Holston Manufacturing CompanyDownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJul 20, 193913 N.L.R.B. 783 (N.L.R.B. 1939) Copy Citation In the Matter Of HOLSTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF HOSIERY WORKERS Case No. C-972.-Decided July 20, 1939 Hosiery Manufacturing Industry-Interference, Restraint, and Coercion- Discrinination: discharge of one employee ; charges of, dismissed-Unit Ap- propriate for Collective Bargaining: production and maintenance employees, ex- cluding clerical and supervisory employees; no controversy as to-Representa- tives: proof of choice : stipulation as to ; respondent stipulated that, for the purpose of the hearing, the Union represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit-Collective Bargaining: continual refusal by the respondent throughout the negotiations to reduce to a signed, written contract such terms as the respondent and the Union should agree upon; respondent ordered to notify the Union in writing that it is prepared to renew negotiations, and to embody understanding, if reached, in written, signed contract. Mr. Alexander E. Wilson, Jr., for the Board. Mr. R. R. Kramer, of Knoxville, Tenn., and De Vault & Dawson, by Mr. Walter D. De Vault, of Knoxville, Tenn., for the respondent. Mr. Roscoe L. Barrow, of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon charges and amended charges duly filed by American Federa- tion of Hosiery Workers, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by Charles N. Feidelson, Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued its complaint dated June 1, 1938, and its amended complaint dated June 3, 1938, against Holston Manufacturing Company, Knoxville, Tennessee, herein called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint, as amended, accompanied by notice of hearing, were duly served upon the respond- ent and the Union. 13 N. L. R. B., No. 85. 783 784 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, as amended, alleged in substance : (a) that on or about October 27, 1936, the respondent discharged Archie Fielden and at all times thereafter refused to employ him, because of his activities in behalf of the Union; (b) that on or about September 1, 1935, and at all times thereafter the respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of its employees in the appropriate unit, although the Union was the designated representative of a majority of such employees; (c) that by the afore-mentioned acts, the re- spondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in. the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Respondent's answer, dated June 10, 1938, denied that it had engaged in or was engaging in the alleged unfair labor practices. Accompanying the answer was a motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended. Pursuant to an amended notice duly served on the parties, a hear- ing was held on July 7 and 8, 1938, at Knoxville, Tennessee, before Walter Wilbur, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Board. The Board and the respondent were represented by counsel and par- ticipated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. During the course of the hear- ing the Trial Examiner made several rulings on motions and on ob- jections to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings and finds that no prejudicial errors were committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. On October 15, 1938, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report, copies of which were duly served upon the parties, finding that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, but that the respondent had not engaged in and was not engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act. He recommended that the respondent cease and desist from its unfair labor practices; notify the Union that it is prepared to renew negotiations; upon request, bargain col- lectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the em- ployees in the appropriate unit; and file within 10 days a report set- ting forth the manner and form of compliance therewith. He rec- ommended dismissal of the allegations of the complaint, as amended, relating to the discharge of Archie Fielden. The respondent and the Union were notified by the Trial Examiner that they were en- titled to request the privilege of filing briefs with or presenting oral argument before the Board within 10 days of the receipt of the report. HOLSTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 785 Thereafter the respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and prayed that the complaint, as amended, be dismissed. None of the parties filed briefs with or requested oral argument be- fore the Board. The Board has reviewed the exceptions to the Inter- mediate Report and, except in so far as they are consistent with the findings, conclusions, and order set forth below, finds them to be without merit. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Holston Manufacturing Company is a Tennessee corporation hav- ing its principal office and place of business in Knoxville, Tennessee. It is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of hosiery. The principal raw material used in its operations is cotton yarn. During 1937 it purchased approximately 1,000,000 pounds of yarn. Approximately 300,000 pounds of this yarn were shipped to the re- spondent from points outside Tennessee. Approximately 600,000 pounds of yarn were purchased from the Central Franklin Processing Company of Chattanooga, Tennessee, which purchased this yarn throughout the country, dyed it, and shipped it on to the Holston Manufacturing Company. Approximately 90 per cent of the respondent's finished products are sold outside Tennessee. The respondent maintains no sales force; a sales agency, Chipman Sons Company, Incorporated, New York City, sells the goods. II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED American Federation of Hosiery Workers is a labor organization affiliated with the Textile Workers Organizing Committee and the Committee for Industrial Organization. It admits to membership the production and maintenance employees of the respondent, ea eluding clerical and supervisory employees. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The refusal to bargain collectively 1. The appropriate unit The Union contends that the appropriate unit should consist of the production and maintenance employees of the respondent, ex- cluding clerical and supervisory employees. The respondent does not 786 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD question the propriety of this unit. Such employees are eligible for membership in the Union, and we see no objection to the proposed unit. We find that the production and maintenance employees of the re- spondent, excluding clerical and supervisory employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining and that said unit insures to employees of the respondent the full benefit of their right to self-organization and collective bargaining and other- wise effectuates the policies of the Act. 2. Representation by the Union of the majority in the appropriate unit During the hearing the respondent stipulated that, for the purpose of the hearing, the Union represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit. Furthermore, the respondent agreed on February 11, 1938, to recognize the Union as the bargaining agent for all the employees. The Trial Examiner found that "for all purposes of the present proceeding, the Union was at all times during the year 1938 the exclusive agency for purposes of collective bargain- ing of the production and maintenance employees of the respondent, exclusive of supervisory personnel." The respondent filed no excep- tions to the Trial Examiner's finding in this regard. We find that on January 1, 1938, and at all times since, the Union was the duly designated representative of a majority of the respond- ent's employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining, and pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the Act, was the exclusive representa- tive of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment.' 3. The refusal to bargain The complaint, as amended, alleges that on or about September 1, 1935, and at all times thereafter the respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union as required by the Act. The respondent's answer denies the allegation. 'The complaint dates the respondent 's refusal to bargain from September 1, 1935, and the above stipulation as to the Union's majority might be interpreted to reach back to that date. However, it is apparent from the record that the real issue as to the refusal to bargain concerned the respondent's refusal to enter into a written contract during negotiations in 1938, and we think that the stipulation is more properly to be regarded as referring to the time of these recent negotiations . The Trial Examiner found, as noted above, that the Union represented a majority "at all times during the year 1938," and no exceptions to this finding have been filed. Under these circumstances , we do not find that the Union represented a majority of the employees in the unit prior to 1938. HOLSTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 787 The Union has been active in the respondent's plant since 1934. On July 15, 1934, a notice of a reduction in wages was posted in the plant. The Union protested this reduction by calling a strike. The strike was terminated 4 days later, after the respondent and the Union had entered into a written contract which was to expire on September 1, 1935. Prior to the expiration date, negotiations for a renewal of the agreement were begun. The respondent took the position that the prevailing wages and working conditions would not be changed, and that the respondent and the employees did not need any agreement. On February 29, 1936, Frank Bradshaw, president of the local union, talked to Greene, the plant superintendent, concerning a dis- pute in the sewing department. Greene refused to recognize Brad- shaw as the representative of the employees and said that he would deal directly with the employees. When the Union threatened to go on strike, Greene agreed to meet a committee from the Union. There- after the respondent continued to consider grievances presented by the union committee. In September 1936, six employees pulled the switches on their machines for about 20 minutes. For this "wild cat" strike they were discharged. Bradshaw attempted to secure their reinstatement but the respondent was adamant and a strike resulted. During the strike Bradshaw asked Joseph Gaut, the president of the respondent, to meet with Edward Callaghan, second vice president of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers,-and negotiate an agreement so that the employees would return to work; Callaghan himself asked Gaut for an appointment; and the city manager of Knoxville attempted to get Gaut and Callaghan together. Gaut took the position that he would not talk to an outsider and refused to see Callaghan. The employees returned to work after 18 working days without having gained any concessions. On April 27, 1937, the Act having been held constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 12, the officers of the respondent and a committee of the Union met and discussed the Act. Gaut said it was his intention to abide by the Act absolutely and that he had instructed the other officers to do so. However, when in May 1937, Callaghan telephoned Gaut asking for an appointment, Gaut refused to see him. Bradshaw on several later occasions tried to per- suade Gaut to see Callaghan, but Gaut continued to delay the meet- ing, saying that he would meet Callaghan when there was something to meet him about. Since it was not established that the Union attained a majority status prior to 1938,• the above-described activities of the president of the respondent and the respondent's supervisory officials do not 788 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD constitute unlawful refusals to bargain