Cruz is still em-
ployed by the Respondent.
It is undisputed that the Respondent accommodated Pimentel
by placing him on light duty, doing hand assembly, when he
returned to work. After seeing his doctor again on March 29,
Pimentel was told he could return to work without restrictions.
Pimentel reinjured his back shortly thereafter and was again
given a weight restriction on April 20. This time his doctor
limited him to 15 pounds lifting with “no straining or pushing.”
The Respondent again accommodated him with the same light
duty job he previously was assigned. On May 5, Pimentel’s
doctor increased his lifting ability to 25 pounds and advised
“caution with straining and pushing.” On August 24, Pimentel
isited another doctor who gave him a note stating that Pimentel
“should avoid repetitious bending at the waist and the lifting of
more than 15 lbs.” He continued to work the same light-duty
job with these restrictions until October 9, when he apparently
injured his knee. Pimentel remained out of work until Novem-
ber 1. During this time, he changed doctors. His new doctor
signed a note recommending “light duty,” without specifying
any weight limit, and “avoid bending and straining pending
orthopedic surgery evaluation 11/14/00.” After his evaluation
on November 14, the orthopedic surgeon gave Pimentel a note
certifying the following restrictions: “avoid prolonged postures,
maximal 10–15 lbs. lifting, minimal bending. Restrictions are
due to L5-S1 herniated disc.”21
As noted above, Pimentel attended the union meeting at the
Log House Restaurant on October 5 where he signed the au-
thorization petition and volunteered for the organizing commit-
tee. It was on the following Monday, October 9, that he re-
injured himself. Pimentel was out of work for the rest of Octo-
ber. The 14 signatures on the Union’s petition that Pimentel
identified as those he solicited are all dated during the period he
was absent from work. Pimentel also testified, as previously
noted, to two conversations in Blancato’s office within a week
of the October 5 meeting. During one of these conversations,
Pimentel claims that Blancato impliedly threatened to take
away his light-duty work.22 Because he only worked 2 days
after the union meeting, these conversations would have to
have occurred on October 6 or 9. Shortly after returning to
work on November 1, Pimentel signed the November 3 letter
from the Union and went with the group of employees who
tried to present it to Blancato and other management represen-
tatives. Blancato identified Pimentel as being in the group and
Ewing recalled that Pimentel was leading the group when they
tried to present the letter to him.
On November 14, the same day that Pimentel visited the or-
thopedic surgeon, the Respondent and the Union signed a stipu-
lated election agreement at the Board’s Regional Office.
Pimentel testified that he gave the November 14 doctor’s
note to Ewing, his supervisor, when he reported for work on
November 15.23 According to Pimentel, he started his light-
duty assembly work and worked until 10 or 11 a.m. when he

21 Pimentel was receiving workers compensation benefits for his in-
jury during his periods of absence.
22 Blancato denied making this threat, as previously noted.
23 In his pretrial affidavit, Pimentel said he gave the note to Ewing
“late morning.” Ewing testified that Pimentel gave him the note first
thing in the morning and that he told Pimentel that he would have to
wait until Abraham and human resources started work at 8 a.m.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 525
was called into Abraham’s office with Ewing. Abraham told
Pimentel that the Respondent did not have a 40-hour-light-duty
job for him. Abraham then said he didn’t understand what the
doctor was saying in his note regarding “prolonged postures.”
Pimentel told Abraham that meant he needed to stand or sit, as
he had been doing. Abraham again said that the Respondent did
not have a 40-hour-light-duty job for Pimentel. He told Pimen-
tel to go home, collect worker’s compensation and come back
when he could work full duty. Abraham assured Pimentel that
his job would be there when he returned. Pimentel left work
that day, as he was instructed. He has never returned to work.
Pimentel testified that his physical condition did not change
between November 1 and 14, that he was still capable of doing
the light-duty hand assembly he had been doing since March.
According to Pimentel, he was already performing this work
with a sit/stand option. He would get up and stretch as needed.
Pimentel also testified that he had modified his work area so he
could do his job from either a sitting or standing position. Pi-
mentel’s testimony was corroborated to some extent by other
employees who recalled seeing Pimentel performing his light-
duty work in a sitting and standing position.
Abraham disputed Pimentel’s testimony regarding his light-
duty assignment. According to Abraham, the Respondent tried
Pimentel out on numerous jobs after his March injury, includ-
ing a job operating the forklift. Each time, Pimentel com-
plained. Finally, Abraham asked Pimentel to walk around the
plant and find a job he could do. That was when Pimentel iden-
tified the hand assembly job he was working in the fall. Abra-
ham conceded that Pimentel had been on that job for some time
prior to the union organizing campaign. Abraham testified that
Pimentel did not have to lift anything on this job, but that he
would have to be sitting to assemble the hinges because the
workbench was so low. Abraham also disputed Pimentel’s tes-
timony that he had configured his work area to enable him to
work in a sitting or standing position. Ewing agreed with Abra-
ham’s assessment of the requirements of Pimentel’s light-duty
job only to a degree. Although Ewing testified that it would be
“uncomfortable” to assemble these parts standing up, he ac-
knowledged that Pimentel had been permitted to stand and
stretch as needed.
Abraham and Ewing also contradicted Pimentel regarding
the meeting on November 15. They both acknowledged that
Abraham told Pimentel that the Respondent could not accom-
modate the new postural restriction. However, Abraham and
Ewing denied that Pimentel was told to come back only when
he was released to full duty. According to these witnesses,
Abraham told Pimentel to come back when he got a note from
his doctor that showed he could do either his normal job, or the
light duty job he had been doing.
On cross-examination, Abraham testified that the Respon-
dent typically “go[es] out of [its] way to find light duty for
everybody.” He confirmed that the Respondent had been able
to accommodate even those employees who were limited to
using one hand. In one instance, a helper was assigned to work
with the one-handed employee. Abraham also testified that the
Respondent has “lots of easy work,” and that there are some
machines at the Respondent’s facility where the employee just
pushes a button and sits there while the machine is running.
Although Abraham testified that he met with Blancato and
Cindy Murphy after receiving Pimentel’s November 14 doc-
tor’s note to determine whether there were any jobs that could
be done with the “new” postural limitation, neither Blancato
nor Murphy were asked to corroborate Abraham regarding such
a discussion.
Abraham also conceded that he did not seek clarification
from Pimentel’s doctor regarding the postural limitation. Ac-
cording to Abraham, that was not something he would ordinar-
ily do. He testified that human resources would be responsible
for something like that. Murphy was not asked any questions
regarding the Respondent’s response to Pimentel’s November
14 doctor’s note. Nor did the Respondent offer any evidence to
show that any effort was made to clarify the extent of Pimen-
tel’s “new” postural limitation.
10. Blancato’s speeches and the plant closing poster
There is no dispute that, between late November and early
December, Blancato held a series of meetings with the employ-
ees to discuss the Union and the upcoming election. Odorczuk
testified that there were about 10 such meetings. Tyree and
employee Michael Dixon testified that there were meetings in
the cafeteria about once a week between October 5 and the
scheduled election date. Lee Sochon, another employee who
testified as a witness for the General Counsel, recalled attend-
ing two or three meetings but said there were other meetings
that he did not attend. Winegar attended the first meeting at
which Blancato spoke, on November 22. She recalled this date
clearly because it was her last day of employment at the Re-
spondent.
With the exception of Winegar, the General Counsel’s wit-
nesses had difficulty specifying what was said at each meeting.
Because Winegar attended only the meeting on November 22,
it was easier for her to match Blancato’s statements to a spe-
cific meeting.24 Winegar recalled Blancato saying that the Re-
spondent would close because the Union would cost too much.
She recalled that he mentioned by name other factories that had
a union but were now closed. One of the factories he mentioned
was a facility operated by her soon-to-be new employer. On
cross-examination, Winegar recalled that Blancato also told the
employees that, if they had a Union, they would be paying
someone to represent them and that the Union could make
promises, but negotiations would determine what the employ-
ees ultimately got. She also recalled a discussion about strikes.
Tyree testified that Blancato used overhead projections to il-
lustrate one of his speeches, including an overhead listing union
factories that had closed. She recalled Blancato talking about
this but could not remember anything he said about the plants
other than that they had been unionized and were now closed.
Tyree testified that Blancato also talked about the Respondent’s
former plant in Beacon Falls and said that one reason the Re-
spondent closed that plant and moved to Winsted was to get
away from the Union. Tyree recalled that Blancato said the
Respondent could lose business if it had a union because Ford,
the Respondent’s biggest customer, doesn’t like working with

24 Because these meetings were held while Pimentel was out of
work, he did not testify about any of the meetings.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD526
union shops. On cross-examination, Tyree was forced to con-
cede that she was not sure if Blancato said that the plants de-
picted on the overhead had closed because they were Union, or
that they had closed and the Union couldn’t do anything about
it. Tyree also acknowledged that there was no mention of this
statement in her pretrial affidavit. Tyree also recalled, on cross-
examination, that Blancato talked about job security and said
that the Union could not guarantee job security, that the only
way to have job security is to work together to satisfy the cus-
tomer.
Lee Sochon testified that Blancato used an overhead projec-
tion with pictures of closed union factories and said, “[I]f things
get bad, the company may have to close.” According to So-
chon, an employee asked Blancato if he was saying that the
Respondent will close if the Union was selected. Sochon testi-
fied that Blancato replied by repeating, if things got real bad,
the Respondent might close. Michael Dixon also testified that
an employee questioned Blancato about his plant closing state-
ment, but he recalled Blancato responding that “it might hap-
pen, could happen, I don’t know.” Schaffer testified that he was
the employee who questioned Blancato when Blancato talked
about what could happen if there was a union. According to
Schaffer, when he asked Blancato for more information, Blan-
cato said, “[T]his is what happened to those factories, this could
happen here.” Dixon and Schaffer, on cross-examination, re-
called Blancato making statements about job security similar to
those recalled by Tyree. Finally, Odorczuk testified that Blan-
cato talked about the closed union factories and said, “[J]ust
because of the Union, all these places closed and people lost
their jobs.” He also recalled the statement that Tyree recalled
about the Respondent having closed the Beacon Falls plant and
moved to Winsted to get away from the Union. Odorczuk testi-
fied that it was Spencer who made this statement.
All of the General Counsel’s witnesses testified that, during
the preelection campaign, they saw a poster in the plant depict-
ing closed factories. The poster, which is in evidence, is ap-
proximately 30” x 40” in size. At the top of the poster appeared
the following statement, in bold type:
These are just a few examples of plants where the UAW
used to represent employees.
(Emphasis in original.) Underneath this heading are five photo-
graphs of shuttered, dilapidated buildings and overgrown park-
ing lots. Under each photograph is the name of a factory, its
location and the date it closed. Across each photograph is writ-
ten, in large red block letters, the word, “CLOSED.” Under
these pictures is the statement: “Is this what the UAW calls job
security?” At the bottom of the poster, it says “VOTE NO!”
next to a depiction of the No box on the ballot marked with an
X. This poster was posted at or near the cafeteria where the
meetings were held. A smaller version of this poster was also
posted by the timeclock.
The Respondent produced written scripts for seven meetings,
including the two described above that were held shortly after
the Respondent learned of the union campaign and at which
Spencer did most of the talking. There were also two prepared
speeches that were read by Blancato after the December 14
election was canceled. Blancato testified that the remaining
three meetings were held on November 22 and 28 and Decem-
ber 5. According to Blancato, he did not read the scripts for
these meetings verbatim. Instead, he spoke either from “trigger
points” he prepared before the meeting based on the text or by
glancing at the headings in the prepared text for clues regarding
what he was supposed to say.25 In response to questions from
the General Counsel, Blancato conceded that he did not have a
clear recollection at the hearing of the words he actually used at
these meetings, but he did have a clear recollection of the topics
he discussed and a general recollection of what he said about
the topics. According to Blancato, at the time he gave these
speeches, he had committed to memory the contents of the
prepared scripts and knew what each “trigger point” in his
notes was supposed to trigger.
Blancato denied that he or Spencer made any threats of plant
closure during these meetings.26 He also denied making any
reference to the poster at the meetings. According to Blancato,
the poster was put up at the end of the campaign to emphasize
the points the Respondent had been making throughout the
campaign about job security. Blancato testified that job security
was an issue that the Union had raised in its campaign litera-
ture. Blancato did identify a chart of “UAW Plant Closings in
Connecticut” that he believed Spencer used in making one of
his speeches. The 13 UAW plants listed include the 5 that are
pictured on the poster. Next to the name of each plant is the
number of jobs lost as a result of the plant having closed. At
least one of the General Counsel’s witnesses recalled seeing
such a chart during one of the meetings. Blancato conceded
during cross-examination that he did not know any of the facts
or circumstances surrounding the closure of these plants.
The text and trigger points for the November 22 meeting
show that Blancato talked first about “the issues involved with
the Union effort to make monthly dues payers out of each of
you.” Blancato then introduced Spencer to talk about the Re-
spondent’s history with unions. One of the points made by
Blancato, according to these documents, is that the NLRB’s
rules governing union organizing efforts were “unfair” to em-
ployers because they allowed unions to make any promises they
want to win the vote while prohibiting employers from making
promises. Blancato told the employees that the reason for such
an unfair rule is that the NLRB knows that a union can not
deliver on its promises while an employer can. Blancato’s trig-
ger points show that he emphasized this point by telling the
employee “HDB [the Respondent] can make good . . . the Un-
ion can not.” After Spencer spoke about the Respondent’s his-
tory, Blancato wrapped up the meeting by telling the employees
they were free to vote no in the December 14 election even if
they had signed a union authorization card. His trigger points
indicate that he also told the employees at the end of the meet-
ing that the Respondent would meet with them twice a week to
present “all the facts.”
Because Spencer did not testify and there are no notes of his
portion of the November 22 speech, I will rely on the written

25 Blancato’s testimony is consistent with the recollection of other
witnesses that, although Blancato may have been holding papers in his
hand, he did not read the speeches to the employees.
26 As previously noted, Spencer did not testify.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 527
text to the extent it tends to corroborate the testimony of the
General Counsel’s witnesses. According to the text, this is what
Spencer told the employees about the Respondent’s history
with unions:
It seems to me that as you are faced with the question
of whether or not to have a Union here at Homer Bronson
part of the answer to that should lie in our own history
with unions. There is a famous saying, “those who cannot
read history are bound to repeat it.” You can learn a lot
from history. So today I am going to spend a little time
talking about history.
My dad first became involved with Homer Bronson in
Beacon Falls after World War II. The company was then
and is now primarily a hinge manufacturer. The company
grew after World War II. In fact an operation was opened
in Chicago. Both the Chicago and Beacon Falls operation
were unionized. The employees were represented by the
Steelworkers Union.
It seemes [sic] that in those days there was a strike
every three years. Whenever the contract ended, the
Steelworkers went on strike. The strikes lasted from 2–8
weeks. I know about those strikes because frankly I
crossed the picket line with my brother to work during the
strikes when we were teenagers. The last strike I remem-
ber was in 1979. I think that was the straw that broke the
camels back. The company was fed up and tired of strikes
and disruption and the effect it had on business. They
bought the land in Winsted and Beacon Falls was closed
down. It was closed down and reopened here in Winsted.
Winsted of course has always been a non-union facility. In
addition the unionized operation in Chicago closed down
and that work was brought here to Winsted as well.
So clearly the history of Homer Bronson and unions
has not been a good one. From the company’s prospective
[sic] the disrubtion [sic] caused by strikes and loss of
flexibility in the union contract hurt business and frankly
from the employees point of view the Steelworkers Union
could not provide them job security. Just ask any employ-
ees who used to work for Homer Bronson in Beacon Falls
or Chicago, when the plants closed down they lost their
jobs.27
The text shows that Spencer continued, after a pause, talking
about the Respondent’s history since he joined the Company in
1990 as vice president of marketing. He described how the
Respondent was losing $1.6 million a year at that time and was
losing customers. Spencer then spoke about changes that had
been implemented since the Respondent was purchased by
Hank Martin, including the conversion to cell manufacturing.
According to the text, Spencer told the employees the goal of
these changes was to make the Respondent competitive in an
increasingly difficult market to keep their jobs secure. Spencer

