Herman Bros

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 26, 1992

307 N.L.R.B. 724 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

724
307 NLRB No. 117
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The name of the Charging Party has been changed to reflect the
new official name of the International Union.
2 The Respondent has excepted to the judge’s rulings, findings, and
conclusions on the grounds that they demonstrate bias and prejudice.
On careful examination of the judge’s decision and the entire record,
we are satisfied that such contentions are without merit.
3 There is no merit to the Respondent’s suggestion that
Fessenden’s testimony that the parties were ‘‘far apart’’ during the
hiatus and that he saw ‘‘no point in pushing the issue’’ establishes
that the Union was adamant and would refuse to make any changes
in its proposals during further negotiations. Fessenden’s testimony on
this matter was follows:
[A]t that point, basically, we were far apart in our proposals and
the company and I had agreed to continue working under the
expired agreement. The employees were still being paid their
regular rates of pay and I saw no point in pushing the issue at
that point to settle the contract.
This testimony is entirely consistent with a view on the part of
the Union that negotiations would undoubtedly end in an agreement
providing reduced wages and benefits for employees, and the Union
therefore had nothing to gain by pressing for a speedy conclusion.
The Union did not, however, resist requests for negotiations. Accord-
ing to Fessenden’s credited testimony, he and Lyman Bell, the Re-
spondent’s representative, had several telephone conversations during
the 13-month period, and he told Bell that he was available to meet
at any time.
4 We do not rely on the evidence of postimplementation negotia-
tions in affirming the administrative law judge’s finding of a viola-
tion.
Herman Brothers, Inc. and Teamsters Local Union
No. 688, affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO.1 Case 14–CA–
20819
May 26, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS OVIATT
AND RAUDABAUGH
On November 25, 1991, Administrative Law Judge
Irwin H. Socoloff issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a brief in support.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings,2 findings, and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
In its exceptions, the Respondent argues, among
other things, that the 13-month hiatus in bargaining be-
tween October 12, 1988, and November 27, 1989, and
the fact that it—rather than the Union—was respon-
sible for calling the November 1989 meeting shows
that the Union was intractably refusing to bridge the
parties’ differences. The Respondent argues that the
parties were therefore at impasse when the Union did
not meet the December 11, 1989 deadline which the
Respondent had decreed for acceptance of its new
‘‘final proposal’’ which it presented at the November
27 meeting. We disagree.
The only witness to testify at the hearing was the
Union’s business representative, Danny Fessenden. We
find no basis in Fessenden’s testimony for concluding
that there was no possibility of reaching common
ground during that 13-month hiatus.3 The Respondent
put in no evidence that, during that time, it ever
brought matters to a head on the basis of proposals
then on the table. In other words, during that 13-month
period the Respondent did not put the Union to the test
by announcing that it had issued its final proposal and
was declaring impasse.
When the Respondent did issue its ultimatum in No-
vember 1989, it did so on the basis of a proposal that,
as the judge correctly found, was so different from
proposals then on the table that further bargaining was
clearly required before impasse could be reached, even
if only to provide the Union a basis for understanding
the economic significance of the totally new wage for-
mula. The Respondent’s contention that it was justified
by deteriorating economic circumstances in presenting
a new, more regressive proposal militates against its
impasse claim. If new circumstances existed, there was
all the more reason that further discussions with the
Union might prove fruitful. Instead of first exploring
the significance of the changed circumstances with the
Union, however, the Respondent characterized its new
proposal as ‘‘final’’ and issued its ultimatum on the
very day it presented the proposal to the Union. We
therefore agree with the judge that there was no gen-
uine impasse on December 18, 1989, when the Re-
spondent implemented the proposal, and the Respond-
ent accordingly violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by this action.4
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Herman Brothers, Inc.,
Clarksville, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Mary J. Tobey, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Walter H. Flamm Jr., Esq., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
the Respondent.
Brian A. Spector, Esq., St. Louis, Missouri, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRWIN H. SOCOLOFF, Administrative Law Judge. On a
charge filed on June 14, 1990, by Teamsters Local Union
No. 688, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL–CIO (the Union), against Herman Brothers, Inc.
(the Respondent), the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 14, is-
725HERMAN BROS., INC.
sued a complaint dated September 11, 1990, alleging viola-
tions by Respondent of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section
2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
Respondent, by its answer, denied the commission of any un-
fair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before me in St.
Louis, Missouri, on April 2, 1991, at which all parties were
represented by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to
be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to in-
troduce evidence. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the
Respondent filed briefs which have been duly considered.
On the entire record in this case, and from my observa-
tions of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Missouri corporation, maintains an office
and terminal facility in Clarksville, Missouri, where it is en-
gaged in the interstate tranportation of freight and other com-
modities. Annually, Respondent, in the course and conduct of
its business operations at Clarksville, derives gross revenues
in excess of $50,000 from the transportation of such freight
and commodities, from the facility, to points located outside
the State of Missouri. I find that Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Union has represented Respondent’s employees work-
ing at the Clarksville terminal since 1962. The bargaining
unit currently includes 17 drivers, who haul bulk cement, and
1 mechanic. Respondent and the Union have been parties to
numerous collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent
of which expired on June 30, 1988. Following contract expi-
ration, they engaged in bargaining, looking toward conclu-
sion of a successor agreement. However, negotiations did not
result in a new contract and, on December 18, 1989, Re-
spondent implemented its ‘‘final offer.’’
In the instant case, the General Counsel contends that, by
unilaterally implementing changes in established rates of pay,
benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment, in
December 1989, Respondent breached its bargaining obliga-
tion, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Respondent
asserts that it was privileged to implement its ‘‘final offer’’
as, at the time that it acted, the prospects of concluding a
new agreement had been exhausted and negotiations were at
an impasse.
B. Facts
The facts in this case are not in dispute and may be sum-
marized, as follows:
Historically, Respondent and the Union have been signato-
ries to the successive Master Cement and all Dry Bulk Com-
modities Agreements, covering employees of signatory em-
ployers located in the central States of the United States.
They have also negotiated supplemental agreements covering
wages, and other terms and conditions of employment, appli-
cable only to Respondent’s employees. The supplemental
agreements have had the same effective dates as the Master
contracts.
On April 13, 1988, the Union sent a letter to Respondent
reopening the then soon to expire contracts for negotiations.
On April 27, Respondent, by letter, informed the Union that
Respondent was not ‘‘a part of any multiemployer bargaining
unit or employer association,’’ but stood ready to negotiate
a new collective-bargaining agreement, covering its employ-
ees, with the Union.Thereafter, the parties agreed to continue
to give full force and effect to the terms of the expiring
agreements, and to postpone negotiations for a new agree-
ment until after the new Master contract was completed.
The parties’ first bargaining meeting was held on August
3, 1988. At that time, the Union’s business representative,
Danny Fessenden, presented to Lyman Bell, Respondent’s di-
rector of terminals, a copy of the then recently concluded
Master agreement. Fessenden stated that he was there to ne-
gotiate the new Master Cement Agreement, and he reviewed
its provisions. That agreement provided for maintenance of
existing health and welfare benefits, requiring an increase in
employer contributions to the Central States Health & Wel-
fare Fund, from $66.70 per employee per week to $88.77 in
the first year of the agreement, to $96.78 in the second year
and to an undetermined amount in the third year. Mainte-
nance of then existing pension benefits, as called for in the
new Master agreement, required an increase in contributions
to the Central States Pension Fund, from $61 per employee
per week to $69 to $73.
Bell stated that Respondent would not sign the Master Ce-
ment Agreement and he proposed that the parties enter into
a ‘‘white paper agreement,’’ that is, a contract independent
of the Master agreement. He presented the Union with writ-
ten proposals calling for a reduction in wages from $10.94
per hour to $9.80, a reduction in the mileage rate paid driv-
ers on certain trips, in lieu of the hourly rate, from 29.3 cents
to 26 cents, a reduction in holidays from 10 to 7, a reduction
in the recall rights of laid-off employees from 3 years to 6
months, a reduction in holiday pay from twice the hourly
rate to a straight time rate and a reduction in the maximum
vacation period from 4 weeks to 3 weeks. The proposals also
called for maintenance of then existing contributions to the
health and welfare and the pension funds, which would have
required switching to plans providing lesser benefits. Lesser
wage rates and benefits were proposed for newly hired em-
ployees, as well as medical coverage under the company
plan, and a 401(k) plan, in place of the Central States funds.
The parties met again on August 4. Fessenden stated that
he had studied Respondent’s proposals but was unwilling, at
that point, to sign a white paper agreement. He said that the
Union was again asking Respondent to sign the Master con-
tract and, then, the parties could work out any relief needed
by Respondent in a supplemental agreement. Bell responded,
stating that, in view of the Company’s economic condition,
and its need to stay competitive, it could not afford the Mas-
ter agreement’s wage rates and benefit levels, and it did not
want to utilize the contractual grievance procedure. Respond-
ent and the Union discussed each other’s proposals and
agreed to meet again.
726 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At a meeting held on September 8, the union representa-
tives reiterated their desire to sign the Master contract with
necessary relief to be provided in a supplemental agreement.
Respondent’s representatives stated that they were not refus-
ing to do so, but that they preferred the approach of a white
paper agreement. The Union pointed to those of Respond-
ent’s competitors who had signed the Master agreement and
claimed that Respondent could do so and remain competitive.
The Company refused to sign the Master agreement at that
time, but agreed to further study it and asked that the Union
further study its proposals.
The parties next met on October 12, 1988. The Union re-
stated its position with regard to the Master agreement and
a supplemental, and Respondent stated that it could not af-
ford the Master agreement and would like to see wages re-
duced to $9.61 per hour, less than it had proposed in August.
Respondent reiterated its desire to negotiate a ‘‘two-tier’’
system of wages and benefits under which then current em-
ployees would be covered by the Central States insurance
and pension plans, and new employees would be covered by
the company medical plan and a 401(k) plan. The Union re-
sponded, stating that it was unsure if the Central States plans
would even allow for a two-tier system. It asked that a copy
of Respondent’s medical plan be furnished. The parties dis-
cussed the Company’s economic state, and they ended the
meeting agreeing to check on insurance matters. A few days
later Fessenden placed a telephone call to Bell and advised
him that the Central States funds would not allow a two-tier
system for health and welfare and pension purposes.
Respondent and the Union did not meet again for a period
of 13 months, each apparently willing to continue to operate
under the provisions of the expired contracts. Late in No-
vember 1989, Bell placed a telephone call to Fessenden
asked for a meeting and advised Fessenden that the Company
would present a new proposal.
When the parties met on November 27, 1989, Bell pre-
sented a new written proposal to the Union, which he termed
a ‘‘final proposal.’’ It was radically different, in concept and
in terms, from Respondent’s previous offer and called for
wages of 21 percent of gross revenues in lieu of hourly and
mileage rates, pension plan contributions not to exceed $20
per employee per week, the company health plan, six holi-
days, and a maximum of 2 weeks’ vacation.
Respondent and the Union discussed the Company’s new
proposal, item by item. Fessenden asked Bell exactly what
21 percent of revenues would amount to in terms of wages.
Bell stated only that it would be 21 percent of revenues.
Fessenden asked if under the 21-percent formulation wages
on certain trips could drop to $5 per hour. Bell said, yes, but
in that event there would be no need for the Company to
haul the load.
Regarding pensions, Fessenden stated that Respondent was
then paying $61 per week, and would have to go to $69 to
maintain benefits, yet, was proposing to drop the contribution
to $20 per week. He asked why Respondent was proposing
a decrease of that magnitude. Bell replied, stating that eco-
nomically that was what the Company had to do. As to
health and welfare, Fessenden said that the employees need-
ed to retain the Central States plan. He asked Bell what type
of plan the Company maintained. Bell stated that he would
have to get a copy of the plan in order to ascertain its cov-
erage. He believed that the plan had a deductible amount of
$250 and, unlike the Central States plan, did not provide
coverage for dependents. Regarding holidays and vacations,
Bell said that Respondent’s proposals were necessitated by
economic conditions. Fessenden told Bell that he could not
believe that Respondent had made that type of proposal as,
in past meetings, cuts of such magnitude had not been
sought. He asked Bell why he was making such a proposal.
Bell stated that that was what Respondent needed in order
to be competitive. Bell further stated that the offer was a
‘‘final proposal,’’ and that he wanted Fessenden to take it to
his membership for a vote. Fessenden asked for further nego-
tiations in order to resolve the matter. Bell said,‘‘no.’’ He
told Fessenden that the proposal was what Respondent need-
ed and that he, Bell, wanted a membership vote on it.
Fessenden stated that he would take it to the membership for
a vote, but would not recommend acceptance or rejection. He
predicted that the membership would turn it down.
On November 30, 1989, Bell sent a letter to Fessenden
which characterized the offer of November 27, as ‘‘final.’’
Fessenden was further advised that if the Union did not re-
spond to the offer by December 11, Respondent would as-
sume that the parties were at impasse and would proceed to
implement its proposals, effective December 18, 1989. On
December 13, Fessenden placed a telephone call to Bell and
advised him that the membership unanimously had rejected
Respondent’s offer. Fessenden asked for another meeting.
Bell agreed, but reiterated Respondent’s determination, over
objection of the Union, to implement its proposal on Decem-
ber 18. On December 19, Bell sent a telegram to Fessenden
advising him that Respondent was, in fact, implementing its
‘‘final offer,’’ effective December 18.
The parties did not meet again until February 28, 1990. At
that time, the Union again asked that the parties sign the
Master contract and a supplemental agreement. Fessenden
agreed to a reduction in wages from $10.94 per hour to $10,
and a reduction in the mileage rate from 29.3 cents per mile
to 27 cents. He stated that this would resolve the competi-
tiveness issue. Bell said that Respondent might agree to pay
for the Central States Health and Welfare plan, or the pen-
sion plan, but not both. Fessenden noted that that represented
a huge increase from what was contained in the Company’s
‘‘final proposal.’’ Bell stated that Respondent wanted to take
care of the employees. When Fessenden again asked for the
Master contract and a supplemental agreement, Bell said that
he would take another look at the Union’s proposal, in light
of its new offer on wages.
The next bargaining session was held on March 14. Bell
rejected the Union’s renewed proposal of the Master contract
and a supplemental, and gave Fessenden a printout showing
a sampling of wages paid to drivers under the 21 percent of
revenues, system. Bell suggested that the drivers were mak-
ing more money under the new system; as much as $12 to
$14 per hour. Fessenden said that under that system driver
rates could, in some cases, fall to $5 per hour. He further
stated that the Union would be willing to look at the 21-per-
cent-of-revenues plan if it were coupled with a $10-floor
rate. Bell said that Respondent would be willing to entertain
and study that proposal. He further stated that if the Union
would agree to a white paper contract things would be settled
quickly. Bell told Fessenden that Respondent would agree to
maintain the Central States Pension plan for vested employ-
ees.
727HERMAN BROS., INC.
1 Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475 (1967); D.C. Liquor
Wholesalers, 292 NLRB 1234 (1989).
2 Excavation-Construction, 248 NLRB 649 (1980).
3 See Howard Electrical & Mechanical, 293 NLRB 472 (1989);
Stephenson-Yost Steel, 294 NLRB 395 (1989).
The final meeting of the parties occurred on May 14,
1990. Fessenden asked for the Master contract and a supple-
mental, and Bell turned him down. Respondent asserted that
the terminal was losing money and handed to the Union a
computer printout of expenses. As Fessenden could not de-
termine from those documents if, in fact, the terminal was
operating at a loss, he asked to see the home office books.
Bell said that he would have to find out whether those
records would be made available. Bell again said that if the
Union agreed to a white paper contract, everything would be
resolved easily. Fessenden said that the Union would have to
take some kind of action. Thereafter, he filed the charges
giving rise to the instant case.
C. Conclusions
The Act requires that the parties bargain in good faith until
an agreement is reached or until any realistic possibility of
reaching agreement is exhausted. An impasse exists in the
latter situation and an employer is, then, privileged to put
into effect its pre-impasse proposals.1
In the instant case, Respondent asserts that when, on De-
cember 18, 1989, it unilaterally implemented its November
27, 1989 proposals, a genuine impasse in negotiations ex-
isted, privileging its action. This contention must be assessed
under standards established in precedent cases requiring the
party claiming impasse to show that, despite the parties’ best
efforts to achieve an agreement, neither party was willing to
move from its position. Until the collective-bargaining proc-
ess has been exhausted, no impasse can occur.2
As shown in the statement of facts, the parties commenced
negotiations on August 3, 1988, and held but four meetings
that year. Throughout those bargaining sessions, Respondent
sought only moderate reductions from the then existing wage
and benefit levels as well as a two-tier system and a white
paper agreement. The Union’s approach to the matter was to
have the parties sign the Master agreement, with needed eco-
nomic relief to be provided in a supplemental contract. Nei-
ther party refused to consider the other’s approach or terms.
The parties then suspended negotiations for 13 months, each
apparently willing to continue to operate under the terms of
the expired agreements.
Respondent’s November 27, 1989, ‘‘final proposal,’’ not
only called for drastic reductions in existing benefit levels,
it called for far more sweeping reductions than those it had
previously sought. Moreover, the November 27 proposal
called for an entirely new system of wage calculation, based
on percentage of gross revenues, the effects of which Re-
spondent itself could neither predict nor explain. Respondent
rebuffed the Union’s request for further negotiations, insisted
that the proposal was final and demanded an immediate rati-
fication vote by the Union’s membership. It made clear its
intent unilaterally to implement the proposal if the member-
ship’s approval was not forthcoming.
When Respondent, on November 27, 1989, after a long hi-
atus in negotiations, presented a proposal radically different,
in both concept and terms, from its previous proposals, it
was obligated to give the collective-bargaining process a
chance. Instead, it followed its precipitous presentation of a
‘‘final proposal’’ with a demand for immediate ratification
under threat of unilateral implementation. It is difficult to in-
terpret Respondent’s actions in this regard as other than those
of an employer with a fixed intent to implement its proposal
regardless of the status of negotiations with the Union. It was
unwilling to await the outcome of a good-faith, collective-
bargaining process.3 This pell-mell rush to artificial impasse
did not create the genuine exhaustion of the bargaining proc-
ess which would privilege unilateral implementation.
Further evidencing the fact that the parties were not at im-
passe on December 18, 1989, when Respondent unilaterally
implemented its proposal, is the flexibility shown on both
sides and concerning the major issues in the post-
implementation meetings. At those sessions, Respondent in-
dicated a willingness to accede to the Union’s position on ei-
ther health and welfare or pension, but not both. It was will-
ing to entertain the Union’s proposal that the system of cal-
culating wages as a percentage of gross revenues be aug-
mented with a floor rate. For its part, the Union offered re-
ductions in wage rates and mileage pay. There was, in short,
significant movement on both sides. In these circumstances,
it cannot be said that the parties had exhausted any realistic
possibility of reaching agreement.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that on December 18,
1989, when Respondent unilaterally implemented its ‘‘final
offer,’’ a genuine impasse in negotiations had not occurred.
Accordingly, Respondent failed to meet its bargaining obliga-
tion, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
ON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above,
occurring in connection with its operations described in sec-
tion I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation
to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practice conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, I
shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to bargain, on
request, with the Union and, if an understanding is reached,
to embody the understanding in a signed agreement. I shall
also recommend that Respondent be ordered, on request, to
restore the status quo ante and rescind the unilateral changes
made commencing December 18, 1989, and to make all af-
fected employees whole for losses they incurred by virtue of
the unilateral changes, from December 18, 1989, until Re-
spondent negotiates in good faith with the Union to agree-
ment or to a valid impasse. If the Union elects to have pre-
vious conditions restored, calculations of the sums and pay-
ments necessary to make employees whole, with interest,
shall be made in accordance with normal Board policy. See
Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970); New Hori-
728 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 Interest on or after January 1, 1987, shall be computed at the
‘‘short-term Federal rate’’ for the underpayment of taxes as set out
in the 1986 amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621. Interest on amounts ac-
crued prior to January 1, 1987 (the effective date of the 1986
amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621), shall be computed in accordance
with Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
zons for the Retarded,4 283 NLRB 1173 (1987);
Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213 (1979).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Herman Brothers, Inc. is an employer engaged in com-
merce, and in operations affecting commerce, within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, affiliated with Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All truckdrivers and mechanics employed by Respond-
ent at its Clarksville, Missouri facility, excluding office cler-
ical and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material the Union has been, and is now,
the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid
bargaining unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By unilaterally implementing changes in the wages,
benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment of
the bargaining unit employees, Respondent refused to bargain
in good faith with the Union, as exclusive representative of
the bargaining unit employees, concerning rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
and thereby, engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within meanging of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, Herman Brothers, Inc., Clarksville, Mis-
souri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith concerning rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment with the Union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of its employees in the appropriate unit.
(b) Unilaterally implementing changes in the wages, bene-
fits, and other terms and conditions of employment of the
bargaining unit employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain in good faith with the Union as
the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement.
(b) On request of the Union, rescind the unilateral changes
in the unit employees’ wages, benefits and other terms and
conditions of employment that were made commencing De-
cember 18, 1989, and make the employees whole, with inter-
est, for losses they incurred as a result of the unilateral
changes, from December 18, 1989, until Respondent nego-
tiates in good faith with the Union to agreement or to a valid
impasse, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this
decision.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay and other moneys due under the terms
of this Order.
(d) Post at its Clarksville, Missouri facility copies of the
attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’6 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14,
after being duly signed by Respondent’s representative, shall
be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken
to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively concerning
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment with Teamsters Local Union, No. 688, affili-
ated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO,
as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employees,
in the appropriate bargaining unit:
All truckdrivers and mechanics employed at the Clarks-
ville, Missouri facility, excluding office clerical and
professional employees, guards, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
729HERMAN BROS., INC.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally implement changes in the
wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment of the bargaining unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclu-
sive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit,
described above, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement.
WE WILL, on request of the Union, rescind the unilateral
changes in the unit employees’ wages, benefits, and other
terms and conditions of employment that were made com-
mencing December 18, 1989, and WE WILL make the em-
ployees whole, with interest, for losses they incurred as a re-
sult of the unilateral changes, from December 18, 1989, until
we negotiate in good faith with the Union to agreement or
to a valid impasse.
HERMAN BROTHERS, INC.