under the Act. But indicat- ing, as they do, continuous hostility toward the Union, the events afford a significant background for our consideration of the negotia- tions occurring in 1938, when the Union did represent a majority of the employees in the unit. In January 1938, Bradshaw called on De Vault, a director of and counsel for the respondent, and tendered to him a proposed contract. De Vault advised Bradshaw that it was improbable that the re- spondent would sign such a contract, but that he would discuss it with the officers of the respondent. Bradshaw did not receive an answer from De Vault or the respondent. On February 8, 1938, Eugene Curtis, a conciliator for the United States Department of Labor, advised De Vault that the Union had designated Callaghan its representative, and asked De Vault to arrange a meeting between Gaut and Callaghan. On February 9, 1938, De Vault, Gaut, and Callaghan met. Callaghan asked Gaut if the respondent proposed to enter into a written contract. Gaut took the position that the re- spondent would not enter into a written contract with the Union. At this meeting collective bargaining was discussed generally and Gaut indicated what the respondent would and would not orally agree to do. A second conference was held February 11, 1938. At this meeting each paragraph of the proposed contract was discussed individually, and as each paragraph was taken up Gaut indicated whether or not he would orally agree to it. The parties agreed on paragraph 1, which provided that neither party will exercise its rights oppres- sively. Paragraph 2 provided that the Union shall be recognized as the bargaining agent for all the employees in the appropriate unit. The respondent agreed to recognize the Union as bargaining agent until it had reason to believe that the Union did not have a majority status. The respondent refused to agree to paragraph 3, which pro- vided : "The Corporation agrees that all of its employees who are, and those that shall hereafter become members of the Union, shall remain members of the Union during the life of this agreement." With respect to paragraph 4, providing that the respondent should give preference to union members in hiring new employees, the respondent took the position that neither union nor non-union appli- cants should receive preferential treatment. The respondent refused to consider paragraph 5, which provided for a check-off. The "Hours" provision provided for a 40-hour week and an 8-hour day, with a 50-per cent increase in pay for overtime. The respondent would not agree to the 50-per cent increase in pay for overtime, and stated that it was already operating under a 40-hour week, 8-hour day schedule, and that it would continue to so operate. However, it did not commit itself to this schedule for any definite time. A pro- HOLSTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 789 vision for a 15-per cent increase in wages was refused as unreason- able. A further provision required adherence to the principle of equal distribution of work in all departments and recognition of seniority rights. Gaut said the respondent would not recognize seniority rights, and that they were already rotating the work as evenly as they could. The respondent agreed to a general provision regarding precautions for the safety and health of the employees. Another paragraph set apart 5 days in each year as holidays without pay. Gaut stated for the respondent that the plant would operate on those days , but that no one failing to work would be penalized. A paragraph concerning discharges proposed that no worker should be discharged for union activity , and that in the event of a discharge the union should be given the reason therefor . The respondent agreed that it would discharge employees only in good faith and for proper cause , and it agreed to give the discharged employee in writ- ing the reason for his discharge . However, it would not agree to inform the Union of the reason . for discharges . An arbitration provision was refused outright by the respondent . At the conclu- sion of this meeting, Callaghan said that no final agreement had been reached. On March 2 , 1938, De Vault tendered Callaghan a memorandum setting forth those provisions to which the respondent had orally agreed. The memorandum was not intended to be, nor was it, a contract. While the respondent showed no willingness to agree to any changes of substance in conditions of employment , we do not find an unlawful refusal to bargain on that score. On the other hand, it is apparent that, aside from the particular terms at issue , a major .obstacle to a successful culmination of the negotiations was the respondent 's continual refusal to put any terms into a written con- tract. During the conference on February 11, Callaghan said that it was his understanding that the Act required the respondent to `reduce such terms as might be agreed upon to writing , if the Union so desired , and that since the respondent had taken a contrary posi- tion, nothing had been agreed upon. At the conclusion of the March ,2 meeting Callaghan said that the employees were insisting on a written contract and that anything less than that was unsatisfactory. The Union sought out the respondent again on March 24, 1938, but learned that the respondent had not changed its position in regard to entering into a written contract . The situation , then, is this : The Union proposed a contract which was discussed by the respondent and the Union and largely rejected by the respondent ; the respondent offered to agree orally to some , of the terms of the contract proposed by the Union but refused to enter into a written contract embodying 187930-39-vol 13-51 790 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD any terms whatever; the Union refused to accept the respondent's proposal and insisted upon a signed, written contract. The respondent contends that the Act does not require it to enter into a written contract embodying any terms agreed upon with the representatives of its employees. In