27 Blancato testified, surprisingly, that the text of this speech was
prepared by the Respondent’s attorneys without any input from him,
Spencer, or anyone else in the Respondent’s operation. One is left to
wonder how counsel knew so much about the Respondent’s history of
dealing with unions.
then reiterated his comments from the earlier speeches, ac-
knowledging that “mistakes” had been made without this time
giving any specifics. After telling employees that the Respon-
dent’s ability to remain competitive and gain new customers
and thereby create job security depended on continuing on the
present course, he concluded his remarks as follows:
It seems to me you have to ask yourself this question: Will the
Union help this company remain competitive and gain new
customers in order to grow and prosper in Winsted, Connecti-
cut? Ask yourself, please, will this Union help us to be re-
sponsive, flexible and competitive as required by our custom-
ers? Or will this Union do to this new Homer Bronson what it
did to the old Homer Bronson?
Blancato testified that he did not have time to prepare “trig-
ger points” for the speech he gave on November 28. He also
denied reading the text of this speech verbatim. Instead, he
flipped through the text prepared by his attorneys and used the
headers as trigger points. The headers in the text are: “Introduc-
tion”; “What is the Union?”; “Cost of a Union”; “Fines”;
“Promises”; and “Conclusion.” The text under “Introduction”
includes a reminder to the employees that Blancato explained to
them at the last meeting that “this election has far reaching
consequences on each and everyone of us here, our families and
the company.” The text then promises that the Respondent will
give the employees “the facts” and “the truth” about the Union
“so that you will vote the way that is best for you and your
families on December 14, and from my perspective, that is to
vote no for the union.” The text under the next two headers is a
lengthy discourse on the Union as a business that makes money
by charging employees dues, fines, etc. The text makes refer-
ence to the LM-2 report of the Union’s Local 376 to estimate
the amount of dues employees would have to pay if the Union
were selected. The text then discusses dues-checkoff clauses,
the possibility of dues increases and the salaries of union offi-
cials, including organizer Becotte, that are paid from these
dues. Under the header “Fines,” the text discusses internal un-
ion charges and trials by the Union’s “kangaroo court” and the
fines that result, citing as examples fines assessed for crossing a
picket line. The text of the speech regarding “Promises” repeats
the message of earlier speeches that the Union can make prom-
ises but can not deliver on those promises. The text then de-
scribes the duty to bargain collectively, emphasizing that the
Respondent, although required to bargain in good faith, is not
required by law to agree to any union demand or to retain all
current benefits. According to the text, Blancato told the em-
ployees “there is no guarantee that the benefits and wages that
you now have will go up. To the contrary, they could go down
or even remain the same. There is no guarantee—everything is
negotiable.” The text follows this discussion by telling employ-
ees that the only two things the Union can truthfully guarantee
employees is that they will have to pay monthly dues and that
the Union will become the employees one and only spokesman.
The latter guarantee is then explained in terms of the employees
giving up the right to speak for themselves in return for having
a coworker who is the Union’s steward, or a union business
agent, represent them if they have a grievance or problem at
work. The text also contains a discussion of superseniority
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD528
clauses. According to Blancato, Spencer did not deliver any
part of this speech.
Blancato did prepare “trigger points” for the last preelection
speech he gave on December 5. In addition, copies of overhead
projections he used to illustrate his speech are in evidence,
along with the prepared text. The topic of this speech was
strikes and, in particular, the history of the Union’s Local 376
and strikes. Blancato’s notes, the text and the overheads show
that Blancato introduced this subject by reminding employees
of his previous speech, in which he explained the process of
collective bargaining and the lack of “guarantees” that this
process would lead to improved wages, benefits, etc. He de-
scribed the strike as the Union’s only option if the Employer
would not agree to the Union’s demands and the Union would
not accept the Employer’s offer. Although Blancato told the
employees, if he followed his notes, that “strikes are not inevi-
table,” the slide projected and the text read: “Where there are
unions. . . . there are strikes.” Blancato then proceeded to give
the employees the “facts” about strikes, including the em-
ployer’s right to hire permanent replacements in the event of an
economic strike and the cost to employees of a strike in lost
wages and benefits. Blancato next reviewed the history of
strikes by Local 376, which is referred to in the text as “strike
happy.” The history described was essentially one of lengthy
strikes marked by violence that ended without a contract or
wage increase and which sometimes resulted in loss of jobs
through subcontracting or the Company going out of business.
Blancato projected newspaper articles to illustrate his points.
According to his notes, Blancato concluded his remarks by
telling the employees:
If we did vote for a union, I am not saying there would
be a strike
I am saying the history of Local 376 is a long one
I am saying that you need to know the facts
The text of the December 5 speech includes a section on
“Job Security.”28 Blancato also wrote at the end of his “trigger
points”: “Job security doesn’t come from the UAW. It comes
from us being competitive in our markets with quality, service
and price.” The prepared text under “Job Security” includes the
following, which tends to corroborate the testimony of the
General Counsel’s witnesses:
I don’t know what the Auto Workers Union is talking
about in terms of job security—but let me tell you it sure
can’t provide job security. I have here a list of all the com-
panies that have closed down in Connecticut who used to
be represented by the Auto Workers Union in the last sev-
eral years. This chart shows quite clearly that the UAW
and Local 376 used to represent a number of business
which no longer operate in Connecticut today. This chart
shows that the Auto Workers Union could not guarantee

28 The name “Charlie” is handwritten on the text of the speech next
to the job security heading. Blancato testified that Spencer gave part of
the speech on December 5. Although he did not identify which part
Spencer delivered, it may have been this section. If Spencer followed
the practice described by Blancato regarding other speeches, he would
have read this section verbatim.
job security for employees of the Torrington Company,
Fafner Bearing, New Departure, Century Brass, Bristol
Brass, North & Judd, TRW—the list goes on and on. In
fact, this list shows that over the last 15 years, 13 compa-
nies have closed, putting 4,141 employees who used to be
represented by the UAW out of work. Do you think those
employees felt they had job security? What did the Auto
Workers Union do for them? The answer is simple—they
have done nothing.
Not only can the Auto Workers Union not guarantee
job security but, in fact, the opposite may be true. Today,
it is increasingly difficult to get and keep business. There
is no doubt that in order to be successful in today’s com-
petitive business climate, you have to be out there day to
day, beating the bushes trying to get and keep business. It
gets tougher and tougher every day. Homer Bronson has
been able to get business and beat the competition because
we can deliver our product on time and in a quality man-
ner. That’s our job security.
The Auto Workers, nor any union, can guarantee you
job security and, in fact, the Auto Workers’ promise of job
security is a dismal failure. As this list shows, today, thou-
sands of employees are out of work in Connecticut despite
the promises made to them by the Auto Workers for job
security. I hope you will not be misled by those promises
as unfortunately, many, many employees in the State of
Connecticut have been in the past.
11. Third-shift wage increase
The Respondent started a third shift on September 18. Ini-
tially, employees working the third shift received the same
differential as those on second shift. The Respondent’s records
show that the five employees working on third shift received an
additional 5-percent differential on November 13. Winegar,
who worked third shift, testified that her supervisor, Kisiel, told
the employees on third shift in early November that he had
been trying to get them a 5-percent increase and that he was
going to write a letter and submit it to the Company. According
to Winegar, the employees had been talking among themselves,
in Kisiel’s presence, almost from the time she started on third
shift, about the unfairness of getting the same differential as
employees on second shift.29 Winegar got the 5-percent raise in
her last paycheck.30
Kisiel denied having any conversation with Winegar about
raises. With respect to the third-shift differential, Kisiel testi-
fied that about a month after third shift started, two employees
approached him about getting an extra 5–10 percent over the
second-shift differential. He agreed with the employees that this
was a good idea and wrote a note to Blancato on the subject.
The handwritten note, which is in evidence, is dated November
10 and reads as follows:
After successfully starting a third shift at Bronson Company
with a group of employees that volunteered to transfer from

29 The Respondent’s records show that Winegar started on third shift
on October 2.
30 As noted above, November 22 was Winegar’s last day at the Re-
spondent.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 529
second shift, a group I might add that are dedicated to the
Bronson Company, I respectfully request that we increase
their shift premium to fifteen percent.
Kisiel acknowledged being aware of the Union’s organizing
drive at the time he wrote this note. Blancato testified that the
Respondent implemented the new third shift differential in
response to Kisiel’s request. He denied that the increase was
given to influence employees’ support for the Union.
12. Other conduct of Kisiel
Winegar testified that, a couple days after she signed the un-
ion petition at the October 5 meeting, Kisiel approached her
while she was working at her machine and said, “I’m sure you
heard that the Union is trying to get in and that some people
think it will help, but it’s just going to hurt.” Kisiel specifically
denied making such a statement to Winegar. Kisiel testified
further that Winegar approached him outside during a break
and asked him what he thought about “it.” When Kisiel asked
Winegar what she was talking about, she replied, “the Union
trying to get in.” According to Kisiel, he responded, “[N]ow
that you’ve asked me, I can tell you my opinion.” Kisiel then
told Winegar that the Respondent was too small a Company
and that it needed the flexibility of having employees do a vari-
ety of jobs. Kisiel testified that he expressed his opinion to
other employees, but only when the employees initiated the
conversation.
Winegar also testified that Kisiel told the third-shift employ-
ees, in the cafeteria in early November, that everyone would
have a review and receive a raise by the end of December.
About a week or two later, Kisiel approached Winegar at her
machine and told her that the Respondent was postponing raises
until after the union election. As noted above, Kisiel denied
having any conversation with Winegar about raises.
13. The cancellation of the election
Pursuant to the parties’ Stipulated Election Agreement, an
election was to be conducted to determine whether the employ-
ees wished to be represented by the Union on December 14. On
December 1, the Union filed the first of the unfair labor prac-
tice charges in this case alleging, inter alia, that the November
15 “layoff” of Pimentel violated the Act. On December 12, the
Union requested that the election be held in abeyance. Blancato
testified that he held a meeting with the employees as soon as
he learned that the election had been canceled and read the
following speech, prepared by counsel, verbatim:
Good afternoon. I got some bad news today. I was just
informed by the National Labor Relations Board that the
Union does not want to have the election on Thursday.
They don’t want the election because they are losing. Yet,
that is not what they have said. They have filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations
Board. They have done this because under the National
Labor Relations Board law if the Union files a charge
claiming an unfair labor practice the election is automati-
cally blocked from going forward. The Union knew this—
the Union knew that they were losing—so they filed a
trumped up unfair labor practice charge.
As an example of how trumped up the charge is, the
Union has claimed that—I am serious when I say this—
they have claimed that the company giving Christmas
Tree’s [sic] to you and your family was an unfair labor
practice designed to get you to change your vote. I have
never heard anything so absurd. We did this same thing
last year. All of us know it was ment [sic] to show our ap-
preciation, as we have in the past, to you and your families
for all the hard work and commitment you have given this
company. For the Union to now turn around and claim that
the Christmas Tree trip last weekend was a bribe for you,
insults not only me but insults you as well.
I’m not sure how the process goes from here. I will
keep you informed as I learn more. If you have any ques-
tions I will try to answer them if I can, if I can’t I will try
to get you an answer.
On the day of the canceled election, according to Blancato,
he met with the employees again and read another speech, pre-
pared by counsel, verbatim. This second speech reads as fol-
lows:
Good Morning
I told you yesterday that when I learn more about the
process or procedure for what took place I would come
and tell you. Well, this morning I have learned about the
process. First of all I was informed by our lawyers today
that this election was blocked even though the Union has
not formally filed its charge yet. Apparently, they have
simply told the Board orally that they are going to file a
charge and no actual charge has been filed.
I was also told by our lawyers that the Union could
have filed a request to go ahead with the election, or if
they thought they were going to lose they could of [sic]
withdrawn the petition.
The Union however has chosen to file a charge—the
specifics of which we don’t have in writing yet. I also
learned that the way the process now works is that once
the Union files a charge the National Labor Relations
Board will investigate it by talking to us and I suppose
some of you, perhaps as witnesses for the Union. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board will then make a decision
whether the charges have merit and if they think they do
they will have a hearing so a judge can determine if they
have merit. That hearing would probably occur 3 to 6
months from now. In addition, the party that doesn’t win
at that hearing can appeal it to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board in Washington. I guess that could take some
period of time and then the party that loses from that can
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals in New York
City. God, this is beginning to sound like the presidential
election, isn’t it?
All those appeals and all that process could take up to
three or more years. I think that is unfortunate. I think its
unfortunate that we are going have [sic] to live with this
potentially a very long period of time. During this time we
will, of course, keep everything going by the rules of the
National Labor Relations Board.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD530
This whole process really brings home the point I tried
to make earlier on. Once you get involved with the Union,
you really do lose control of your lives. Do you remember
when I told you that once you get involved with the Union
you could be heading down a path you don’t want to fol-
low. That is because the Union makes all the decisions at
the National Labor Relations Board.
The Union filed the charge blocking the election—the
Union is now going to litigate this case. The Union, not
you, will make a decision whether there is an election that
goes forward—the Union, not you, will make a decision
whether or not they file an unfair labor practice charges
[sic]—the Union, not you, will make decisions about
whether or not the charges are withdrawn. The Union is
now making the decisions which fundamentally effect
your lives in ways that frankly I didn’t that were possible
before this whole process began. [Sic.]
Certainly the way this situation stands now, no one is
benefiting. Because of this, I have told our lawyers to go
ahead and file a request with the government for the elec-
tion to proceed. They told me that there wasn’t much hope
that it would be approved, but I thought we should at least
try that.
Finally I must tell you that from my point of view, the
lack of certainty resulting from the Union’s actions could
not come at a worse time. We need to focus our attention
on the business not on these frivolous charges. Unfortu-
nately, we will have to respond because we have done
nothing wrong.
Blancato testified that he read these two speeches verbatim on
the advice of counsel.
On December 13, employee Thibodeau began circulating a
petition among his fellow employees. The petition states:
We want the Union to drop the petition and get rid of the
charges. We don’t want a Union at Bronson and want to re-
sume to normal life [sic].
There are 52 signatures on the petition, many of which also
appear on the Union’s authorization petition.31 Thibodeau testi-
fied that he drafted the petition himself in order to find out if
claims made by union supporters, that three-quarters of the
employees wanted the Union, were true. Thibodeau acknowl-
edged that he was also upset because Ewing told him he would
not be getting the raise he was promised when he got his review
because “everything’s frozen.” Thibodeau testified further that
he went around with the petition during breaks and at noontime,
obtaining most of the signatures on the first page. At the end of
his shift, he gave the petition to Charlie Wolcott to circulate on
second shift. According to Thibodeau, he told Wolcott to just
hand it around and not to let the foreman see him doing it.
Thibodeau testified that he arranged with the leadman on third
shift, Rafael de la Cruz, to circulate the petition on that shift.

31 One of these, Jean Oliveri, wrote next to her signature, “who ever
say that lied about the tree.” This appears to be a reference to Blan-
cato’s speech in which he described the Union’s unfair labor practice
charge as being based on the Respondent having given a Christmas tree
to the employees.
Neither Wolcott nor de la Cruz testified. Thibodeau gave a
copy of the petition to Dale Schaffer to give to the Union and
sent a copy to the NLRB Regional Office with a letter dated
January 10. In the letter, Thibodeau stated:
All we want is peace of mind and return to normal routine.
Fairness is all we want and our rights. At this time we’re in
limbo and we really don’t know why. Any action on your part
to straightend [sic] this out would be appreciated.
Dixon and Schaffer contradicted Thibodeau, testifying that
Thibodeau solicited them to sign the petition while they were
working. Both refused to sign. Schaffer testified that he told
Thibodeau that he would take the petition to the Union.
Odorczuk testified that Ewing told him, while they were riding
to work together, that Ewing and Thibodeau came up with the
idea for the petition in response to a request from Blancato that
they do something about the blocked election. Ewing denied
such a conversation occurred, although he admitted commuting
to work with Odorczuk on a regular basis. Ewing also acknowl-
edged that he considered Odorczuk a friend and that he was
candid when speaking to Odorczuk about the union campaign.
Odorczuk also testified that Blancato asked him to talk to his
people about signing the petition. Odorczuk did so and told
Thibodeau when they were ready to sign. Odorczuk allowed
Thibodeau to obtain the signatures of his employees during
worktime.
Blancato testified that he was aware that Thibodeau was cir-
culating a petition that had something to do with the Union, but
denied seeing it or discussing it with Thibodeau or anyone else.
Although Blancato admitted being aware that Thibodeau was
circulating the petition during worktime and in work areas, he
did nothing to stop it. According to Blancato, that was “not
within [his] purview.” When asked for a clarification, Blancato
testified that it meant nothing to him whether employees were
signing the petition as long as it did not interfere with produc-
tion.
14. The spring 2001 wage increase
Witnesses for the Respondent and the General Counsel ap-
pear to agree that the Respondent had a policy regarding wage
increases before the advent of the Union.32 That policy called
for an annual performance review that could result in a wage
increase. At the same time, there is no dispute that, when em-
ployees began signing up with the Union in October, many
employees had not received either a raise or a review in more
than a year. The evidence is convincing that this was one of the
chief concerns among the employees that led them to consider
union representation. As previously discussed, Spencer and
Blancato addressed this concern in response to the union cam-
paign. The Respondent’s text of Spencer’s second speech to the
employees shows that he acknowledged that the Respondent
had not been following its policy, and that he promised the
employees that he “would insist that our policy on wage in-
creases be followed.” Soon thereafter, Blancato sent his memo

32 Although several of the General Counsel’s witnesses testified that
there didn’t appear to be any policy, this perception most probably was
the result of the Respondent’s admitted failure to follow whatever
policy it had.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 531
to the supervisors identifying those employees who were due or
overdue for a review and directing them to complete these re-
views by October 31. A number of these reviews were in fact
done in the October/November period. I have previously dis-
cussed the testimony of several witnesses that they were told by
their supervisors, in October or November, to expect a raise.
These witnesses testified that the same supervisors later told
them that the Respondent could not give any raises because of
the union campaign. Thibodeau testified that his unhappiness
over this was part of the reason he began circulating his petition
after the election was blocked.
Summaries of the Respondent’s payroll and personnel re-
cords, as well as copies of some of the records themselves
which are in evidence, reveal that nine employees received
performance reviews in the October–November period that
were at least satisfactory but received no wage increase at that
time. The Respondent’s records reveal that these same employ-
ees received increases in their hourly wage ranging from $.25
to $1.25 in May or June 2001 without any further review being
done.33 All nine employee were identified in Blancato’s Octo-
ber 20 memo as being due or overdue for a review and possible
wage increase. Other employees who were identified in that
memo also received raises in the spring 2001.34 The reviews for
these employees are dated around the same time as their in-
crease. These and other employees were also identified in a
second memo from Blancato, dated April 16, 2001, listing em-
ployees who were still in need of a performance review.35 In
all, a total of 24 employees received wage increases in May or
June 2001.
The summary of the Respondent’s records also reveals that
12 employees did receive a wage increase in the October–
November period, after the Respondent learned about the Un-
ion.36 Only four of these employees (Dixon, Melius, Purcha,
and Zuchegna) were identified in Blancato’s October 20 memo
as due or overdue for a review. The evidence in the record does
not indicate whether any of the 12 received a review at the time
of their fall 2000 wage increase. Blancato testified generally
that those employees who received raises in the fall were “peo-
ple who had skill sets that the business could not afford to
lose.” No specific evidence was offered as to the reason any of
these 12 employees received a raise at that time.
Blancato testified that he made the decision not to give raises
to the nine employees who received reviews in the October–
November period. According to Blancato, the Respondent was
experiencing a decline in revenue and he was under pressure as

33 These employees are: Maria Budney, Robert Infante, Robert Is-
rael, Jaroslaw Ogniewski, Wladyslawa Ogniewska, Jean Oliveri, Leo-
nard Preato, Linda Rogers, and Claude (Frenchie) Thibodeau.
34 Hank Archambault, Jeff Parsons, Kurt Parsons, Linda
Truskauskas, Roberta Tyree, and Ana Valenzuela.
35 The April 2001 memo listed many of the same employees who
had been identified in the October memo, as well as others who were
named for the first time.
36 John Calkins, Sandra Calkins, Michael Dixon, Daryl Godsoe,
Kevin Hackett, Gordon Marshall, Clifford Melius, Daniel Mogob,
Eugene Purcha, Glenn Rich, Rafael Valenzuela, and Alan Zuchegna.
The five employees on third shift who received the increased shift
differential on November 13 are not included in this group.
the new president to reduce costs. His decision not to give these
nine employees a raise was part of a cost-reduction program
Blancato claims to have implemented in the fall 2000. Blancato
acknowledged that he sent the October 20 memo to his supervi-
sors with the intent of having them adhere to the Respondent’s
policy of annually reviewing employees’ performance for a
possible wage increase. He decided however that eight of the
nine who were reviewed did not warrant a raise because, as the
lowest-skilled employees in the plant, they could be easily re-
placed if they chose to quit over pay. As to the ninth employee,
Thibodeau, Blancato testified that he was already the most-
highly paid hourly employee in the plant and that his rate was
competitive with that paid by other employees for similarly
skilled individuals. According to Blancato, he believed it was
not necessary to give Thibodeau a raise at that time to keep him
from leaving. Blancato testified further that he decided to give
all nine employees raises in the spring because, by April 2001,
his cost-reduction program was having a positive effect. Be-
cause the Respondent was nearing the end of its fiscal year, in
June, Blancato came to the conclusion that any wage increases
given would not adversely affect the Respondent’s profits.
Blancato testified that this is the reason he issued the April 20
memo asking the supervisors to complete reviews of employees
who were still due or overdue for a review. Blancato testified
further that he relied upon the October/November reviews to
grant the May/June raises to the nine employees in order not to
burden the supervisors with administrative tasks.
15. The termination of Pimentel
As noted above, Pimentel was sent home on November 15
after bringing in the note from his doctor advising him, inter
alia, to “avoid prolonged postures.” Pimentel testified that he
heard nothing further from the Respondent until he received the
following letter, dated June 5, 2001, from Murphy, the Respon-
dent’s human resources manager:
We have been advised by our insurance carrier that you have
been working at Howmet since February of this year (2001).
We have had no correspondence from you concerning your
position at Bronson and therefore assume that you have aban-
doned your job. We have terminated your insurance coverage
immediately.
Murphy then advised Pimentel of the cost of continuing insur-
ance coverage under COBRA. She also enclosed forms to elect
COBRA and to close out Pimentel’s 401(k) account.
Pimentel testified that, upon receipt of this letter, he tried
calling Murphy. Although he left two or three messages for
Murphy, it was Blancato who finally returned his call. Pimentel
indicated to Blancato that he was calling about Murphy’s letter.
Pimentel told Blancato that he did not abandon his job. Blan-
cato replied that Pimentel didn’t understand the letter and then
read the letter to him. When Blancato was finished, Pimentel
said he did understand the letter and again denied having aban-
doned his job. He told Blancato that he stopped working when
Abraham told him to go home and not to come back until he
could work full duty. Pimentel did not testify to any response
from Blancato. After this phone conversation, Pimentel went to
the Respondent’s plant and spoke to Ewing about getting his
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD532
job back. According to Pimentel, Ewing laughed and told him
he had to speak to Cindy Murphy. He waited for Murphy to
come in. When she did, she told Pimentel that he had to speak
to Blancato. Pimentel then met with Blancato in his office.
When Pimentel asked about the letter, Blancato again suggested
that Pimentel had misunderstood the letter and read it to him.
Pimentel told Blancato he understood the letter and again de-
nied abandoning his job, telling Blancato he only did what
Abraham told to do. Blancato then said that the Respondent
hadn’t heard from Pimentel in 7 or 8 months and asked how
could they leave his job open all that time. Blancato asked Pi-
mentel if he was working. When Pimentel said no, Blancato
called him a liar. Pimentel then said he had only started work-
ing May 21. Blancato again said Pimentel was lying. At that
point, Pimentel asked Blancato if he had a job or not and Blan-
cato replied, “[N]o.”
Pimentel acknowledged at the hearing that he was working
elsewhere when he got the letter from Murphy. According to
Pimentel, he received worker’s compensation benefits after
Abraham sent him home in November. Pimentel’s lawyer told
him that he had to look for work he could do with the doctor’s
restrictions in order to continue receiving disability benefits.
Pimentel kept a record of the places he looked for work until
February 6, 2001. In February, he obtained work through a
temporary agency, working at Howmet Corporation. On May
21, 2001, Pimentel became a direct employee of Howmet. Pi-
mentel’s job at Howmet is light duty and allows him to sit or
stand. Pimentel admittedly did not advise the Respondent di-
rectly regarding his new employment. However, the Respon-
dent’s worker’s compensation insurance carrier would be aware
of these circumstances because it paid Pimentel temporary
partial disability benefits through January 2001 and entered into
a voluntary settlement of his compensation case in April 2001.
The records from Pimentel’s compensation case show that he
reached maximum medical improvement on November 24,
2000. The last medical evaluation, from Dr. Selden on January
30, 2001, indicates that Pimentel had a permanent light-duty
restriction. According to Dr. Selden’s report, Pimentel was
capable of “selective work but should avoid repetitive bending,
squatting, lifting, and climbing. Occasional lifting of 20–25
pounds would be appropriate.” The Respondent’s insurance
carrier was sent a copy of this evaluation and agreed to the
settlement of Pimentel’s claim on April 4, 2001.
Murphy testified regarding the events leading up to the June
5 letter. According to Murphy, sometime in the spring, she
received a call from someone at the State Department of Social
Services (DSS) regarding a wage garnishment for Pimentel.
Murphy told the DSS representative that Pimentel was out on
worker’s comp. The DSS representative told Murphy that they
could have garnished his worker’s comp payments if they had
known he was receiving them. Murphy testified that she then
mentioned to the DSS representative that she had heard that
Pimentel was working across the street, at Howmet. The DSS
representative said she could investigate that for Murphy. Mur-
phy had a second telephone conversation with the DSS repre-
sentative in which she was told that DSS had run Pimentel’s
social security number and determined that he had been work-
ing at Howmet since February through a temporary agency.
Murphy then called the Respondent’s compensation insurer
who confirmed that Pimentel was working. According to Mur-
phy, she brought this information to Blancato who decided to
terminate Pimentel. She then wrote the June 5 letter and termi-
nated Pimentel’s insurance coverage. Murphy testified that she
“assumed” that Pimentel had abandoned his job because he was
working elsewhere. According to Murphy, that was the sole
reason for his termination. Murphy conceded on cross-
examination that she made no effort to contact Pimentel before
sending him the letter.
Murphy also testified that she was present at Blancato’s
meeting with Pimentel after the letter was sent. According to
Murphy, Pimentel asked if the Respondent had a job for him.
Blancato referred him to the letter. Murphy recalled that Blan-
cato may have read the letter to Pimentel. Blancato asked Pi-
mentel if there was something he didn’t understand about the
letter. When Pimentel said no, Blancato asked if he was work-
ing. Pimentel said no. Blancato called him a liar. On cross-
examination, Murphy testified that Pimentel may have admitted
working after being called a liar. Blancato was not asked about
this meeting.
At the time of the hearing, Schaffer was out of work on
workers compensation due to a knee injury. Although he had
been out of work since January 2001, he was never told by any
representative of the Respondent or its insurance carrier that he
had to keep in contact with the Respondent. According to
Schaffer, his last contact with the Respondent was about 3
months before he testified at the hearing.
16. The discharge of Odorczuk
Odorczuk had been employed by the Respondent since 1984
and was a supervisor on first shift for the last 7 years. In the fall
2000, Odorczuk supervised six–seven employees who worked
in an area that he referred to as the blank and turn department
and the butt department. Blancato testified that no such depart-
ments existed in 2000, that Odorczuk was the supervisor of the
“made-to-order cell.” Ewing, who shared an office with
Odorczuk, referred to Odorczuk’s area as the Kenworth or
blank and turn cell and the made-to-order cell. According to
Ewing, the latter cell produced a variety of small “butt hinges”
using the blank and turn machines. Despite this difference in
nomenclature, all the witnesses agreed as to the nature of the
work performed in Odorczuk’s area and the employee comple-
ment he supervised.
There is no dispute that, soon after learning of the union
drive, Blancato called Odorczuk and Ewing into his office and
told them that they would be fired if Blancato ever found out
that they knew anything about the Union and didn’t tell him.
According to Odorczuk, Blancato also asked him and Ewing at
this meeting and on other occasions to talk to the employees,
find out what they could about the Union, and report back to
him. Odorczuk also testified that Blancato instructed them to
try to convince the employees working for them not to go with
the Union. Odorczuk conceded that he was not given any spe-
cific instructions to threaten or coerce employees. As noted
previously, Blancato also instructed them to break up groups of
employees that they saw talking. According to Odorczuk, he
complied with Blancato’s instructions by asking employees
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 533
about the Union and talking to them about the Respondent’s
opposition to the Union. Odorczuk did not testify to any spe-
cific unfair labor practice he committed in carrying out these
instructions and none are alleged in the complaint.
Odorczuk testified that, sometime in the fall, during the un-
ion campaign, he had a meeting with Abraham about Tyree.
According to Odorczuk, Abraham said they were going to
move Tyree to Odorczuk’s area and have her work for him
because they knew that Odorczuk was not a “favorite” of
Tyree. Abraham told Odorczuk he wanted “that b— out of here
because every time there’s a union meeting she makes a big
scene crying about the company.” Odorczuk testified that he
told Abraham that he would have a hard time firing Tyree be-
cause she came into work every day and did her job. Odorczuk
told Abraham he did not hire Tyree and he was not going to fire
her. Tyree was not transferred to Odorczuk’s area after this
conversation. Although it is undisputed that some of the ma-
chines Tyree worked on were moved to Odorczuk’s area, she
continued to report to Ewing. Tyree was not terminated. On the
contrary, after Odorczuk was terminated, the Respondent ap-
pointed her the cell leader in his former cell.
On cross-examination, Odorczuk testified that the Respon-
dent had been trying to get rid of Tyree for some time even
before the union campaign, ever since her boyfriend was let go
in the spring. Odorczuk also testified that he had more than one
conversation with Abraham about getting rid of Tyree but he
could not recall when any of these conversations occurred. As
described by Odorczuk on cross-examination, it appears the
Respondent’s “problem” with Tyree related to an incident be-
tween her boyfriend and a former manager, Steve Perron. Al-
though Odorczuk testified that Tyree was a good worker, he
also claimed that there were some deficiencies in her perform-
ance. These deficiencies, as described by Odorczuk, appear to
be related to a lack of confidence in her own abilities.
Odorczuk also described how emotional Tyree could be, a
characteristic that was evident when she testified at the hearing.
Abraham denied having any discussion with Odorczuk about
transferring Tyree to his department in order to fire her. Ac-
cording to Abraham, Odorczuk did not even have the authority
to fire Tyree or anyone else. Abraham also testified that Tyree
was a good worker.
Odorczuk testified further that, soon after Christmas, Ewing
told him, while they were commuting to work one day, that
there was a rumor that the Respondent was going to fire
Odorczuk because someone told Blancato he was involved with
the Union. Ewing recalled this conversation differently. He
recalled that it was Odorczuk who told Ewing about the rumor
and that Ewing told Odorczuk not to believe it. Odorczuk testi-
fied that he went to see Abraham about this rumor, but Abra-
ham refused to talk to him. Odorczuk then went to see Blan-
cato. He asked Blancato what was going on and reminded
Blancato that he had done everything Blancato asked him to
during the union campaign. Odorczuk denied being involved
with the Union and asked Blancato who said he was. Blancato
told Odorczuk that he could not tell him who said this, but that
he had already heard it from three people. Odorczuk testified
that he saw Hank Martin, apparently one of the Respondent’s
owners, when he came out of Blancato’s office and that he had
a similar conversation with him. Despite the rumors Odorczuk
had heard after Christmas, he was not fired at that time.
Odorczuk testified that he heard nothing further about these
rumors until 2 or 3 weeks before he was terminated. Ewing
again told him that he had heard from a good source that the
Respondent was going to fire Odorczuk. Odorczuk again spoke
to Martin about the rumor. According to Odorczuk, Martin told
him that he doesn’t interfere with decisions made by his presi-
dent, that if Blancato wanted to fire him, he was going to fire
him. Odorczuk told Martin if he wanted to fire him, go ahead,
but “don’t fire me for the wrong reason.” Odorczuk then re-
minded Martin of all he had done for the Company and how
they had always trusted him, giving him the keys to the plant to
lock up, etc. Odorczuk told Martin that the Respondent had
trusted him for 10 years, now they don’t trust him with the
Union. Martin again told Odorczuk there was nothing he could
do.
On June 28, 2001, Dominic Balducci, who was a vice presi-
dent of the Respondent, called Odorczuk into the office at the
end of the day. Abraham was also present. According to
Odorczuk, Balducci gave him an envelope with his vacation
pay and his final paycheck and told Odorczuk that the Respon-
dent was eliminating his job. No other reason was given.
Odorczuk responded by commenting that was a nice way to
treat people after 20 years on the job. He questioned why he
wasn’t even offered another job if they were eliminating his
job. He told Balducci and Abraham he could do any job in the
company. Balducci’s only reply was to tell Odorczuk to call
him if he had any questions. On cross-examination, Odorczuk
admitted telling Balducci in this meeting that he was being
fired because the Company believed he supported the Union.
He denied telling Balducci that the Respondent hadn’t heard the
last of him.
Blancato testified that Odorczuk was terminated on June 28
because his position was eliminated as part of an ongoing cost-
reduction program that the Respondent had undertaken. The
Respondent put in evidence several memos purportedly ad-
dressing this program. The first is a September 6 memo from
Blancato to Spencer indicating that the September revenue
target was in jeopardy because of delays at Ford in introducing
a new product. In the memo, Blancato refers to material cost
reductions and the possibility of subcontracting assembly of
some products to Summit as a way to reduce costs. There is no
mention of reducing the work force. The second memo is dated
September 26 and is addressed to the Respondent’s controller,
vice president of quality, director of engineering, and vice
president of sales. These four managers are instructed to have
their “direct reports” prepare goals aimed at, inter alia, cost
reduction which could be used quarterly to measure their per-
formance and contribution to the Company. The memo is not
addressed to anyone in manufacturing or hourly labor. A memo
dated December 15, from Spencer to Blancato on the subject of
“EBIT Protection Plan,”37 does refer to cost reductions, includ-
ing manpower cutbacks, that “must be immediately put into

37 EBIT is “earnings before income taxes,” a line on the financial
statements.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD534
place” in order to deliver the earnings projected in the remain-
ing six months of the fiscal year.
Blancato testified that other personnel were affected by the
Respondent’s cost-reduction program. According to Blancato, a
customer service position, a quality inspector position, and a
sales department clerical position were eliminated in February
2001; a quality engineer position was eliminated in April 2001;
the receptionist/telephone operator was eliminated in May
2001; a budget analyst was eliminated in July 2001; another
quality engineer position was eliminated in October 2001 when
the incumbent, Don Mahony, became a vice president; and the
tool room supervisor’s position was eliminated in November
2001 after the supervisor, Chet Case, quit. These reductions
were accomplished primarily through attrition with the Re-
spondent combining or eliminating jobs when an employee left
the Company. Blancato acknowledged that no other manufac-
turing employees were laid off as part of the cost-reduction
program.
Blancato acknowledged that Odorczuk was not given any
advance notice that his position would be eliminated. Blancato
acknowledged further that Odorczuk was not offered any other
position in the Company even though he was admittedly a long-
term, valuable employee. According to Blancato, there were no
other salaried positions to offer to Odorczuk and the Respon-
dent was not adding any direct labor in production.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Credibility
The determination of many of the allegations in the com-
plaint turns on a resolution of conflicting testimony and the
credibility of witnesses. In many instances, there are no cor-
roborating witnesses on either side, leaving essentially a “s/he
said, s/he said” dispute. In evaluating the credibility of the
many witnesses who testified for each side, I have considered a
number of factors, including the demeanor of the witnesses. I
have attempted to find corroboration, if there is any, in objec-
tive evidence such as business records. I have also considered
the extent to which a witness’ testimony is internally consistent,
as well as consistent with any prior statements that witness has
given. I have considered the inherent plausibility of the testi-
mony. I have also considered the fact that a number of the Gen-
eral Counsel’s witnesses are still employed by the Respondent.
Both the Board and the courts have historically recognized that
the testimony of such witnesses that is adverse to their em-
ployer is particularly reliable. Flexsteel Industries, 316 NLRB
745 (1995); Georgia Rug Mill, 131 NLRB 1304, 1305 fn. 2
(1961), enfd. as modified 308 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1962). Finally,
in some situations, it is the omission of a document, or the ab-
sence of testimony from a witness, which is in the control of a
party and would be expected to have bolstered the party’s case,
that tips the balance in favor of one side or another. The spe-
cific credibility factors relied upon will be discussed as I evalu-
ate the evidence and make my findings.
2. The 8(a)(1) allegations
a. Rules restricting union activity
The second amended consolidated complaint alleges, at
paragraphs 7(b), (h), 9(a), 10, and 11, that the Respondent,
through various admitted supervisors, orally promulgated rules
that either prohibited employees from discussing the Union at
work or unlawfully and discriminatorily interfered with their
right to engage in union solicitation and distribution. The Re-
spondent, through the testimony of Blancato, has admitted that
it had no effective solicitation/distribution rules in place when
the Union began its drive to organize the Respondent’s em-
ployees. There is no dispute that, in the past, employees were
free to sell items at work, talk to one another about nonwork
related topics and otherwise interact freely, governed only by a
commonsense guideline that their activities not interfere with
production. Tyree and Schaffer, both still employed by the
Respondent, testified credibly that Blancato told them, soon
after the October 5 union meeting, that he didn’t want them to
solicit cards or promote the Union on company time. Although
Blancato admitted speaking to Tyree and Schaffer about union
solicitation and distribution, he claimed that he told them he
had to let them engage in such activity since the Respondent let
employees engage in similar activities in the past. According to
Blancato, the only thing he told Tyree and Schaffer was not to
let it interfere with production. Tyree appeared certain that
Blancato did not tell her she could engage in union solicita-
tion/distribution because he let her sell Avon. On the contrary,
she recalled that Blancato said that union solicitation “was dif-
ferent.” 38 Schaffer clearly understood that Blancato was asking
him not to engage in union activity on company time. I credit
Tyree’s and Schaffer’s account of their conversations because it
is more believable, it is consistent with the other evidence
showing that the Respondent reacted swiftly to stop the Union’s
organizing effort, and because they were testifying adversely to
their economic interests as employees.
The Board and the courts have recognized that an employer
has a right to impose some restrictions on employees’ statutory
right to engage in union solicitation and distribution. Such re-
strictions, however, must be clearly limited in scope so as not to
interfere with employees’ right to solicit their coworkers on
their own time or to distribute literature on their own time in
non-work areas. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793 (1945); Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 394 (1983); Stoddard-
Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962). Accord: United Parcel
Service, 327 NLRB 317 (1998), enfd. 228 F.3d 772 (6th Cir.
2000); Jay Metals, Inc., 308 NLRB 167 (1992). If the language
used by an employer, such as “company time” or “working
hours,” is ambiguous, the employer must provide the employ-
ees with a clear explanation of the limitations on their right to
engage in statutorily protected solicitation and distribution.
Ichikoh Mfg., Inc., 312 NLRB 1022 (1993). Blancato’s prohibi-
tion of union activity during “company time” is thus overly
broad on its face. Moreover, the promulgation of a rule in the
midst of an organizing campaign, even if the rule is lawful on
its face, is strong evidence of a discriminatory motive. Waste
Management of Palm Beach, 329 NLRB 198, 200 (1999); Tu-

38 The Respondent argues in its brief that Tyree’s recollection about
this part of her conversation with Blancato doesn’t make sense. I dis-
agree. Tyree’s version makes much more sense, when considered in the
context of the Respondent’s reaction to the Union, than the stilted and
formal language Blancato claims to have used.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 535
alatin Electric, Inc., 319 NLRB 1237 (1995); Ideal Macaroni
Co., 301 NLRB 507 (1991). See also Wexler Meat Co., 331
NLRB 240, 242 (2000). In the present case, the discriminatory
motive is further established by the evidence showing that the
Respondent permitted Thibodeau to circulate his petition on
work time and in work areas. Premier Maintenance, Inc., 282
NLRB 10, 11 (1986); Montgomery Ward, 269 NLRB 598
(1984); St. Vincent’s Hospital, 265 NLRB 38, 40 (1984). In this
regard, I credit the testimony of employee Dixon and Schaffer
over Thibodeau’s claim that he only circulated the petition on
nonworktime.
The credible evidence in the record shows that Blancato was
not alone in attempting to limit employees’ union efforts.
Winegar testified that Kisiel told the employees on third shift
that he didn’t want anyone on his shift discussing the Union in
the shop or anywhere on the premises. Although the Respon-
dent attempted to show that Winegar was biased against the
Respondent because of a dispute she had over holiday pay
when she left employment, Winegar appeared to be testifying
truthfully. Moreover, she would have nothing to gain by com-
mitting perjury in this proceeding. Kisiel, on the other hand, as
a current supervisor of the Respondent, would have reason to
conceal any unlawful activity he engaged in. I also find credible
the testimony of Pimentel that Abraham told him he didn’t
want him speaking to the employees about the Union and
Odorczuk’s testimony that Abraham instructed him and Ewing
to break up any groups of employees they saw talking. Al-
though Pimentel and Odorczuk had a tendency to be evasive
and argumentative on cross-examination, and displayed diffi-
culty communicating in English, I find their testimony on this
aspect of the case credible because they were corroborated by
the testimony of Winegar, Tyree, and Schaffer. The testimony
of these witnesses establishes that the Respondent became con-
cerned about employees’ union activity after learning of the
campaign and took steps to limit employees’ protected activi-
ties in the workplace. The Board has historically found such
employer efforts to prohibit employees from talking while they
work to be unlawful. See PPC Structurals, Inc., 330 NLRB 868
(2000); Frazier Industrial Co., 328 NLRB 717 (1999); Emer-
gency One, Inc., 306 NLRB 800 (1992).
I found Ewing and Blancato’s testimony, that the Respon-
dent was experiencing production problems in the fall because
employees were standing around in groups talking instead of
working, a convenient after-the-fact justification for an unlaw-
fully broad prohibition of protected activity. The employees
who testified for the General Counsel did not appear to be the
type who would slack off at work in order to sit around and
discuss the Union. The Respondent had never before been con-
cerned about its employees’ casual interactions with one an-
other, and wasn’t concerned when Thibodeau circulated among
the employees soliciting them to sign a petition disavowing
Union. Ewing, Abraham, and Blancato were only concerned
when the employee talk supported the Union.
Accordingly, based on the above, I find that the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act as alleged in
paragraphs 7(b) and (h), 9(a), 10, and 11 of the second
amended consolidated complaint.
b. The statements and conduct of Blancato
The second amended consolidated complaint alleges, at
paragraphs 7 (a), (c)–(g), 12, and 16, that Blancato, the Re-
spondent’s president, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
through statements he made in the course of one-to-one conver-
sations with employees. Because the only witnesses to these
conversations are Blancato and the employee to whom he
spoke, resolution of these allegations turns exclusively on
credibility.
The bulk of the alleged unlawful statements attributed to
Blancato involve two conversations Pimentel testified that he
had with Blancato in his office. Blancato essentially denied that
these conversations occurred. According to the General Coun-
sel, Blancato violated the Act during these conversations by:
1. creating the impression that Pimentel’s union activi-
ties were under surveillance by telling Pimentel that he
knew Pimentel was speaking to the employees about the
Union.
2. promising Pimentel increased benefits by telling
him that “the company can give you anything you want.”
3. making an implied promise of a job promotion by
telling Pimentel that he had scheduled an interview for
him for an accounting job in which Pimentel had ex-
pressed interest.
4. threatening plant closure by telling Pimentel that if a
union got in, “we will close the doors.”
5. making an implied threat by reminding Pimentel
that he had a family to support.
6. threatening Pimentel with the loss of light duty work
by reminding him that he was currently on light duty and
suggesting that the Respondent could take that away from
Pimentel.
The Respondent argues that Pimentel’s testimony is “inconsis-
tent, exaggerated, and, when necessary, resulted from leading
questions from General Counsel.” According to the Respon-
dent, Pimentel was “incapable of testifying in an honest, forth-
right manner.” The Respondent’s brief is full of quotations
from the transcript to illustrate its argument.
Pimentel’s testimony was difficult to understand, confusing,
and at times incomprehensible. I also noted that he tended to be
evasive and argumentative on cross-examination. I also per-
ceived a tendency on his part to exaggerate his role in the union
campaign.39 However, a good deal of the confusion in his tes-
timony can be attributed to the fact that he was testifying as to
these conversations in English and that he is not especially
proficient in the language. When he testified in his native Span-
ish through the interpreter, his testimony was more lucid. What
appeared to be inconsistencies on direct and cross may be noth-
ing more than Pimentel’s inability to fully articulate his an-
swers in English. Although I did not find Pimentel to be as
dishonest as the Respondent contends, I also did not find him to

39 In this regard, it must be noted that Pimentel was not even around
during much of the campaign. His doctors’ notes in evidence show he
was out of work from October 9 through 31 and that he worked only 2
more weeks before being sent home by Abraham on November 15.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD536
be entirely credible.40 The difficulty he displayed testifying in
English suggests to me that he may have misunderstood some
of what Blancato said to him during their conversations.
Blancato’s denial of Pimentel’s testimony was not entirely
credible either. Blancato had the benefit of testifying about
these conversations in his native language from his perspective
as a corporate executive, fully cognizant of the consequences
for his Company of any admission of wrongdoing on his part.
In addition, parts of the conversation described by Pimentel
were similar to conversations Blancato had with other wit-
nesses who were credible. I also note that some statements that
Pimentel attributed to Blancato were consistent with the themes
the Respondent addressed in its campaign to convince the em-
ployees that a union wasn’t necessary. As often occurs in cases
like this, the “truth” about what was said during Blancato’s
conversations with Pimentel may never be known and, in all
probability, may lie somewhere between their two versions of
the conversations. I shall nevertheless make findings based on
the above factors that I have considered.
Pimentel’s testimony that Blancato told him he knew that
Pimentel was talking to other employees about the Union is
consistent with conversations Blancato had with Tyree and
Schaffer in which he indicated his awareness of their union
activities. These conversations are also consistent with testi-
mony from Odorczuk that Blancato was interested in knowing
who was behind the Union, even threatening Odorczuk and
Ewing with termination if he found out that they knew about
the Union and didn’t tell him. Ewing corroborated Odorczuk as
to this threat. Thus, I find Pimentel’s testimony as to this part of
the conversation credible. The Board has held that such state-
ments, which suggest to employees that the employer is closely
monitoring their union activities at a time when the employees
are attempting to conceal such activities, unlawfully create the
impression of surveillance. Electro-Voice, Inc., 320 NLRB
1094 (1996); Ichikoh Mfg., 312 NLRB at 1023. See also Hertz
Corp., 316 NLRB 672, 685 (1995). Cf. South Shore Hospital,
229 NLRB 363 (1977). Accordingly, I find that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1), as alleged in paragraph 7(a) of the
complaint, when Blancato told Pimentel in early October that
he knew that Pimentel was talking to people in the Company
about the Union.
Pimentel’s testimony that Blancato talked about the amount
of dues he would have to pay is also consistent with the
speeches Blancato and Spencer were giving to the employees
early in the campaign. In the context of those speeches, it is
more than likely that Blancato talked to Pimentel about the
Respondent’s ability to provide wage increases and other bene-
fits in contrast to the Union’s reliance upon making promises it
could not keep (“now is the time the company can give you
anything you want”). It is also more likely than not that Blan-
cato spoke to Pimentel about the impact of a union on his abil-

40 The fact that Pimentel admittedly lied to Blancato in June 2001
when he initially denied that he was working elsewhere, while trou-
bling, is not fatal to his credibility in this proceeding. Although Pimen-
tel may not have been truthful in that conversation, his deception oc-
curred in the context of attempting to save his job after having received
the June 5 termination letter. This context is a far cry from the commis-
sion of perjury in a legal proceeding.
ity to support his family and on the Respondent’s ability to
remain in business (“remember you have a family to support”
“if the Union comes in, we’ll close the doors”). Although I
believe that Blancato discussed these subjects with Pimentel, as
he did with employees generally, I cannot credit Pimentel’s
recollection of the words Blancato used because I am not con-
vinced that Pimentel fully understood what Blancato was say-
ing. It is also possible, based on the difficulty Pimentel dis-
played in trying to testify as to certain statements in English, as
well as the General Counsel’s use of leading questions to elicit
some of this testimony, that Pimentel did not accurately recall
the conversation. These doubts are sufficient to convince me
that the testimony is not reliable as evidence of an unfair labor
practice. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the allegations
that Blancato promised Pimentel increased benefits, and threat-
ened him with plant closure or other unspecified reprisals (pars.
7(d) and (f)) be dismissed.41
Pimentel testified that, during his first meeting with Blan-
cato, Blancato referred to an accounting position in which Pi-
mentel had expressed interest and told Pimentel he had an in-
terview for this position scheduled on the following Monday.
Blancato admitted talking to Pimentel about an interview for
this job but denied that there was any mention or discussion of
the Union in that conversation. Murphy, the Respondent’s hu-
man resources director, confirmed that Blancato spoke to her
about Pimentel’s interest in this job and that she scheduled an
interview for him. Blancato and Murphy testify that Pimentel
did not show up for the interview.42 As to this allegation, I
credit Blancato’s version over Pimentel’s testimony. Because
of the coincidence in time between his inquiry regarding the job
and his conversation with Blancato regarding the Union, Pi-
mentel may have been confused about when and what Blancato
said concerning this possible promotion. Because of the many
weaknesses in Pimentel’s testimony noted above, I cannot find
that Blancato promised Pimentel, either implicitly or explicitly,
any promotional opportunity to refrain from engaging in union
activities. Accordingly, I shall recommend dismissal of para-
graph 7(e).
Pimentel testified that, in his second conversation with Blan-
cato, after reminding Pimentel that he had a family to support,
Blancato referred to the fact he was currently on light duty and
suggested that he could be taken off light duty. Blancato denied
making any such threat. Again, I cannot credit Pimentel’s recol-
lection of this conversation because of the general weakness in
his testimony, attributable to Pimentel’s difficulties understand-
ing and communicating in English. Accordingly, I shall rec-
ommend dismissal of paragraph 7(g) of the complaint.
Blancato also spoke individually to Tyree and Schaffer re-
garding the Union. I have already credited both employees as to
Blancato’s promulgation of a no-solicitation rule in those con-
versations. For the same reasons, I credit their testimony re-

41 I shall also recommend that par. 7(c) be dismissed to the extent it
is based on this testimony.
42 The General Counsel argues that it doesn’t make sense that Pi-
mentel would not show up for an interview he sought. Such a scenario
does make sense when one recalls that Pimentel left work with another
injury on October 9, the Monday after the union meeting, and remained
out of work for the rest of that month.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 537
garding the remainder of their conversations with Blancato.
When Blancato told Tyree to “do him a favor and not have
people sign cards on company time,” he not only promulgated a
new and discriminatory rule, he created the impression that
Tyree’s activities were under surveillance. There is no dispute
that Tyree had not been openly soliciting on behalf of the Un-
ion when Blancato approached her at her machine. The reason-
able tendency of an employee in Tyree’s position would be to
draw the conclusion that she apparently did, i.e., that the Re-
spondent was monitoring her activities because she was a union
advocate. As noted above, it is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) for
an employer to create such an impression among its employees.
Electro-Voice, Inc., supra; Ichikoh Mfg., supra.
Tyree also testified that, after she became upset during their
conversation at her machine, Blancato invited her into his of-
fice. Once there, Blancato told her that he was the new guy in
charge and that things would be different. Schaffer testified
that, during his first conversation with Blancato about the Un-
ion in early October, Blancato said he was aware of employees’
concerns about raises and he was working on the problem.
These statements echoed the theme of Spencer’s first two
speeches to the employees that the Respondent had made mis-
takes and would work to correct them. Such statements amount
to an implied promise of benefits if employees refrain from
supporting the Union and violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as
alleged in paragraphs 7(c) and 12(a).
Schaffer testified that, in mid-December, when he asked
Blancato about raises, Blancato told him that raises or anything
else positive in nature could not happen “while union negotia-
tions were going on.” Blancato did not specifically deny this
conversation. I credit Schaffer because this statement is similar
to statements heard by other employees from their supervisors
suggesting that the Respondent had frozen raises because of the
pending union election. When Schaffer recalled having this
conversation with Blancato, In mid-December, the union elec-
tion had just been blocked by the Union’s unfair labor practice
charges. The statement attributed to Blancato by Schaffer is
similar to the remarks made by Blancato in the two speeches he
read to the employees after the election was canceled. Blan-
cato’s statement to Schaffer was an unlawful threat to withhold
benefits from employees because of the Union, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1), as alleged in paragraph 12(b).
Because I can find no evidence in the record to support the
allegation in paragraph 16 of the second amended consolidated
complaint, i.e., that Blancato promised employees improved
benefits on December 13 if they renounced their support for the
Union, I shall recommend dismissal of this allegation.
c. Alleged threats of plant closure
The second amended consolidated complaint alleges at para-
graphs 14 and 15 that the Respondent, through Blancato’s
speeches in late November early December, and through the
display of the poster depicting closed UAW factories, threat-
ened employees with plant closure and job loss if they selected
the Union as their representative. The General Counsel argues
that the poster, in the context of the overhead projections used
and statements made at the Respondent’s meetings with the
employees, amounted to a prediction of job loss if employees
selected the Union as their bargaining representative. The Re-
spondent counters that Blancato’s statements and the poster
were not threatening. According to the Respondent, this elec-
tion propaganda contained only the lawful message that a union
could not provide job security, in response to the Union’s cam-
paign literature promising job security. The Respondent argues
that the meetings and poster were permissible employer expres-
sions regarding the consequences of unionization that are pro-
tected by Section 8(c) of the Act.
The Respondent contends that the most reliable evidence of
what was said at the meetings is the text and Blancato’s “trigger
points” prepared from that text. This might be true if Blancato
had read the text or his trigger points verbatim. There is no
dispute that he did not. Rather, he used these documents as a
starting point for an extemporaneous speech to the employees.
As Blancato himself admitted, it is impossible to say with any
certainty that he did not depart from the prepared text in the
course of explaining the Respondent’s position on the Union.
Thus, Blancato’s memory of what he said is not qualitatively
better than that of the employees who testified without the
benefit of notes or prepared texts.
Although the employees who testified on behalf of the Gen-
eral Counsel could not recall everything that was said at the
meeting, and at times pleaded a lack of certainty as to the pre-
cise phrase or word used by Blancato, their recollection is re-
markably consistent with the themes expressed and the lan-
guage used in the Respondent’s prepared texts. Thus, these
witnesses recalled that Blancato spoke about other plants,
whose employees had been represented by the UAW, that were
now closed. The plants identified in the speech were graphi-
cally illustrated on the poster and in the overhead projection.
Although none of the employees recalled Blancato making a
direct threat that, if the employees selected the Union to repre-
sent them, the Respondent would close, this was clearly the
inference they drew from his statements and the illustrations. In
fact, there is substantial testimony that when Schaffer attempted
to get information to clarify whether such an inference was
warranted, Blancato did not take this opportunity to disabuse
the employees of the notion that the Respondent would close.
On the contrary, he replied that the same thing that happened at
the unionized factories could or might happen here. The testi-
mony of several witnesses, as well as the text of the speeches,
reveals that Spencer, not Blancato, discussed the Respondent’s
own history with unions. Included in that history was the fact
that the Winsted plant was built to replace two unionized facili-
ties, one in another part of Connecticut and the other in Chi-
cago.
The Board and the courts have frequently addressed
speeches and campaign posters similar to those at issue here.
The decisional precedent reflects a constant struggle to balance
the 8(c) right of an employer to make his views known and the
right of employees to make their decision free from unlawful
threats and intimidation. The fact that an employer does not
directly threaten employees with plant closure or job loss is not
the end of the inquiry. As the Supreme Court itself has recog-
nized, any balancing of these competing interests “must take
into account the economic dependence of the employees on
their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD538
because of their relationship, to pick up intended implications
of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more
disinterested ear.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at
617. Under Gissel, when an employer makes a prediction re-
garding the consequences of unionization,
[T]he prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of ob-
jective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably
probable consequences beyond his control. . . . If there is any
implication that an employer may or may not take action
solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic
necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer
a reasonable prediction based upon available facts but a threat
of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as
such without the protection of the First Amendment.
Id. at 618. See also NLRB v. St. Francis Healthcare Centre, 212
F.3d 945, 954–955 (6th Cir. 2000); Times-Herald Record, 334
NLRB 350 (2001); Wallace International de Puerto Rico, 328
NLRB 29 (1999); and SPX Corp., 320 NLRB 219, 221 (1995).
Cf. Savers, 337 NLRB 1039 (2002).
The Board, in Quamco, Inc.,43 found unlawful an employer’s
campaign tactic of displaying a “UAW Wall of Shame,” con-
sisting of tombstones with the name of a closed factory where
the UAW had represented employees, added one a day leading
up to the posting of a tombstone bearing the name of the em-
ployer with a question mark the day before the election. The
Board held that “the logical inference to be drawn from the
expanding cemetery of UAW-represented plants is that the
same fate of plant closure and job loss awaited [Quamco].” Id.
at 223. The Board held further that “the clear implication of the
display [of the final tombstone] was that the fate of the plant
would be thrown into question if, and only if, the employees
chose union representation.” Id. See also Laser Tool, Inc., 320
NLRB 105 (1995) (employer’s poster depicting four or five
UAW strikers in front of a factory building displaying a “closed
banner,” with the legend “Do you want this to happen to you?
Vote No,” violated Sec. 8(a)(1)).
The Respondent distinguishes Quamco and Laser Tool fac-
tually from the poster and speeches in the instant case. Here,
unlike Quamco, the Respondent posted only one poster rather
than building up to election day, and made no reference to it-
self. The Respondent distinguishes the theme of the posters
used by it and the employer in Laser Tool. There, the employer
directly linked plant closure and job loss to unionization. Here,
according to the Respondent, it used the theme of plant closure
as a vehicle to show the employees that unionization does not
guarantee job security. The Respondent relies, instead, on two
cases finding that posters depicting closed factories with the
question, “Is this what the Union calls job security?” were law-
ful. Sheraton Hotel Waterbury, 312 NLRB 304 (1993), enfd. in
relevant part 31 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994); EDP Medical Com-
puter Systems, 284 NLRB 1232 (1987). In these two cases, the
complaint allegations regarding the posters were dismissed by
the respective administrative law judge, without comment by
the Board. Because it is unclear from the Board’s decisions

43 325 NLRB 222 (1997).
whether the General Counsel even took exception to these par-
ticular findings, the decisions are of limited precedential value.
In a more recent case, currently pending before the Board on
exceptions, an administrative law judge found that a poster
nearly identical to the one used by the Respondent here, when
considered in the context of a series of speeches remarkably
similar to those made by Blancato and Spencer in the instant
case, amounted to an unlawful threat of plant closure and job
loss. Stanadyne Automotive Corp., Case 34–CA–9365
(JD(NY)–56–01, November 9, 2001). Although the judge’s
decision is not binding precedent for the instant case, I have
considered his analysis, as well as the analyses of the adminis-
trative law judges who decided the cases relied on by the Re-
spondent, in applying Board precedent to the facts here.
I find the Respondent’s attempt to differentiate the campaign
tactic here from those used by the employers in Quamco and
Laser Tool disingenuous. Whether one calls the theme “job
loss” or “job security,” the logical inference from the poster
used by the Respondent and the points made by Blancato and
Spencer at the meetings, is that a vote for the Union will
threaten their future employment. Although couched in terms of
“economic realities,” the Respondent omitted from its cam-
paign speeches any objective facts that would demonstrate that
the plant closings used to illustrate its points were caused by
anything other than the fact that the “strike happy” UAW repre-
sented the employees. To make sure the employees did not miss
the implication, Spencer related how the Respondent itself
chose to close union-represented facilities and move work to
the nonunion Winsted plant after a series of union strikes.
Blancato then told the employees “where there are unions, there
are strikes,” driving home the inevitable linkage between un-
ionization and job loss. Blancato’s disclaimer immediately
before this statement, that “strikes are not inevitable” was
meaningless in the context in which it was used. The most tell-
ing evidence is the fact that, when Blancato had an opportunity
to disavow any implication of a threat in response to Schaffer’s
question, he chose not to. Instead, he told the employees that
the same fate that befell the employees at other UAW plants
“could” or “might” happen in Winsted. As the Supreme Court
so eloquently stated, in Gissel, an employer “can easily make
his views known without engaging in brinkmanship. . . . At
least he can avoid coercive speech simply by avoiding con-
scious overstatements he has reason to believe will mislead his
employees.” 395 U.S. at 620 (citation omitted).
I find, based on the above, that the Respondent, through
Blancato’s and Spencer’s statements to employees during the
speeches on November 22 and 28 and December 5, and by the
display of the plant closing poster and overhead projections
during the period in late November and early December, vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by implicitly threatening its
employees with plant closing and job loss if they voted for
union representation. Although the complaint, at paragraph 14,
did not allege Spencer as the Respondent’s agent in making
such threats, the evidence in the record shows that it was
Spencer who told employees about the Respondent’s union
history and the closed Beacon Falls and Chicago facilities.
These statements, while not unlawful in themselves, provided
part of the context in which the Respondent conveyed its im-
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 539
plied threat to the employees. Under these circumstances, the
General Counsel’s failure to specifically name Spencer in con-
nection with this allegation does not preclude the finding of an
unfair labor practice based in part on his conduct. I note that it
was evidence offered by the Respondent, i.e., the testimony of
Blancato and the prepared texts of the speeches, that estab-
lished Spencer’s role in the commission of this unfair labor
practice. Because the Respondent was on notice regarding these
facts before the General Counsel even rested her case, it is not
now prejudiced by reliance upon Spencer’s statements as a
basis for this finding. I also note that the Respondent was aware
of Spencer’s role, yet chose not to call him as a witness, either
to corroborate Blancato, or to refute the testimony of the Gen-
eral Counsel’s witnesses.
d. Statements regarding the EN-114 machine
Paragraph 13 of the second amended consolidated complaint
alleges that the Respondent threatened employees with job loss
by (a) removing the EN-114 machine from its facility; and (b)
statements of Abraham and Ewing to employees indicating that
the machine was removed because of their union activities. It
should be noted that the complaint does not allege that the re-
moval of the machine itself violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
because motivated by the employees’ union activity. The Gen-
eral Counsel’s theory of the case, based on the way the allega-
tion is drafted, is that the Respondent used the removal as a
device to threaten the employees without regard to the motive
for its removal.
The General Counsel relies on the testimony of Dixon and
Odorczuk regarding statements they heard Abraham make
when the EN-114 machine was sitting in the aisle awaiting
shipment to Summit, and the testimony of Pimentel regarding
statements he heard Ewing make during the same time period.
Although the statements recalled by the General Counsel’s
witnesses were similar, they occurred at different times. Thus,
the individual recollections of the three witnesses were not
corroborated by other witnesses who may have been present
when the statements were made. As noted above, Ewing denied
making the statements attributed to him by Pimentel. Although
Abraham confirmed Dixon’s testimony to a significant degree,
he denied making any reference to the Union and denied saying
anything to Odorczuk about the EN-114.
Although the General Counsel and the Respondent proffered
conflicting arguments, and supporting testimony, on the ques-
tion of employer motive, it is unnecessary for me to resolve this
issue. Because the removal of the machine and the statements
allegedly made by Abraham and Ewing are alleged only as
violations of Section 8(a)(1), motive is irrelevant. The sole
inquiry, once credibility issues are resolved, is whether the
statements and conduct would reasonably tend to interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of protected activ-
ity. This is an objective test. El Rancho Market, 235 NLRB
468, 471 (1978), citing American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB
146, 147 (1959). Thus, even if the employer had a legitimate
business reason for subcontracting assembly work to Summit
and removing the EN-114 machine, the circumstances and tim-
ing of the move in the context of contemporaneous statements
by supervisors could be found unlawful if employees could
reasonably infer that the Respondent had decided to subcontract
the work because they were seeking union representation.
There is no dispute that the EN-114 machine was shipped to
Summit in November, after the employees had attempted to
present the Union’s demand for recognition, first to Blancato
and then to Abraham and Ewing. I credit the testimony of the
General Counsel’s witnesses that the machine was allowed to
sit on a pallet, packed and ready for shipment, for several days
before its removal. No explanation was given to the employees
during this time as to the reason for the removal of this ma-
chine. Thus, even assuming that Blancato and Larson are cred-
ited as to the date when the decision was made and negotiations
over the subcontracting concluded, there is no evidence that the
Respondent informed the employees that it had decided to sub-
contract assembly work to cut costs.44 The only explanation
provided by the Respondent for the sight of the EN-114 ma-
chine out of service and on its way out the door would be the
statements attributed to Abraham and Odorczuk.
Of the witnesses who testified on this issue, I found Dixon to
be the most credible. He is a current employee of the Respon-
dent and displayed obvious discomfort testifying adversely to
his employer. Blancato, the Respondent’s president, was in the
hearing room when Dixon testified. Ewing is still his supervi-
sor. I conclude that his inability to recall with certainty pre-
cisely what Abraham said about the Union in connection with
the removal of the EN-114 machine was a matter of self-
preservation rather than a lack of credibility. It is clear that he
did recall Abraham making some comment about unionization
relating to the presence of the machine in the aisle packed and
ready to be shipped. Abraham admitted that he made the com-
ment, “there goes the EN-114 machine. These things happen.”
It is not much of a stretch to arrive at the conclusion that “these
things” include removal of work and that they “happen” when a
union is around.
I also credit the testimony of Pimentel and Odorczuk over
Ewing’s and Abraham’s denials with respect to this allegation.
Although I found some problems fully crediting Pimentel re-
garding his conversations with Blancato and will note some
weaknesses in Odorczuk’s testimony with respect to other alle-
gations, their testimony here is consistent with Dixon’s testi-
mony that Abraham linked the removal of this machine to the
ongoing union campaign. When considered in the context of
the speeches that Blancato was to give to the employees in a
few weeks, it becomes apparent that the Respondent decided to
use its subcontracting decision as a means of dramatically illus-
trating one of the principal themes of its campaign, i.e., union
representation is a threat to job security.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in paragraphs 13(a) and (b) of the
complaint. Garry Mfg. Co., 242 NLRB 539, 542 (1979), enfd.
630 F.2d 934, 940–941 (3d Cir. 1980).

44 Dixon testified that the first time he heard that Summit had any-
thing to do with the removal of the EN-114 machine was in 2001, “after
the end of all of this stuff.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD540
e. Other statements and conduct of Respondent’s supervisors
The second amended consolidated complaint, at paragraph 8,
alleges that the Respondent, through Ewing, violated Section
8(a)(1) by: (a) imposing more onerous working conditions on
Pimentel; and (b) threatening to withhold a wage increase if
employees did not reject the Union as their bargaining repre-
sentative.
The first allegation is based on Pimentel’s testimony that, be-
tween the October 5 union meeting and when he stopped work-
ing on November 14, he was followed by Ewing or Simmons,
his lead person, anytime he left his work area. Pimentel also
claimed that they stopped him from talking to other employees
when he walked around the plant in the performance of his job
duties. Although Ewing denied this allegation, he admitted
talking to Blancato about complaints from Simmons that Pi-
mentel was spending too much time away from his work area,
congregating with other employees. Blancato corroborated
Ewing as to the receipt of these complaints and testified that he
spoke to Pimentel about them. Simmons did not testify. I do not
credit Pimentel’s testimony that he was followed every time he
moved, even to go to the bathroom. I found this testimony to be
an example of his tendency to exaggerate the facts. In reality,
Pimentel was absent from work for almost the entire month of
October. By the time he returned to work on November 1, the
Union had completed its solicitation of authorization signatures
and was in the process of filing the representation petition and
negotiating for an election date through the Board’s Regional
Office. It is unlikely that there was much reason or opportunity
for Pimentel to speak to his coworkers about the Union in the 2
weeks in November before he was sent home by Abraham. In
addition, Pimentel’s testimony that he was required to use the
forklift and move about the plant as part of his light-duty work
is not an accurate description of the nature of the work he was
doing in the October–November period. While he may have
done these things months earlier, after he first injured himself,
he was limited to hand assembly at a workstation by the fall.
Although I do not doubt that Ewing would have been con-
cerned by the sight of Pimentel away from his work area or
talking to employees, the evidence does not support a finding
that the Respondent “imposed more onerous working condi-
tions on Pimentel by following him throughout the facility.”
The only condition imposed on Pimentel when he was at work
after the union meeting was that he do the work he was sup-
posed to be doing. Accordingly, I shall recommend dismissal of
paragraph 8(a) of the complaint.
The second allegation regarding Ewing is based on the testi-
mony of Thibodeau regarding conversations he had with Ewing
after his October 31 performance review. As noted above, Ew-
ing told Thibodeau he could expect a raise based on that re-
view. When Thibodeau still had not received a raise by
Thanksgiving, he asked Ewing where his raise was. According
to Thibodeau, Ewing told him that he could not discuss the
raise with Thibodeau at that time, that everything was frozen
because of the Union and that the Respondent would have to
wait “until the Labor Board was done.” I detected a certain
reluctance on Thibodeau’s part when testifying as to his con-
versation with Ewing. The General Counsel had to show
Thibodeau his affidavit, given not long after these events, be-
fore he would confirm Ewing’s allegedly unlawful statement.
Although Ewing denied making such a statement to Thibodeau,
I credit Thibodeau, and in particular his recollection as re-
corded in the affidavit. Thibodeau is another current employee
of the Respondent. He was being asked to testify adversely to
his current supervisor, Ewing, with his Employer’s president,
Blancato, sitting in the room. I also note, in light of his efforts
to convince the Union to withdraw its petition, he is not a wit-
ness who would be expected to testify favorably for the Union.
Thus, to the extent he gave any testimony in support of the
General Counsel’s case, he was particularly credible. It is
clearly unlawful for an employer to promise an employee a
raise on the one hand and then tell the employee that he could
not be given that raise because of the pending union campaign.
Met West Agribusiness, Inc., 334 NLRB 84 (2001); Centre
Engineering, Inc., 253 NLRB 419, 420–421 (1980). Accord:
Wellstream Corp., 313 NLRB 698, 707 (1994). Accordingly I
find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), as alleged in
paragraph 8(b) of the complaint, by Ewing’s statement to
Thibodeau.
The second amended consolidated complaint alleges, at
paragraph 9, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, through Third-Shift Supervisor Kisiel, by creating the
impression of surveillance; informing employees it would be
futile to select the Union as their bargaining representative; and
threatening employees with unspecified reprisals if they select
the Union as their bargaining representative.45 This allegation is
based upon the testimony of Winegar regarding the conversa-
tion she had with Kisiel at her machine a couple days after she
signed the union petition at the Log House. According to
Winegar, Kisiel initiated the conversation by saying, “I’m sure
you heard that the Union is trying to get in and that some peo-
ple think it will help, but it’s just going to hurt.” I credit Wine-
gar’s testimony over Kisiel’s denial that he made any such
statements. Although Winegar is no longer employed by the
Respondent, she had nothing to gain by fabricating such testi-
mony. Even assuming she bore some grudge against the Re-
spondent over its refusal to pay her holiday pay after she gave
her notice, this would hardly lead to a conclusion that she was
willing to perjure herself to get back at the Respondent.
Winegar had signed the Union’s petition, but was not a
member of the organizing committee, nor otherwise active in
support of the Union. When Kisiel approached her and raised
the subject of the Union, the employees were in the early stages
of the campaign. Winegar, in particular, had done nothing to
indicate to Kisiel her views on the Union. In these circum-
stances, Kisiel’s statement, “I’m sure you heard that the Union
is trying to get in,” would reasonably tend to convey the im-
pression that the Respondent had employees’ union activities
under surveillance. Electro-Voice, Inc., supra; Ichikoh Mfg.,
supra. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in paragraph 9(b). Kisiel’s state-
ment that some people thought the Union would help, but “it’s
just going to hurt,” if considered in isolation, would be too

45 Par. 9 also alleged that Kisiel unlawfully promulgated a rule pro-
hibiting employees from discussing the Union. I have already addressed
this allegation in sec. II,B,2,a above.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 541
ambiguous to amount to either a statement of futility or a threat
of unspecified reprisals. Ohmite Mfg. Co., 217 NLRB 435
(1975); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 194 NLRB 1043 (1972).
However, the Respondent’s other unfair labor practices “im-
parted a coercive overtone” to this statement. Reno Hilton Ho-
tel, 319 NLRB 1154, 1155 (1995), and cases cited therein. In
the context of the Respondent’s other threats, it would be rea-
sonable for an employee to believe that Kisiel was threatening
unspecified reprisals if employees chose union representation.
Accordingly I find that the Respondent violated the Act, as
alleged, in paragraph 9(d). On the other hand, Kisiel’s state-
ment, while threatening, was not a statement of futility. Cf. St.
Luke’s Hospital, 258 NLRB 321, 322 (1981). This statement
does not convey the notion that the Respondent would refuse to
bargain with the employees’ designated representative, or oth-
erwise engage in conduct to frustrate the employees’ selection
of union representation. Accordingly, I shall recommend that
paragraph 9(c) of the complaint be dismissed.
f. The third-shift wage increase
Paragraph 17 of the second amended consolidated complaint
alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
in about late November, by granting its third shift employees a
wage increase. There is no dispute that the Respondent in-
creased the shift differential for its third-shift employees from
10 to 15 percent effective November 13. This increase was
given soon after the Union filed its petition and just before the
Respondent entered into the stipulated election agreement. The
Respondent contends that it granted this increase at the request
of Third-Shift Supervisor Kisiel. His written request for an
increase in the shift differential is dated November 10, also well
after the Respondent learned of the Union’s efforts to organize
its employees. Kisiel attempted to place the decision earlier by
testifying that employees on third shift first voiced complaints
about the shift differential being the same for second and third
shift about a month after the third shift started, this would be
about mid-October. The Respondent gave its first speech to
employees, acknowledging its awareness of the Union’s orga-
nizing drive in late September or early October. Kisiel himself
admitted that he was aware of the Union when he made his
request to Blancato that the third-shift differential be increased.
It is well settled that the grant of wage increases or other
benefits during the preelection period is presumptively unlaw-
ful because employees would reasonably view such conduct as
an attempt to interfere with or coerce them in their choice of
union representation. An employer may rebut this presumption,
however, by demonstrating a legitimate business reason for the
timing of the raise. Southgate Village, Inc., 319 NLRB 916
(1995). Accord: Audubon Regional Medical Center, 331 NLRB
374 fn. 5 (2000). As the Supreme Court recognized, many years
ago:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the
suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not
likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now
conferred is also the source from which future benefits must
flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964). Here,
this inference was supported by statements made by Blancato in
his speeches to the employees that only the Respondent could
make good on its promises. The Respondent cannot show in
this case that a decision to increase the pay differential for
third-shift employees was made before it acquired knowledge
of the Union’s campaign. It’s own witnesses admit that the
subject was not even discussed before mid-October at the earli-
est. The Respondent also cannot show any practice regarding a
third shift differential because it did not have a third shift until
September 18. When third shift started, the Respondent offered
its employees the same differential it was offering to second-
shift employees. Only after the Union appeared on the scene
and the Respondent learned that the third-shift employees were
unhappy with only a 10-percent differential, did the Respondent
decide to grant an increase. The fact that the Respondent
granted this increase in wages at a time when it claims to have
been in a cost-cutting mode casts further suspicion on the tim-
ing of the decision and undermines any business justification
for the raise.
Based on the above, I find that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint, by granting
its third-shift employees an increase in the shift differential on
November 13, in the midst of the election campaign.
g. The spring 2001 wage increases
Paragraph 7 of the complaint in Case 34–CA–9829 that is-
sued on November 15, 2001, was amended at the hearing to
allege that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act by granting wage increases in May and June 2001 that
had been withheld from employees in October–November be-
cause of the Union. When the General Counsel amended this
allegation at the hearing, the Respondent argued that the new
allegation was barred by Section 10(b) of the Act because it
was not supported by a charge filed within 6 months of the
alleged unfair labor practice. The Respondent renewed this
argument in its brief. Before turning to the merits of this allega-
tion, I must address the 10(b) issue.
The Board has held that, when General Counsel amends a
complaint at the hearing, the new allegation must be “closely
related” to a timely filed charge in order to satisfy the require-
ments of Section 10(b) of the Act. Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB
1115 (1988). In that case, the Board adopted a three-part test to
determine whether the amended allegation is sufficiently re-
lated to the charge: (1) Does the new allegation involve the
same legal theory? (2) Does the new allegation arise from the
same factual circumstances or sequence of events? and (3)
Would a respondent raise similar defenses to the new allega-
tion? Id. at 1116. See also Nickles Bakery of Indiana, 296
NLRB 927 (1989). In applying this test, the Board has held that
the requisite factual relationship may be based on acts that arise
out of the same antiunion campaign. Office Depot, Inc., 330
NLRB 640 (2000); Ross Stores, Inc., 329 NLRB 573 (1999).
The initial charge, which was filed and served well within
the 6-month period required by the statute, alleged that the
wage increases granted by the Respondent in 2001, during the
pendency of the representation proceeding, were contrary to
past practice and violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5). When
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD542
the complaint issued, it alleged at paragraph 7 that the Respon-
dent’s grant of wage increases in about May 2001 violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The complaint was consolidated
with the consolidated complaint that had previously issued in
Cases 34–CA–9499, et al., alleging numerous violations of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act related to the Respondent’s
conduct in response to the Union’s organizational campaign.
Among the allegations in the earlier complaint were claims that
the Respondent threatened to withhold wage increases in the
course of its preelection campaign. It is clear that the new alle-
gation, as well as the allegations in the underlying charges and
complaints, all related to the same antiunion campaign. The
new allegation involves the same sections of the Act, the same
legal theory, and the same sequence of events. One would also
expect a respondent to raise similar defenses to the amended
allegation as it would have to the timely allegation originally
pleaded at paragraph 7, i.e., that it granted wage increases in the
spring 2001 for reasons other than the pendency of the Union
campaign. Applying the Redd-I test here, I find that amended
paragraph 7 is closely related to the underlying charge which
was filed within the 6-month period required by the statute.
The evidence described above establishes that, at the time
the Union began organizing the Respondent’s employees, the
Respondent was not following its policy of conducting annual
performance reviews as a basis for granting wage increases. It
is clear there was no rhyme or reason as to when, or even if, an
individual employee would receive an increase. This is one of
the main concerns that led some employees to seek union rep-
resentation. The evidence also establishes that one of the Re-
spondent’s first acts, once it became aware of the Union, was to
meet with its employees, acknowledge its failure to follow this
policy, and assure them that the policy would be followed in
the future.46 Within a couple weeks of this meeting, Blancato
instructed his supervisors, by memo, to conduct performance
reviews for 29 employees who were “due or overdue” for a
review. Although Blancato’s memo does not explicitly state
that these employees would get wage increases following their
reviews, he clearly implied this would be the result by remind-
ing the supervisors that the reviews would be the basis for de-
termining wage increases. Blancato’s eagerness to follow the
Respondent’s policy in October contrasts with his reaction to
Odorczuk’s request, 6 months earlier, that Blancato give a raise
to one of the employees in Odorczuk’s department who had not
had a raise for so long she was falling behind new hires. Blan-

46 While Spencer, speaking for the Respondent, apparently told the
employees that it could not make any promises during the union cam-
paign, he nevertheless did promise to follow the Respondent’s policy of
conducting performance reviews. The employees could logically infer
from this that the Respondent would be providing wage increases be-
cause the performance reviews had historically been the basis for such
increases. Spencer’s doublespeak was typical of the mixed messages
the Respondent gave throughout the campaign. See, e.g., Blancato’s
statement in his December 5 speech, “strikes are not inevitable,” fol-
lowed almost immediately by, “where there are unions, there are
strikes.”
cato told Odorczuk if the employee didn’t like it, she could
leave.47
The undisputed evidence also reveals that several of the Re-
spondent’s supervisors, such as Ewing and Odorczuk, re-
sponded to Blancato’s memo by completing reviews for a num-
ber of employees. Credited testimony establishes that Ewing,
Kisiel, and Odorczuk told employees that they would most
likely be getting a raise. The Respondent’s records reveal that,
in fact, 12 employees received raises in October or November.
Only four of these employees, however, had been identified in
Blancato’s memo as due or overdue for a raise. The other 25
employees named in Blancato’s memo did not receive any
wage increase, including 9 who received performance reviews
that were at least satisfactory.48
The Respondent’s records establish that 24 employees did
receive wage increases in the period from late April to early
June 2001, including the nine employees who had received
reviews but no raises in the fall. Because the Respondent did
not conduct new performance reviews for these nine employee
before giving them a raise, it must be inferred that the level of
their performance shown by the earlier reviews was sufficient
to justify the raise. The Respondent’s records show that another
six employees who had not received a review in the fall, despite
being identified by Blancato in October as in need of one, re-
ceived reviews and raises in April–June 2001. I find, based on
this incontrovertible evidence, that at least 9, and perhaps as
many as 25, employees who should have received a raise in
October–November under Blancato’s memo, had raises with-
held for 6 months.
On these facts, I must determine whether the Respondent, by
delaying wage increases for some employees for 6 months,
engaged in conduct that would reasonably tend to interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights, or whether the Respondent delayed the grant of
these wage increases for discriminatory reasons. I have already
found, based on the credited testimony of Schaffer, Thibodeau,
and Winegar, that the Respondent’s agents advised employees
in November and December that wage increases it had prom-
ised could not be given because of the pending union election.
In addition, the Respondent’s conduct with respect to the grant
of wage increases must be considered in the context of the
speeches Blancato gave in November and December indicating
that only the Respondent can grant wage increases, that only
the Respondent has the ability to make good on its promises.
This evidence and the animus it reveals is sufficient to establish
a prima facie case that the employees’ union activities were a
motivating factor in the Respondent decision to withhold wage
increases from employees in the fall and to grant them after the

47 I credit Odorczuk’s testimony, which was not denied by Blancato.
I also note that the statement attributed to Blancato is akin to the ration-
ale he provided on the witness stand when explaining why he did not
give this same employee a wage increase in October after Odorczuk
had complied with Blancato’s instructions and conducted a review of
her performance.
48 As previously indicated, there are no reviews in evidence for the
12 employees who received raises in the October–November period.
Thus, one can only speculate as to the particular reason any of these 20
were deemed worthy of a raise at that time.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 543
union activity had subsided 6 months later. It is immaterial
whether the Respondent was aware of the specific union activ-
ity of the individual employees affected by its conduct. For the
type of violation alleged here, it is sufficient that the Respon-
dent was aware of union activity generally, that it was opposed
to that activity and was engaged in a campaign to prevent the
Union from achieving representation rights. See Electro-Voice,
Inc., 320 NLRB at 1095 fn. 4.
To rebut this evidence suggesting an unlawful motive, the
Respondent proffered an economic justification for its actions.
Blancato testified that the Respondent withheld wage increases
from the nine employees who received reviews in October and
November because of financial constraints and because these
particular employees either were already paid too much, or
were so unskilled that they were expendable. Although the
relative skills and pay of these employees had not changed in
six months, Blancato claims he was able to give these nine
employees a wage increase in April and May because the Re-
spondent’s financial condition had improved and an increase at
that time, shortly before the end of the fiscal year, would not
have a significant adverse impact on the bottom line. I find this
self-serving and unsubstantiated testimony unconvincing. Blan-
cato’s credibility is undermined in part by the fact that he gave
a 5-percent increase to the six relatively unskilled employees on
third shift at about the same time he decided to save money by
not giving eight unskilled employees who had received overdue
reviews any raise at all. Blancato’s credibility is further under-
mined by the absence of any evidence that the 12 employees
who did receive a raise in October and November had any par-
ticular skills needed by the Respondent that would have justi-
fied this additional expense at a time of claimed financial con-
straint. Finally, the Respondent did not even attempt to substan-
tiate its economic justification with records, such as a financial
statement, that would have shown whether it even had any fi-
nancial problems at the time.
The Respondent argues that it found itself “between a rock
and a hard place” because the Union could have alleged an
unfair labor practice whether the employer did or did not grant
raises. If the Respondent found itself in such a place, it was of
its own doing. Because the Respondent had not been following
its policy for some time before the Union arrived, it should not
have promised the employees that it would follow the policy at
the first whiff of union activity. Moreover, once the Respondent
decided it would act as if it had a well-established policy that
had been consistently followed, it should have adhered to its
decision rather than do an about-face and withhold a raise it had
just promised. See NLRB v. Aluminum Casting & Engineering
Co., 230 F.3d 286 (7th Cir. 2000); Noah’s Bay Area Bagels,
LLC, 331 NLRB 188 (2000). Considering the expert legal ad-
vice available to the Respondent, it is hard to believe that the
Respondent could not have safely navigated the shoals of this
election campaign. The Respondent’s conduct here appears to
have been a carefully orchestrated campaign to convey the
message evident throughout the text of the speeches, i.e., only
the Respondent can provide for the employees, and a union will
only interfere with the employer’s ability to do so.
h. The termination of Odorczuk
The second amended consolidated complaint, at paragraphs
21 and 22, alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
on June 28, 2001, by discharging its supervisor, Odorczuk,
because he refused to commit an unfair labor practice. The
Respondent contends that Odorczuk was laid off when his posi-
tion was eliminated as part of a cost-cutting program. It is well-
settled that a statutory supervisor has no right under the Act to
engage in union or other concerted activities protected by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. The Board has found a supervisor’s termina-
tion unlawful under the Act in a few very limited situations.
Thus, an employer may not discharge a supervisor for giving
testimony adverse to the employer in a Board proceeding or
during the processing of an employee’s grievance under a col-
lective-bargaining agreement, for refusing to commit unfair
labor practices, or for failing to prevent unionization. The pro-
tection afforded a supervisor in these situations “stems not from
any statutory protection inuring to them, but rather from the
need to vindicate employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights.”
Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 NLRB 402, 402–404 (1982),
review denied sub nom. Auto Salesmen Local 1095 v. NLRB,
711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
There is no dispute that Odorczuk was a statutory supervisor
during the union campaign. There is also no dispute that Blan-
cato threatened to fire Odorczuk and Ewing if he found out they
were involved in the union organizing drive. Odorczuk testified
that Blancato asked him to talk to the employees, find out what
was going on and to report back to him. He testified that Blan-
cato also asked him to talk to his employees and convince them
to vote against the Union. In December, according to
Odorczuk, Blancato asked him to talk to the employees about
signing the petition being circulated by Thibodeau. Odorczuk
testified that, as a loyal supervisor, he complied with all of
these instructions. The only instruction Odorczuk claims he
refused to carry out was Abraham’s directive that the he was to
supervise Tyree and assist in bringing about her termination.49
According to Odorczuk, Abraham said he wanted “that b— out
of there because, every union meeting, she was always crying
about the company.” Abraham denied having any such conver-
sation with Odorczuk. Blancato and Abraham both testified that
Tyree was a good worker and that the Respondent had offered
her a cell-leader position before this conversation allegedly
occurred. In fact, after Odorczuk’s termination, Tyree became
the cell leader of his area with a 50-cent-hour raise.
Determination of this allegation turns entirely on credibility
because the only alleged unfair labor practice Odorczuk refused
to commit is Abraham’s directive to get rid of Tyree. If
Odorczuk is not credited, then no such instruction was given
and the General Counsel’s case falls. Although I have credited
Odorczuk’s testimony with respect to several allegations al-
ready discussed, I did not find him to be a credible witness
when it came to his own case. Odorczuk was often not respon-
sive to questions, even those asked by the General Counsel.
There were many occasions when the General Counsel had to
interrupt Odorczuk and get him back on track. Much of

49 Odorczuk conceded that, even as a supervisor, he had no authority
to fire Tyree.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD544
Odorczuk’s testimony had to be elicited by leading questions
from the General Counsel. It appeared that Odorczuk had his
own agenda on the witness stand. He had a story to tell and he
wasn’t about to let something like direct examination get in the
way. I also observed that Odorczuk had a tendency to exagger-
ate and displayed a great deal of hostility and bitterness toward
the Respondent and its management, particularly Blancato.
Although Odorczuk’s bitterness is understandable in light of
the manner in which the Respondent terminated him after 17
years of good and faithful employment, that bitterness appeared
to poison his testimony, rendering it unreliable as a basis for
finding an unfair labor practice.
Odorczuk’s credibility as to Abraham’s alleged instruction to
help the Respondent “unload Tyree” is particularly suspect.
Odorczuk evaded the efforts of both the General Counsel and
the Respondent to place this conversation in time. On direct,
Odorczuk testified it occurred “during the meeting—I mean the
union stuff.” In response to a leading question, he testified that
his conversation with Abraham occurred “in the Fall of last
year.” On cross, Odorczuk said that he had more than one con-
versation with Abraham about getting rid of Tyree, and that the
Respondent had been trying to get rid of her for a long time,
since her boyfriend was terminated in the spring 2000. Al-
though Odorczuk, on direct, claimed that the reason Abraham
wanted to get rid of her was because of her activity at union
meetings, on cross he suggested that the Respondent had other
reasons to want Tyree terminated, including problems with her
job performance. Tyree’s apparently fragile emotional state that
caused her to break down on the witness stand does lend some
support to Odorczuk’s testimony. The fact that some of Tyree’s
machines were moved to Odorczuk’s area might also support
his testimony. Unfortunately, Odorczuk’s testimony is too unre-
liable to link any concerns that the Respondent had about
Tyree’s emotional state to her union activity, or to establish that
the machines were moved during the union campaign. In light
of Odorczuk’s constantly shifting answers on this key matter,
and in the absence of other evidence to corroborate his testi-
mony, there is simply no foundation to support a finding that
the Respondent devised a scheme to terminate Tyree because of
her union activity and attempted to enlist Odorczuk in carrying
it out.
The General Counsel argued that the Respondent’s asserted
justification for Odorczuk’s termination was not credible and
that the only plausible explanation was that the Respondent
terminated him for refusing to commit this unfair labor prac-
tice. Although I agree with the General Counsel that the Re-
spondent’s defense is not credible, I disagree that her theory is
the only plausible explanation for Odorczuk’s termination.
Blancato’s testimony that he laid off a 17-year employee, who
admittedly was knowledgeable in the Respondent’s operations
and had been a valuable employee, as part of a cost-cutting
program is unconvincing. On cross-examination, the General
Counsel was able to show, in virtually every case, that positions
were consolidated or eliminated only after the incumbent em-
ployee had voluntarily left the Respondent’s employment.
Odorczuk appears to have been the only employee who was
involuntarily separated as a result of the Respondent’s efforts to
reduce expenses. In addition, three memos that the Respondent
introduced into evidence to substantiate the existence of such a
cost reduction program had not been furnished to the General
Counsel in response to a subpoena requesting all records show-
ing the basis for the Respondent’s decision to terminate
Odorczuk. Although I did not find any evidence that the Re-
spondent engaged in a conscious refusal to comply with the
subpoena in order to obstruct the General Counsel’s investiga-
tion, the Respondent’s failure to furnish such evidence until late
in the hearing is suspect. If these memos were in fact part of
Blancato’s decision-making process and would have supported
the position the Respondent took in response to the charge, one
would think the Respondent would have been quick to disclose
them. Moreover, as noted above in my discussion of these
memos, they do not directly address Odorczuk’s position and
are dated 6 to 9 months before his termination. The Respondent
offered no other documentary evidence in support of Blancato’s
testimony, giving rise to an inference that the Respondent’s
records would not have supported his self-serving testimony.
The only plausible explanation for the Respondent’s termina-
tion of Odorczuk that is supported by the evidence in the record
is that Blancato believed Odorczuk was involved in the em-
ployees’ efforts to get a union. That was the rumor circulating
in the plant after the Christmas holidays. Blancato even told
Odorczuk at that time that he had heard from three or four peo-
ple that Odorczuk was involved with the Union.50 By terminat-
ing Odorczuk, Blancato carried out his threat to Ewing and
Odorczuk that he would fire them if he ever learned they were
involved with the Union. The Respondent’s termination of
Odorczuk, even if this were the motivation, is not unlawful
under the Act. Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., supra.
3. The 8(a)(3) allegations
The second amended consolidated complaint alleges that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by deny-
ing overtime to Roberta Tyree since about early October (pars.
18 and 23) and by denying light duty work to Tony Pimentel on
November 15 (pars. 19 and 23).51 The test for determining
whether the Respondent’s actions involving these two employ-
ees violated Section 8(a)(3) is the Board’s Wright Line test.52
Under this test, the General Counsel bears the initial burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that protected ac-
tivity was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to
deny Tyree overtime and Pimentel light-duty work. To meet
this burden, the General Counsel must offer evidence of union
or other protected activity, employer knowledge of this activity,
and the existence of antiunion animus that motivated the em-
ployer to take the action it did. The Board has recognized that
direct evidence of an unlawful motivation is rarely available.

50 I credit Odorczuk’s testimony regarding this conversation with
Blancato.
51 The second amended consolidated complaint also alleged that the
Respondent’s promulgation of rules prohibiting employees from talking
about the Union or engaging in union solicitation and distribution vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(3) in addition to Sec. 8(a)(1) (pars. 7(b), (h), 9(a), 10,
and 11). The legality of these rules has already been discussed.
52 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 622 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied 455 U.S. 988 (1982). See also Manno Electric, 321
NLRB 278, 280 fn. 12 (1996).
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 545
The General Counsel may meet his burden through circumstan-
tial evidence, such as timing and disparate treatment, from
which an unlawful motive may be inferred. See Naomi Knitting
Plant, 328 NLRB 1279 (1999), and cases cited therein. If the
General Counsel meets his burden, then the burden shifts to the
respondent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it
would have taken the same action, or made the same decision,
even in the absence of protected activity.
a. Tyree’s overtime
Tyree has been employed by the Respondent for more than
20 years. She was still working for the Respondent when she
testified at the hearing. At the time of the Union’s campaign,
she was a setup operator in the modification area, reporting to
Supervisor Ewing. In July 2001, after Odorczuk was termi-
nated, the Respondent promoted Tyree to cell leader to take
over most of his duties, giving her a wage increase to go along
with the additional responsibilities. Tyree’s testimony and the
Respondent’s records establish that, before the Union’s arrival
on the scene, Tyree was regularly working overtime by coming
into work up to 2 hours before the start of her shift. It is undis-
puted that this weekday overtime was worked on the hinge line,
not Tyree’s normal work area. She had also occasionally
worked Saturday overtime, either on the hinge line or in her
work area. She was one of only a few employees who were able
to fill in on the hinge line when one of the employees assigned
to that line was unavailable.
Tyree’s first involvement with the Union was to attend the
October 5 meeting at the Log House, where she signed the
Union’s authorization petition and volunteered for the organiz-
ing committee. Ewing admitted knowledge of Tyree’s union
activity by identifying her as one of the employees he saw con-
gregating and talking during worktime. Ewing acknowledged
that he believed Tyree and the other employees were discussing
the Union and that he complained to Blancato about this. Blan-
cato also admitted knowledge of Tyree’s involvement in the
Union by corroborating Ewing’s testimony about this com-
plaint. Blancato’s knowledge is further demonstrated by the
conversation at her machine shortly after the union meeting
when he asked her not to solicit on company time. When Tyree
denied she was doing this, Blancato told her to tell whoever
was doing it to stop. This is a clear indication of Blancato’s
belief that she had a key role in the organizing drive. Further
evidence of this belief can be found in the conversation Blan-
cato and Tyree had in his office after she became upset by the
conversation at her machine. Based on her credited version of
the conversation, it is clear that Blancato suspected that Tyree
and her boyfriend were behind the union drive.
The Respondent’s antiunion animus is established by the
numerous violations of Section 8(a)(1) already found, including
unlawful statements directed specifically at Tyree. It was
against this background that Ewing told Tyree, shortly after the
union meeting, not to come in before the 7 a.m. start of her
regular shift. The Respondent’s timekeeping and payroll re-
cords establish that, from October 10 through January 20, 2001,
Tyree did not start work before 7 a.m. and, beginning with the
first full pay period after the union meeting, she received no
pay for overtime until January 2001. The Respondent’s records
also show, that during this same period, other employees with
hinge line experience were working overtime.
Tyree testified that the only reason Ewing gave her for not
letting her work overtime during the week was her refusal to
work Saturday overtime on the hinge line. Tyree credibly testi-
fied that this refusal occurred several months before October 5.
The Respondent’s records support her testimony because they
show that she had not worked a Saturday between July 31 and
September 9. Moreover, she had worked the Saturday immedi-
ately after the union meeting and before Ewing took away her
weekday overtime. Thus, there was no refusal to work overtime
on her part in proximity to the denial of overtime.
The above evidence is sufficient to support the inference the
General Counsel urges, i.e. that the Respondent was motivated
by Tyree’s involvement with the Union when it decided to take
away the 1–2 hours of overtime she had been working on a
daily basis during the week. This inference is also supported by
Odorczuk’s testimony that he was present when Abraham told
Ewing shortly after the Respondent became aware of the Union
that Tyree and Hank Archambault were not to work any more
overtime. Although I found Odorczuk’s testimony not entirely
credible, this portion of his testimony is corroborated by the
Respondent’s own records which show that neither Tyree nor
Archambault received overtime for a significant period after the
October 5 union meeting despite both having regularly worked
overtime before. As previously noted, Archambault was also on
the organizing committee and was one of the four employees
about whom Ewing complained to Blancato.
The Respondent did not deny that Tyree’s overtime declined
after October 5. The Respondent attempted to rebut the General
Counsel’s evidence by claiming that the only reason Tyree did
not work overtime was because she declined it. I did not find
Ewing’s testimony in this regard to be credible. Ewing ac-
knowledged that Tyree only refused to work Saturday overtime
if she was going to have to work on the hinge line. There is no
evidence that Tyree ever refused to work overtime by coming
in early, as she had been doing for some time. In addition, Ew-
ing’s certainty that Tyree’s refusal to work Saturday overtime
in October is suspect in light of his generally poor recollection
of dates. This testimony is also contradicted by the fact that
Tyree worked the only Saturday in October that predated Ew-
ing’s denial of overtime.
Much of the Respondent’s case is based on his argument that
Tyree’s testimony is not credible. I have previously noted
Tyree’s fragile emotional state and the fact that she broke down
on the witness stand. This is not an indication that she was testi-
fying untruthfully. Rather, it appears to be the result of the
pressure Tyree was under, having to testify adversely to her
employer in light of everything that had already occurred dur-
ing the Union’s organizing drive. In addition, despite the efforts
of the Respondent’s counsel to confuse her, her testimony was
consistent with her pretrial affidavit. Her testimony regarding
other incidents during the union campaign was also consistent
with the testimony of other witnesses. The Respondent also
argues that it did not discriminate against Tyree because it
granted her requests to take time off in October and November,
and eventually offered her a promotion. I find this argument
unpersuasive when considered against the strong evidence of
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD546
antiunion motivation behind the denial of overtime. Taking
away the extra income that Tyree earned by working overtime
would have a greater negative impact than a refusal to let her
take time off without pay. The promotion occurred after the
General Counsel had issued a complaint against the Respondent
naming Tyree as a discriminatee and was probably intended as
damage control.53
I find, based on the above, that the Respondent has not met
its burden of showing, by a preponderance of credible evidence,
that Tyree would not have been assigned weekday overtime on
and after October 10, in the absence of her union activity. Ac-
cordingly, I find that the denial of overtime was discriminato-
rily motivated, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1), as al-
leged in the complaint.
b. Pimentel’s light-duty work
Pimentel had been employed by the Respondent for more
than 3 years at the time of the union campaign. Although his
regular job was as a shear machine operator, he had not worked
this job since March 3 because of a work-related back injury.
There is no dispute that Pimentel had been on light duty since
March 3 with the exception of a brief period, shortly after the
accident, when his doctor released him from any restrictions.
Because his symptoms recurred, he was quickly placed back on
light duty by his doctor. Like Tyree, Pimentel became involved
in the union campaign by attending the October 5 meeting,
signing the Union’s petition and joining the organizing commit-
tee. Pimentel was the only bilingual employee on the organiz-
ing committee. The Respondent employed a number of His-
panic employees who spoke no English. Pimentel thus became
their link to the Union and the Employer.54 Pimentel testified
without dispute that he obtained the signatures of 14 other em-
ployees on the Union’s petition, all but 2 of whom were His-
panic. Blancato and Ewing admitted knowledge of Pimentel’s
participation in the early November attempt by a group of em-
ployees to present the Union’s demand for recognition. In fact,
it was Pimentel who spoke for the employees when they met
with Ewing.
I have already credited Pimentel’s testimony in part regard-
ing his meetings with Blancato within a few days of the union
meeting. I found above that Blancato created the impression of
surveillance when he told Pimentel that he knew Pimentel was
talking to other employees about the Union and he wanted him
to stop doing this. I have also credited Pimentel’s testimony
that Abraham told him not to speak to employees about the
union. These unfair labor practices establish the Respondent’s
knowledge and animus toward Pimentel’s union activities.
Although I found Pimentel’s testimony regarding threats alleg-
edly made by Blancato to be unreliable as a basis for finding an
unfair labor practice, I did credit Pimentel to the extent that I
believe the topics he described regarding the adverse conse-
quences of unionization did come up during his meetings with

53 I also note, in a similar vein, that Tyree began receiving overtime
again after the Union amended it’s first charge, on January 8, 2001, to
specifically allege the denial of overtime to Tyree as an unfair labor
practice.
54 The Respondent did not have any Spanish translator available at
Blancato’s and Spencer’s meetings with the employees.
Blancato. One of these topics was the fact that Pimentel was
currently on light duty.
There is no dispute that Abraham sent Pimentel home on
November 15 after he brought in a new doctor’s note advising,
inter alia, that Pimentel “avoid prolonged postures.” I credit
Pimentel’s testimony that Abraham told him he did not have a
40-hour light-duty job for him because of the new limitation. I
credit Pimentel further that Abraham told him to go home, col-
lect worker’s compensation and not return until his doctor said
he could return to full duty. This occurred the day after the
Respondent entered into a stipulated election agreement with
the Union and less than 2 weeks after Pimentel and the other
employees were rebuffed in their attempts to present the Un-
ion’s demand for recognition. Based on the Respondent’s
knowledge and animus and the timing, I find that the General
Counsel has established that Pimentel’s union activity was a
motivating factor in the Respondent’s decision to send Pimentel
home in response to the November 14 doctor’s note. In reach-
ing this conclusion, I also note that Pimentel’s testimony that he
was already avoiding prolonged postures while doing his cur-
rent light-duty job was corroborated by other employees who
had no reason to lie and by Ewing himself, who acknowledged
that Pimentel was already permitted to stand and stretch as
needed.
The Respondent attempted to rebut the General Counsel’s
evidence of motivation by claiming that the November 14 doc-
tor’s note was such a significant change from Pimentel’s prior
restrictions that it had no choice but to send him home. This
argument, and the testimony of the Respondent’s witnesses on
this point, might have been credible had the Respondent taken
any steps to clarify the restriction. The Respondent’s knee-jerk
reaction to Pimentel’s note stands in contrast to the policy
enunciated by Abraham that the Respondent will ordinarily
make every effort to accommodate a medical restriction. The
Respondent’s conduct toward Pimentel is also inconsistent with
its history of accommodating other employees with even more
restrictive limitations. Finally, Abraham himself conceded that
there are many easy jobs at the Respondent’s plant, including
some where an employee need do no more than push a button
and watch as the machine operates. No explanation was given
why Pimentel could not stand or sit as he watched such a ma-
chine. I discredit Abraham’s testimony that he met with Blan-
cato and Murphy to explore how to accommodate Pimentel’s
new restriction because neither Blancato nor Murphy corrobo-
rated him on this issue. The conclusion is inescapable that, in
the absence of Pimentel’s union activity, the Respondent would
not have so readily sent him home at the first indication that his
physical limitations had changed. On the contrary, the Respon-
dent seized upon this fortuitous event to remove from the plant
a key member of the organizing committee, i.e., the only one
who could keep the Spanish-speaking employees in the union
fold, at a time when an election was imminent and the Respon-
dent’s antiunion campaign about to take off with captive audi-
ence speeches, posters, and literature.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel’s case has not
been rebutted and that the Respondent denied light-duty work
to Pimentel and sent him home on November 15 because of his
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 547
union activity, thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) as al-
leged in the complaint.
4. Pimentel’s termination
The complaint that issued on November 15, 2001, in Case
34–CA–9829 alleges that the Respondent terminated Pimen-
tel’s employment on June 5, 2001, in violation of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4). The Respondent denied that it terminated
Pimentel. According to the Respondent, Pimentel abandoned
his job when he failed to maintain contact with the Respondent
and accepted employment elsewhere. Under this view of the
facts, the Respondent was not motivated by any union activity,
or by the filing of unfair labor practice charges when it merely
confirmed by letter that Pimentel had abandoned his job. The
Board’s Wright Line test also applies to the determination of
this allegation of the complaint.
As found above, the Respondent unlawfully denied Pimentel
light-duty work on November 15 and sent him home to collect
worker’s compensation benefits until he could return to full
duty. The evidence above shows that, by November 24, Pimen-
tel had reached maximum medical improvement in the opinion
of his doctor, which left him with a permanent light-duty re-
striction. Because Pimentel had been told by Abraham not to
come back until he could return to his old job on the shear ma-
chine, Pimentel had no choice but to look for work elsewhere.
In fact, he was required to do this in order to continue receiving
the temporary disability benefits he had been receiving from the
Respondent’s compensation carrier. His efforts proved success-
ful and he obtained light-duty employment at a nearby factory,
first through a temporary agency and then as a direct employee.
There is no dispute that Pimentel did not communicate with the
Respondent about these events. However, Pimentel could
hardly be blamed for this in light of the manner and tone used
by Abraham when he sent him home on November 15. It would
have been reasonable for Pimentel to infer that the Respondent
was not interested in hearing from him unless he could get a
full release from his doctor, something he could not do because
of the injury he had. I also note that Schaffer, who had been out
of work due to a worker’s compensation injury for some time at
the time of the hearing, had never been told that he had to keep
in contact with the Respondent.
There is no dispute that, on June 5, the Respondent notified
Pimentel by letter that it had “terminated his insurance cover-
age immediately” based on the Respondent’s assumption that
Pimentel had abandoned his job. The Respondent also advised
Pimentel in this letter of his right to continue insurance cover-
age under COBRA and of his option to close out his 401(k)
account. Although the letter may not have explicitly said that
Pimentel was terminated, the clear implication of the Respon-
dent’s actions described in the letter was that his employment
had ended. When Pimentel was able to speak with Blancato
about the letter, this implication was confirmed. Pimentel de-
nied abandoning his job and told Blancato that he only did what
Abraham told him to do. Then, when Pimentel asked Blancato
directly if he still had a job with the Respondent, Blancato said,
“No.” To the extent there is any difference in the testimony
about this meeting, I credit Pimentel. I find, contrary to the
Respondent’s argument, that the Respondent in fact terminated
Pimentel on June 5. In determining whether an employee has
been terminated, the Board considers whether the actions of the
employer would reasonably lead an employee to believe he or
she had been terminated. If an employer’s actions create any
ambiguity regarding an employee’s status, the Board will re-
solve the ambiguity against the employer. Ridgeway Trucking
Co., 243 NLRB 1048 (1979), enfd. 622 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir.
1980). Accord: MDI Commercial Services, 325 NLRB 53
(1997); Apex Cleaning Service, 304 NLRB 983 fn. 2 (1991);
Express Messenger Systems, 301 NLRB 651 (1991).
Having found that the Respondent terminated Pimentel, I
must determine whether the General Counsel has offered suffi-
cient evidence to show that Pimentel’s union activity was a
motivating factor in that decision. I conclude that she has. I
have already discussed the Respondent’s knowledge regarding
Pimentel’s union activities and its animus toward the Union
generally and Pimentel in particular. The circumstances which
led to the Respondent’s “assumption” that Pimentel had aban-
doned his job were created by the Respondent when Abraham
sent Pimentel home and told him not to come back until he
could work full duty. I have already found that this conduct
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3). When the Respondent formal-
ized Pimentel’s separation from employment on June 5, it was
merely carrying to its logical conclusion Abraham’s discrimina-
tory action in November.
The Respondent counter’s this evidence of an unlawful mo-
tivation by arguing that it was the information Murphy received
in early June, that Pimentel was working elsewhere, which
precipitated his “termination.” The Respondent also argues that
Pimentel’s dishonesty when confronted with this by Blancato is
further evidence that he would have been terminated even in
the absence of union activity. The question here is whether the
Respondent would have treated the information uncovered by
Murphy the same had Pimentel not been a key union organizer.
The fact that Pimentel was working was not a secret. The Re-
spondent’s compensation carrier was aware of it. If the Re-
spondent truly suspected that Pimentel had abandoned his job,
it only had to ask him. When given the opportunity, he clearly
told Blancato that he had not abandoned his job. Because Abra-
ham was still the Respondent’s plant manager at the time, and
he was the one who sent Pimentel home, any confusion or mis-
understanding could have been quickly resolved. The fact that
Blancato told Pimentel that he did not have a job even after
Pimentel denied abandoning his job shows that the true motiva-
tion was the Respondent’s desire to finally rid itself of a union
activist. The fact that some time had passed since the election
was cancelled in December is immaterial. At the time Pimentel
was terminated, the instant charges were pending, including the
allegations regarding Pimentel. Within 2 weeks of June 5, the
first complaint issued against the Respondent. The Respondent
certainly was aware when it terminated Pimentel of the possi-
bility of a revived campaign if the Union’s charges were found
meritorious. Thus, the Respondent had reason to want Pimentel
gone for good.
Pimentel admitted that he lied to Blancato when asked, dur-
ing their meeting in June, if he was working elsewhere. Al-
though such conduct is not to be condoned, I find it is not egre-
gious enough to deny Pimentel a remedy under the Act. As
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD548
previously noted, it is the Respondent who placed Pimentel in
the position of having to find work elsewhere. Pimentel may
have believed that the Respondent was going to terminate him
if he had another job. Certainly, that is what the June 5 letter
indicated. His initial denial, when confronted by Blancato, is
understandable in this context. Moreover, the Respondent had
already made a decision to terminate Pimentel before Pimen-
tel’s act of dishonesty. The Respondent can not escape liability
for its own unlawful conduct by shifting the focus to some mis-
conduct by Pimentel.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by terminating Pimentel on June
5, 2001. The Section 8(a)(4) allegation is based solely on the
fact that the Union had filed charges naming Pimentel as a vic-
tim of unfair labor practices before the Respondent decided to
terminate him. There is no evidence to show that it was Pimen-
tel’s involvement in the charges that motivated the Respon-
dent’s action. Accordingly, I shall recommend dismissal of the
8(a)(4) allegation.
5. Appropriateness of a bargaining Order under Gissel
a. The Union’s majority status
The Respondent and the Union stipulated, in the representa-
tion case, that the following unit of employees is appropriate
for purposes of collective bargaining:
All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, shipping and receiving employees, produc-
tion clerk, truck driver and technician employed by the Re-
spondent at its 150 Price Road, Winsted, Connecticut facility,
but excluding all other employees, temporary employees, of-
fice clerical employees, professional employees and supervi-
sors and guards as defined in the Act.
At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the identity of 78 em-
ployees who were employed in the above unit on November 3,
the date the employees attempted to present the Union’s de-
mand for recognition to Blancato. As previously noted, the
showing of interest filed by the Union with its representation
petition had 48 signatures, all dated between October 5 and
November 2. Discounting the duplicate signatures of Henry
Archambault and Jaroslaw Ogniewski leaves the Union with 46
signatures as of November 3. These 46 employees were on the
Respondent’s payroll on that date.
The testimony of the General Counsel’s witnesses is suffi-
cient to authenticate their own signatures and the signatures of
other employees whom they witnessed signing the petition. A
total of 25 signatures are authenticated by such eyewitness
testimony.55 This includes the 14 signatures solicited by Pimen-
tel, whose testimony in this regard I have credited. Moran’s
conflicting and uncorroborated testimony as to one of the em-
ployees solicited by Pimentel, i.e., Kurt Parsons, is discredited.
I note that, regardless of who solicited Parsons, his signature on
the Union’s petition is identical to what purports to be his sig-
nature on Thibodeau’s petition and on his W-4 maintained in
the Respondent’s personnel records. I have compared the re-
maining 26 signatures on the Union’s petition with the signa-

55 See pp. 4–5, supra.
tures of these employees on the W-4 and, when available I-9,
forms maintained by the Respondent. I have also compared the
signatures on the Union’s petition to those of the same employ-
ees that appear on Thibodeau’s petition.56 Although I am not a
handwriting expert, the signatures on the Union’s petition all
appear to be authentic. The Board has held that an administra-
tive law judge may determine the genuineness of signatures on
authorization cards by comparing them to W-4 forms in the
employer’s records. Part’s Depot, Inc., 332 NLRB 670 (2000),
and cases cited therein.
The Respondent attempted to show, during its cross-
examination of the General Counsel’s witnesses, that the em-
ployees who signed the Union’s petition were told the purpose
was to get an election. I found the testimony of Becotte and
Schaffer regarding what was said at the October 5 meeting
credible. I also credit Pimentel regarding what he told the em-
ployees whom he solicited. The Respondent offered no testi-
mony of employees to contradict these witnesses. Accordingly,
I find that the Union did not tell any of the employees that the
sole purpose of their signature on the petition was to get an
election. The Respondent has not offered any other reason to
discount the signatures of these employees as an uncoerced
expression of their desire for union representation at the time
they signed.
Accordingly, based on the above, I find that the Union had
obtained the support of a majority of employees in the unit by
November 3.
b. Is a bargaining order warranted?
The Board’s test for evaluating the appropriateness of a bar-
gaining order as a remedy for an employer’s preelection unfair
labor practices has been stated as follows:
In Gissel, supra, the Supreme Court “identified two types of
employer misconduct that may warrant the imposition of a
bargaining order: ‘outrageous and pervasive unfair labor prac-
tices’ (‘category I’) and ‘less extraordinary cases marked by
less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the ten-
dency to undermine majority strength and impede the election
process’ (category II).” The Court found that, in determining a
remedy in category II cases, the Board can take into consid-
eration the extensiveness of an employer’s unfair labor prac-
tices in determining whether the “possibility of erasing the ef-
fects of past practices and ensuring a fair election . . . by use
of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and employee
sentiments once expressed by authorization cards would, on
balance, be better protected by a bargaining order.”
Michael’s Painting, Inc., 337 NLRB No. 140 (2002), and cases
cited therein. See also Part’s Depot, Inc., supra; Sheraton Hotel
Waterbury, 312 NLRB 304 (1993), enf. denied sub nom.
J.L.M., Inc. v. NLRB, 31 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994). Among the
factors considered by the Board when applying this test are the
number of employees directly affected by the unfair labor prac-
tices, the size of the unit, the extent of dissemination among
employees, and the identity and position of the individuals
committing the unfair labor practices. Garvey Marine, Inc., 328

56 Twenty-six employees signed both petitions.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 549
NLRB 991, 993 (1999). The Board must also be mindful of the
important congressional policy underlying the Act which favors
employee free choice of a bargaining representative through a
secret-ballot election conducted under the Board’s auspices. A
bargaining order in the absence of such an election remains an
extraordinary remedy applied only in unusual cases. J.L.M.,
Inc., supra; NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208 (2d
Cir. 1980).
I find, initially, that the instant case is not a category I case
because the unfair labor practices found here are not so outra-
geous or pervasive to render the Board’s traditional remedies
totally meaningless. Because this is a category II case, I must
consider the nature and severity of the violations found above
and decide whether, under all the circumstances, application of
the Board’s traditional remedies for such violations would
eliminate the possible effects they would have on the employ-
ees’ ability to exercise a free choice in an election. This inquiry
is not mechanistic, but requires consideration of the specific
facts of this case. NLRB v. Stephen Dunn & Associate, 241
F.3d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Respondent’s unlawful conduct in the instant case began
almost immediately after it became aware that its employees
had contacted a union about representing them. The Respon-
dent committed several “hallmark” violations that the Board
has considered sufficient to justify a bargaining order.57 Within
a week of employees signing a petition for the Union, Blancato,
the Respondent’s president, orally promulgated overly broad
and discriminatory rules prohibiting employees from engaging
in union activity and made statements to several employees
creating the impression that their activities were under surveil-
lance. Later, Blancato implicitly threatened employees with
plant closure and job loss in the course of his captive audience
speeches in late November early December. The Board has
historically found that the coercive effect of unfair labor prac-
tices is heightened when the misconduct is committed by top
management officials and commences rapidly after the em-
ployer learns of union activity. Carter & Sons Freightways,
Inc., 325 NLRB 433 (1998). The threat implicit in Blancato’s
speeches, suggesting that selection of the Union would result in
plant closure and job loss, was emphasized by other conduct,
such as the timing of the Respondent’s removal of the EN-114
machine and the statements of its plant manager about the
move, and the use of a poster that graphically depicted closed
factories where the employees had been represented by the
Union or one of its affiliates. The Board has found that threats
of plant closure and job loss are more likely to destroy election
conditions for a longer period of time than other unfair labor
practices. A.P.R.A. Fuel, Inc., 309 NLRB 480, 481 (1992),
enfd. mem. 28 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Grieg’s Dump
Trucking, 320 NLRB 1017 (1996), enfd. 137 F.3d 936 (7th Cir.
1998); Q-1 Motor Express, 308 NLRB 1267 (1992), enfd. 25
F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1994). The Respondent also granted a wage

57 The Second Circuit defined “hallmark” violations as those regu-
larly regarded by the Board and the courts as highly coercive, including
such conduct as threats of plant closure or job loss, the grant of benefits
to employees and discriminatory actions taken against union adherents.
NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., above at 212–213.
increase to the employees on third shift on November 13. Other
employees, who were told in October and November that they
could expect a wage increase as a result of the Respondent’s
revival of its dormant employee review process, were told in
December that all wage increase or other benefits were frozen
because of the union campaign. These same employees ulti-
mately were granted wage increases 5 or 6 months after the
election was canceled. The Board has found that the grant of
benefits during a preelection period has a particularly long-
lasting effect on employees that is difficult to remedy by tradi-
tional means. The continuing receipt of such benefits would
serve as a reminder to employees that the employer, not a un-
ion, is the source of such benefits. Grieg’s Dump Trucking,
supra; Skyline Distributors, 319 NLRB 270 (1995), enfd. 99
F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Tower Records, 182 NLRB 382
(1970). The “carrot and stick” approach utilized by the Re-
spondent here with respect to the employees’ annual reviews
has been found particularly egregious. America’s Best Quality
Coatings Corp., 313 NLRB 470, 472 (1993). Finally, the Re-
spondent discriminatorily denied overtime to one member of
the Union’s organizing committee, and denied light-duty work
and terminated another, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
The Respondent’s unfair labor practices are of the type that
have been found sufficiently serious to support a bargaining
order. However, this does not mean that a bargaining order is
the only remedy for such violations. Were that the case, it
would no longer be an extraordinary remedy. The Respondent’s
misconduct occurred in a large bargaining unit consisting of 78
employees. Only one of the hallmark violations was directed at
the entire unit, i.e., Blancato’s implied threat of plant closure
and job loss conveyed to employees at the captive-audience
meetings and by the poster prominently displayed in the plant.
The increase in the shift differential affected only six employ-
ees. The Respondent’s promise to revive the dormant employee
review process and grant wage increases, which theoretically
would cover all employees, has only been shown to have af-
fected about one-third of the unit. Blancato’s October 20 memo
to the supervisors identified only 29 employees as in need of a
review and possible wage increase. There is no evidence that
these 29 employees even knew that such a memo existed. The
record does show that nine employees received reviews in Oc-
tober and November. These nine employees had their raises
withheld until the following spring, a period of almost 6
months. However, there is no evidence that all nine employees
were either promised raises in the fall or told that the raises
they received in the spring were linked to the union campaign.
In fact, only two witnesses, Winegar and Thibodeau, testified
that they were promised a wage increase. Although these same
two witnesses and Schaffer testified that they were later told
that the Respondent could not give raises or any other benefits
because of the Union, there is no evidence that these statements
were disseminated to other employees. Blancato’s oral promul-
gation of unlawful rules and his statements creating an impres-
sion of surveillance were directed at two or three employees.
No more than a handful of employees heard Abraham’s com-
ments linking removal of the EN-114 machine to the onset of
the Union’s campaign. Only two union adherents have been
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD550
shown to have been discriminated against and only one was
terminated, 6 months after the canceled election. These facts
distinguish this case from those where a bargaining order has
been deemed necessary to extinguish the lingering effects of an
employer’s unfair labor practices.
A review of the multitude of cases in which the Board has
considered this issue indicates that the Board is more likely to
grant a bargaining order in a small unit than a large one. Those
cases involving large units where a bargaining order has issued
involve far more pervasive and devastating unfair labor prac-
tices, such as mass layoffs, discharges of a number of key union
adherents or across the board wage increases or other benefits
affecting the entire unit. See Parts Depot, Inc., supra; Burling-
ton Times, Inc., 328 NLRB 750 (1999); Sheraton Hotel
Waterbury. See also NLRB v. Stephen Dunn & Assoc., above at
665. The one widely disseminated threat here, i.e., Blancato’s
threat of plant closure and job loss, although serious, was not a
direct plant closing threat. The Respondent’s unlawful conduct
here was much more subtle. Blancato, unlike the management
officials in most of the bargaining order cases, did not tell em-
ployees that the Respondent would close if they voted for union
representation. Instead, by words and actions, he planted in the
minds of the employees an implication that a vote for the Union
would jeopardize their employment. It is possible to remedy the
effects of this type of violation by use of traditional remedies
adapted to the circumstances here. Thus, I shall recommend
that the Respondent be required to post a notice and to have
Blancato read the notice to the employees at captive audience
meetings similar to the ones he held in November and Decem-
ber. In this way, the employees will hear directly from the indi-
vidual who first threatened them that he was wrong to imply
that their vote for the Union would threaten their job security.
Accordingly, based on the above, and in light of the facts of
this case, I do not find that a Gissel bargaining order is the only
effective remedy for the Respondent’s unfair labor practices. I
find, on the contrary, that the effects of the Respondent’s unfair
labor practices can be remedied through use of traditional
remedies tailored to the facts and that a fair election can occur
once those unfair labor practices have been remedied.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By promulgating overly broad and discriminatory solicita-
tion and distribution rules, including rules prohibiting employ-
ees from discussing the Union at work, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. By creating the impression that employees’ union activi-
ties are under surveillance; by threatening employees with plant
closure, job loss, and other unspecified reprisals; by threatening
to and withholding wage increases from employees; by making
implied promises to improve benefits, and by granting in-
creased wages, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained,
and coerced the employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights and has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
3. By denying overtime to Roberta Tyree and by denying
light duty to and terminating the employment of Viterbo (Tony)
Pimentel because Tyree and Pimentel engaged in activities on
behalf of the Union, the Respondent has discriminated against
its employees and engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Respondent has not violated the Act in any other
manner alleged in the complaint.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. The Respondent must rescind the
overly broad and discriminatory rules promulgated during the
union campaign that prohibit its employees from engaging in
union solicitation and distribution and from discussing the Un-
ion at work. In order to remedy its discriminatory denial of
overtime to Tyree, I find that the Respondent must be ordered
to make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a result
of its failure to assign her weekday overtime on and after Octo-
ber 10, 2000. Because the Respondent discriminatorily denied
Pimentel light-duty work on November 15, 2000, and termi-
nated him on June 5, 2001, the Respondent must be ordered to
offer him reinstatement to his light-duty job and to make him
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on
a quarterly basis from November 15 to the date of proper offer
of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950). Because I have
found that the Respondent withheld raises from a number of
employees in response to the union campaign, the Respondent
must make these employees whole for any wages they lost as a
result. Although the precise identity of all the employees af-
fected by this particular unfair labor practice is not known, the
Respondent must make whole at least those nine employees
who received satisfactory performance reviews in October–
November 2000 but did not get a wage increase until April
2001 or later. Whether any of the other 20 employees identified
in Blancato’s October 20, 2000 memo are entitled to backpay
for any wage increase they should have received at that time
can be determined during the compliance stage of these pro-
ceedings. The make-whole remedies for Tyree, Pimentel, and
any other employees shall include interest as computed in New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
In addition to the above actions and other customary reme-
dies for the violations committed here, I shall also recommend
that the Respondent’s president, Joseph Blancato, read the no-
tice to the employees at a meeting or meetings scheduled to
ensure the widest possible attendance. Because the record re-
veals that the Respondent employs a number of employees who
speak and understand little or no English, I shall recommend
that the notices be posted in English, Spanish, and Polish and
that the Respondent have Spanish and Polish interpreters at the
meetings to translate as Blancato reads the notice to the em-
ployees.
HOMER D. BRONSON CO. 551
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended58
ORDER
The Respondent, Homer D. Bronson Company, Winsted,
Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Promulgating and maintaining overly broad and discrimi-
natory solicitation and distribution rules, including rules pro-
hibiting employees from discussing the Union at work.
(b) Making statements to employees that create the impres-
sion that their union activities are under surveillance.
(c) Threatening employees with plant closure, job loss, and
other unspecified reprisals if they select the United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
Region 9A, AFL–CIO (the Union), or any other labor organiza-
tion, as their collective-bargaining representative.
(d) Threatening to and withholding wage increases from em-
ployees because they sought union representation.
(e) Making implied promises to grant raises and otherwise
improve benefits if employees reject the Union as their bargain-
ing representative.
(f) Granting increased wages to employees in order to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce them in their choice of a bargain-
ing representative.
(g) Denying employees overtime or light-duty work because
they joined, supported, or assisted the Union.
(h) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any em-
ployee for supporting the Union or any other labor organiza-
tion.
(i) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the overly broad and discriminatory rules prom-
ulgated during the union campaign that prohibit employees
from engaging in union solicitation and distribution and from
discussing the Union at work.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Viterbo
Pimentel full reinstatement to his former light-duty job or, if
that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed.
(c) Make Pimentel whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to Pimentel’s unlawful discharge, and
within 3 days thereafter notify Pimentel in writing that this has

58 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
been done and that the discharge will not be used against him in
any way.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, make Roberta
Tyree whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a result of the
discriminatory denial of overtime, which began on or about
October 10, 2000, in the manner set forth in the remedy section
of the decision.
(f) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, make whole
any employees who were denied wage increases in fall 2000
because of the union campaign in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of the decision.
(g) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(h) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Winsted, Connecticut, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”59 Copies of the notice, in English, Span-
ish, and Polish, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 34, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since October 5,
2000.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, hold a meet-
ing or meetings, scheduled to ensure the widest possible atten-
dance, at which the attached notice is to be read to the employ-
ees by the Respondent’s president, Joseph Blancato, with trans-
lation available for Spanish- and Polish-speaking employees.
(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.

59 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”