HOLLENSHEAD, Robert et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 19, 2020

2018006687 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/829,442 07/02/2010 Robert HOLLENSHEAD 26454-0429 8544
101373 7590 08/19/2020
Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP / CEI
999 Peachtree Street
Suite 2300
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
RUHL, DENNIS WILLIAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
CoxCommPatents@eversheds-sutherland.us
CoxEnterprisesPatents@eversheds-sutherland.us
patentdocket@eversheds-sutherland.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROBERT HOLLENSHEAD and THEODORE REIMEL
____________

Appeal 2018-006687
Application 12/829,442
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 9, 21, 34, 40, and 43–67. An oral hearing in this
appeal was held on July 1, 2020. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed February 12, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 17, 2018),
and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed April 17, 2018), and Final
Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed November 1, 2017). Appellant
identifies Autotrader.com, Inc. as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 2).
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CLAIMED INVENTION
The claimed invention “relate[s] to vehicle appraisal systems”
(Spec. ¶ 1).
Claims 9, 21, 34, 40, 63, and 64 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 9, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
9. A method for generating a guaranteed offer price for
a particular vehicle by an appraiser computer, wherein the
appraiser computer is communicatively linked to a user
computer, a dealership computer, and a database of market
values for vehicle types, the method comprising:
[(a)] selecting, by the appraiser computer, a price
adjustment category for the particular vehicle from a set of
adjustment categories stored in a data storage device based on
vehicle type information received from the user computer,
wherein the price adjustment category selected by the appraiser
computer defines a depreciation curve of a vehicle type;
[(b)] modifying, by the appraiser computer, a market
value of a vehicle type retrieved from the database based on an
amount corresponding to the selected price adjustment category;
[(c)] determining, by the appraiser computer, a base
value for the particular vehicle using the modified market value;
[(d)] determining, by the appraiser computer, a modifier
value based on vehicle information received from the user
computer, wherein the modifier value is limited to a threshold
value;
[(e)] determining, by the appraiser computer, a
guaranteed offer price for the vehicle using the base value and
the modifier value;
[(f)] generating, by the appraiser computer, an offer
certificate indicating the guaranteed offer price for the particular
vehicle, wherein the offer certificate is a binding agreement
between an appraiser and a dealer such that the guaranteed offer
price represents an amount the appraiser is obligated to pay the
dealer for the particular vehicle after the dealer has purchased the
particular vehicle from a user based on the offer certificate;
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[(g)] transmitting, by the appraiser computer, the offer
certificate to the user computer; and
[(h)] configuring the appraiser computer to receive a
request for payment from the dealership computer after the
dealer has purchased the vehicle from the user at the guaranteed
price indicated on the offer certificate, wherein in response to the
request for payment, the appraiser will purchase the vehicle from
the dealer at the guaranteed price.
REJECTION
Claims 9, 21, 34, 40, and 43–67 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 8–21).
We select independent claim 9 as representative. The remaining claims
stand or fall with claim 9. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
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directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner
determined that the claims are directed to “generating a guaranteed offer
price for a vehicle and entering into a contractual relationship (a binding
agreement) for the sale and purchase of the vehicle,” i.e., to a concept
similar to other concepts that courts have held abstract (Final Act. 3–9). The
Examiner also determined that the claims do not include additional elements
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (id.
at 10–11).
After Appellant’s briefs were filed, and the Examiner’s Answer
mailed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published
revised guidance for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019
Revised Guidance”). That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination
procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by
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(1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract
idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception
if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that
exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised Guidance, by its terms, applies to all
applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on,
or after January 7, 2019. Id.2,3
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)
The first step in the Mayo/Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to
determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible
concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step,
as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test;
in Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas:
(1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human
activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or
legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance,

2 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04(II) and also supersedes all versions of the
USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.”
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related
guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly,
Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s
rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on
now superseded USPTO guidance.
3 The USPTO issued an update on October 17, 2019 (the “October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility,” available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) clarifying the
2019 Revised Guidance in response to comments received from the public.
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84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next consider whether the claim includes
additional elements, beyond the judicial exception, that “integrate the
[judicial] exception into a practical application,” i.e., that apply, rely on, or
use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). Id. at 54–55.
Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is
“directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id.
As an initial matter, we are not persuaded of Examiner error to the
extent Appellant maintains that the § 101 rejection cannot be sustained
because the Examiner has not addressed the patent eligibility of each of the
dependent claims separately (Appeal Br. 9–10). There is no dispute that
examiners are to evaluate the patent eligibility of each claim individually.
But, consideration of each claim individually does not require a separate
written analysis for each individual claim. Moreover, we agree with the
Examiner that the dependent claims are directed to the same abstract idea as
the independent claims, albeit at differing levels of specificity (Final
Act. 11). Cf. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that when all claims
are directed to the same abstract idea, “addressing each claim of the asserted
patents [is] unnecessary.”).
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in determining that claim 9 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal
Br. 10–17). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
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based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including
the claim language) that claim 9 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on any
improvement to technology and/or a technical field.
The Specification is titled “METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR
PROVIDING A GUARANTEED OFFER PRICE FOR A VEHICLE,” and
describes, in the Background section, that Internet vehicle appraisal services
evaluate a user’s vehicle and provide an estimated value (Spec. ¶ 2). This
estimated value is calculated by first determining an initial value based on
information regarding the type of vehicle, including its make, model and
year, and then modifying the initial value based on the vehicle’s mileage,
options (e.g., color, transmission), general condition (e.g., poor, fair, good),
and location (id.). The Specification describes that “[t]he estimated value
represents the price a seller might receive from a buyer in a sale of any
vehicle possessing substantially the same characteristics as those provided
by the user” (id. ¶ 3). However, this estimated value “could correspond to
thousands of different vehicles and, as such, does not represent the actual
value of the user’s particular vehicle” (id.)
The claimed invention is intended to address this shortcoming by
providing methods and systems that determine a guaranteed offer price that
an appraiser will pay a dealer for a user’s specific vehicle (Spec. ¶ 6).
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Claim 9, thus, recites a method for generating a guaranteed offer price for a
particular vehicle by an appraiser computer comprising: (1) selecting a price
adjustment category for the vehicle based on vehicle description information
received from a user computer, i.e.,
selecting, by the appraiser computer, a price adjustment
category for the particular vehicle from a set of adjustment
categories stored in a data storage device based on vehicle type
information received from the user computer, wherein the price
adjustment category selected by the appraiser computer defines
a depreciation curve of a vehicle type
(step (a)); (2) determining a base value for the vehicle by modifying the
market value of the vehicle type based on the selected price adjustment
category, i.e., “modifying, by the appraiser computer, a market value of a
vehicle type retrieved from the database based on an amount corresponding
to the selected price adjustment category” and “determining, by the appraiser
computer, a base value for the particular vehicle using the modified market
value” (steps (b) and (c)); (3) determining modifier values based on vehicle
information received from the user computer, and combining the base value
and modifier values to arrive at a guaranteed offer price for the vehicle, i.e.,
“determining, by the appraiser computer, a modifier value based on vehicle
information received from the user computer, wherein the modifier value is
limited to a threshold value” and “determining, by the appraiser computer, a
guaranteed offer price for the vehicle using the base value and the modifier
value” (steps (d) and (e)); (4) generating a binding agreement between an
appraiser and a dealer whereby the appraiser agrees to pay the dealer the
guaranteed offer price for the user’s vehicle, i.e.,
generating, by the appraiser computer, an offer certificate
indicating the guaranteed offer price for the particular vehicle,
wherein the offer certificate is a binding agreement between an
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appraiser and a dealer such that the guaranteed offer price
represents an amount the appraiser is obligated to pay the dealer
for the particular vehicle after the dealer has purchased the
particular vehicle from a user based on the offer certificate
(step (f)); (5) “transmitting, by the appraiser computer, the offer certificate to
the user computer” (step (g)); and (6) purchasing the vehicle from the dealer
at the guaranteed price after the dealer has purchased the vehicle from the
user, i.e.,
configuring the appraiser computer to receive a request for
payment from the dealership computer after the dealer has
purchased the vehicle from the user at the guaranteed price
indicated on the offer certificate, wherein in response to the
request for payment, the appraiser will purchase the vehicle from
the dealer at the guaranteed price
(step (h)). We agree with the Examiner that these limitations, when given
their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite “generating a guaranteed offer
price for a vehicle and entering into a contractual relationship (a binding
agreement) for the sale and purchase of the vehicle,” i.e., a fundamental
economic practice, which is one of certain methods of organizing human
activity that are judicial exceptions and, therefore, an abstract idea. See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. See also, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that creating a
contractual relationship is a patent-ineligible abstract idea).
Having concluded that claim 9 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claim
recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two).
The only additional elements recited in claim 9, beyond the abstract
idea, are “an appraiser computer”; “a user computer”; “a dealership
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computer”; “a data storage device”; and “a database of market values for
vehicle types” — elements that, as the Examiner observed, are generic
computer components (Final Act. 10–11), and disclosed as such in the
written disclosure (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 11, 28–30). We find no indication in
the Specification that the operations recited in claim 9 require any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, invoke any allegedly inventive programming, or
that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes an improvement in technology and/or a technical
field to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed
invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that
phrase is used in the 2019 Revised Guidance.4

4 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or
combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract
idea, into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the
claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception.
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Citing Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed.
Cir. 2017), McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d
1299 Fed. Cir. 2016), Enfish, and Trading Technologies International v.
CQG Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017), Appellant variously argues
that, rather than being directed to an abstract idea, the pending claims are
directed to a patent-eligible improvement (Appeal Br. 10–17). Yet, we can
find no parallel between claim 9 and the patent-eligible claims at issue in
any of Visual Memory, McRO, Enfish, and Trading Technologies.
In Enfish, the Federal Circuit held that claims reciting a self-
referential table for a computer database were not directed to an abstract idea
under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework, and were patent eligible,
because the claims were directed to an improvement in computer
functionality. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. The specification described the
benefits of using a self-referential table – faster searching and more effective
data storage – and highlighted the differences between the claimed self-
referential table and a conventional database structure. Id. at 1333, 1337.
The Federal Circuit, thus, rejected the district court’s characterization of the
claims as directed to the abstract idea of “storing, organizing, and retrieving
memory in a logical table,” id. at 1337, emphasizing that the key question is
whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an abstract
idea for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. Id. at 1335–36.
Similarly, in Virtual Memory, where the claims recited a computer
memory system connectable to a processor and having one or more
programmable operational characteristics, the Federal Circuit determined
that, “as with Enfish’s self-referential table,” Visual Memory’s claims “are
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directed to a technological improvement: an enhanced computer memory
system”; the court noted that the claims “focus on a ‘specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities’ — the use of programmable
operational characteristics that are configurable based on the type of
processor — instead of ‘on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool” and like the patents at issue
in Enfish, “the specification discusses the advantages offered by the
technological improvement.” Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1259–60.
As such, the Federal Circuit concluded that Visual Memory’s claims, like
Enfish’s, are directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer,
and, therefore, not directed to an “abstract idea” under step one of the
Mayo/Alice framework Id. at 1262.
Appellant argues that “[l]ike the claims in Visual Memory, the present
claims are patent-eligible because they . . . solve a technical problem with a
technical solution” (Appeal Br. 11). Appellant describes the “technical
problem” as “determining a consistent vehicle value at a central computer
system that can be propagated to other computers without having to re-
perform calculations,” and asserts that “[t]o solve this problem, the claims
recite specific and concrete operations” (id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3, 13, 16, 19, 20,
22, 25, 57)).
Appellant takes a substantially similar position with respect to Enfish
(Appeal Br. 16 (arguing that “[l]ike the claims in Enfish, the present claims
are directed towards an improvement of an existing technology — that of
providing consistent and accurate vehicle values at a central appraiser
computer that can be propagated across multiple dealership computers
without requiring dealership computers to individually determine vehicle
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values”)). But, unlike the claims in Visual Memory and Enfish, Appellant
does not identify, and we do not find, any element or combination of
elements recited in claim 9 that yields an improvement in the functioning of
a computer. The alleged improvement that Appellant touts, i.e., providing
consistent and accurate vehicle values, does not concern an improvement to
computer capabilities, but instead relates to an alleged improvement in
assessing vehicle values — a process in which a computer is used as a tool
in its ordinary capacity.
We also are not persuaded that there is any parallel between claim 9
and the claims at issue in McRO. Appellant asserts that the Federal Circuit
“found that the claims in McRO were limited to rules with specific
characteristics, and that the specific, claimed features of the rules allowed
for the improvement realized by the invention” (Appeal Br. 13).
Appellant ostensibly maintains that claim 9, like the claim in McRO,
is not directed to an abstract idea because the improvement realized by the
claimed invention (i.e., determining a vehicle value) is allowed for “through
a specific sequence of events” (id. at 13–14; see also id. at 15 (“The
claimed components are employed to perform the distinct claimed process,
which uses a combined order of specific rules and determinations that
are then used and applied to create desired results.”)). Yet, the Federal
Circuit did not premise its determination that the claim in McRO was patent
eligible merely on the specificity of the claimed animation scheme. Instead,
the court determined that the claim there at issue was patent eligible because,
when considered as a whole, the claim was directed to a technological
improvement over existing, manual 3-D animation techniques and used
limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved
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technological result in conventional industry practice. See McRO, 837 F.3d
at 1316. In particular, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed rules allow
computers to produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial
expressions in animated characters that previously could only be produced
by human animators. Id. at 1313.
Generating a guaranteed offer price for a particular vehicle in
accordance with a set of rules, may well improve a business process, i.e.,
vehicle appraisals. But we are not persuaded that it achieves an improved
technological result analogous to that obtained in McRO.
Appellant’s reliance on Trading Technologies is similarly unavailing.
In Trading Technologies, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding that the patented claims (which recited a method and system for
displaying market information on a graphical user interface) were not
directed to an abstract idea because the district court found, and the Federal
Circuit agreed, that the challenged patents were “directed to improvements
in existing graphical user interface devices that have no ‘pre-electronic
trading analog,’” and did not simply claim displaying information on a
graphical user interface; instead, the claims required “a specific, structured
graphical user interface paired with a prescribed functionality directly
related to the graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to and
resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art.” Id.
at 1004.5 The Federal Circuit, thus, concluded that “the claimed subject

5 Specifically, the district court found that with prior art GUIs, the best bid
and best ask prices changed based on updates received from the market;
therefore, there was a risk with these GUIs that a trader would miss her
intended price as a result of prices changing from under her pointer at the
time she clicked on the price cell on the GUI. The patents-in-suit provided a
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matter is ‘directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate,’
. . . for the claimed graphical user interface method imparts a specific
functionality to a trading system ‘directed to a specific implementation of a
solution to a problem in the software arts.”’ Id. at 1006 (citations omitted).
Appellant asserts here that, like the claims and patents at issue in
Trading Technologies, “the present claims and patent application solve a
problem specific to vehicle valuation consistency for which there is no
manual [i.e., “pre-electronic”] analog, and result in increased accuracy and
computing efficiency by performing the calculations at a central computer”
(Appeal Br. 16–17). But, unlike the situation in Trading Technologies,
Appellant does not identify any problem with prior user interfaces or prior
art computers that the claimed invention was specifically designed to
resolve. Nor, is there any indication of record that the claimed invention
improves the way computers operate.
Even assuming, without deciding, that the claimed invention has no
pre-electronic analog, and can determine the value of a particular vehicle
faster than doing so manually, any speed increase comes from the
capabilities of the generic computer components — not the recited process
itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Servs., L.L.C v. Sun Life Assurance Co.,
687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not

system and method whereby traders could place orders at a particular,
identified price level, not necessarily the highest bid or the lowest ask price
by keeping the prices static in position, and allowing the quantities at each
price to change. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., No. 05-cv-4811,
2015 WL 774655 *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2015).
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materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012,
1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process
of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and
accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-
purpose computer ‘do[ ] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the
claimed subject matter.”’(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Like the
claims in FairWarning, the focus of claim 9 is not on an improvement in
computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use
generic computing components as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d
at 1095; cf. BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (“While the presentation of summary comparison usage
information to users improves the quality of the information added to the
database, an improvement to the information stored by a database is not
equivalent to an improvement in the database’s functionality.”).
We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 9 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the
additional elements recited in the claim are no more than generic computer
components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they
do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice
Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is
not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical
assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)
(alteration in original)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that
claim 9 is directed to an abstract idea.
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Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 9 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 9 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or
combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in
the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Appellant argues that even if claim 9 is directed to an abstract idea,
the claim is nonetheless patent eligible because, similar to the claims held
patent eligible in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d
1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2016), claim 9 provides “an unconventional
technological solution (performing calculations at a central appraiser
computer that can be propagated across multiple dealership computers
without requiring dealership computers to individually determine vehicle
values) to a technological problem (determining accurate and consistent
vehicle values)” (Appeal Br. 18–19). Appellant’s reliance on Amdocs is
misplaced.
There, the Federal Circuit held that the claim at issue was patent
eligible because the claim entails an unconventional technological solution
(enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem
(massive record flows which previously required massive databases).
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Although the solution requires generic components, the court determined
that “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic
components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an
improvement in computer functionality” and that the “enhancing limitation
depends not only upon the invention’s distributed architecture, but also
depends upon the network devices and gatherers –– even though these may
be generic –– working together in a distributed manner.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d
at 1300–01.
Appellant argues here, as described above, that, similar to the claims
in Amdocs, claim 9 provides an unconventional technological solution to a
technological problem. (Appeal Br. 18). But, Appellant does not identify
any “distributed architecture” comparable to that in Amdocs. There also is
no persuasive evidence of record that the generic components recited in
claim 9 operate in an unconventional manner, as in Amdocs, to achieve an
improvement in computer functionality.
It also is significant here that although Appellant repeatedly asserts
that the pending claims are not about merely generating vehicle values but
instead solve the technological problem of determining a vehicle value at a
central appraisal computer that can be propagated across multiple dealership
computers without requiring dealership computers to individually determine
vehicle values, neither claim 9 nor any of independent claims 21, 34, 40, 63,
and 64 recites that the vehicle value is “propagated across multiple
dealership computers.” Instead, the claims merely recite that the appraiser
computer determines a guaranteed offer price for the vehicle, and that the
appraiser computer transmits an offer certificate indicating the guaranteed
offer price to the user computer over a communication link. And, as the
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Federal Circuit observed in buySAFE, Inc., 765 F.3d at 1355, “[t]hat a
computer receives and sends information over a network — without further
specification — is not even arguably inventive.”
We also do not agree with Appellant that any parallel exists between
claim 9 and the claims at issue in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 19–20).
There, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims were directed to a
technology-based solution to filter Internet content that overcame existing
problems with other Internet filtering systems by taking a known filtering
solution — i.e., a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet Service Provider
(“ISP”) — and making it more dynamic and efficient by providing
individualized filtering at the ISP. Id. at 1351. The court, thus, held that the
second step of the Mayo/Alice framework was satisfied because the claimed
invention “represents a ‘software-based invention[ ] that improve[s] the
performance of the computer system itself.’” Id. (alterations in original)
(citation omitted).
Appellant argues that, similar to the claims of BASCOM, the present
claims “recite a specific implementation and processes that provide benefits
over the prior art.” (Appeal Br. 19). But, unlike the filtering system
improvements in BASCOM that added significantly more to the abstract idea
in that case, the claimed invention here merely uses generic computing
components to implement an abstract idea, i.e., “generating a guaranteed
offer price for a vehicle and entering into a contractual relationship (a
binding agreement) for the sale and purchase of the vehicle.”
Responding to the Examiner’s Answer, Appellant argues in the Reply
Brief that the present rejection cannot be sustained because “the Examiner
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fails to provide any additional detail or evidence regarding the assertion that
the pending claims or any elements are well-understood, routine, and
conventional” (Reply Br. 2). That argument is not persuasive.
The Examiner determined here, and we agree, that the only claim
elements beyond the abstract idea are “an appraiser computer”; “a user
computer”; “a dealership computer”; “a data storage device”; and “a
database of market values for vehicle types,” i.e., generic computer
components (Final Act. 10–11) — a determination amply supported by, and
fully consistent with the Specification (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 11, 28–30).
Appellant cannot reasonably contend that there is insufficient factual
support for the Examiner’s determination that the operation of these
components is well-understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here,
there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the operations recited in
claim 9 require any specialized hardware or inventive computer components
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the
absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been
defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of
using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes,
with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (internal
citations omitted); see also BSG Tech LLC, 899 F.3d at 1291 (“BSG Tech
does not argue that other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions,
alone or in combination, are not well-understood, routine and conventional
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database structures and activities. Accordingly, the district court did not err
in determining that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept.”).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9, and claims 21, 34, 40, and 43–
67, which fall with claim 9.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
9, 21, 34,
40, 43–67
101 Eligibility 9, 21, 34,
40, 43–67

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED