Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 4, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 866 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

866 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc. and Highway and Local
Motor Freight Employees Local Union No. 667,
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America. Case 26-CA-4200
April 4, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On September 11, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
George J. Bott issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc.,
Bruceton, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE J. Borr, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a
charge and amended charge filed by the Union on January
4 and February 22, 1972, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint
against Respondent on February 25, 1972, alleging that it
had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, herein called the Act. Respondent filed
an answer and a hearing was held before me in Hunting-
don, Tennessee, on May 31 and June 1, 1972. Subsequent
to the hearing, Respondent and General Counsel filed
briefs which have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. RESPONDENT' S BUSINESS
Respondent is a corporation with a plant and place of
business located in Bruceton, Tennessee, where it Is
engaged in the manufacture of clothing. During the 12-
month period preceding the issuance of the complaint,
Respondent received goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly from points outside the State of Tennessee, and
during the same period, Respondent shipped goods valued
in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of
Tennessee.
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Setting and the Issues
In addition to its manufacturing plant in Bruceton,
Tennessee , Respondent also operates there a large distribu-
tion center from which it ships to its customers the clothing
produced at all of its manufacturing plants. Customer
shipments are usually made by common carrier, but
Respondent also conducts an interplant trucking operation
with its own equipment and drivers to transport piece
goods from plant to plant for finishing and the finished
garment back to the distribution center in Bruceton.
Respondent 's garage facilities are located in the Bruce-
ton distribution center. When the events in this case began
in the summer of 1971, Respondent employed approxi-
mately 12 drivers and 3 or 4 mechanics . In July or August,
a driver obtained union authorization cards and an effort
was made to organize the drivers and mechanics. The
Union filed a petition for an election with the Board on
August 19 , 1971, and , after a hearing , the Board 's Regional
Director , on September 21, directed an election among
Respondent 's over- the-road drivers , mechanics and me-
chanics' helpers. An election , which the Union lost by a
vote of 10 to 6, was held on October 21, and the certificate
of results issued on November 1, 1971.
The complaint alleges that Respondent , during the
Union's attempt to organize the employees in the unit,
created an impression among its employees that it was
keeping their union activities under surveillance ; coercively
interrogated employees ; and threatened others with loss of
employment in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent denies these allegations. The complaint also
alleges that Respondent , on December 9, 1971, discharged
three of its drivers because they had participated in the
Union 's earlier campaign , but Respondent contends that
the drivers were fired because they had stopped more than
20 minutes for coffee during one of their trips to one of
Respondent 's plants.
202 NLRB No. 125
HENRY I. SIEGEL CO., INC. 867
B. Independent Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act
Truckdriver James Foster attended a union meeting with
a group of other drivers in Jackson, Tennessee, near the
end of August 1971. In early September, Ross, his
immediate supervisor, sent him to see Sam Siegel, Respon-
dent's vice president in charge of the Bruceton distribution
center. Foster testified that when he arrived in Siegel's
office, Siegel informed him that he understood that a
carload of employees had gone to Jackson about the
Union. When Foster admitted that they had, he said Siegel
stated that he assumed that Foster knew that it "could
mean your job if you people vote the union in."
Foster also testified that sometime in September 1971,
Supervisor Ross asked him to consider voting against the
Union in the coming election. Ross prefaced his request
with the information that the Union "was going to put
some people out of jobs" and by reminding Foster that he
was a friend whom he did not wish to see "hurt."
According to Foster, Ross told him that his information
about possible loss of employment came from "higher
officials "
Sam Siegel said he did not remember talking with Foster
about the Union, but he admitted that he could have, but
only if Foster "got the subject up" first. He denied,
however, that he made any statement about a carload of
drivers going to Jackson, Tennessee, about the Union, or
telling Foster that employees could lose their jobs over the
Union. Siegel explained that he knew better than to make
such statements because he had been involved in every
Board election among Respondent's employees and was in
the habit of following counsel's advice.'
I credit Foster rather than Siegel because he appeared to
have a better recall of events and because he impressed me
with his sincerity. His testimony was given calmly and
without any apparent exaggeration . Although Foster has
an interest in the proceeding because he is one of the
alleged discriminatees, his wife and daughter are employed
by Respondent. I sensed no indication of bias in his entire
testimony in this area and in others relating to his later
discharge. I find, therefore, that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Siegel's threat that unioniza-
tion of Respondent's drivers would result in loss of
employment and by his remarks indicating that Respon-
dent had its employees' union activities under surveillance.
Because I also find that Foster's testimony is more
reliable than Supervisor Ross', I find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Ross' remark that the
Union was going to cause some employees to lose their
jobs. Taken in context with his statement that Foster was a
friend whom he did not wish to see harmed and his
indication that his information came from "higher offi-
cials," his remarks were clearly coercive.
Near the end of July 1971, a group of Respondent's
drivers met with Thornton, Respondent's vice president in
charge of operations, to complainrabout their wages. Hicks,
another alleged discriminatee, said that he and other
drivers signed union authorization cards after the Thorn-
ton meeting because they were dissatisfied with the way in
which he had answered their grievances.
According to Hicks, in the middle of August, Sam Siegel
invited him into his office and asked him what was going
on among the drivers. When Hicks parried this inquiry,
Siegel added that he had heard that the drivers had signed
union cards. Hicks said he told Siegel that the drivers had
indeed signed cards. Siegel asked him why they had and
what they expected to gain from it. Hicks said he explained
to Siegel that the drivers had gone to the Union for help
because they felt that Thornton had given them no
satisfaction. Siegel commented that he did not think the
drivers could have an election of their own because the last
Board election had been held on a plant basis.
After Hicks left Siegel, he drove to the Gleason plant,
approximately 35 miles from Bruceton. While there he was
called by Ross who told him Siegel wanted to see him
again . He returned to Bruceton and went to Siegel 's office
where he found Sam and Jesse Siegel, the latter being
Respondent's president, headquartered in the Respon-
dent's New York City executive offices, but who also visits
Bruceton frequently.
Hicks testified that when he entered the office, Sam
Siegel asked him to repeat for Jesse Siegel's benefit what he
had told him earlier. After he told Jesse Siegel that he and
other drivers had signed union authorization cards, he said
that Jesse Siegel asked him why the men did not quit if
they were dissatisfied. According to Hicks, Sam Siegel
stated that employees could lose their jobs because of the
union activity and asked him where he would get another
job if he lost his present one. Sam Siegel also commented,
Hicks said, "If you stick your neck out you are liable to get
it chopped off."
At the end of the interview, Hicks was asked if he would
get in touch with the other drivers to determine whether
they would meet with Siegel the next day. He told them he
would, but although a meeting with the drivers, attended
by both Siegels, was held the following day, it was
apparently arranged by Thornton.
Sam and Jesse Siegel's version of why they met with
Hicks and what was said are different from his. Sam Siegel
said he knew that Thornton had met with the drivers but
had not replied to their complaints. Because of this, and
since Jesse happened to be visiting Bruceton , he suggested
to him that they talk with one of the drivers to find out for
themselves what was bothering them. Hicks was chosen,
according to Sam Siegel, because he was the most senior
driver, or perhaps, he added, because he was available and
would accept an invitation to talk with them.
Sam Siegel testified that when Hicks appeared they
mentioned the Thornton meeting and asked him what his
problem was and how they could solve it. Hicks responded
that the men wanted more money, but he hastened to add
that he was not the "ringleader," which was evidently a
reference to the union activity, according to Siegel. Siegel
also said that because Hicks appeared a little "shaky and
scared," he and Jesse tried to calm him. He agreed that
Jesse may have said "something to the effect" about
quitting if dissatisfied, but this he tied to the Company's
I The Board found that Respondent violated the Act in the following 147 NLRB 594, enfd 340 F 2d 309 (C A 2), 165 NLRB 493, enfd 417 F 2d
cases Henry I Siegel Co, Inc, 143 NLRB 386, enfd 328 F 2d 25 (C A 2), 559 (C A D C). and 172 NLRB 825. mod 417 F 2d 1206 (C A 6)
868 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
inability to grant wage increases at that time and not to
any union activity that Hicks might be engaging in.
Sam Siegel denied that he told Hicks dunng their
conferences that employees could lose theirjobs because of
the Union or advised him that he could get his neck
chopped off if he stuck it out. He also said that, before they
met with Hicks, he had not told Jesse Siegel about
employee attempts to organize but only about the
Thornton meeting. He admitted, however, that it was
possible that he had spoken with Hicks during the
morning.
Jesse Siegel testified that he met with Hicks because Sam
Siegel had told him about the meeting the drivers had with
Thornton He suggested that he would like to talk with a
driver to find out what exactly was bothering them. When
Sam agreed, he chose Hicks to talk with because Hicks had
driven him from the Nashville airport to Bruceton on
occasion.
When Hicks came in, Siegel said he mentioned the
Thornton meeting and driver dissatisfaction to him and
asked him what the discontent was all about. Hicks listed a
number of grievances, including wages and lack of
appreciation. Siegel said he was surprised because, not
having heard Hicks voice a complaint before this, he
assumed he had none, and he told him so. He denied that
he suggested that Hicks quit his employment, and he said
that he only explained to him that if he (Siegel) had worked
hard, but could not achieve a certain goal, and was,
moreover, emotionally upset because of his failure, he
would consider leaving the environment that was contnb-
uting to his emotional distress. He stressed, however, that
such a course was what he personally would do, not what
he wished Hicks to do.
Jesse Siegel denied that he and Hicks discussed the union
movement which was afoot. He also said Hicks did not tell
him that the drivers had signed union cards, "nor was (he)
interested in it," he added He corroborated Sam Siegel's
denial of Hicks testimony about threats based on his union
activities.
Jesse Siegel immediately reached Thornton after the
Hicks' conference, he said, and had him arrange a meeting
with the drivers for the morning of August 19, which was
before he had received a copy of the Union's petition for
an election. The meeting was attended by a number of
company officials. Thornton spoke to the employees about
comparable rates in the area. Jesse Siegel said that he also
addressed the employees and explained that because of
costs and an earnings decline, plus the recent wage freeze,
there was nothing the company could promise the
employees by way of wage increases besides a wage
increase in September that had been promised them the
year before
Based upon a number of factors, I conclude that Hicks'
version of how he came to be interviewed by Respondent's
principal officers and what was said by the participants
during the interview is more logical and believable on its
face than theirs and that he was otherwise the most
credible. First of all, since Thornton, Respondent's vice
president in charge of operations, had heard the drivers'
complaints about their wages, there would appear to be no
real reason why the Siegels could not have found out what
the "problem" was from him and not from an individual
driver. If they were displeased, as they said they were about
Thornton's delay in acting on the "problem," they could
have directed him to take action immediately without
further discussion of it with a rank-and-file employee. It
also appears that, regardless of what was said about union
activities in their conversation, Sam Siegel, I find, had
clearly had Hicks in his office to talk with him about
something that very morning and had him summoned back
from an assignment that afternoon to meet with him again,
this time with Jesse Siegel present. This, it seems to me, was
an unusual amount of attention for a company president
and vice president to pay to an ordinary truckdriver whose
only deviation from conventional employee behavior,
assertedly known to Respondent at the time, was his
attendance at a gripe session with another vice president.2
The logic of the situation is that Hicks had some important
information to transmit to Jesse Siegel about the current
union activity and that Jesse had previously learned of this
from Sam Siegel. A further indication of this is found in
Jesse Siegel's lame explanation that he chose Hicks to talk
with about the "problem" because he knew him from the
Nashville trips, for, not only does it appear that other
company drivers had performed the same services for
Siegel in the past, the explanation differs from Sam Siegel's
testimony that Hicks was chosen because he was the oldest
driver, or because he was available and would probably
accept the invitation.
Sam Siegel had testified before Jesse Siegel was called by
Respondent that it was possible that Jesse had suggested to
Hicks that he quit his job if he were dissatisfied with
conditions. I find Jesse Siegel's explanation for how this
remark came to be uttered to be completely unconvincing
and an after-the-fact attempt to blunt the obvious coercive
nature of the statement but attributing Hicks' uneasiness
during the interview to something other than the meeting
itself with the highest official in the company and by
camouflaging the inhibiting suggestion with qualifying
phrases purporting to relate his gratuitous advice to
Respondent's humanitarian and overriding interest in
Hicks' mental health and not to Respondent's own self-
interest.
I also find Jesse Siegel's statements that there was no
discussion about employee union activity with Hicks and
that he was ' not interested in it too hard to believe
Respondent's interplant transportation system upon which
its manufacturing processes depend cannot operate with-
out drivers. That Respondent would be unconcerned about
their drivers joining the Teamsters Union is as incredible as
Jesse Siegel's testimony that he knew nothing about the
Union's organization efforts at the time he met with Hicks.
Sam Siegel knew about them; he admitted that he had
heard about it before he received the official notification
from the Board that a petition had been filed. If he had
been alerted, it is more than likely that he had alerted Jesse
Siegel, particularly when they were trying to get to the root
of some "problem" that the drivers appeared to have with
respect to employment.
I find, therefore, that on or about August 17, 1971, Sam
2 Jesse Siegel has 5,000 employees under his command
HENRY I. SIEGEL CO., INC. 869
Siegel coercively interrogated employee Hicks about why
he and other truckdrivers had signed union authorization
cards. By such conduct Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
At the same time , Sam Siegel told employee Hicks that if
he stuck his neck out for the union, he could get it chopped
off, and he also asked him where he would find another job
if he lost the one he had. During the same conversation,
Siegel told Hicks that employees could lose their jobs
because of the Union. By such threats, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
Jesse Siegel 's suggestion made in their conversation about
union activity on or about August 17, 1971, that Hicks and
other drivers quit their employment if they were unhappy
C. The Discharge of Foster, Hicks, and Presson
1. The facts
There is a restaurant called the "Crestview Drive Inn" at
Gleason, Tennessee, on State Route 22, which is frequent-
ed by Respondent's truckdrivers for coffeebreaks and
lunch on their way to and from Respondent's Gleason
plant and its other plants northwest of Gleason. Foster,
Hicks, and Presson were discharged by Ross, their
immediate supervisor, on December 9, 1971, at approxi-
mately 9:05 a.m., as they left the Crestview after having
spent 15 or 20 minutes, or 30 to 40 minutes in the
restaurant, depending on whose version is accepted. There
can be no question that most of Respondent's drivers had
been stopping at the Crestview for a very long time, and
there also is no doubt that Respondent was aware of it for
at least 2 years, according to Thornton, who is responsible
for them. It also is undisputed that Respondent had its
drivers propensities under surveillance for many months
and was aware that many of them were stopping at the
Crestview for periods of time which Respondent now
claims were unreasonable, but no disciplinary action was
taken by Respondent to remedy the situation until
December 9 and no employee was warned that he was
abusing a privilege and that continued violations of
Respondent's policy, whatever that may actually have
been, would lead to his discharge
As indicated earlier, the Union lost the Board election
held on October 21, 1971, by a vote of 10 to 6 No
objections were filed to the election, and the Regional
Director of the Board certified the results on November 1.
There appears to have been no union activity among the
drivers after the election, and according to Hicks, the
matter "died."
The three dischargees all signed union authorization
cards on August 12. Foster attended two union meetings
prior to the election, one of which, that held at Jackson,
Tennessee, was the one that Sam Siegel asked him about in
September 1971 Hicks solicited other employees for the
Union and attended three meetings, one of which was held
at his home. He also acted as the Union's observer at the
Board election. Presson attended one union meeting in
addition to signing a card, and he appears to have been the
least active of the three.
All of the dischargees had excellent work records; they
had never been disciplined or seriously warned about their
work. Foster had been employed for 6 years; Presson for 5;
and Hicks for 10 , 7 of which were as a driver . As indicated
earlier , Hicks was Respondent 's most senior driver.
Foster, whose testimony I consider to be reliable, arrived
at the Crestview restaurant in Gleason on the morning of
December 9, 1971, between 8:30 and 8:45. Foster got there
about 5 or 10 minutes after drivers Hicks and Presson did,
but all three left the establishment at the same time
Foster testified that as he left the restaurant , Supervisor
Ross stopped him and told him he was fired . When he
asked Ross to repeat what he had said , Ross did so, adding
that he was acting under orders to fire him if he caught him
stopping at the restaurant.
Ross fired the other two drivers and ordered them all to
turn over their ignition keys and leave the vehicles where
they were parked. Security Manager Hollingsworth, who
had accompanied Ross that morning, drove Ross and the
dischargees back to Bruceton.
On the way back to Bruceton there were some exchanges
about the reasons for the terminations . Foster asked Ross
if drivers were not permitted to take breaks, and he said
Ross did not give him "too good an answer ." One of the
drivers asked if they were the only ones who were going to
be fired when it was also the practice for other drivers to
stop at the Crestview Ross admitted , according to Foster's
credited testimony , that he knew that the three dischargees
and other drivers had been stopping at Crestview and that
the three who he had just apprehended had not been
spending any more time there than some of the others.
Ross also indicated , however, that because Foster , Hicks,
and Presson were the only drivers he had caught, they were
the only employees he had orders to fire.
When the employees arrived at Bruceton they were
permitted to talk with Sam Siegel .3 Hicks, who did most of
the talking, asked why they had been fired and if breaks
were not allowed . According to Foster , Siegel said breaks
were not permitted because the drivers were paid for a full
day, but he also made some reference to the length of time
the drivers had been spending at the restaurant. In any
case, it is clear that the men protested that they had been
acting no differently in this instance than they had in the
past and that Siegel replied that it had been going on for
only "two of three months"
Foster testified without contradiction that it had been his
practice for many years to stop at the Crestview in the
morning on almost every trip which took him past it and
that every other driver going in that direction did too. He
said that his stays usually lasted 15 or 20 minutes and that
the pattern of his conduct in regard to frequency and
length of time at the Crestview had not changed recently.
Hicks testified that he has no regular run but had been
assigned to drive to Tiptonville on December 9. He
stopped at Crestview on the way, getting there ahead of
Presson and Foster, and he left when they did.4
Hicks testified that as he left the restaurant slightly
3 Siegel knows most of the drivers because they were under his 4 The drivers' logs, which show time of departure and arrival at various
supervision at one time points, are not too helpful in determining exactly when a driver left or
(Continued)
870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ahead of Foster and Presson, Ross shouted at him, "Hey,
Hicks, this is it . The man told me to fire you on the spot
when I caught you stopped." Hicks said that since he knew
that Ross was aware that he and other drivers had been
stopping at Crestview for some time, he responded,
"You've got to be kidding," but Ross replied, "No, it's the
truth," and added, "He told me to fire all three of you."
When Presson and Foster came within speaking range,
Ross told them essentially what he had just told him. Ross
then telephoned Thornton at the plant, and returned to
inform the three discharged drivers that he had been
instructed to remove the ignition keys from their vehicles
and drive them back to Bruceton
Hicks added to Foster's account the information that
during the course of the drive to Bruceton there was some
reference to Respondent's failure to warn the drivers and
that Ross conceded that he knew that all the drivers
stopped at Crestview, some longer than the dischargees,
but that Thornton had instructed him not to issue a
warning, but to fire the drivers when he caught them.
Hicks' version of the drivers' meeting with Sam Siegel
that afternoon is essentially like Foster's The men
protested their discharges, but Siegel told them he was
sorry, but he could do nothing about them because
Respondent had written evidence that they had been
spending as much as an hour or two at Crestview. Hicks
denied this charge, but Siegel replied that the drivers were
paid for the entire day and were not entitled to take coffee
or lunch breaks on Respondent's time.
According to Hicks, he has stopped at Crestview on
several occasions in the past, but not "too frequently." His
longest stop when he did, he said, was not over 20 minutes.
Presson testified that Hicks was already stopped at
Crestview when he arrived and that Foster entered the
restaurant within 5 or 10 minutes His testimony about
what Ross told them as they left the restaurant is basically
like Hicks', and I credit that much of it. He said, for
example, that he could not at first believe Ross' announce-
ment that all three drivers were discharged because
Thornton had ordered him to fire them "on the spot." Ross
admitted that he had never warned the drivers about their
conduct, and when Presson argued that other drivers
engaged in the same practice, Ross replied that he only had
orders to fire those he caught stopping that mornmg.5
Presson said, and I credit his uncontradicted testimony,
that he had been stopping at Crestview "four or five times"
each month for approximately 15 or 20 minutes for the last
5 years, that he knew he should not remain there "for any
long period of time," but that he had never been told by
anyone to change his habits.
Ross, the drivers' immediate supervisor and dispatcher,
was admittedly acting under instructions from Thornton to
terminate the drivers he caught at the Crestview on
December 9. Thornton testified that he had known for at
least 2 years that drivers were stopping at the Crestview.
He said that although there was some discussion about the
practice among management officials, no investigation of it
arrived at a given point, for the time is entered to the nearest quarter hour
5 I do not credit Presson's statement that the drivers charged Ross with
"setting them up" that morning and that he admitted that they were "set
up " These words do not appear in Hicks' and Fosters' versions, and Ross
was made until May 1971, after he had seen three of
Respondent's vehicles parked outside of the restaurant on
overtime. Because of what he had personally observed, he
said he discussed it with Ross, and it was decided to have
Security Manager Hollingsworth conduct an investigation
to determine the extent of the practice. Hollingsworth
placed the restaurant under surveillance intermittently
during June and July 1971, but discontinued it, Thornton
said, on advice of counsel, while the Union's election
proceeding was pending before the Board.
Thornton said that the investigation began again in
November, after the Board had certified the results of the
election, because the Respondent had heard that the
practice of drivers stopping at the Crestview was still alive.
This investigation disclosed that drivers were spending an
hour or more at the restaurant, Thornton said, and, during
President Jesse Siegel's visit to Bruceton in late November
to discuss a coming Board election for the employees at
Respondent's Fulton plant, Thornton mentioned the
practice to him. He said that Jesse Siegel told him to
continue his investigation and to have "someone go down
there and determine if this is happening, see it on the spot,
and fire the people on the spot ." Siegel did not tell
Thornton to select any particular driver.
Thornton relayed Siegel's instructions to Ross. He said
he told him to personally observe the drivers at Crestview
and if they "were abusing the stop privilege .. . if they
stayed longer than 15 or 20 minutes, that he was to go in
and the drivers who happened to be there, he was to
terminate them on the spot." He explained that by
"abusing the privilege he meant taking more than a 15- or
20-minute break, but he also said that "10 or 15 minutes at
that hour of the morning would have been reasonable" and
that the Company felt that its prior investigation would
show that whomever would be found at the Crestview that
day would also have been there "in June, July and
August," and so the immediate abuse of breaktime "plus
past conduct amounted to the reason for the discharges."
Ross was instructed to take another company representa-
tive with him and not to permit the potential discharges to
drive their equipment back to Bruceton . Thornton said he
did not instruct Ross when to go to Crestview or who to
observe, and he had to "prod him several times" before he
carried out his orders.
Jesse Siegel testified that having learned from Thornton
in June 1971 that company drivers were "killing time" at
the Crestview, he instructed him to have Hollingsworth
investigate and determine how extensive the practice was.
He received no written reports from either Hollingsworth
or Thornton after the investigation commenced, but they
told him that they were investigating and would keep him
informed. No action was taken in June, July, or August,
but Siegel said he knew that Thornton and Hollingsworth
were continuing their surveillance and were maintaining
records.
During the course of a meeting in Bruceton with
company counsel and a local plant manager to discuss the
denied making the remark I am con.mced that Presson believes from the
circumstances that Respondent had planned to permit him and the others to
take breaks at Crestview that morning while under surveillance and, in that
sense , "set them up " But this is his conclusion and not Ross' words
HENRY I . SIEGEL CO., INC
coming Board election for the Fulton employees, Thornton
told him that "the truckdrivers were continuing to take
inordinate breaks . . . and that this was causing the
company delay in getting its material to its plant and, also,
was causing considerable overtime costs." This report
perturbed him, Siegel said, because he was "tired of
hearing these stories," and so he directed Thornton the
"next time he catches any drivers taking inordinate breaks
he should dismiss them on the spot." He said he did not tell
Thornton who to discharge or when to do it.
Ross testified'that surveillance of the Crestview contin-
ued from June to the middle of August and was resumed in
late October or early November. When investigation
revealed that the drivers were still taking long breaks at the
restaurant, Thornton advised him that he must act to stop
the practice. He delayed doing anything, however, until
Thornton asked him a number of times when he planned to
act and finally ordered him to go to the Crestview with
Hollingsworth and discharge any driver he found spending
more than 15 minutes in the restaurant.
On December 9, which Ross said was the first day both
he and Hollingsworth were free, they left Bruceton
sometime before 8 a.m., after he had given Foster, Hicks,
and Presson their assignments for the day and after he was
sure that they were about ready to leave for their
destinations When he and Hollingsworth arrived at the
Crestview, they parked across the road and waited. Shortly
thereafter, two of Respondent's trucks stopped and their
drivers entered the restaurant. "About" 10 minutes later,
another driver parked and went in. Ross said that he and
his companion then remained where they were for
"approximately" 20 minutes, which would have been 30
minutes after the arrival of the first driver, and then drove
across the road and waited for the drivers to leave the
restaurant. As they did, they were timed. It was now 9:05
a.m., he said, and Hicks and Presson had spent 40 minutes
at the Crestview, and Foster 30.
Ross said that Foster, Hicks, and Presson were the only
truckdrivers headed toward Gleason at that hour in the
morning, and he agreed that he was aware that since they
were the only ones he had scheduled to drive in that
direction, they were the only persons who could possibly
be discharged that morning.
Ross' version of what was said when he confronted the
drivers as they left the Crestview is not a great deal
different from theirs. He added, however, that as he got out
of the car and approached them, Hicks said, "You've
caught us all " He also denied that he had made any
statements to them about "setting them up." He agreed
that he told them that he had orders to fire them if he
caught them, but he qualified this by adding that they were
to be fired if they spent "any time over break time, 15
minutes" at the restaurant. He also agreed that the men
complained about the lack of warnings and that he replied
that he was acting under orders from his superiors. He
recalled that Hollingsworth stated that he had been
checking on all drivers and had records of their stops. but
he did not remember anyone stating that other drivers
6 Hollingsworth's notes were at first offered into evidence, but it did not
clearly appear when the witness had made the entries General Counsel
objected to their admission, and the offer was subsequently withdrawn after
871
remained at Crestview longer than the dischargees.
Although I credit Ross' dental of Presson's testimony
about having admitted that the drivers had been "set up"
for discharges by Respondent and also believe that Hicks
or someone made some remark about being "caught,"
since I find, as indicated earlier, that Hicks' and Foster's
versions are more complete and reliable, I find that Ross or
Hollingsworth, or both, admitted to the employees that
they were not the only or the worst offenders. I also find
that Ross did not specifically tell the men that he had been
told to fire them if their breaks exceeded 15 minutes,
although he very likely could have mentioned "killing too
much time."
Hollingsworth, Respondent's security manager, began
his surveillance of the Crestview in May 1971, at
Thornton's request, and he continued it until December,
with an interruption during the election period, until the
drivers were discharged. During that period, he recorded
the name of each of the 8 or 9 drivers who regularly
stopped at Crestview and the amount of time each
remained.6 Most of his observations were made in the
morning at coffeebreak time, and the amount of time each
driver remained inside varied from 12 to nearly 45 minutes,
he said, and one driver stayed an hour. He conceded that
one driver, who was not discharged, spent more time in the
Crestview than Foster and possibly more than Hicks and
Presson. He also agreed that after the employees had been
discharged they asked him if he had checked other drivers
and if the others had not spent as much time as they had.
He said that he responded that he had and that he thought
so.
Hollingsworth's testimony about his participation in the
December 9 discharges is similar to Thornton's and Ross'.
He had made some reports to Thornton about Crestview
and the drivers before December and at that time
Thornton told him he had been instructed to recheck the
drivers and fire them if they spent over 15 minutes in the
restaurant. He went to Crestview with Ross and observed
the discharges as Ross had testified. He said that two
dnvers remained at Crestview for 40 minutes and one for
30. He added little else to Ross' version of what was said to
and by the drivers after Ross told them he had orders to
terminate them if they "spent that much time in there." 7
Sam Siegel, whose responsibilities once included supervi-
sion of the Company's interplant transportation system,
testified that he told the drivers when they saw him that
they had been discharged because "they were spending too
much time, or were taking off time while they were
supposed to be working." He explained to them that there
were two things the Company could not tolerate, namely,
"stealing or wasting time," and he said that the drivers
knew this, or should have known it, for anyone who had
worked for the Company for any length of time did.
Siegel testified that it was "common knowledge" that the
drivers were under surveillance, that he had known of it for
approximately 9 months before they were fired, that the
problem had been discussed internally and that it was
agreed that "sooner or later" something had to be done
Hollingsworth testified from memory
7 This is the witness ' phrasing
872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about it because "too many people" were complaining
about it.
The Company has a policy of issuing warnings to
employees for offenses such as absenteeism , tardiness, bad
work, and other things, Siegel said, but the company did
not warn the discharged truckdrivers because the Compa-
ny cannot "warn anybody who is going to steal, take time
off . . . because we don't know ahead of time what they-
are going to do." He said he did not know when drivers
took lunch or break periods.
Siegel said Thornton made the decision to discharge the
drivers, and he did not mention Jesse Siegel 's participation
in it.
2. Analysis, additional findings, and
conclusions with respect to the discharges
Initially it should be noted that General Counsel
established a strong prima facie case that the discharges
were illegally motivated . Hicks and Foster were known to
have been active in the Union and Presson had also signed
a union card and attended a union meeting with Foster. As
found earlier, Respondent demonstrated its hostility to the
employees ' efforts to organize by Sam and Jesse Siegel's
and Ross' statements to Foster and Hicks , going so far as
to indicate to both of them that their union activities could
cause them to lose theirjobs . In Hicks' case , Respondent's
president , Jesse Siegel , even suggested that he quit if he
were unhappy with existing conditions.8 All three drivers
appeared to have impeccable employment records for they
testified credibly that they had never been warned,
reprimanded , or disciplined during their many years of
service. It also appeared that the employees were dis-
charged for doing something that they and other drivers
had been doing for years , 5 years in one case , and of which
Respondent, and everyone else, was aware. Finally,
Respondent gave the employees no indication of any kind
that it considered their conduct, on which it purportedly
based its later action , impermissible , let alone cause for
termination , and it admitted when it fired them that it
knew what they and others had been doing and that the
habits of the three involved were no worse and perhaps
better than those of other drivers. In the light of these
factors , taken in the context of the more than suspicious
nature of the stake-out itself, Respondent had to go
forward with a credible explanation for the discharges,
although, of course , the ultimate burden rested on General
Counsel to establish his case by a preponderance of the
evidence Based upon a number of considerations, I find
that Respondent 's explanation of its actions is not credible
First, the obvious, employers do not discharge, certainly
not three at a time , accident-free, competent , dependable,
sober, and otherwise reliable, senior over-the-road truck-
drivers without substantial provocation. The dischargees
were of such character; their personnel files were bare of
F Additional evidence of Respondent ' s opposition to employee union
activity is found in the cases cited in fn 1, supra
9 I credit Presson 's testimony that Ross spoke with him only once about
taking too long to make a trip He explained why he had, and the matter
was dropped I also view Ross ' dredging up of this incident as an attempt to
buttress the Company's actions in this case with an event totally
unconnected with the discharges
reprimands or other material reflecting adversely on them,
the Respondent was unable to credibly point to anything
significant which it had or could criticize in their past
employment 9 At the end of Respondent's case, the drivers'
records were still unassailable . More obviously , employers,
especially those who employ personnel managers and
maintain personnel records and who follow a policy of
warnings and reprimands for the usual employee dere-
lictions, do not discharge employees with records such as
these drivers had because their conduct has deteriorated
without first counseling or warning them of the possible
consequences of continuing such actions.
There were no warnings in this case and neither had the
employees ' work habits changed for the worse , because I
credit the main thrust of their testimony , corroborated by
the Company' s own intensive and extended surveillance of
their coffeebreaks , that they were acting on the day they
were fired in conformity with their past practices, which
brings us to a third obvious factor, which is that employers,
acting rationally , do not discharge employees such as these
for doing what they always have done, even if only by
suffrance , without first advising them that the rules have
been changed or will be strictly enforced . To do otherwise
indicates that the real reason for action is concealed, for
the action suggests entrapment and a "set up." io
A fourth obvious factor weakening Respondent 's expla-
nation is that it had observed almost all of its drivers taking
what it claims were "inordinate" breaks of up to an hour or
more , breaks which Jesse Siegel said were delaying
material shipments and requiring overtime payments,
before it acted to stop the practice . If the situation were as
serious as claimed as early as May or June 1971, an
employer who had no compunction in discharging such
employees without warning in December under the
circumstances described, would have been just as hard-
nosed in May or June or even November and would not
have timidly postponed action. The delay strongly suggests
that there was a reason for it other than the one offered. In
addition , there was no election petition pending in May,
June, and July and the first 2 weeks of August to inhibit
Respondent from disciplining its drivers , and so for this
reason alone Jesse Siegel's explanation for delay on that
basis is unconvincing
Still another strong factor working against Respondent's
explanation is that the drivers were fired allegedly for
violating a company rule or policy which I find did not
exist This asserted policy was never made clear to the
drivers or even to company officials, for the latter did not
seem to understand it or be able to explain it. Ross, for
example, testified that there had "always been a standing
rule" that drivers could take a coffeebreak for "ten or
fifteen minutes" if they had been driving "three or four
hours," and that was what "everybody understood," even
though this rule or policy had never been reduced to
writing. The drivers learned about it, he said, by their
10 Respondent never actually offered any explanation for deciding not to
warn the drivers Sam Siegel's suggestion that one can't warn a thief because
one never knows when he plans to steal is not only a strained analogy, but
Respondent had known for considerable time just which drivers had been
stopping at Crestview and was aware that they would probably stop there
again if they were dispatched in that direction , as they were on December 9
HENRY I. SIEGEL CO, INC 873
asking him and his telling them that it was permissible to
stop "if they had been on the road a long period of time."
At another point, he said that Thornton told him to fire
anyone who spent over 15 minutes on a break. Later he
said he told Hicks when he discharged him that he had
been ordered to fire any employee who spent over 15
minutes in the restaurant, but still later he said he told him
that the dead line was 20 minutes or "15 or 20." In an
affidavit given a Board agent prior to the hearing, Ross
stated that all drivers knew that the Company "knew they
stopped for coffee for 5 or 10 minutes in the morning and it
was understood that they could do this." Ross' testimony,
therefore, shows that his understanding of the rule shifts.
Sometimes a break of only 5 or 10 minutes is permissible
and at other times 15 or 20 minutes is tolerated, but these
breaks may be taken only if the employee had been on the
"road a long period of time" or, if the affidavit accurately
expresses the policy at any time in the morning. Asked
what he considered a reasonable time for a break, Ross
conceded that it depends on what the particular driver
"wanted to do " None of the three drivers discharged, of
course, had been on the road more than an hour when they
stopped at Crestview on December 9, in the morning.
Vice President Thornton's description of company policy
was unclear. He said he "would assume" that drivers stop
for breaks and that the Company has never objected to
drivers taking "reasonable breaks." He was aware for some
time before the surveillance started from discussions within
the management family that trucks were sitting at the
Crestview "too long," but nothing was done about it. After
he received his instructions from Jesse Siegel to fire drivers
who were "abusing the privilege," he instructed Ross to
discharge anyone caught "exceeding 15 or 20 minutes." 11
There is nothing in Jesse or Sam Siegel's testimony about
an exact time limit on breaks. Jesse said he heard that the
men were taking "inordinate" or "long coffee breaks," and
ordered their discharges on that basis Sam Siegel said that
the men had been "taking off too much time" but he was
unable to state what the company policy was on morning
or afternoon breaks for drivers. He indicated at one point
that because drivers were paid for all hours from the time
they clocked in until they clocked out, they were not really
entitled to take coffeebreaks at all, and, according to
Hicks' credited testimony, he told the drivers so when they
spoke with him after their discharges, although he also told
them that the Company "had evidence that (they) had
been spending too much time parked on the road."
I find as already indicated, therefore, that there existed
no rule precisely limiting the amount of time a driver could
spend on a coffeebreak and that the only limitation was the
vague standard of "reasonableness." The men had never
been told otherwise and were discharged for doing exactly
what they had done in the past with company knowledge.
The Company's action in terminating them on the basis of
a nonexistent 15- or 20-minute rule without a clarification
of what was expected of them in the future was harsh and
arbitrary, and this is additional evidence that the asserted
reason for discharge is pretextual.
I have also indicated that the total set of circumstances
surrounding the implementation of the Company's claimed
policy are so bizarre from any industrial relations point of
view as to indicate that no legitimate business or
management interest was served by the discharges , and this
suggestion is supported not only by what has been found to
be here, but also by the following . According to Respon-
dent's officers , drivers had been suspected of abusing their
privileges for 2 years and had been known , on the basis of
extended professional surveillance , to be spending up to an
hour or more at the Crestview . All this, names, dates, and
time spent , was documented . Thornton had the power to
fire any driver on the basis of this conduct and Ross had
the power to recommend it, yet neither took any action
until Jesse Siegel ordered it , and Ross had to be prodded
three or more times to execute President Siegel 's orders.
If the driver 's habits were interfering with Respondent's
plant operations and increasing its costs , as Jesse Siegel
suggested in his testimony , it is more than likely that
Thornton, vice president in charge of all plant operations,
would have seen that the problem was remedied without
Siegel's personal mtervention . 12 At least it would not have
been normal for him to have waited from June to
December to resolve it. Then when Respondent finally
decided to act, Ross dispatched three drivers in the
direction of Gleason , full knowing on the basis of past
performances that all or some of them would more than
likely stop at Crestview . When he and Hollingsworth were
satisfied that the drivers were ready to depart , they rushed
to Crestview and waited for the drivers to enter the trap,
prepared to discharge them all if they spent more than 15
or 20 minutes , as they always did, in the restaurant. This
from its beginning was a long, tedious, costly, and
inefficient procedure , and I do not believe that it happened
that way for the reasons given by Respondent The better
inference is that the discharges under those circumstances
were connected with something other than driver efficien-
cy.
Respondent has not fired , disciplined , or warned any
other drivers because of unduly long coffeebreaks since the
three drivers in this case were terminated , and surveillance
seems to have ceased . What Holland , a driver who took
longer breaks than Hicks did and who was not disciplined,
is doing now the record does not reveal and what the
drivers understand the Company's policy to be today is
purely conjectural . No new rules have been issued nor have
the old ones been clarified . The shock of the wholesale
firings may have eliminated the Crestview as a rest stop,
but it would seem that whether this place is off-limits or
whether any breaks for any length of time are allowed is
something that an enlightened employer would want to
make clear to its employees . The failure to do so is some
evidence that the elimination of Hicks, Foster , and Presson
solved the only real "problem" they were connected with
11 As set out above, Thornton also stated that he thought 10 or 15
minutes would be a "reasonable" break at that time of the morning, but he
also testified that those drivers expected to be found at the Crestview on
December 9 would have previously engaged in an abuse of breaktime and
that their past conduct, "plus" their conduct on December 9, was the cause
of their discharge This combination, of course, makes Respondent's policy
even harder to understand
12 Jesse Siegel is the only witness who mentioned interference with
production as one of the effects of the drivers' stops at Crestview, and there
is no other support in the record for this statement I find it to be an
exaggeration and an afterthought bearing on his credibility
874 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which concerned Respondent, that is union organizing
among the drivers.
Finally, Respondent 's witnesses appeared to have real-
ized the unreasonableness and harshness of Respondent's
ultimate action because they attempted to rationalize it,
sometimes without logic or conviction. Jesse Siegel's
testimony, for example, that he waited from June to
December before he acted because he is a careful person
who did not want to act "precipitately," was unrealistic in
the light of the subsequent discharges without warning,
and without regard to the prior records of the individuals
involved. It was like saying that one does not act hurriedly
so that one may act arbitrarily when one does act. A
bulletin board notice, a drivers' meeting, or a word from
Ross to the drivers would have accomplished any legiti-
mate management goal Ross' testimony about why he had
not warned the employees before he fired them indicated
that he sensed that his role at least was untenable. He
admitted that he customarily issued warnings to other
employees about rule violations, but said he did not think
to warn these drivers because he had not been told to warn
or not to warn. Asked what was unique about these three,
he answered that their uniqueness rested on the fact that
"higher supervision" had told him what to do if he caught
them. This reluctant foreman clearly did not have his heart
in the job he was sent to do.
An employer "can discharge for good cause, for bad
cause, or no cause at all." N.L.R.B. v. T. A. McGahey, Sr.,
et al, d/b/a Columbus Marble Works, 233 F.2d 406, 412
(C.A. 5). But the absence of any cause or the presence of a
reason for which employees are not ordinarily fired is
evidence bearing on the weight of the evidence advanced
by the employer to offset an inference of discriminatory
motivation from other evidence in the record.i3
Based upon the factors which I have listed with respect
to Respondent's claimed reason for the terminations, I am
convinced that the reason put forth does little to offset the
inference that the terminations were illegal I have also
examined Respondent's argument that since no union
activity occurred after the election and another election
could not be held for a year, an inference of unlawful
retaliation is not proper. The election was lost by a vote of
10 to 6, and so there still was a nucleus of union strength to
threaten Respondent with another election which might go
the other way. The elimination of three union sympathizers
would insure against such a possibility.i4
I have also noted that Presson's union activities were not
extensive, but I think it likely that Respondent was aware
of them because it knew that a "carload" of employees had
gone to another town to attend a union meeting. However,
whether or not Respondent knew of Presson's activities or
whether it would have discharged him if he alone had
stopped at Crestview that day, I am convinced that having
S I find it unnecessary to determine whether the employees remained in
the restaurant for 15 or 20 minutes, as they stated , or 30 and 40, as
Respondent 's witnesses testified , for at least two reasons First , as frequently
stressed throughout this decision, they were acting on that day in accord
with past practices, and Respondent knew it Their reactions when
confronted by Ross were not those of guilty men hiding their crimes, and
Ross sensed their shock and the unreasonableness of his position for he
made it clear that he was acting under orders from above Second, his
orders were to fire them after 15 or 20 minutes, depending on which part of
Ross ' statements are based on fact, and so the three men were not
decided to discharge Hicks and Foster if it caught them at
Crestview on December 9, Respondent had to discharge
Presson under the same circumstances or make the
illegality of Hicks' and Foster' s firings apparent . In such a
case, Presson 's discharge is equally discriminatory.
I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by discharging Foster, Hicks, and Presson
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
It is found that the activities of the Respondent set forth
above , in section III, occurring in connection with its
operations described in section 1, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act,
it will be recommended that the Board issue the Recom-
mended Order set forth below requiring Respondent to
cease and desist from said unfair labor practices and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act
Having found that Respondent violated the Act by
discharging James Foster, Willis Hicks, and Thomas
Presson, I will recommend that Respondent offer them
immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs are not available, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights or privileges and make them whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them, by payment to them of a sum
of money equal to what each of them would normally have
earned as wages from the date of discharge to the date of
the Respondent ' s offer of reinstatement, less net earnings
during such period, with backpay and interest thereon to
be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co,
138 NLRB 716.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
the Act , and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization as defined in
Section 2(5) of the Act.
discharged because of 30 or 40 minute breaks , but because their breaks were
at least a minute over 20 Since, as pointed out in detail earlier, no employee
could have understood the rule to be that strict or precise. Respondent's
predetermined response to what it expected to find at Crestview was
Draconian and absurd
is Another election could be held under the Act in September 1972. and
the Board will accept a petition before a year elapses so that it may be
processed Union campaigning, therefore could commence again in much
less than a year
HENRY I SIEGEL CO, INC.
3 By discharging James Foster, Willis Hicks, and
Thomas Presson because they had engaged in union
activities, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act.
4. By engaging in the conduct found to be violations of
the Act set forth in section III, B, the Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER i s
Respondent, Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc., Bruceton, Tennes-
see, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1 Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging employees, refusing to reinstate them or
otherwise discriminating against them because they engage
in union or other protected concerted activities.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees about their union
sympathies or activities.
(c) Creating the impression among its employees that it is
keeping their union activities under surveillance.
(d) Threatening employees with discharge or other
reprisals because they engage in union activities.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer James Foster, Willis Hicks, and Thomas
Presson immediate and full reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if those jobs are not available, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges and make them whole for any
loss of earnings, in the manner set forth in "The Remedy"
section of this Decision.
(b) Notify the above-named employees, if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States , of their
right to full reinstatement upon application, in accordance
with the Selective Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents all payroll and other records necessary to compute
the backpay and reinstatement rights, as set forth in "The
Remedy" section of this Decision.
(d) Post at its Bruceton, Tennessee, plant, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 16 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 26, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent, be,
posted immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in
875
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith i7
15 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board . the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
16 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
17 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Highway
and Local Motor Freight Employees Local Union No
667, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, or any other labor organization, by discharg-
ing or refusing to reinstate employees or in any manner
discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL offer James Foster, Willis Hicks, and
Thomas Presson immediate and full reinstatement to
their former jobs or, if those jobs are not available, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
seniority or other rights and privileges and make them
whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their
union activities and the activities of other employees,
threaten reprisals against employees because of their
union activities, create the impression among employ-
ees that we are keeping their union activities under
surveillance, or in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the
right to self-organization, to form labor organizations,
to join or assist the above-named or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities.
HENRY 1. SIEGEL CO, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
Note: We will notify each of the above-named employees,
if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in
876 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Clifford Davis Federal
Bldg., Room 746, 167 North Main Street, Memphis,
Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161.