Hickory Farms

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 8, 1974

209 N.L.R.B. 502 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Cheese Barn, Inc. d/b/a Hickory Farms and
Local 1105, Retail Clerks International Associa-
tion , AFL-CIO. Case 19-CA-6519
March 8, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On November 30, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
E. Don Wilson issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions' and
brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing in this matter was held
before me in Seattle , Washington, on September 25 and 26,
1973. All parties fully participated. General Counsel and
Respondent filed excellent briefs on October 27, 1973,
which have been fully considered.
Upon the entire record 1 in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. RESPONDENT 'S BUSINESS
At all times material, Respondent has maintained a place
of business at Northgate Shopping Center, Seattle, Wash-
ington , and has maintained other places of business in
Washington where it has regularly engaged in the sale and
distribution of cheese and specialty items . During the past
year, in its regular business operations , it has sold and
distributed at its stores in Washington products valued in
excess of $500,000 and has purchased goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000, from sources located outside
Washington. At all material times , it has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, The Cheese Barn,
Inc. d/b/a Hickory Farms, Seattle, Washington, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in said recommended Order.
I These exceptions were limited to the Administrative Law Judge's
recommending a bargaining order to remedy the unfair labor practices
found by the Administrative Law Judge, and to his characterization of the
demeanor and motives of Respondent 's witnesses in testifying before him
We find no merit to either exception
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
E. DON WILSON, Administrative Law Judge: Based upon
a charge filed July 3, 1973, and amended August 31, 1973,
by Local 1105, Retail Clerks International Association,
AFL-CIO, herein the Union, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board, herein the Board, issued
a complaint and notice of hearing on August 31, 1973,
alleging that The Cheese Barn, Inc., d/b/a Hickory Farms,
herein Respondent, by various acts violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein the
Act.
i General Counsel's unopposed motion to correct the transcript is
granted
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The issues before me include: (1) Is an appropriate unit
herein one which includes all the employees of one of
several stores of Respondent located in one county in
Washington? (2) Has Respondent unlawfully refused to
bargain with the Union since June 29, 1973?2 (3) Did
Respondent's agents unlawfully keep a union meeting
under "surveillance" on June 5? (4) On June 5, did
Respondent's agents unlawfully instruct employees not to
sign union cards for the Union? (5) On or about June 8, did
Respondent unlawfully grant a 10-cent-an-hour across-the-
board wage increase to its employees? (6) On June 30, did
Respondent unlawfully reduce the working hours of
Donna Edgar? (Gamache was her married name when she
testified. She will be referred to as Edgar herein to accord
with the bulk of the record. (7) On or about June 30, did
Respondent unlawfully discharge Edgar? After her dis-
charge did Respondent make a full and complete and
proper offer of reinstatement to Edgar? (8) Were Respon-
dent's unfair labor practices of such a nature as would
require the Board to issue a bargaining order as part of a
proper remedy?
B. The Facts
Counsel admirably stipulated to many facts herein,
thereby saving time , effort, and much money. While the
following statement is most unusual, I feel it is much in
2 Hereinafter all dates are 1973 unless otherwise stated
209 NLRB No. 85
HICKORY FARMS 503
order. The trial of this case was handled by the attorneys
for both sides in a most admirable fashion. Their courtesy
to each other and to me for long hours of each day was
most outstanding. Their trained and exceptional legal
ability was admirably used and never wasted. Each wanted
to win and knew he might lose. Each submitted a brief
which displays a high degree of legal acumen and skillful
draughtsmanship. These facts, known to me, should not be
concealed from others. Their conduct was exemplary. I am
certain this statement will be slight solace to the loser, who
labored as earnestly and honorably as did the winner.
1. Alleged surveillance
The union campaign began in late May. Respondent was
aware of it by or before June 1. At Respondent's Northgate
store there were 11 employees and 3 supervisors within the
meaning of the Act: Esther Sample, Louise West, and
Marge Olson. Union Representative Claude Liday testified
he went to the Northgate store on May 29, speaking there
to West and employee Donna Edgar. He testified West
told him she was either an acting or assistant manager.
According to him, he told her he didn't know whether
she'd "be eligible." He admitted telling her it was possible
that only the manager would be excluded, he didn't know.3
Such a conversation would be novel to West and would
likely remain in her memory. While I do not credit all of
her testimony, I credit her testimony as to this conversation
with Liday. Liday told her he was a union official. She
replied she didn't know what it was all about. During the
conversation, she told Liday he shouldn't be talking to her
because she "was management." Liday replied there was
only one manager and she'd be considered by the Union as
a "head clerk," or "working supervisor." He thereafter
spoke to Edgar for some time to the knowledge of West.
Shortly thereafter, a notice4 of the Union was made public
in the store. It read:
Meeting, Tuesday, June 5, 9:45 p.m. Doubletree Inn,
Dogwood Room to discuss the Union. Very important
for all employees to attend. Pass the word on.
West saw the notice in the store. Based on Liday's
statement to her, she, in her innocent ignorance of labor
law, had every reason and right to attend the meeting as
would be true of Olson, her subordinate. I find Liday told
West, even if he was innocently wrong, that only the
manager, Sample, would be excluded from the Union.
There was no secrecy about the fact that there would be a
union meeting on June 5. Pursuant to the union notice,
West and Olson attended the June 5 meeting which was
also attended by employees from other stores as well as
mole than several from Northgate. The positions of West
and Olson were known to the Northgate and probably
other employees. Liday saw West and no doubt Olson
present. No one asked them to leave the meeting. They had
no reason to believe they were not welcome guests. Liday
made it plain to those in attendance that there was coffee
present to dunk, if desired. West was not ruled out.
Obviously, the union meeting was under the "surveil-
lance" of West and Olson. They were there. And without
protest from anyone after Liday, again perhaps innocently
wrong, had advised Supervisor Olson's supervisor, West,
that the Union would consider her only as a head clerk and
inferred that only the manager (Sample) would be
ineligible for the Union. I have not the slightest doubt that
the presence of these supervisors, West and Olson, had an
inhibitory effect upon the free exercise by the employees
present of their Section 7 rights. That's what surveillance
does. But West and Olson had every good reason to believe
they were invitees of the Union and, although their
presence was obvious, no employee or union representative
even suggested or indicated that they depart. In fact, they
were supervisors within the meaning of the Act and
especially the Northgate employees knew they were
"bosses," even if they did not know the refinements of the
Act. General Counsel cites a variety of cases which he
claims establish the unlawfulness of this "surveillance."
Some, especially in words, lend some but little support to
his position. He states Olson received no invitation.
Although not gold-plated, I find the announcement of the
meeting was a public invitation not only to "employees"
but in the circumstances of this case to West and, of
course, her subordinate, Olson. I know Sample knew they
were going to attend the union meeting, but they were not
directed so to do, especially as spies of any kind. I know
they reported to Sample as to what occurred at the
meeting. But I find no more than innocent conversation,
not a "report" on successful spying activities. That Sample
passed their information along to Respondent's president,
Derby, is a fact having no relevance to their open and
innocent attendance at a meeting to which they reasonably
assumed they were invited .5 There is no evidence their
attendance was surreptitious, nor that they exercised guile,
nor that they made any effort to conceal their status with
Respondent. Liday certainly was substantially aware of
West's status. Any employee present could easily have
completely briefed any union representative as to the
positions of West and Olson. Had such occurred without
the knowledge of West or Olson, there is no evidence that
both would not readily have left by request with no
disturbance of any kind. In the circumstances here present,
I find no substantial evidence that Respondent, through
West or Olson, engaged in "surveillance" as that term is
used by the Board. The Union bears a substantial
responsibility for their presence. I have no doubt that their
mere presence tended to inhibit exercise by employees of
rights guaranteed to them by the Act. But, in the peculiar
circumstances of this case, I find no "surveillance." The
"invitation" plus no objection to their presence by
employees or union agents cannot be ignored. I find no
justification for a finding that employees would have in
any manner been offended or disturbed in any manner had
West and Olson been asked to leave. Whatever the Union's
intent may have been in draughting the notice of this
meeting, especially in light of Liday's statements to West
and the tacit acceptance of their presence at the meeting,
3 There is no doubt he spoke to many persons about the Union 1 am i Resp Exh 5
certain he could not possibly recall the contents of each such conversation 5 No protest from anyone about their attendance
504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
there was ample justification for West and Olson believing
they were present at the meeting as guests of the Union .6
Their subsequent activities with respect to Sample and
what the latter may have reported to President Derby does
not change their presence, as not unwelcomed guests at the
union meeting. That they surveyed is obvious. There was
no "surveillance" violative of the Act.
2. Did West and Olson unlawfully instruct
employees not to sign union authorization cards at
the June 5 union meeting?
After distributing union authorization cards for the
employees to sign at the meeting, the union agents left the
meeting for a while so that the employees could discuss this
matter among themselves. I have noted that, though there
was no illegal surveillance of the meeting by West or
Olson, their presence would tend to inhibit union activities
by the employees. The fact is that certainly either West or
Olson told the employees not to sign up with the Union
until they heard Derby's side of the question. I find both of
them so advised the employees. Mrs. West so admitted.
Such advice having been given, no employee signed a card.
Apparently, the employees said very little, if anything.
I credit the testimony of Pamelo Colasurdo. Her
demeanor impressed me most favorably. Her testimony
was straightforward with no hint of animosity against
Respondent or its agent, Olson. On the night of June 5 in
Respondent's parking lot, in Colasurdo's car, Olson told
her and two other Northgate employees not to sign
anything because Olson's dad had been involved with
unions and had really gotten messed up. Olson told them,
then, to sign nothing. This was very shortly before the start
of the June 5 meeting. On this occasion, Olson did not even
mention hearing Derby's side
Again to West's and Olson's instructions at the June 5
meeting . While 10 or more employees were in attendance
at the meeting, not one signed a union card after West and
Olson spoke.? Indeed, the record as a whole reveals to me
that not one employee even opened his or her mouth in
favor of the Unions The employees knew that West and
Olson were their bosses even though they may not have
known them to be "supervisors within the meaning of the
Act." Whatever West or Olson may have thought, they were
such supervisors and they knew they were the employees'
bosses who regularly, day in and day out, told their
employees what to do and what not to do. They had every
reason to believe, as happened, that the employees would
follow their instructions even at a union meeting. I find it
was unlawful for either West or Olson or both of them as a
management team to direct, instruct, advise, or suggest to
the employees not to sign a union card until they heard
from President Derby .9 While they may not have been
engaging in unlawful "surveillance," they certainly, as
Respondent's agents, unlawfully interfered with the em-
ployees' rights at the June 5 meeting. I find Olson similarly
violated the Act when she instructed the three employees in
6 At another union meeting on June 25, the union agents in their notice
of the meeting made it especially clear that neither supervisors nor
management were welcome to attend Resp Exh 6
7 The employees obviously had some interest in the meeting Otherwise
they would not have traveled to it at 10 p in after working hours
the car shortly before the meeting. Their instructions not
only constituted interference but also coercion, as well as
restraint , within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. I
am not concerned that their motivation may have been
purer than Ivory Snow or an ecologist's dearest dream.
They were bosses talking to their employees on matters of
no concern of Respondent and its agents. They should not
have trod upon the union affairs of the employees. That
union activity continued after their statements at the June
5 meeting is amazing . I find West and Small at the June 5
meeting by their statements to employees violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act and so did Olson when she spoke to three
employees shortly before the meeting.
3. After the union meeting and about June 10,
did Respondent unlawfully grant a 10 cent-an-hour
across the board increase to its employees?
I have found Respondent's president, Derby, was aware
of union activity at Respondent's various stores shortly
before June 1. He had much more knowledge as of June 5.
Here N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405
(1964), controls. The credited evidence demonstrates that
Respondent granted a 10-cent raise on or about June 8 for
the purpose of undermining the Union. Employees were
given "carrots," in the form of pay raises, so they would
not choose union representation . The employees involved
herein were in a low-pay category and 10 cents an hour was
not without genuine significance and momeni to them. We
must not ignore the timing-shortly after June 1 to June
5-on or about June 8, 10, and 11, and 14.
Only the president, Rodger C. Derby, testified as to
when he came to an undisclosed, to others, decision to give
this raise . I most closely observed him. He appeared to be
an intelligent , hard-working businessman . I find that when
he testified he was much more influenced by stating what
he thought would help his side of this case rather than in
merely telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth. If the truth hurt his case, in his opinion, he
concealed it. If an untruth helped his case, in his opinion,
he stated it.io
Various employees testified about the speech given by
Derby when he announced the raise. While they knew of
this, they generally testified they just couldn't understand
what else he talked about. I could share their predicament
during parts of his testimony. Careful reading and
rereading has brought about an understanding by me even
though some of the inconsistencies in many parts of his
testimony continue to be and are the occasion of some
bewilderment.
Derby's letter of June 1 which was brought to the
attention of all employees was written in anticipation of
the Union's June 5 meeting. He received reports on the
8 The inhibiting effect of West's and Olson's presence and remarks.
9 While they had reason to believe they were invitees, they had no reason
to believe they could speak as to such activity.
is 1 am certain his eminent counsel was in no way a conscious party to
such deception as Derby tried to practice.
HICKORY FARMS
meeting from at least several persons including Sample,
West, and Olson and at least one employee. it
Derby then called an employee meeting where breakfast
was served to the employees on June 14. All hourly
employees of Respondent's four stores in King County
were invited.12 His recitation of what he said to the
employees is not very coherent, but he probably spoke at
some length. Among many matters, he discussed possible
increases in minimum wages by Congress and a speech by
President Nixon about freezes or a possible speech, and a
magazine article or two, he testified. There follows an
example of his response to a simple question on direct
examination:
Q. Was there any discussion at that meeting of the
wage freeze?13
A. Yes, I may have touched on it. I thought I did,
that the, it really was not elaborated on to any great
extent. At most I was attempting to say that my
concern with the minimum wage hour would have a
direct result depending on the freeze and what the
President might do.
We have only Derby's testimony as evidence of when he
decided to give the employees a raise. Such testimony was
obviously self-serving. He testified it "was decided back at
the first of the year. As to the exact date, it was decided the
first of June,14 probably about the 10th or 11th of June,15
but the plan for it initiated in my mind in January." As of
just prior to June 14, he allegedly "was trying to find out
what else was happening in the economy." 16 He discussed
this with the employees on June 14. He began to examine
Respondent's "slow decline" more closely on June 1.
I credit entirely the testimony to the effect that the June
14 meeting was called so that the employees could learn
how Derby "felt about the Union" and so that Derby
could "give his side of the Union." 17 He testified that
knowing of the union activity and that it had held a
meeting he felt he had a right to talk to the employees
about the Company and their employment.is
I am, admittedly, a bit confused about his claim that he
was motivated simultaneously by a possible increase in the
minimum wage and a wage freeze, but such is really of no
great moment. He certainly did not appear to have any
expertise with respect to either subject. He testified he had
to reduce labor costs. Yet he granted an across-the-board
raise. He testified that he decided to give the raise because
of the expected wage freeze, but President Nixon did not
speak on this subject until June 13. "Across-the-board"
wage increases were not customary in Respondent's
operations. The raise announcement was made at the first
"breakfast meeting" in 3 years.
Derby's plan to increase wages, if he had one before June
14, was never revealed to the employees prior to its fait
accompli announcement.
11 He expected Sample to keep abreast of employee activities at the
Northgate store where there were only I I employees during these critical
times
12 The Union was attempting to organize each Breakfast meetings were
not a common event.
13 A "yes" or "no" or "I don't remeber" would have been a simple
answer.
11 When he first learned of union activity.
505
The timing of this wage increase and all the circum-
stances surrounding it, including the circumlocution of
Derby, make it manifestly clear to me that the June 14
announcement of a raise and its effectuation as of June 8
were violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Derby, by
announcing and effectuating the raises seriously and
gravely tended to undermine the strength and appeal of the
Union in the eyes of the employees. Any reviewing body
will note in going over Derby's testimony that he
volunteered much, spoke of two or more things at a time,
did not always give direct answers to simple, pointed
questions calling for simple answers and appeared, in
many instances, to have been intentionally evasive. I am
convinced he tried by intentional loquacity to conceal all
the truth as he knew it, solely to strengthen his case in his
mind. I do not believe, based upon the entire record, that
he had any intention or plan or had arrived at any decision
to give his employees a raise, until he learned that the
Union was attempting to organize the employees. His mere
say so to the contrary is not credited. I find the raise was
announced and given in an unsuccessful attempt to
prevent successful employee organization by the Union.
Such action by the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. The raise is not to be withdrawn from the
employees by Respondent. Respondent's able counsel in
his excellent brief states, "The specific timing of the wage
increase in question was not decided until approximately
June 10 or 11." Even then, it was a well-kept secret from
the employees. If Derby had a plan for a raise in January
or before late May, it was at best ephemeral and lacking in
substance of any kind. I in no way credit the testimony of
Derby that the wage increase was not "tied" to the
appearance of the Union. The timing of his action and his
labored concocted explanations of his actions belie his
claim of innocent and mere coincidence. The employees
did not understand what Derby was talking about other
than the raise announcement and his self-serving statement
that in spite of stick and carrot that it was their
"prerogative" to act as they pleased about the Union.
Having heard Derby and having observed him, I am
convinced the Derby, who I find was very intelligent, knew
what he was saying to the employees and knew what he
was testifying. Before the employees and before me, he was
obfuscating, excepting when he announced the raise and
spoke of "prerogatives." I find no probative and substantial
evidence that Derby decided upon the pay raise before he
was well aware of the Union's activities. I am sure he
thought, in substance, that as an apple a day keeps the
doctor away, so would the raise keep the Union away.
Derby was in no "dilemma" when he announced the raise.
I find his "plan" of January, or before June 10 or 11, was
lacking in probative substance. The organizational efforts
by the Union were stark realities to Derby when he
15 After he knew the details of the first union meeting.
1 "Business Week." etc.
17 At the meeting, Derby told the employees it was their "prerogative" to
act as they chose about the Union. The carrot extended at this meeting and
the stick used at the June 5 union meeting and the unlawful discharge of
Donna Edgar, which I shall find, make these mere "weasel" words
1s And to announce a raise as of June 8.
506 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
announced the raise, as a benevolent gift from on high, to
his employees.19 They had no prior advice of such
beneficence. The announcement had the natural tendency
to diminish union enthusiasm on the part of the employees.
The announcement and the granting of the raise were
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The reduction of the working hours of Donna
Edgar and her discharge
Edgar impressed me as a most honest and forthright
witness, and I credit her testimony. Sample, West, and
Olson impressed me as pleasant, nice ladies who unfortu-
nately felt obliged to testify in such fashion as would aid
Respondent's case rather than to tell only the unblemished
truth. Some of their gross exaggerations were obvious. I
credit none of their testimony where it materially conflicts
with that of Edgar 2° I also shall find that the alleged
reasons, given partly in combination, by Derby, Sample,
West, and Olson for reducing Edgar's hours and for
discharging her were pretextual, especially in light of
Edgar's seniority, her many admittedly good working
assets, her ready availability for work, and most especially
in light of the timing of Respondent's action with respect to
her.
With a rank-and-file group of employees, but "employ-
ees with at least" four supervisors.21 including Derby, this
was obviously a "small shop" as the Board uses the term. I
am convinced that everyone in the shop, employees and
supervisors, were aware, on a daily basis, of even trivial
activities of each other. I am convinced each supervisor
was well and fully aware of Edgar's union activities when
her hours of work were drastically reduced and she was
terminated after making normal and respectful comments
about such reduction.22
I accept it as a fact that Respondent had good economic
reasons for reducing manhours of work at Northgate for
the week of July 7.23
Edgar was a relatively highly paid employee when her
hours were reduced on June 30, at $2.10 an hour. Indeed,
she was one of the highest paid employees at Respondent's
four stores in King County. When she was discharged, only
employees with much less seniority and wage scales were
let go. The exhibits do not reveal that when Edgar was
discharged, and when her hours were reduced, a full-time
management-trainee was taken aboard at Northgate. I
agree with General Counsel that comparisons of Respon-
dent's treatment of Edgar with that of its treatment of
employees at other stores are odious to Respondent, but I
find no need to elaborate on the subject. The records reveal
that, at Northgate, 160 of the total working hours of 270 in
July were covered by salaried people in the first week of
July, although at the Southgate store salaried employees
worked only 120 of the total of 360, in the first week in
July.
Originally, Edgar's hours were to be reduced 44 percent
for the first week in July, while the hours of employees with
less seniority were to be increased and one was to have no
change. The reduction next to that of Edgar's was to be
only 20 percent. Cathy Peterson, who regularly worked
substantially the same number of hours as Edgar, had her
work hours increased.24
Sample gave two reasons for Edgar's discharge: her
complaint about the reduction in hours and her alleged
refusal to work them.25 Sample also testified West told her
Edgar was "slow."26 Sample testified she knew Edgar was
"Slow." 27 "We had tried to encourage her in many ways to
no avail." "She had always been slow." 28 "From the time
she started to work." "I would say [Edgar] could be a good
worker. " She was a "good worker," "aside from being slow. "
Sample complimented Edgar on occasions "for a job well
done." Sample tried never to find fault with Edgar in the
presence of someone else. In more than 1 1/2 years,
Sample found fault with Edgar's work, according to
Sample, " several times." She couldn't say how often in the
last 6 months of Edgar's employment. When asked by me
to state in what way Edgar was "slow," was it in walking, in
the use of her fingers, or in her observations, Sample swore
Edgar was slow in "every movement." Sample could not
recall if Edgar was slow when first employed. Sample could
not recall if Edgar was "slow" in the first month of her
employment. "Generally speaking," swore Sample, Edgar
was "slow" throughout the whole course of her employment. I
asked Sample why she did not terminate Edgar long before
June 30 because of her "physical slowness" as compared
with the other employees she had. Sample's reply was,
"Your Honor, I felt that she worked sufficiently at the time
that I employed her and she started to give her employ-
ment "29 I again asked Sample why she didn't fire Edgar,
who allegedly was always "physically slow," long prior to
June 30. She then replied she didn't fire Edgar because she
was physically slow. She testified she allegedly fired her
because she said, "I cannot live on 19 hours," and said she
didn't think the reduction was "fair." Allegedly she told
Edgar "we had been carrying [Edgar] for a long time." i0
Sample then testified she wouldn't say the fact that Edgar
said she couldn't live on 19 hours' work a week, was the
reason she fired Edgar. She testified she asked Edgar to
come in on Monday and talk and Edgar refused and then
Sample fired Edgar. I specifically do not credit this
testimony. I find this was, at best, a figment of Sample's
imagination, in an effort to justify what I will find was an
illegal discharge by Respondent. Sample then, after all her
testimony about Edgar's "slowness," testified she didn't
fire Edgar because she was "slow," but because "she would
not work the hours scheduled" and "because she said she
19 Derby simultaneously complained of the alleged dire economic slump
he was in during and poor to June
20 Which was given a variety of corroboration
21 1 make no finding with respect to the legal status of Cathy Peterson.
22 West and Olson saw her at the June 5 union meeting
23 But not for selecting Edgar for a most drastic cut and discharge
24 I am not slightly impressed by "titles" allegedly assigned Peterson
25 There is no truth to the latter.
26 Edgar worked for Respondent over 1-1/2 years and averaged about 33
hours per week in the last 6 months of her employment . Only Peterson
averaged a trifle more time a week.
27 This alleged "slowness" wat first brought up at this trial, obviously as
an alleged reason for the cut in hours and termination.
28 Almost "three years"?
29 I'm still waiting for an answer to a simple question.
30 Edgar's alleged statements seem most innocuous and straightforward
and to be a normal reaction
HICKORY FARMS
couldn't live on 19 hours a week." She then testified
Edgar's hours were cut because of "efficiency and
productivity." What "did it," swore Sample, was that
Edgar said she could not live with 19 hours' work.31 She
testified every employee was faster than Edgar, probably. "32
She testified she would not "define" that Edgar was slow
with her fingers, "to that degree." I asked her what she
visualized, saw, observed that indicated to her that "Edgar
was physically slow." The answer was, "Well, I can give a
girl, I can give two girls tasks, the same thing, on alternate
days."33 She swore this was the means of her comparison.
"One could have done it in an hour, the other would take
an hour and a half, two hours. This is what I mean." I
pointed out that one who did the job in an hour could do a
poor job and one who took longer could do ajob of beauty
and perfection. She replied, "they would both have to be
efficient jobs to have a fair comparison." She compared
Edgar with no person in particular. No regular employee in
a year and a half was as "slow" as Edgar. She said she
would have to "look over the records" to see if there were
an employee faster than Edgar. She talked to Edgar about
her lateness "in getting on the floor."34 Edgar then ceased
being late. Edgar was "generally cooperative." She had "no
trouble with customers." She had no trouble with fellow
employees. She was "respectful." She was available for
work,35 and she was pleasant, and she got along with
people.36 The slowness was bad,37 so when cuts come these
are things that stand out in your mind. Donna Edgar
worked with direction, slowly, but worked with it. "At
Christmas she was valuable because there's never without
customers." Sample complimented Edgar in keeping "Gift
Pack" records. Sample testified Edgar talked to her
boyfriend, mother, and others during working time more
than other employees. Considering the entire record, I find
this to be untrue, even though corroborated by some other
witnesses. Sample swore Edgar let other employees carry
her load. The credited testimony establishes Edgar per-
formed her job most creditably at all material times.
Sample said she spoke to Edgar about letting other
employees carry her load and Edgar "responded favora-
bly," at least "for a period." She found Edgar responded
favorably to West, "but it was very easy to lapse back into
the old."38 Sample testified she attempted "to keep on top
of things at the store, what's going on with [Sample's]
employees."39 Sample or West or Olson or Peterson was
always on the "floor" 40 with the employees. On June 26th,
33 Sample never asked Peterson if she could live on 19 hours
32 Edgar, in the courtroom , throughout long hours of trial , appeared to
me to be physically normal and active in every way
33 An answer?
34 Working
35 She lived very near the Northgate store
36 All as testified by Sample.
37 For over I 1 /2 years9
38 The last three words of 1 1, p 449, should be spelled "facdls decensus
averno "
36 Edgar signed up a majority of the employees at a union meeting in her
home 2 days before Sample says she fired Edgar and Edgar signed up the
seventh employee, at work, I day before Sample claims to have fired her
Peterson, "head clerk," or what have you, knew of the June 28 meeting at
Edgar's home , but did not attend
40 Work area
41 From the time Derby first learned of union organizing, I am
convinced not only that each supervisor had a great interest in the
507
Sample, to the extent possible, had each employee in her
office and discussed a letter from the Union with each such
employee.41 She told each employee that Derby wanted
her to advise the employee about the union letter.42
According to West, Sample told her to use her own
judgment about attending the June 5 union meeting. After
the meeting she discussed it with Sample when Sample
phoned her long distance from Yakima.43 She told Sample
who attended the meeting, including Edgar. West prepared
the schedules for each workweek. She was not told by
Sample, until after she had made out the original schedule
for the first week in July, to prepare a new one which
would provide for dismissals of new hires and those with
very short hours per week and a drastic reduction for
Edgar.44 This was between 4 and 5 p.m. West testified that
the reduction in hours for Edgar from 33 to 19 wasjointly
decided upon by Sample and West. She immediately
testified she couldn't remember who made the decision and
it "wasjust the way it worked out." Peterson was left at her
usual hours because she was "head clerk" and had
senionty.45 Edgar told West she could not work 19 hours
and West referred her to Sample. West testified she worked
with Edgar throughout the latter's employment. She didn't
remember when she started to discuss Edgar's work with
Sample. She swore that in the fall of 1972, in the Christmas
rush, and in January, Edgar failed to greet customers as
they arrived and was "slow" to get to the customer.46 Then
West couldn't remember the year. It might have been 1971.
Sample complimented Edgar for her Christmas packing
work in 1972. West testified she asked Sample to speak to
Edgar about her work and Edgar improved "for a time."47
West "talked" to Edgar about talking "on the floor when
there were customers" West testified. She didn' t "remem-
ber" any such time in 1973. The two particular faults West
found with Edgar were failure to greet customers and she
talked too much to noncustomers 48 Also she never got
around to keeping up the candy section which was part of
her assigned job. Then West referred to Edgar's alleged
"slowness." I inquired what kind of slowness , suggesting
arthritic, to which West replied no. She gave the same
answer when I inquired if the "slowness" were due to
"palsy," or mental retardation. To the latter, West replied
Edgar "was a very likeable girl, and I liked her." Edgar, she
added, got along well with her fellow employees and with
West. She "listened" when West spoke to her. Or told her
to "perk up." Edgar would try and cooperate and as far as
organizing, but also that each employee regularly engaged in conversations
about the Union, at least pro and con Should the latter not be a fact it
would be contrary to human nature
42 Such private conversations took place even though there was a
bulletin board where the letter could have been posted and each employee
could readily have perused it Sample must have consumed a lot of valuable
worktime when the economy of the business was allegedly very poor
43 No evidence that anything else was discussed.
44 This was the Saturday Sample says she fired Edgar In fact, Edgar was
not fired until the following Monday when she reported to work for her
reduced number of hours
45 She and Edgar worked substantially the same number of hours There
is little evidence as to Peterson 's capabilities as compared with Edgar
46 According to Sample, as I understood her, Edgar got along well with
customers
47 Days, weeks , months9
48 What about "physical slowness"?
508 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
West was concerned she "was just as good as she could
possibly be."
West thought it might have been the second week in June
that she learned of the June 8 pay raise.
During Edgar's employment, West recommended Edgar
for pay raises , "perhaps" a couple of times. She testified
she recommended Edgar's discharge from her job "about a
year and a half ago," but it was not followed.49 She did not
remember whether she ever again recommended Edgar's
discharge. West worked with Edgar more than did Sample
and testified Edgar "and I had a good relationship. When
we worked on the floor we got along. I mean, if something
bothered me about her work, I would come up and tell her
and she'd smile and attempt to cooperate. She got along
well with her fellow employees and with the customers and
when she did herjob she did it to the best of her ability." It
was well done. All this, from the assistant manager. As, an
employee, I find Edgar was like a pearl of great price. I
utterly and completely reject as abject falsehoods the
testimony about her "physical slowness." I am convinced
from the whole record that she spent no more time
speaking to noncustomers than any other employee. I find
she was a crackerjack who until she held the union meeting
at her home on June 28, and obtained a union majority,
was treated on the same basis as Peterson. I have no reason
to find that her work was not at least equally as good as
Peterson's. Peterson's "title" of "head clerk" was, I find,
bestowed for the purposes of this trial. West later
remembered that it was Christmas of 1970 when Edgar's
work wasn't very good. She did not reduce the working
hours of Edgar until 2 days after Edgar's union meeting,
and then at Sample's direction. After the reduction in
hours at the end of June, there were six "employees" and
four "supervisors." She guessed that in this "small shop,"
as assistant manager, she was a sort of "house mother" or
"den mother." 50 She testified, "I think I know what' s going
on in my store." I find she did, and was well aware of what
happened at Edgar's home on June 28 and what Edgar did
in the store on June 29 5i
Edgar was not the only employee to whom West spoke
about unsatisfactory work. West was "very outspoken."
She corrected employees even "on the floor." She was sure
employee Aletta didn't know about the Union, because she
wasn't at the June 5 meeting.52 In a pretrial affidavit to the
Board, she swore, "I believed that Donna [Edgar] favored
the Union from impressions because the union official
[Liday] spent about a half hour talking to her while I was
waiting on customers."53 The affidavit was given in the
presence of Respondent's attorney. In the past, cuts in
hours were based on seniority and performance. I find
Edgar's performance, based on the whole record, was
excellent.
49 Recommendation of assistant manager of a small store
50 I have no doubt that the essential details of the June 28 union meeting
at Edgar's house came to her attention
51 The same for Sample , Olson, and Derby
52 Of course , Edgar was
53 When Liday first entered the store.
54 I still find no illegal "surveillance" in the circumstances of this case
55 They wore out this poor record
56 I've made my finding on that
Olson testified Sample "encouraged" her to attend the
June 5 union meeting.54
West never discussed with Olson any reduction in the
working hours of Edgar, or that she was going to be
terminated. Edgar was "a good employee when she
worked," but she was "a slow employee." 55 Olson said
Edgar spent a lot of time talking to friends .56 She falsely
stated other employees did not do as much such talking.
She falsely testified-Edgar was "slow" throughout 1972 and
slow through 1973 until she was terminated. "She did work
when she was working, if there was incentive there." She
falsely stated Edgar was "just a slower worker than a lot of
other people." 57 "[Edgar] was good when she did work."
She was a "slow" worker, testified Olson, during January,
February, March, and April 1973.58 Olson never recom-
mended a reduction in hours for Edgar or her discharge.
The only time Sample mentioned Edgar's talking in the
store was January or February 1973. Sample never found
fault with Edgar in Olson's presence. She didn't know
specifics but she was sure Sample and West had compli-
mented Edgar. She did not know whether West had ever
corrected Edgar when she was not doing what she was
supposed to do, in January, February, March, or April
1973. Early in 1973, she found fault with Edgar for talking
to her boyfriend excessively. Again, Edgar was "physically
slow." "She was slow, it took her longer to go through a
cheese case, wrap the cheese , this type of thing."59 "She
was a good worker in that she was available when we
needed her, did know the routine of the store, and did
know her job." Obviously, despite the exaggerated fabrica-
tions of Sample, West, and Olson, Edgar was a most
desirable employee . She did not make mistakes . She was
not deformed so as to account for slowness . I asked many
questions in a vain attempt to find out from Olson in what
way Edgar was "slow" or an undesirable employee. She
was a "slow wrapper ." "Basically she is just a slower
person." Olson didn't know if she had ever reprimanded
Edgar for being "slow." She did not recall any specific
reprimand by West, but "she probably did." She had no
recollection of a similar reprimand by Sample 60 Olson
thought it was in the "springtime," Edgar was reprimanded
for speaking too long to her boyfriend on the floor. Sample
complimented Edgar for doing a good job on gift packs
and on their records at a sales meeting in June , around
Father's Day6i She only thought West had reprimanded
Edgar. West told people when they were doing wrong,
including Olson. Olson agreed she herself had "been a
good , hard working, conscientious , dedicated loving
employee during these many years." She had been praised,
complimented, and promoted, but West found fault with
her because she did not like Olson's coat. West probably
reprimanded her 62 Sample found fault with Olson on
51 Who?
58 Why were her hours not reduced or why was she not then fired')
59 "Haste makes waste ." Maybe Edgar did a perfectjob throughout her
long period of employment
so It is almost ludicrous to conceive of a "physically slow" Edgar never
being found fault with or encouraged to speed up in over 1 -1/2 years
81 Obviously not long before the drastic cut and discharge.
sz Sounds fantastic to me.
HICKORY FARMS 509
several occasions, but Olson agreed she hadn't done
anything wrong.
It is inconceivable to me that Respondent fired Edgar
because she said she couldn't "live on 19 hours a week,"
immediately after, with no warning of any kind, she found
her usual hours of 33 a week were suddenly cut to 19. I find
she was in every way an employee much to be desired,
especially when her ready availability for work and her
overall dependability and good personality are considered.
I find it contrary to the truth that at such time she stated
she "refused" to work 19 hours per week.
When Edgar was discharged she was told it was because
she "was not doing her job," which the entire record
reveals was contrary to fact. No one had ever found
substantial fault with her or her work. When discharged,
she asked why they had "waited three years." She was
given no particulars about any alleged shortcoming. There
had been no complaints about her work. When she stated
she could not work on 19 hours, she did not believe she was
then terminated, but, rather believed she was to work and
was ready to work the 19 hours she was still listed to work
on the schedule during the following week. She did not
learn her name had been taken off the schedule until a
fellow employee told her on the next day, Sunday. Even
after such advice, she went to the store on Monday, to
make sure. Early on Saturday morning when she went to
work, Sample directed her to go home and bring back the
"gift pack records." Edgar did so and inquired of Sample if
she was to get them back and continue to keep them for the
rest of the year Sample replied in the affirmative. This is
clear and abundant evidence that the discharge resulted
not from deep considerations of economics, but rather was
an abrupt decision of Respondent based on other consider-
ations. The gift packs were not mentioned when she was
told of discharge. She had always kept these records during
her employment.
"Slowness" was never mentioned to her as a reason for
discharge. I find West, Sample, and Olson testified about
"slowness" in an unsuccessful effort to make white black.
Such testimony emphasizes the illegality of the cut in hours
and discharge.
She returned to the store the Monday immediately after
Saturday night, June 30. She had not been told she was
terminated on June 30. On this Monday, she was told she
was terminated by West. She asked West if she were still on
the schedule63 and West told her she wasn't 64 Sample had
told Edgar she would have to terminate Edgar when she
complained about being scheduled for only 19 hours for
the next week. On Monday, she was told only that she was
not on the schedule for work. She was told on June 30 only
that she "would be" terminated for poor work.65 She
reasonably assumed she would continue to work at least 19
hours in the following week. On June 26, Edgar saw two
schedules on West's desk, one giving her 19 hours and the
other 34 hours of work for the following week. The one
83 The Sunday phone call
64 She was , when she left Saturday night
65 The entire credited testimony in the record reveals she was a good and
most pleasant employee throughout her employment
88 These were "probationary" employees or those who worked but very
few hours per week, about 3 or 4
listing her for 19 hours eliminated entirely some other
employees.66 When, on June 30, she first talked to Sample
about her reduction in hours, she said she'd like to know
why her hours were cut back. Sample replied she'd like to
talk to Edgar about it and suggested Edgar come in on
Monday to talk about it 67 Edgar asked if they could talk
about it then, June 30. Sample agreed. Sample said Edgar
hadn't been doing her work and business was down and
Edgar would have to be terminated 68 She did not say when
the termination would occur. Edgar believed she would
work at least the scheduled 19 hours in the following week.
She did not refuse to work the scheduled 19 hours. In May,
Sample told her that after her honeymoon she would be
promoted to supervisor and would train new employees.69
The concocted reasons for discharge given at this trial
were obviously pretextual, especially in light of shifting
reasons therefor. The discharge was most precipitous and
followed her union meeting almost immediately.
I have pointed out Respondent' s intimate knowledge of
Edgar's attendance at the June 5 union meeting. I find
Edgar was the moving force among the employees in the
union organization.70 Admittedly West and Sample tried
to keep up on what was going on among the II employees.
One considered herself as a den mother or house mother.
With no chauvinism, I am convinced the employees could
not have remained silent about union activities and
Edgar's leading role therein. The "head clerk," Peterson,
who was a "floor supervisor," was the only one who did
not sign a union card, upon invitation. The circumstances
of this case, if no other, demand the use of the Board's oft
invoked "small shop doctrine." Edgar's union activities
must have been known to all of supervision. Sample's,
West's, Olson's and Derby's denials of knowledge of
Edgar's strenuous union activity are not credited by me,
especially in the circumstances of this case. The pretexts
offered as defense emphasize that Edgar was discharged
because of her union activity. West and Olson used the
stick on June 5. Derby used the carrot on June 14.
Respondent again resorted to a "club" when it discharged
Edgar either on June 30, or 2 days later. (For backpay
purposes, Respondent should be stuck with its claim that
the discharge occurred on June 30, even though Edgar was
unaware that it was effected at the end of that workday.)
5. The "offer of reinstatement" and its
subsequent refusal by Edgar
In late August, Respondent offered to rehire Edgar for
17 hours' work per week.71 Edgar properly refused it. Such
was not a valid offer of reinstatement. There is no evidence
as to the number of hours worked by Peterson or more
junior employees at such time. Respondent failed utterly to
establish that the offer of 17 hours per week work to Edgar
was a valid offer to reinstate Edgar to her "former
position" with all rights and privileges and seniority.
67 As found above, Edgar did so
68 I find Edgar had been doing her work in commendable manner
69 Fired the next month , without any warning and precipitously.
70 Witness that she signed up seven employees for the Union on June 28
and June 29, and was fired on June 30.
71 Edgar's regular hours for the first 6 months of 1973 averaged about 34
510 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's Exhibit 2 for the month of July is irrelevant
to the August "offer."
6. The employees at the Northgate Store
constituted an appropriate bargaining unit 72
Respondent urges that only its four stores in King
County are an appropriate unit.
Presumptively, the unit at Northgate is an appropriate
unit for bargaining. This presumption has not been
successfully rebutted. There is no past history of any
collective bargaining at any or all stores. Operations at
each store are handled by the manager under the general
and remote direction of Derby. There is no evidence of
central labor control. Hirings and firings are done by each
manager. There is minimal interchange of employees
among the stores and apparently for most special reasons. I
find a glaring lack of evidence that the employees in the
four stores have a community of interest. Each manager
had day-to-day control of the work of employees at each
particular store. No union seeks a unit wider than the
Northgate unit . Respondent's original store in Tacoma,
Pierce County, and its headquarters and Federal Way store
are much closer than the other stores in King County.
Respondent, with eight stores, does not operate on a
countywide basis. There is an absence of the administra-
tion of benefits on a general basis. Derby or any other
officers have very little contact with employees. There is
very little exchange of goods among the stores. Hours
during which work is performed vary from store to store.
Hours of work are scheduled by the supervision of each
store. The Northgate store employees, I find, constitute an
appropriate unit, excluding supervisors and guards.
7. In the circumstances of this case a Gissel
remedy is essential.
In light of the most pervasive and destructive unfair
labor practices I have found hereinabove, I conclude the
holding of a Board election at Northgate would be a futile
act. The memory of stick, carrot, and club will long linger
in the minds of employees, even should there have been or
will be drastic turnovers in employment. As things stand,
Respondent's outrageous unfair labor practices will long-
permeate the atmosphere of employment. The effects of
the gross unfair labor practices can be eliminated only by
issuance of an Order that Respondent bargain with the
Union. The past unfair labor practices and their lasting
effects on the minds of employees cannot be even slightly
eradicated by more traditional methods. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel
Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), almost mandates
rather than merely encourages a bargaining order here.
Respondent has made it impossible for the employees to
voice their true sentiments even in a secret Board election.
Each employee will continue to fear Respondent's next
antiunion move. The Union had 7 of 11 employees signed
up through the efforts of the so pleasant and competent
Edgar, and "pop" went Edgar in almost immediate
response by Respondent. A burned child dreads the fire.
72 1 have already found the Union represented a majority of the
employees in this unit , 7 of the I 1 employees
73 1 most respectfully recommend that the Board reconsider its prior
Posting reams of notices by Respondent would effectuate
nothing, without an order that Respondent bargain with
the Union. Respondent has made it clear to present
employees and those who may follow that it is adamantly
opposed to a union in the Northgate store. Edgar's
discharge goes to the very heart of the Act. Of great
relevance, in combination with the club of Edgar's
discharge, are the June 5 stick and the June 14 carrot.
Absence of a bargaining order, in this case, would ignore
the reasoning of Gissel, supra. Edgar will continue to be a
vivid symbol of what Respondent does to a union
supporter, even if reinstated with backpay. I am convinced
that only an order that Respondent bargain with the
Union, along with other traditional remedies, will remedy
Respondent's illegal efforts.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that about the end of June or beginning of
July Respondent discharged Edgar because of her umon
and other protected concerted activities, I shall recom-
mend that Respondent offer Edgar full and complete
reinstatement to her former position, or if it no longer
exists, then to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority and other rights and privileges. I
shall also recommend that Respondent make Edgar whole
for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason of her
discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the act,
in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company,90
NLRB 289, with interest on backpay computed in the
manner described in his Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716 73
t shall further recommend an Order that Respondent
bargain with the Union, on request, with respect to the
hours of employment, wages, and other conditions of all
the employees at the Northgate store, excluding supervi-
sors and guards, that group constituting an appropriate
bargaining unit.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
rulings, in light of our present drastic inflation , and most high rates of
interest, and increase the traditional rate of interest on Edgar's backpay.
HICKORY
CONCLUSIONS Or LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
3. By discharging Edgar on June 30, or July 2, and
thereafter failing and refusing to reinstate her, all because
of her union or other protected activities, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By ordering or suggesting that employees refrain
from signing union cards until Respondent's president was
heard from and by granting an across-the-board raise to its
employees in order to discourage their union support,
Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
Upon the entire record, including the foregoing findings
of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
ORDER 74
Respondent, The Cheese Barn, Inc. d/b/a Hickory
Farms, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Terminating or otherwise discriminating against any
of its employees because of their support for or assistance
to a union or because they engage in any union activities,
or any other activities protected by the Act.
(b) In any other manner, interfering with, restraining, on
coercing any employee in his right to join, assist, or support
the Union or any other labor organization or engage in any
activity protected by the Act, or to refrain from so doing.
2. Take the following affirmative action which, I find,
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Donna Edgar Gamache immediate and full
reinstatement to her former position, or, if that position no
longer exists, to a substantially similar position, without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges.
(b) Make Donna Edgar Gamache whole for any loss of
earnings she may have suffered by reason of Respondent's
discrimination against her, in the manner set forth in the
"Remedy" section of this Decision.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or any of its agents, all records necessary or useful
to determine or compute the amount of backpay due
Donna Edgar Gamache, if any.
(d) Bargain collectively in good faith, respecting wages,
hours. and working conditions of its employees, with the
Union as the collective-bargaining representative of all the
employees, excluding supervisors or guards, at its North-
gate store, such employees constituting an appropriate
bargaining unit.
(e) Post at its Northgate store copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 75 Copies of said notice on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19,
after being duly signed by an authorized representative of
Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt
thereof and be maintained by it for a period of 60
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, mclud-
FARMS 511
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
74 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
15 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT terminate or otherwise discriminate
against any of our employees because of their support
for or assistance to Local 1105, Retail Clerks Interna-
tional Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, or because they engage in any union
activities or any other activities protected by the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, interfere with,
restrain, or coerce any of our employees in their rights
to join , assist, or support the above-named Union or
any other labor organization or engage in any other
activity protected by the Act, or to refrain from so
doing.
WE WILL offer Donna Edgar Gamache immediate
and full reinstatement to her former position, or, if that
position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority and other
rights and privileges.
WE WILL make Donna Edgar Gamache whole for
any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of
our illegal discrimination against her, in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively, in good faith, with
respect to the wages, hours, and working conditions of
our employees, with Local 1105, Retail Clerks Interna-
tional Association, AFL-CIO, as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of all our employees. excluding
supervisors and guards, at our Northgate store, such
employees constituting an appropriate bargaining unit,
and if an agreement is reached, we will, on request,
reduce it to writing and sign it.
THE CHEESE BARN, INC.
D/B/A HICKORY FARMS
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
512 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
anyone. its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 10th
This notice must remam posted for 60 consecutive days Floor, Republic Building, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle,
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, Washington 98101, Telephone 206-442-7472.
or covered by any other material.