Hirani, Sunil G. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 12, 2019

11882090 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 12, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/882,090 07/30/2007 Sunil G. Hirani CRD-08-1375R 2143
35811 7590 11/12/2019
IP GROUP OF DLA PIPER LLP (US)
ONE LIBERTY PLACE
1650 MARKET ST, SUITE 5000
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
EXAMINER
HAMILTON, LALITA M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/12/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto.phil@us.dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte SUNIL G. HIRANI, MAZYAR M. DAR, BENJAMIN LIS JR.,
MARK I. BEESTON, CHRISTOPHER J. CROWLEY,
MARC TEICHMAN, JOE BERARDO, and CLIVE P. DE RUIG

Appeal 2018-006615
Application 11/882,090
Technology Center 3600

BEFORE BIBHU R. MOHANTY, MICHAEL W. KIM, and
NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges.

KIM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10–15, 17–26, 28–46, 49,
50, and 52–57. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “ Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Creditex
Group, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed invention “relates generally to methods and platforms
that provide post-trade affirmation and messaging services.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented affirmation method that improves
throughput and operating efficiency of a downstream computer
processing system, comprising:
assessing transaction details upstream of the downstream
computer processing system, and only transmitting the
transaction details to the downstream computer processing
system if the transaction details are consistent, comprising:
receiving, by an electronic processing platform,
transaction details from a remote first party computing device,
the electronic processing platform positioned upstream and
separate from the downstream computer processing system and
comprising at least one processor, at least one server, and at least
one database, the processor executing an affirmation model
comprised of computer-readable instructions;
generating, by the electronic processing platform, an
electronic communication comprising key details from the
transaction details;
transmitting, by the electronic processing platform, the
electronic communication to a second party computing device;
receiving, by the electronic processing platform from the
second party computing device, one of a second party affirmation
and a second party rejection, the second party affirmation
comprising an indication that the key details are consistent;
updating, by the electronic processing platform, the
electronic communication to reflect one of the second party
affirmation and the second party rejection received from the
second party computing device and transmitting the updated
electronic communication to the remote first party computing
device;
generating, by the electronic processing platform, one or
more trade tickets comprising the transaction details for
transmission to the downstream computer processing system
only if the second party affirmation is received; and
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transmitting, by at least one of the electronic processing
platform, the remote first party computing device and the second
party computing device, the one or more trade tickets to the
downstream computer processing system, said downstream
computer processing system comprising at least one of an
electronic transaction execution and transaction confirmation
system, wherein no transaction details are transmitted to the
downstream computer processing system unless and until the
second party affirmation is received and the one or more trade
tickets are generated based thereon.
REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10–15, 17–26, 28–46, 49,
50, and 52–57 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10–15, 17–26, 28–46, 49,
50, and 52–57 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to ineligible subject matter
in the form of abstract ideas.
OPINION
Indefiniteness Rejections
The Examiner asserted that the claim term “key details,” recited in
independent claims 1, 7, and 17, is “unclear,” because it “is unclear from the
specification what ‘key details’ means as used in the claims.” Non-Final
Act. 4.2
Citing paragraphs 64, 76, 78, 82–84, 88, and 89 of the Specification,
the Appellant argues “the skilled person would understand, that ‘key
details’, when considered in light of the specification and in view of the

2 We refer here to the Non-Final Action mailed Aug. 28, 2017, which is the
last rejection mailed by the Examiner.
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claim limitations as a whole, refers to details needed in a transaction
between two parties.” Appeal Br. 12.
We agree with the Appellant. The Specification describes that in prior
art methods,
the dealer and the buyer then each submit the trade details to a
matching platform such as Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation (DTCC) DERIV/Serv for execution. If the trade
details do not match exactly the DTCC server does not execute
the trade and the trade fails. The parties then have to reenter the
details.
Spec. ¶ 5. The Specification further describes the claimed method
helps ensure that all key economic details of a transaction are
agreed upon by the counterparties to a trade. Preferably, this is
accomplished immediately after the execution of the transaction
between the counterparties – i.e., on the date of the trade. The
platform reduces operational risks by ensuring accurate trade
capture and by providing connectivity to support downstream
processing of transactions outside of the platform.
Id. ¶ 69. We are persuaded that, based on at least the above portions of the
Specification, the ordinary artisan would have understood “key details” to be
those details needed by the matching platform to execute the trade.
The Examiner also asserted that the claim term “upstream,” recited in
every independent claim, is “unclear,” because it “is unclear what
‘upstream’ means with regard to its use in the claims.” Non-Final Act. 4.
The Appellant argues “any skilled artisan would understand that the
platform described in the specification is necessarily upstream from the
systems to which it is delivering trade details.” Appeal Br. 13.
We agree with the Appellant. The Specification describes actions that
take place upstream from the downstream processing of transactions, which
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indicates that upstream is a system that performs actions before the
downstream system operates on the same transaction.
We, thus, do not sustain the rejections under § 112.

Ineligible Subject Matter Rejection
The Appellant argues all claims together as a group. Appeal Br. 13–
26. We select independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
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economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
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concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the
claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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The Examiner asserts that the claims concern “the abstract idea of
allowing parties to affirm trades with their counterparties prior to
processing.” Non-Final Act. 6.
Independent claim 1 recites “receiving . . . transaction details from a
remote first party,” “generating . . . [a] . . . communication comprising key
details from the transaction details,” “transmitting . . . the . . communication
to a second party,” “receiving . . . from the second party . . . , one of a
second party affirmation and a second party rejection, the second party
affirmation comprising an indication that the key details are consistent,”
“updating . . . the . . . communication to reflect one of the second party
affirmation and the second party rejection received from the second
party . . . and transmitting the updated . . . communication to the remote first
party,” and “generating . . . one or more trade tickets comprising the
transaction details . . . only if the second party affirmation is received.”
These are all consistent with the Examiner’s assertion that the claims
concern “allowing parties to affirm trades with their counterparties prior to
processing,” in that these are all steps one would undertake to affirm a trade.
We have no trouble determining that “allowing parties to affirm trades with
their counterparties prior to processing” is one or more of a “fundamental
economic practice,” “[a] commercial or legal interaction,” such as “sales
activities” and “business relations,” as well as “managing . . . interactions
between people.” Final Act. 2–3; Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Independent claim 1, thus, recites at least one of certain methods of
organizing human activity which have been recognized by the courts as
abstract ideas. Id.; see e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the
claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e.,
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the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The claims are squarely about
creating a contractual relationship—a ‘transaction performance guaranty’—
that is beyond question of ancient lineage.”). We, therefore, agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Having concluded the independent claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we
next consider whether the claim “integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of the exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Here, in addition to steps for “allowing parties to affirm trades with
their counterparties prior to processing,” independent claim 1 recites
“additional elements” of a “first party computing device,” “second party
computing device,” “downstream computer processing system,” “electronic
processing platform,” and “electronic communication.” For purposes of this
analysis, the specific content of the data that are communicated within the
claimed method (the “electronic communication” and “trade ticket[]”) is
merely part of “allowing parties to affirm trades with their counterparties
prior to processing,” and thus not an “additional element.” We are
unpersuaded that the above identified additional elements are sufficient to
integrate “allowing parties to affirm trades with their counterparties prior to
processing” into a practical application.
Specifically, the limitations of independent claim 1, whether
considered individually or as a whole, do not purport to improve the
underlying “electronic processing platform,” because, as claimed, we discern
that any computer can be used to execute the claimed method. See
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a). For example,
the Specification describes that the “platform is a connectivity and
messaging platform.” Spec. ¶¶ 56, 73. Connectivity and messaging are
basic functions of any network-connected, general-purpose computer, as is
communicating via “an electronic API, a graphical user interface (GUI), or
an e-mail message.” Spec. ¶ 76. The Appellant essentially admits the
general-purpose nature of the claimed platform, when arguing that the
Examiner erred in referring only to paragraph 77 of the Specification as
describing the general-purpose nature of the platform. Appeal Br. 24
(“patent eligible subject matter may take the form of logic embodied on
otherwise generic computer components”). Rather than directing us to
descriptions of the platform that show it is more than merely a general-
purpose computer, the Appellant asserts the “invention clearly includes an
inventive concept that improves the functioning of conventional computer
systems in this art.” Id.
The Appellant does not argue that the claimed invention in any way
improves the “first party computing device,” “second party computing
device,” or “electronic communication” in general. Rather, the Appellant
argues that by avoiding work on the “downstream computer processing
system,” (essentially by shifting work to the “electronic processing
platform,”) the “downstream computer processing system” is improved,
which we address next.
Specifically, against the backdrop of arguing that the claimed
invention “improves the functioning of conventional computer systems”
(Appeal Br. 24), the Appellant argues the claimed invention includes
“special-purposed and specially-configured computer components that,
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when implemented in the claimed ordered combination, constitute a
differently-configured system that improves throughput and operating
efficiency (i.e., the functioning) of a downstream computer processing
system.” Appeal Br. 15. According to the Appellant, and citing Enfish, LLC
v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) for support, by inserting
the general-purpose “platform,” which communicates with trade parties
before submitting potentially flawed trade information to an execution
system, the platform avoids the execution system needing to be involved in
“notifying the parties of the inconsistencies, rejecting the transaction details,
[or] re-processing the transaction details after the parties re-submit them.”
Id. We view this as essentially shifting the work from one computer to
another, which does not improve the underlying mode of operation of the
execution system, because by merely having less work to do, the system
does not alter the way the “downstream computer processing system”
operates. Id. We are unpersuaded that is any improvement to any computer
recited in independent claim 1.
Indeed, as written, independent claim 1, at best, “improves throughput
and operating efficiency” by using computers. Appeal Br. 15–17. However,
“merely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of
the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.”
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
In addition, independent claim 1 concerns “allowing parties to affirm
trades with their counterparties prior to processing,” described similarly in
the Specification as “post-trade affirmation and messaging services” (Spec.
¶ 2), and as such does not even mention technology, let alone improve it,
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because independent claim 1 merely recites steps for affirming and
communicating messages as part of trade transactions. MPEP § 2106.05(a).
And because the computers are generic, by definition, a particular computer
is not required, indicating that independent claim 1 also does not define or
rely on a “particular machine.” MPEP § 2106.05(b); see also Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Further, the method does not transform matter to a
different state or thing. MPEP § 2106.05(c). Instead, the claim receives,
generates, transmits, receives, and updates data. As such, the method has no
other meaningful limitations (MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and, thus, merely recites
instructions to execute the abstract idea on a computer (MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
Thus, we determine that claim 1 does not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument that the claimed
invention “include features for causing computer components to function in
a manner that is unconventional.” Appeal Br. 17. The “features” are,
according to the Appellant, the portion of the method for “affirmation.”
Appeal Br. 17–18. As we noted above, a general-purpose computer that
receives, generates, transmits, and updates data is performing conventional
functions, because the operations of storing, analyzing, receiving, and
writing data are primitive computer operations found in any computer
system. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d
1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of
the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ discussed below, those
functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special
programming.”).
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Citing DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.
2014), the Appellant argues “the claims are necessarily rooted in computer
technology and they overcome a computer-centric problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks,” and “do not simply apply a
known business practice from the pre-Internet world to computers or the
Internet.” Appeal Br. 18–19.
We disagree with the Appellant. Electronic trading platforms, even
for complex transactions such as “credit derivatives” (Spec. ¶ 4), are not the
only situation where agreement between trading partners is necessary to
complete a trade transaction. Take, for instance, a typical real estate
transaction. Though parties may even verbally agree to a sale (“I’ll buy your
house for your asking price”), a licensed real estate agent involved in the
transaction will know that several “key details” of the transaction must be
agreed upon, in writing, before a closing/escrow agent will be able to
complete the sales transaction at closing. These details may include price,
dates, conditions on the offer or its acceptance such as financing or
inspection results, performance by third parties such as lenders, and so on.
Typically, the agent presents a written offer from the buyer to the seller, who
may agree or change terms. If the terms are changed, the offer must be
further affirmed by the buyer. This process continues until all the “key
details” are memorialized, and then passed to a closing/escrow agent as an
affirmed trade transaction agreement, analogous to the claimed “trade
ticket.”
In this situation, the real estate agent is essentially performing the
functions of the claimed “electronic processing platform,” on behalf of the
claimed “first” and “second” parties, before sending an affirmed agreement
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to the closing/escrow agent, which is analogous to the “downstream
computer processing system.” This process does not require the use of the
Internet, and does not involve shortcomings in, or improvements to, any
computer technology, because it is a basic business process, which has been
in use in our system of commerce for countless years.
Thus, the claimed system which separates this function from the
“downstream computer processing system,” and moves it to a separate
“electronic processing platform,” does not address a problem which only
occurs in computer networks or centered on computers, and does merely
apply a known business practice from the pre-Internet world to computers.
We are also unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument, citing
Diamond v. Diehr, that the claimed invention is patent eligible “because its
components are controlling other technology/components.” Appeal Br. 19–
20. The claims here receive, create, and update data, and transmit data to
other computers. One computer sending data to other computers does not
control “other technology,” unlike the computer in Diehr, which controlled a
rubber-molding machine. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
The Appellant also argues independent claim 1 is subject matter
eligible because of a “lack of preemption.” Appeal Br. 20. “The Supreme
Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the
judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on
preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216).
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We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument that “[s]imilar to the
claims in McRO,3 the Appellant’s claims also define a specific and novel set
of rules that enable processing tasks that previously could not be
performed.” Appeal Br. 21. As explained in our real estate example, not
only could the claimed functions be performed before the claimed method
and systems, they are routinely performed in our system of commerce. In
addition, merely having a new abstract idea (alleged on the basis of the lack
of a pending prior art rejection) does not transform an ineligible abstract idea
into eligible subject matter. Even unconventional abstract ideas are still
unpatentable. . “What is needed is an inventive concept in the non-abstract
application realm.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
We are not persuaded, as the Appellant asserts, that the claims are
patent eligible “because the claims include an ordered combination of
elements that, when taken as a whole, improve upon prior art processes, and
also provide a benefit to end users, as did the eligible claims in Bascom.”
Appeal Br. 22.
In BASCOM v. Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he inventive
concept described and claimed . . . is the installation of a filtering tool at a
specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering
features specific to each end user.” Id. at 1350. The court explained that the
remote location of a filtering tool having customizable user-specific filtering
features provides the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local

3 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server, which is a technical
improvement over prior art ways of filtering content. Id. at 1350–51. Here,
the Appellant has not demonstrated any particular arrangement in the claim
as providing an inventive concept parallel to BASCOM in claiming a
technology-based solution, because the claim merely implements a well-
known business process on a general-purpose computer.
We have considered the Appellant’s other arguments, directed to
alleged shortcomings in the Examiner’s analysis of the claimed invention,
and determine that they are unpersuasive in light of the above analysis.
Appeal Br. 23–28.
The Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims as directed to ineligible subject matter in the form of
abstract ideas. For this reason, we sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is
reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis 
Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 5, 7,
10–15, 17–26,
28–46, 49, 50,
52–57
112, second
paragraph
Indefiniteness   1, 2, 4, 5, 7,
10–15, 17–26,
28–46, 49, 50,
52–57
1, 2, 4, 5, 7,
10–15, 17–26,
101 Eligibility  1, 2, 4, 5, 7,
10–15, 17–26,

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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis 
Affirmed Reversed
28–46, 49, 50,
52–57
28–46, 49, 50,
52–57
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4, 5, 7,
10–15, 17–26,
28–46, 49, 50,
52–57

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED