HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT LP

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 22, 2021

2020006067 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/318,868 12/14/2016 Christopher JOHNSON 90301877 5527
146568 7590 12/22/2021
MICRO FOCUS LLC
500 Westover Drive
#12603
Sanford, NC 27330
EXAMINER
WICKRAMASURIYA, SAMEERA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2494
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/22/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
software.ip.mail@microfocus.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON
__________
Appeal 2020-006067
Application 15/318,868
Technology Center 2400
__________

Before JAMES B. ARPIN, AMBER L. HAGY, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–20, all of the pending claims. Final Act. 2.2 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as Micro Focus LLC, a wholly-
owned affiliate of Micro Focus International Plc. Appeal Br. 1.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
March 11, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 24, 2020); the
Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed October 21, 2019) and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 22, 2020); and the Specification
(“Spec.,” filed December 14, 2016). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s
findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these
documents.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claimed systems, media, and methods relate to “an identity
management system includ[ing] an authority engine to provide an agency
identifier based on an authority relationship between a first identity and [a]
second identity and a duty engine to provide a duty identifier based on the
agency identifier and a first end point.” Spec., Abstr.
As noted above, claims 1–20 are pending. Claims 1, 6, and 11 are
independent. Appeal Br. i (claim 1), ii (claim 6), iv (claim 11) (Claims
App.). Claims 2–5 and 16–18 depend directly from claim 1, claims 7–10
and 19 depend directly or indirectly from claim 6, and claims 12–15 and 20
depend directly from claim 11. Id. at i–vi.
Claims 1 and 11, reproduced below with disputed recitations
emphasized, are illustrative.
1. A system comprising:
a processor; and
a non-transitory storage medium storing instructions
executable on the processor to:
provide an agency identifier comprising a value
identifying an authority relationship between a first identity and
a second identity, the authority relationship comprising an
authorization for a second entity identified by the second identity
to access a first service on behalf of a first entity identified by the
first identity;
provide a duty identifier based on the agency identifier and
a first end point of a plurality of end points, the first end point
being a destination to access the first service, and the duty
identifier to define an authorization to interact with the first
service provided at the first end point;
identify a second end point of the plurality of end points
based on the first end point, the second end point associated with
a second service;
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associate an authority to access the second end point with
the duty identifier, the duty identifier defining an authorization
to interact with the second service provided at the second end
point; and
accessing the second service at the second end point based
on the authority to access the second end point, the accessing
comprising the second entity identified by the second identity
accessing the second end point on behalf of the first entity
identified by the first identity based on the authority relationship
identified by the value of the agency identifier.
Id. at i (emphasis added).
11. A method executed by a system comprising a processor,
comprising:
creating an agency identifier that identifies an authority
relationship between a first identity and a second identity, the
authority relationship comprising an authorization for a second
entity identified by the second identity to access a service on
behalf of a first entity identified by the first identity;
identifying a potential service end point based on a
designated service end point, the designated service end point
providing a first service, and the potential service end point
providing a second service;
accessing the second service provided by the potential
service end point, the accessing comprising the second entity
identified by the second identity accessing the second service on
behalf of the first entity identified by the first identity based on
the authority relationship;
associating a plurality of end points with the agency
identifier, the plurality of end points including the designated
service end point and the potential service end point;
calculating authorized actions based on the plurality of end
points associated with the agency identifier; and
providing a termination end point based on a termination
condition associated with one of the plurality of end points.
Id. at iv (emphasis added). Independent claim 6 recites elements
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corresponding to the disputed elements of independent claim 11. Id.
at ii.
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name3 Reference Issued/Publ’d Filed
O’Neill US 8,769,642 B1 July 1, 2014 May 31, 2011
Villavicencio US 2007/0089167 A1 Apr. 19, 2007 Nov. 16, 2006
Hardt US 2010/0306830 A1 Dec. 2, 2010 Aug. 5, 2010
The Examiner rejects:
a. claims 6, 7, 9, 11–15, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by O’Neill (Final Act. 4–16);
b. claims 1–5, 8, and 16–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of O’Neill and Hardt (id. at 16–27); and
c. claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of O’Neill and Villavicencio (id. at 27–28).
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). The Examiner and Appellant focus their findings and
contentions, respectively, on claims 1 and 11; so we do as well. See Appeal
Br. 6, 12, 13; Ans. 4, 7, 11. Because the reversals of the rejections of
independent claims 1, 6, and 11 are dispositive, we do not address the merits

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
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of the rejections to the dependent claims further herein.4 We address the
rejections below.
ANALYSIS
A. Anticipation by O’Neill
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 6, 7, 9, 11–15, 19, and 20
as anticipated by O’Neill. Final Act. 4–16. “A claim is anticipated only if
each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or
inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc.
v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The elements must be
arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test.
See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Moreover, “it is proper
to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the
inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw
therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968). Nevertheless,
unless a reference discloses within the four corners of the
document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of
the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited
in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the
thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102.
Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
accord In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586 (CCPA 1972).
Appellant challenges the rejection of independent claim 11 separately.

4 Appellant challenges separately the rejection of claims 7 and 14, but our
reversal of the rejection of independent claims 6 and 11 is dispositive of the
rejection of claims 7 and 14, respectively. Appeal Br. 7–8, 10–11; Reply
Br. 6–7.
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Appeal Br. 6–9; Reply Br. 1–6. For the reasons given below, Appellant
persuades us the Examiner errs.
Claim 11 recites, “creating an agency identifier that identifies an
authority relationship between a first identity and a second identity, the
authority relationship comprising an authorization for a second entity
identified by the second identity to access a service on behalf of a first entity
identified by the first identity.” Appeal Br. iv (Claims App.) (emphases
added). The Specification discloses:
The authority engine 104 represents any circuitry or
combination of circuitry and executable instructions to provide
an agency identifier based on an authority relationship. For
example, the authority engine 104 can create a relationship
between a first entity and a second entity and provide an
identifier associated with the relationship for a service call and/or
relationship flow. The authority relationship can include an
authorization to access a service on behalf of the first entity. The
relationship between entities can be discussed as an agency
relationship between a principal and an agent.5 For example, a
principal can be a service account for which the relationship will
act on behalf of (i.e. the impersonatee) and an agent can be the
service account that will act on behalf of the principal (i.e. the
impersonator). . . .
The agency identifier provided by the authority engine 104
can provide a reference to associate the authority relationship
with the duties, limits, liabilities, and audits of an agent to act in
behalf of a principal. The agency identifier can be a number,

5 See BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 362–63 (2nd ed.1984) (“In the law of
agency, a principal is ‘one who has permitted or directed another to act for
his benefit and subject to his direction or control.’”; quoting Seavey, Law of
Agency § 3 (1964)); see also id. at 16 (“AGENT one who, by mutual
consent, acts for the benefit of another; one authorized by a party to act in
that party’s behalf.”).
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value, string, label, class, category, vector, or any other data
capable of identifying a relationship between identities.
Spec. ¶¶ 11–12 (emphases added). Thus, we understand the claim recites
that the second entity must act on behalf of the first entity, rather than solely
on behalf of itself, in a manner similar to that in which an agent acts on
behalf of a principal, and according to an “authority relationship” identified
by an “agency identifier.” See id. ¶ 33 (“The authority module 404 can
include program instructions, such as an identifier module, to create an
identifier 464 associated with the authority relationship between the
principal 460 and the agent 462.” (emphasis added)).
The Examiner finds O’Neill discloses this disputed element of
claim 11. Final Act. 9–10 (citing O’Neill, 4:10–12, 4:24–30, 12:47–49); see
Ans. 4–7 (citing O’Neill, 4:10–12, 4:24–62, 6:24–28, 12:47–49, 15:39–46,
26:1–39, 26:58–62, Fig. 16). In particular, the Examiner finds, “[w]hen a
delegation of access occurs, a user or service (who is delegating his/its
access) authorizes another entity (i.e. another user) or a service to carry out
actions and/or tasks on behalf of the user or service.” Ans. 5 (emphasis
added). Specifically, the Examiner relies on O’Neill’s use of the terms:
“delegator” and “delegatee” to disclose a delegatee acts on behalf of the
delegator. See Ans. 5 n.1 (citing a dictionary definition of “the word
‘delegation’ as ‘the act of empowering to act for another.’”). Nevertheless,
the Examiner does not point us to any disclosure in O’Neill adopting this
definition of “delegation” or describing the delegatee’s actions as “on behalf
of” or for the delegator.
The Examiner acknowledges that, based on the Specification, “it is
apparent that the authority relationship permits an agent to act on behalf of a
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[principal] (i.e. principal can be an account).” Ans. 6 (citing Spec. ¶ 11).
The Examiner finds:
On the other hand, it is noted that O’Neill discloses that “Policies
in the user-specified policy set 606 may be specified with
alphanumeric strings. A first example of such a policy is: permit
administrators * corresponding to permission for members of the
group with identifier [‘]administrators[’] to perform all actions
with respect to all resources associated with a particular virtual
resource provider 502 (FIG. 5) customer account” (O’Neill [Col.
15 Lines: 39-46]).
Ans. 6–7. Thus, the Examiner relies on O’Neill’s disclosure that permitted
members may “perform all actions with respect to all resources associated
with a particular virtual resource provider” (id. (emphases added)) to
disclose the recited requirement that the second entity (e.g., an agent) acts on
behalf of the first entity (e.g., a principal).
Appellant contends:
A delegator delegating access privileges (for accessing
computing resources) to a delegatee means that the delegatee is
provided with the access privileges for accessing the computing
resources. However, the delegation of access privileges does not
constitute an “authority relationship comprising an authorization
for a second entity identified by the second identity to access a
service on behalf of a first entity identified by the first identity,”
as claimed. There is no teaching or hint in O’Neill that a
delegatee would access a service on behalf of the delegator (or
vice versa).
In O’Neill, one or more delegatees accessing computing
resources using a session credential refers to the one or more
delegatees accessing the computing resources for themselves,
not on behalf of first entity identified by the first identity.
Reply Br. 2 (italics added). We agree with Appellant.
Because we are persuaded the Examiner fails to show that O’Neill
discloses each and every element of the methods, as recited in independent
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claim 11, we are persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 11 as
anticipated by O’Neill, and we do not sustain that rejection. Further,
Appellant challenges the anticipation rejection of independent claim 6 for
the same reason as claim 11, and we also do not sustain the rejection of
claim 6. Appeal Br. 12.6 Because we find this reason for reversal
dispositive with respect to independent claims 6 and 11, we need not reach
the merits of Appellant’s other challenges to the rejection of those claims.
With respect to the anticipation rejection of dependent claims 7, 9, 12–15,
19, and 20, our reversal of the anticipation rejection of their base claims is
dispositive; and, therefore, we also do not sustain the rejection of those
claims.
B. Obviousness over O’Neill and Hardt or Villavicencio
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 1–5, 8, and 16–18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of O’Neill and
Hardt (Final Act. 16–27); and claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over the combined teachings of O’Neill and Villavicencio (id. at 27–28).
Similar to claims 6 and 11, independent claim 1 recites,
provid[ing] an agency identifier comprising a value
identifying an authority relationship between a first identity and
a second identity, the authority relationship comprising an
authorization for a second entity identified by the second identity
to access a first service on behalf of a first entity identified by the
first identity.
Appeal Br. i (Claims App.) (emphases added); cf. supra Section A (quoting

6 Although Appellant refers to “claim 1,” we understand that this is a
typographical error and that Appellant intends to refer to claim 11.
See Reply Br. 6.
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the disputed element of claim 11).
The Examiner finds O’Neill teaches or suggests this limitation of
independent claim 1 for substantially the same reasons that the Examiner
finds O’Neill discloses the corresponding elements of independent claims 6
and 11. Final Act. 18 (citing O’Neill, 4:10–12, 4:20–22, 4:24–30, 4:40–46,
6:35–38, 12:47–49). Appellant challenges the obviousness rejection of
claim 1 for substantially the same reasons that it challenges the anticipation
rejection of claims 6 and 11. Appeal Br. 14 (“O’Neill does not teach the
following elements of claim 1 (for similar reasons to those stated for claim
11)[.]”); see Ans. 12 (“Appellant’s arguments are defective for the same
reasons as discussed with respect to Claim 11 above, mutatis mutandis.”).
Because Appellant’s contentions regarding the deficiencies of
O’Neill’s teachings with respect to the disputed limitation of claim 1 are
equally persuasive to the contentions with respect to the disputed elements
of claims 6 and 11, and because the Examiner does not find that Hardt (or
Villavicencio) teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of claim 1,
Appellant persuades us the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 as obvious
over the combined teachings of O’Neill and Hardt, and we do not sustain
that rejection. Because we find this reason for reversal dispositive with
respect to independent claim 1, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s
other challenges to the rejection of that claim. Further, Appellant challenges
the obviousness rejections of dependent claims 2–5, 8, 10, and 16–18 based
only on its challenge to the rejection of their base claim, independent claim
1; and, therefore, we also do not sustain the rejections of those claims.
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DECISION
1. The Examiner errs in rejecting:
a. claims 6, 7, 9, 11–15, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by O’Neill;
b. claims 1–5, 8, and 16–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over the combined teachings of O’Neill and Hardt; and
c. claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of O’Neill and Villavicencio.
2. Thus, on this record, claims 1–20 are not unpatentable.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20.
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
6, 7, 9, 11–
15, 19, 20
102(a)(1) O’Neill 6, 7, 9, 11–
15, 19, 20
1–5, 8, 16–
18
103 O’Neill, Hardt 1–5, 8, 16–
18
10 103 O’Neill,
Villavicencio
10
Overall
Outcome
1–20
REVERSED