Matter of St. Joseph Stock- yards Company 2 we held that after an understanding has been reached on the terms of the agreement, that understanding must be incorporated in some form of agreement if the representatives of the employees so request. And in Matter of Inland Steel Company," we held that under normal circumstances, an essential element of collec- tive bargaining in good faith by an employer is a willingness to embody the results of negotiations in a signed agreement. In that case the respondent's refusal to enter into a signed agreement with the Union, announced at the commencement of negotiations, broke up the negotiations and the actual terms were not seriously discussed. Although the facts in the case before us differ, in that after the respondent's refusal to enter into a signed contract the parties bar- gained to an apparent impasse, it is clear that although there was no final agreement on particular terms, a vital factor in the impasse was the respondent's refusal to embody such terms as might be agreed upon in a signed contract. In Matter of Inland Steel Company 4 we had this to say as to the importance of signed contracts in the bargaining process : Section 8 (5) of the Act requires an employer to accept the procedure of collective bargaining in good faith, and the nature of this obligation must be determined in the light of the prevail- ing practice of collective bargaining and the spirit and purpose of the Act as a means of avoiding industrial strife. We regard it as well settled that collective bargaining in good faith requires a willingness to consummate the negotiations, if successful, by entering into some sort of an agreement. And we hold that under circumstances such as are presented here, it is the em- ployer's obligation to accede to a request that understandings reached be embodied in a signed agreement. The present con- troversy is projected on the background of a long struggle by, labor organizations to attain full recognition of their right to recognition as collective bargaining agencies with a dignity equal 9 Matter of St. Joseph Stockyards Company and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local Union No 159, 2 N L R. B 39 In this Decision the relevant precedents and the Reports of the Congressional Committees on the Act are reviewed. 8 Matter of Inland Steel Company and Steel Workers Organizing Committee and Amal- gamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers of North America, Lodge Nos. 84, 1010 , and 1101, 9 N. L. R. B 783. See also Matter of H. J. Heinz Company and Canning and Pickle Workers , Local No. 325, affiliated with Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, American Federation of Labor, 10 N. L R. B. 963. ' See supra, footnote 3. HOLSTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 791 to that of the employers with whom they deal. We take judi- cial notice of the fact that today thousands of employers have accorded unions their right to normal contractual relationships, and that, as is shown by the record, the signed collective bar- gaining agreement is the prevailing practice. From the view- point of harmonious and cooperative labor relations, as well as of sensible business practice, the importance of embodying under- standings in signed agreements is obvious. Similarly, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Globe Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board 5 • stated : We believe there is a duty on both sides, though difficult of legal enforcement, to enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement touching wages and hours and conditions of labor, and if found to embody it in a contract as specific as possible, which shall stand as a mutual guaranty of conduct, and as a guide for the adjustment of grievances. The respondent advances no valid reason as to why it should not enter into a written contract. The reasons given by the respondent for its refusal to enter into a signed contract, namely, that the Act does not require it, that changing conditions in the industry do not render it advisable, and that there is no reason for a signed contract, indicate, rather, an attitude that in dealing with the Union, recogni- tion of the Union's status as an equal party in normal business rela- tionships is to be withheld to the greatest possible extent. Such an attitude does not lend itself to the dignified and stable collective bargaining process contemplated by the Act as an aid to industrial peace. We conclude, that the respondent in refusing to sign any con- tract with the Union was motivated by a desire to curtail the growth of the Union's strength in its plant.° We find that the respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit, and has thereby engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act. By such refusal the respondent also interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em- ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. ° 103 F. (2d) 91 (1939). ° The respondent 's reluctance to accept collective bargaining is also shown by its refusal during the negotiations to agree even orally to any terms which would change current conditions of employment, and by its past refusal to meet with a union representative iN ho was not an employee of the respondent. 792 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. The discharge The complaint, as amended, alleges that on or about October 27, 1936, the respondent discriminatorily discharged Archie Fielden and at all times thereafter refused to reemploy him, because of his union activities. The respondent's answer denies the allegation. Archie Fielden had been in the respondent's employ for about 12 years. Prior to his discharge he was a knitter. He joined the Union in 1934, and served on various union committees. On several ,occasions he treated with the plant foremen concerning grievances of individual employees. In July 1935, Fielden talked to a foreman about a grievance of two girls in the plant and on the following day the plant superintendent called Fielden to the office and told him that if he was to remain with the Company they would have to "pull together." On October 26, 1936, Fielden, while working at his machine, was commenting loudly on events which had transpired at a union meet- ing on the previous day. It appears that Fielden was disconcerted by the occurrences, for he used the words "damn" and "God damn" liberally. Mrs. Jack Bradshaw, who worked across the machine from Fielden, noticed that another employee, Pearl West, was unnerved by Fielden's language. She accordingly asked Mae Brewer, who was working nearby, to advise Fielden to refrain from cursing. Brewer called Fielden over to her machine and warned him that West would report his conduct if he continued to curse. Fielden replied : "Hell's fire, I will tell Luke and Jim, either one,7 I don't like her God damned looks, anyway. Hell's fire, anybody working in a God damned hosiery mill will hear anything." This commentary on the situation was heard by West, as well as Brewer and Bradshaw. By this time West was too nervous to continue working. She reported the inci- dent to the foreman, Luke Lindsay. Lindsay questioned Bradshaw and Brewer and told Fielden to finish up his work and report to the office on the following day. Upon leaving his machine Fielden apologized to West for his conduct. He was discharged on the fol- lowing day. While Fielden was fairly active in union affairs, others who have held the same positions in the Union which Fielden has held have been retained in the respondent's employ. The occasion for warning Fielden that he must "pull together" with the respondent was ap- proximately 16 months prior to the discharge. The Trial Examiner found that although Fielden's discharge seemed to be harsh treat- ment in view of his long service with the respondent, there was no 7 The "Luke" and "Jim" referred to are evidently Luke Lindsay and Jim Williams. foremen. HOLSTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 793 motive behind it related to his union activity. We agree with the Trial Examiner. We-find that Fielden was not discharged because of his activity on behalf of the Union. We shall, therefore, dismiss the allegations of the complaint as to him. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section III A above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respond- ent described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substan- tial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, we will order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The issue in this case was whether or not the respondent's refusal to enter into a signed contract, regardless of the terms agreed upon, constituted an unfair labor practice. We have found that this con- stituted a refusal to bargain collectively. Addressing ourselves to the wrong sought to be remedied, we shall order the respondent to bargain collectively with the Union and to evidence the terms of any agreement finally arrived at in a signed contract. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. American Federation of Hosiery Workers is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. All the production and maintenance employees, excluding clerical and supervisory employees, employed at the respondent's plant in Knoxville, Tennessee, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 3. The American Federation of Hosiery Workers was on January 1, 1938, and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive representa- tive of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 794 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4. The respondent, by refusing to bargain collectively with American Federation of Hosiery Workers as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act. 5. The respondent, by interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 7. The respondent has not discriminated and is not discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Archie Fielden, and has not and is not engaged in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act, with regard to him. ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the re- spondent, Holston Manufacturing Company, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with American Federation of Hosiery Workers as the exclusive representative of all its production and maintenance employees, excluding clerical and supervisory em- ployees, employed at the respondent's plant in Knoxville, Tennessee; (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted ac- tivities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Notify the American Federation of Hosiery Workers in writing that it is prepared to renew negotiations looking toward a collective bargaining agreement and to embody the terms of such agreement as may be finally arrived at in a written, signed, contract; (b) Upon request, bargain collectively with the American Federa- tion of Hosiery Workers as the exclusive representative of the re- spondent's production and maintenance employees excluding clerical and supervisory employees, in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours HOLSTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 795 of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an under- standing is reached on such matters, embody said understanding in a written, signed, contract; (c) Post immediately, and keep posted for a period of at least sixty (60)' consecutive days from the date of posting, notices to its employees in conspicuous places throughout its plant stating that the respondent will cease and desist in the manner set forth in 1 (a) and (b), and that it will take the affirmative action set forth in 2 (a) and (b) of this Order; (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith. AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, in so far as it alleges that the respondent discriminated in regard to the terms and conditions of employment of Archie Fielden, be, and the same hereby is, dismissed. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation