Harrison Steel Castings Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 17, 1954

109 N.L.R.B. 1381 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS COMPANY 1381
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, the undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The operations of Respondent, Scott Lumber Company, Inc., affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Woodworkers of America, Local 13-269, CIO, is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
deem it unnecessary to pass upon this statement for it is clear that, in the light most favor-
able to the General Counsel, it was an isolated incident and the issuance of a remedial order
is not warranted under the circumstances See Bob Morgan Motor Company, Inc, 100
NLRB 334; Waffle Corporation of America, 103 NLRB 895; and The American Thread Com-
pany, 97 NLRB 810.
HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS COMPANY and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF
AMERICA, CIO . Case No . 35-CA-619 . September 17, 1954
Decision and Order
On April 13, 1954, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his In-
termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint, and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in
its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report at-
tached hereto. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Union filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and the briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
The complaint herein, as amended at the hearing, alleges that the Company has
violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61
Stat. 136, by laying off on April 10, 1953, and failing and refusing 1 to reinstate,
because they engaged in union activities, Garnet B. Price, Edgar Rager, Jesse W.
I Except In the case of Johnnie Lyons, the General Counsel does not claim that there
were refusals to reinstate ; he relies on the Company's failure to reinstate the other seven
named when the duty to do so allegedly existed. The Company admits that the eight were
laid off on or about the respective dates listed.
109 NLRB No. 195.
1382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lions, Corbin C. Honaker , Glen D . Green , and Eugene K. Douglas; on May 1, 1953,
Leon P. Blanton; and on April 10, 1953, Johnnie Lyons, who was refused reinstate-
ment until on or about August 24, 1953 , at which time the Company discriminatorily
reinstated him to a lesser position ; and that the Company has violated Section 8 (a)
(1) by said alleged acts, and by threatening employees with loss of jobs if they engaged
in union activities, and interrogating employees concerning such activities or mem-
bership. The answer denies the allegations of unfair labor practices . A hearing
was held before me at Attica , Indiana, from February 1 through 5, 1953, inclusive.
Pursuant to leave granted to all parties, briefs were thereafter filed by the General
Counsel and the Company , the time to do so having been extended.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE COMPANY 'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It was admitted and I find that the Company , an Indiana corporation with sole
plant and office in Attica , Indiana, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of steel
castings ; that during the calendar year 1952 it purchased raw materials valued at more
than $ 600,000, of which approximately 50 percent was shipped to its plant from
points outside the State ; that during said period it sold products valued at more than
$1,000 ,000, of which more than 50 percent was shipped by it from the plant to points
outside the State; and that the Company is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act.
It was stipulated and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
References herein made to the evidence , not ascribed to named witnesses , represent
uncontradicted testimony , or findings where conflicts have been resolved; findings
are made on the basis of reliable , probative , and substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole and the preponderance of the testimony taken , and evidence
in conflict with the findings which is not discussed has not been credited. I have
felt warranted in crediting portions of a witness ' testimony while rejecting other
portions.
A. The alleged violation of Section 8 (a) (3)
1. The history of recent organizational activities
It appears from the testimony that Yohe, a ladleman, played the leading role
in organizational activities . In January 1953 several employees asked him "about the
prospects of getting a union," and the next month he and Howard, another employee,
met with and obtained cards from a representative of the Union. Yohe thereafter
gave cards to those who had asked him about a union; they themselves signed and
took cards for others . On Sunday , March 29 ( this date was fixed by other witnesses;
Yohe was uncertain whether it was March 29 or April 5), 15 employees and the
union representative met at Yohe 's home. The various individuals ' union activities
were so slight that it is necessary to detail virtually all of them prior to making any
finding concerning substantiality.
In addition to his activities already described , Yohe talked about the Union at
the plant , and signed men up at the washhouse and going to and from work, all on
his own time . Hutchison attended the meeting ( that at Yohe 's house on March 29
is the only one mentioned); he signed a union card and, in the shop, talked to
employees about the Union. He got blank cards about a week before the meeting,
and, next to Yohe, he appears to have been the most active union supporter.2 Ross
attended the meeting and signed a card. Ralph Lyons ( not a discriminatee ) attended
the meeting . He signed a card and obtained others, which he distributed at home
and downtown ; he did not "talk union" at the plant.
Green attended the meeting , received cards, and distributed them in the shower-
room outside of duty hours . He himself signed a card about a week before he was
8 Assistant Supeiintendent and Foreman Ward testified that on May 15 or 16 he saw a
union handbill dated May 15 and signed by Yohe and Hutchison ; earlier bills had been
signed , but not by them. The union representative testified that a handbill was distributed
on May 14 , but that not until May 21 did any bear the signature of Yolie or Hutchison
Whatever inaccuracy and impairment of credibility are here suggested are not deteimina
tive in the face of the other evidence received
HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS COMPANY 1383
laid off . Price, about 2 weeks prior to his layoff, signed a union card which Yohe
gave him. He did not attend the meeting , but he spoke "some" in favor of the union
at the end of his shift and at the noon hour. Johnnie Lyons' union activity was
limited to signing a card which Yohe gave him some 4 to 6 weeks before he was
laid off. Blanton attended the meeting; he signed a card and obtained others, which
he distributed among the men at the shop. He testified that he signed up 1 or 2,
perhaps more, but he did not remember, and that he also discussed the Union at the
plant. Rager attended the meeting where he received cards for distribution. He
talked about the Union at the plant, but got signed cards at his home only. He gave
his own and other signed cards to Yohe. Jesse Lions appears only to have signed
a card 2 or 3 weeks before he was laid off. Honaker attended the meeting, where
he signed a card and received blank cards, which he had signed. He spoke to em-
ployees on the way to and from the bathhouse and in his car on the Company's
parking lot. Douglas attended the meeting, signed a card, and got blank cards.
An attempt to reconcile his testimony suggests that in the plant he spoke to other
employees about the Union, but he did not in the plant speak to any about signing
cards.
2. The layoffs and knowledge of union activity
On the part of the Company it was explained that with a cutback in orders and the
anticipation of further cutbacks, and as stocks accumulated, it was decided in the
latter part of March 1953 and early in April to cut down on production and to reduce
personnel by approximately 100. The reduced pouring schedule for the week begin-
ning April 13 meant a cutting off of 5 electric furnaces, from 14 to 9, this affecting
among others the employees in the classifications with which we are here concerned.
There was a reduction from 3 shifts to 2, and the electric furnace job classifications
affected by this reduction included cranemen, shakeout men, chain hookers, ladlemen,
and electric furnace operators. The foundry superintendent testified that on the basis
of the total number which he was instructed to lay off, he fixed the number in each
department and directed the respective foremen to reduce their force by the specified
number. It does not appear from the figures submitted and which stand unchallenged
that the decision to reduce the working force or the extent of the allocation of reduc-
tions to the foundry, with which we are specifically concerned, was discriminatory.
This is not to say that employees are powerless to organize and that such activities
can be prevented when business declines. Having the right to reduce its force, an
employer must exercise that right without discrimination for organization activities.
The total of the Company's hourly employees fell from 1,019 in the week ending
April 11 (there were approximately 450 in the foundry; the change in total employ-
ment there from week to week is not set forth) to 922 in the week ending May 16.
Thereafter there were fluctuations, with some explanation 3 thereof on the basis of
specific and limited orders, and an approximate mean of 950 unul the week ending
October 3; further reductions, including 2 of about 100 each brought the year end
total for the plant to 703. (While the weekly figures for employees hired and termi-
nated did not tally with the total on the payroll for the respective weeks, it was
assumed that the differences reflect an office girl's use of the figures. For the calendar
year, the totals were close to a balance.)
Coming down from the plant to the foundry level, the decision was then made by
the foundry superintendent to cut out certain numbers of jobs of various kinds. As
noted, supra, the record shows that under the procedure followed foremen selected the
individuals to be laid off within the classifications indicated by the foundry superin-
tendent and transmitted by Ward. There being no issue concerning the types of job
selected for layoffs, the question remains whether, having received instructions con-
cerning the positions , and the number of men in each, where reductions were to be
made, the foremen acted discriminatorily in their specific recommendations; and
whether the foundry superintendent discriminatorily approved the recommendations.
(The General Counsel lays the discrimination to Ward, but adds that "the evidence
as a whole clearly shows that the layoffs in question were discriminatorily moti-
vated.")
3 The only explanation for the hiring of 15 during the week ending April 11 is the works
manager's statement that the "chances ale they were ordered in tine week before " He
later noted that 4 or 5 days ordinarily elapse between the time of requisition and the time
of hiring. It does not appear that they directly or indirectly replaced the alleged dis-
criminatees although 7 or 8 were hired in the foundry ; their jobs wale not described, and
there is no basis for assumption that these were the same as those held by the men laid off
Such evidence as there is on this point indicates that those laid off «ere not replaced As
for any later lured, reference must be made to the Company's hiring practice, infra.
1384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Not to be overlooked is the relationship in point of time between the organizational
activities and the layoffs, which would give rise to the suspicion and support the
General Counsel's claim of causal connection. But the explanation of economic
necessity was submitted, as noted. Further, the suggestion that retaliation was imme-
diate in relation to the meeting at Yohe's house is met by the fact that the activities
had been pursued for a few months before; union cards had been obtained in February
and given before the meeting to various employees for further distribution and sign-
ing. The General Counsel claims that Ward had more than a general knowledge of
these activities, and the latter testified to a conversation which he had with Ross con-
cerning union activities; by reference to an increase which Ross received at the time,
Ward placed that conversation in the middle of March, while Ross testified that it
took place during the latter part of the week after the March 29 meeting. In any
event, whatever the extent of Ward's knowledge of union activities, there is no basis
for a finding that such knowledge existed on April 10 or a few days before, but not
in March or even February.
But whatever decision is made on the basis of the testimony that there was or was
not justification for the respective layoffs (these will be further examined seriatim,
infra, for such additional consideration as reviewing authority may want to give
them), we must weigh the evidence whether the Company had knowledge of the
organizational activities of the various individuals as distinguished from knowledge of
activity generally .4 Unless the layoffs, which are the subject of proof, are them-
selves to be regarded as evidence of company knowledge, there is no evidence that the
Company had knowledge of organization activities by the alleged discriminatees,
which were conducted off the working area and in such places as the washroom, the
parking lot, and off the company premises entirely. The General Counsel, admitting
the absence of knowledge of the "specific activities engaged in by the individual 8
(a) (3)'s herein," urges an inference of knowledge. Such an inference is unwarranted
both on principle and on the authority of the Shen-Valley case cited.
Yohe and Hutchison, the two most active union adherents, were not laid off. (I am
not impressed by the argument that Yohe was not discharged, despite the Company's
discriminatory intent, because his is "one of the most responsible jobs at the plant."
That same importance would be stressed as indicating discrimination if he had been
discharged The argument is also at cross purposes with the claim that Ward urged
him to quit.) Three of the eight alleged discriminatees did not even attend the
meeting at Yohe's house; the other 5 were among the 15 who did attend together with
Yohe, Hutchison, Ross, and 7 unidentified employees. Of course, "a complete house-
cleaning of union members and supporters is not essential to a finding that some
employees have been discriminated against." 5 But on the other hand the General
Counsel has not shown any correlation between these eight layoffs and any known
union activity. (Seven of these were among the 23 listed terminations for the week
ending April 10; the eighth was among 40 for the week ending May 2.) Whether any
of the others laid off engaged in union activity does not appear; the union representa-
tive testified that he did not know three who were named. Of the 9 original selections
for layoffs in the foundry, 3 of the 5 in the shakeout or labor department appear to
have been union members; 1 of the 2 cranemen; the chain hooker in the south
foundry; but not the 1 man selected from the chill room.
The union activities herein were limited and of such an extent as would not warrant
even an assumption that they came to the Company's attention with respect to any
of the individuals with whom we are here most closely concerned, as distinguished
from the overall effect of such activities and the Company's knowledge of their
totality. Nor is this a "small plant" situation, in which, under the doctrine of
attributed knowledge, one can indulge in a presumption of knowledge.
In addition to the union activities testified to, the remarks allegedly made by
company supervisors must also be considered in connection with the question of
company knowledge. Whether such remarks support a finding of interference will
be considered, infra. But at most it is claimed that the suggestion was made to
Yohe that he quit (although, as noted, it was argued that he was too essential to
4 Cf. N. L R. B. v. Falls City Cieameiy Co, 207 F 2d 820, 829 (C. A 8), where the court
held that knowledge of individuals' union activity was not shown although unlike the in-
stant case, the "small plant" rule was considered as potentially applicable. Cf. also
N L R B v. Shen-Palley Heat Packers, Inc., 211 F. 2d 289 (C. A. 4), where the court
declared erroneous the holding that "specific knowledge of Baker's and Rodeffer's UCW
positions is inferred on the part of the Company because certain Company representatives
admitted only to knowing of UCW activity within the plant."
6 Stewart-TVarner Corporation, 55 NLRB X593, 610. See also Inter-City Advertising Com-
pany of Greensboro, N C, Inc., 89 NLRB 1103, 1105; Pennwoven, Inc., 94 NLRB 175.
HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS COMPANY 1385
the Company 's operation to be laid off ); that Hutchison was questioned, and the
Company's considerateness pointed out to him; that Ross was threatened, as was
Blanton; that Ward told Green and Price that the employees should have gone to
a supervisor instead of trying to do things themselves ; that Beason , another employee,
was asked about union talk in his home community ; that a threat and warning were
issued to Ralph Lyons ; and that Ward told Sewell , a rank-and -file employee , that he
knew or could tell "about who" had signed cards. ( Sewell later testified that Ward
stated this more positively .) I note that except for the last of these, and the statement
allegedly made to Green and Price, both of which statements are all inclusive,
these remarks refer immediately to none of the alleged discriminatees other than
Blanton, who remained on the job for 3 weeks after the others were laid off . Sewell's
credibility is considered , infra. But in any event, Ward's alleged replies to him, as
to Blanton , suggest that Ward did not discriminate against those who signed a union
card. The General Counsel would have it both ways; prove company knowledge
by statements allegedly made to employees who signed cards but were not laid off;
then prove discrimination by the layoff of some who signed cards-no basis being
suggested for distinction between signers laid off and those not laid off . Whether
or not they constituted interference , these various statements do not prove company
knowledge of the union activities of the respective 8 (3)'s; this regardless of whether
the conversations with Yohe and Hutchison took place in April or in May.
Finally, by way of noting the type of evidence which would be material to the
issues before us, there is neither claim nor proof that the Company failed to lay off
employees whose jobs in the production process preceded the work of the alleged
discriminatees , or other employees whose jobs would likewise be affected by the
cutbacks in orders ; nor do we have any attempt to correlate layoffs with union mem-
bership. We do not even have evidence of the extent of union membership in the
departments in which there were layoffs. (This is noted in addition to the elements
which suggest that in fact there was no unlawful discrimination.)
3. The failure to recall
The General Counsel 's position is that a layoff, as distinguished from a discharge,
is intended to be temporary ; and that the Company was under obligation to recall
laid off employees . It is true that "laid off" ( the General Counsel's witnesses also
used the word "discharged " without distinction ) frequently is used to indicate a tem-
porary severance , as distinguished from "discharge ." But that distinction is not
universal , and the Company 's intent and practice in that connection , as well as the
understanding of the employees are at least material . The General Counsel relies
on such meaning of temporariness to indicate an obligation to recall those laid off.
But aside from that alleged meaning of the term , there is no evidence that the Com-
pany intended or that the employees expected management to take the initiative by
recalling.
The Company maintains that "layoff" and "discharge" are used interchangeably
and indicate a permanent condition . The Employees Absentee Report forms received
in evidence , all but one of which were signed by the employees involved , indicate
that each layoff was noted as "Permanent ." Further, the reason for termination
of employment of various employees appears to have been consistently referred to
by the Company as "quit" or "laid off." The records noted go as far back as 1939,
and it would be quite remarkable if during a period of 15 years the Company had
not had occasion to "discharge ," if that term be distinguished from "lay off." If
any doubt remained on this point , it would be dissolved by examination of the
employee separation forms: the only heading referring to discharge is "laid off."
Whatever significance sometimes attaches to the words , there is no warrant for find-
ing that the layoffs here were intended to be or regarded as temporary ; I find that
the General Counsel 's position that there was an obligation to recall has not been
established . ( I do not rely on the pension plan form given Rager , which was received
over the Company 's objection , or the statement made by Steinbaugh , by whom
employees are paid , that layoff and discharge are identical in effect , the Company's
responsibility for either of these has not been shown . That an employee, on termi-
nation , is told to return for money to his credit under a separately administered
profit-sharing plan does not spell out the Company 's liability for whatever is said
or given to him when he does return. Yet, if accepted , they would support the
Company's claim of interchangeableness and "discharge ." The General Counsel,
urging these items, argues that they indicate inconsistency , but no sufficient reason
has been shown for preferring " inconsistent" to "interchangeable ." Neither do I rely
on Honaker 's testimony that at quitting time on April 10 , Clardy, his foreman, told
him that , although he did not know who they were , higher-ups were responsible for
1386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the layoffs, which would be temporary. Aside from the question whether such a
statement under the circumstances would bind the Company despite Clardy's status,
Honaker impressed me as being an overardent witness. On the morning of April 10,
Clardy had allegedly told Honaker that he thought some would be laid off, this
suggesting that the foreman did not choose the men to be laid off, and despite the
consistency of last minute notice of layoffs as well as the evidence of an unhappy
relationship between the two.)
Having passed the question whether the Company was obliged to recall the laid off
employees, we should also consider whether unlawful discrimination was practiced
in subsequent hirings. It is clear from the record that the Company's employment
agent, on request by the works manager for men with given qualifications, screens
applications which he maintains in his active file, and submits more than the required
number for ultimate selection by the works manager. The active file includes new
and recently (the exact time was neither asked nor stated; the works manager thought
"in (his) own mind" that it should be within 1 or 2 weeks, while Johnnie Lyons
went back to work 3 weeks after he applied. As will be noted, infra, applications of
at least some men, unidentified, laid off on April 10 and May 1 were considered in
connection with the hirings during the week ending May 23) filed applications as
well as applications by former employees. The latter need not prepare a new appli-
cation form: if one so requests, the employment agent checks his address and tele-
phone number and places his application into the active file, thus noting his
availability for employment. (It was testified that at least half of the people in
Attica have worked for the Company at some time.) The testimony stands uncon-
tradicated that this method has been uniformly followed for many years and that
the Company has taken the initiative or gone into the field to recruit only when
there was a shortage of men with special skills. It was testified that the last example
of such recruitment occurred early in 1952; before that, early in 1951. It does not
appear that any other method than that described was followed after the last sub-
stantial reduction in force, which occurred in or about 1948.
Confining ourselves to this period, Blanton alone testified that, in the fall of
1950, he was sought out and asked to return to work. Whether his experience on
the various cranes brought him within the group of those with special skills (1950
antedated the period covered by the employment agent in his testimony), or this
be recognized as an exception to the practice described, this is the only instance of
recruitment which the General Counsel can claim violates the alleged practice.
All of the alleged discriminatees except Green appear to have been reemployed
by the Company at various times; among the witnesses who were called by the
General Counsel there were many instances of reemployment after previous lay-
offs or quitting; yet no other instance of recruitment has been cited 6 The testi-
mony concerning hiring practices is accepted as covering the various instances of
rehiring concerning which testimony was received.
There was received in evidence a list of eight other employees, who worked inter-
mittently, quitting and being laid off. A stipulation was noted concerning three
others, and yet another was mentioned in the testimony. The jobs of only some
of these were identified; nor do we have the circumstances of their various hirings,
whether they applied for jobs, or the nature and quality of their work. That they
were latterly hired does not per se establish discrimination. Another item was
noted by the General Counsel, but again without indication of its probative value
here 21 men were hired during the week ending May 23, but (except for 1) for
what kind of work or whether they were even in the foundry does not appear.
Applications of at least some of the men theretofore laid off were at that time con-
sidered; whether they had requested such consideration we do not know.
While reference was made to seniority, there is no proof of a rule or practice
that seniority is determinative on layoffs. Ward, while explaining why Blanton
was laid off, compared his period of service with that of other cranemen. Rhodes,
explaining the layoff of Weppler who appears not to have been a member of the
Union, said that he had less seniority than others, was older, and had no special
skills. Foreman Peterson, although he considered seniority (he noted that Rager
had just been transferred to his department), cited specific reason for discharging
him; likewise for Mettee in Lions' case. The works manager testified that in
explaining the need for layoffs, he did not tell the foundry superintendent to con-
9I have not overlooked Price's testimony that 1 day in 1945 he met Ward in town and
that the latter asked whether he would come back to the plant. Ward explained at that time
that it costs a great deal of money to break in a crane operator.
HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS COMPANY 1387
sider length of service. As for transferability, employees are transferred between
jobs within the foundry and within departments in the foundry, but there is no
evidence of a practice to replace an employee with a transferee in order to avoid
replacement of the latter.
Aside from missing elements of proof to show that the various jobs were later
filled and by whom, I find that it was the Company's practice not to recall unless
application or request therefor was made, and that there was no discrimination
in the failure to recall the alleged discrimmatees. Johnnie Lyons and perhaps
Jesse Lions, of whom more, infra, alone appear to have applied for reemployment
after April 10. No others of the alleged discriminatees tested the Company's policy
of utilizing current applications when hiring, whether of new or former employees
Throughout the hearing, as the General Counsel probed at witnesses and their
testimony, the atmosphere was charged (but scarcely pregnant) with the possi-
bility of disclosure which would involve contradiction, obligation to recall, and
proof of liability. Ever present was the suggestion of imminent discovery as the
evidence was presented. But such discovery or disclosure to show discrimination
by the Company was never realized. There were several opportunities to test the
veracity of the Company's witnesses concerning various forms employed, and the
General Counsel utilized such opportunities. Detailed questioning showed that the
documentary evidence as it included separation forms, Employees Absent Reports,
and retirement plan forms, and the testimony concerning them were generally con-
sistent and credible, e.g., the separation forms are dated and stamped as of the last
day the employee is on the rolls, or the separation date. That the possibility in
each case failed to meet his expectations may not be the General Counsel's fault;
yet his is the responsibility and he must accept the consequences as the defense
was in each case further supported. As the little boy said, a result is what one
hopes for, the consequence is what one gets.
4. The separate instances of alleged discrimination
a. Price and Green
Price, a crane operator, was due on the job at 3:30 p. m. on April 10. He had
gone to the plant that morning to pick up his check, and was told by Ward that
he would be transferred to another crane the following week. A severe storm
had struck the day before and after he left the plant that morning Price heard that
it had hit near his sister's home about 30 miles away. He went there and helped
clean up the damage; but it was then too late to go to work. Nor could he notify
the plant since the storm had knocked down the telephone lines.
Green had been employed by the Company for 2 years, first as a truckdriver and
more recently as a crane operator. He had become ill earlier that same day, and
was unable to go to work. Because the wires were down he, too, was unable to
notify the plant. He lived approximately 20 miles away.
On Saturday morning, April 11, Sewell, another crane operator, went to Price's
house and told him that both Price and Green had apparently been laid off. Price
passed the word to Green, and the three of them then went to see Ward in Attica
To meet the defense that these two layoffs were connected with the absence on
April 10, the General Counsel attempted to show that the decision with respect to
Green and Price had been made earlier. Green testified that Ward said that his
work had been satisfactory, and that his layoff was not due to his absence, the
separation papers having gone in earlier. Price confirmed this alleged statement
as to Green's separation papers (although according to Green, Ward said they
had gone in before the 10th while according to Price, Ward said that Green had
been laid off on the 10th), but as to himself testified that Ward said that he had
been laid off that morning, April 11. This latter weakens the claim that the deci-
sion had been made prior to the absence of April 10. Similar effect is seen in
Price's testimony, noted, supra, that Ward had told him of another assignment for
the following week only a few hours before Price was to go to work on April 10
and when Ward manifestly did not know that Price would be absent. Had these
decisions to discharge already been made, as the General Counsel claims, it is
unlikely that Ward would have dissimulated to the extent of discussing a new assign-
ment. Nor do I believe that Ward admitted that Green's discharge papers "went
in before the 10th."
Ward testified that on April 9 or 10 he had as usual prepared an assignment
schedule for the next 2 weeks, omitting Johnnie Lyons and Sewell as the two crane
operators to be laid off in the reduction-in-force agreed upon; both Green and Price
1388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
were included in the list 7 of those who were to work during the period beginning
April 13. When these two failed to appear on April 10, Ward instructed the night
foreman that if no word were received from them that evening, he should tell8
Sewell, who was to work until 7 o'clock the next morning, to come in on the 13th.
Ward testified that before he left the plant for the last time that evening, at about
8 or 9 o'clock, he decided to lay off Green and Price, subject to the superintendent's
approval the following morning (this may be a variance from or may represent his
intent when he testified earlier that he decided on April 11 to lay off Price and
Green), and to keep Sewell and Harth, the latter of whom was to have been trans-
ferred elsewhere. Ward testified further that in response to their questions he told
both Green and Price on Saturday morning that they had been laid off because they
had been absent the day before without reporting. I do not credit Green's and
Price's testimony that Ward at that late date gratuitously "went on to say" that the
men should have gone to their supervisors instead of "trying to go as a group and do
it" themselves. The General Counsel's witnesses here depict Ward as considerably
less circumspect than he allegedly was in his conversations with Yohe and Hutchison.
(According to Sewell, when they asked what it was all about, Ward replied that it
was about not reporting for work.)
Sewell evidently saw the list after his name had been added to it. Whether he was
disturbed or puzzled by the changes and the facts that no line had been drawn
through Green's name and that his own name did not appear in the original column,
we need not speculate. He testified that he had himself expected to be bumped by
DeZarn, who had recently been rehired, was doing the same work, and was related
to a foreman. Aside from the element of unreliability which appears in his own
testimony concerning his condition when he again called on Ward later on April 11,
I note his testimony that the work schedule is posted every 2 weeks; recalled after
Ward testified that it is left on his desk but never posted, he testified that he saw
a schedule which showed that Price and Green were laid off, and that it was on Ward's
desk. No more reliable is his testimony that neither of the two names in question
appeared on the list, and that neither that list nor any for another period ever in-
cluded assignments for the coreroom and sand mill; five other such schedules, cover-
ing immediately proximate periods, were thereafter received in evidence: each in-
cludes coreroom and sand mill assignments. Questioned concerning other names on
the list, he was unable to answer. (The testimony, such as Hutchison's, concerning
changes in assignments for the period beginning April 13, involving as it does indi-
vidual requests to change does not indicate that Price or Green was discriminated
against. See footnote 7, supra.)
Whether or not Ward promised these or other employees a statement of the reason
for their layoff, is of no great moment. As for the actual failure to submit such
reason in writing to each employee, of which much has been made, it does not appear
that a statement was given to employees on prior layoffs or even on the other layoffs
simultaneously made. Nor does significance attach to the fact that a line was drawn
through Price's name on the assignment list while none appeared through Green's.
The explanation is sufficient to the occasion, and in any event no more could be
claimed than that although Green was not slated for layoff he was in fact laid off
without evidence of any intervening episode. Ward was not certain whether he
crossed out Price's name on Friday evening or Saturday morning: I will not specu-
late whether this suggests that Ward indicated finality before the superintendent
approved or that Sewell informed Price when he saw more than one name listed for
an assignment.
It is clear that Price had several times before been told to notify his foreman when
he would be unable to work. Whether he had been told that he would be fired if
he did not report in advance of absence, is in dispute. The issue, of course, is not his
attendance, but his failure to report before absence. Regardless of warning, an
employer's failure to discharge for earlier offenses does not establish a vested right in
7 An element of confusion was introduced, and not thereafter dispelled, by Hutchison's
testimony at the conclusion of the hearing that while the schedule called for his assign-
ment to No 2 crane, Ward on April 10 told him to report to No. 4 crane. But whatever
the ultimate explanation, the suggested inaccuracy does not establish the General Counsel's
case. That Hutchison in fact worked on No. 3 crane and on another shift is explained
by the permission which he sought and obtained to trade with another craneman, and
Ward's earlier testimony that the list shows assignments, not performance. The General
Counsel makes no claim and points to no conclusion to be drawn from any of this
8It would be necessary to tell Sewell only if his name were not on the list since he and
the other men normally saw such lists. His name was added before the evening was over;
his foreman did not tell him to report.
HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS COMPANY 1389
an employee so that he may with impunity continue his violations; but it is material
on the issue of intent and whether the Company did in fact fire him for the failure
to report. Further evidence of discrimination might be found in the fact that Green
was laid off the first time he failed to report, and during a period of general union
activity. But the circumstance that a reduction in force was necessary and was now
in process, with the explanation of the method in which that reduction was effected,
reasonably constituted the additional and determining element, and indicates that
Green and Price were not originally scheduled for layoff but were nondiscrimina-
torily selected because they did not report on April 10. Other reasons declared at
the hearing were stated not to be "the reason"; justification having been found, we
need not consider subsidiary grounds which were not in fact themselves determina-
tive .9 Whether Ward would have considered any explanation as "good enough" to
warrant reinstatement of Green and Price need not concern us. I find that these lay-
offs were not in violation of the Act.
b. Johnnie Lyons
Lyons testified that he had been a crane operator for 7 or 8 months before his
layoff on April 10, and had broken in on the job for 3 or 4 months before that. He
could have been kept on as Sewell was when it was decided to lay off Green and Price;
but as seen, supra, Ward decided to keep Harth instead of transferring him. Ward
testified that Lyons had been in a crane for some 6 or 7 months, including the time
spent "riding" with someone else; he was "on the slow side" and was among the lower
paid cranemen. Whether Lyons was in the crane as long as he maintained or for a
shorter period need not be determined. Ward testified without contradiction that
more recently (since his reemployment) Lyons had been put into a crane part time
as they were trying to break him in to operate a crane again.
Of the alleged discriminatees who were crane operators, reasons other than the
quality of their work have been assigned for the layoff of Green, Price, and Blanton.
In Lyons' case alone is the question of skill raised, and this must be considered as we
note that a new employee, Watkins, was retained on the crane. Hired at the begin-
ning of August 1952, Watkins worked on the floor and was then transferred to the
crane, still some time in 1952. His breaking in on the crane was finished by DeZarn,
who testified that this lasted for 6 weeks to 2 months beginning in the middle of
March, and that thereafter Watkins operated a crane on his own. The testimony con-
cerning these dates is not clear: it would appear from Ward's testimony that Watkins
operated a crane prior to Blanton's layoff on May 1. (Comparison of Watkins'
experience was made with that of Blanton, who according to Ward was admittedly
more experienced.) No direct comparison was offered between Lyons and Watkins
as crane operators. We are left to inferences from Ward's testimony that the former
was not a skilled operator, and from Lyons' attempt to minimize the skill called for
on that job; neither item sustains the General Counsel's burden of showing that
Watkins was discriminatorily favored over Johnnie Lyons (if that be the purpose of
the references to Watkins at the hearing).
At the beginning of July Lyons asked the employment agent about getting back
on the job, and was told he would be called if needed. On July 31, he spoke to
Ward, who referred him to the agent. He saw the latter again on August 3 and said
he would take any available job. He was rehired on the shakeout on August 24 at
the same rate he was earning when laid off, but he did not receive the 10-cent increase
granted in the interim and which he would presumably have received had he
remained on the job as crane operator. This assignment to a lesser or lower paid job
is one of the elements of discrimination alleged. The question of greater hazard on
the shakeout is material only as part of a finding of discrimination. I do not credit
Lyons' testimony that no greater skill is required on the crane, where he admittedly
spent 4 months breaking in, than on the shakeout. The works manager testified that
it takes 2 days to 2 weeks to break a man in on the shakeout, depending on the
nature of the work, and that more time may be required for some specialized work,
but that it takes several months to train a man to start operating a crane by himself.
Further on the issue of transferability, the foundry superintendent testified that
he may have told some unidentified craneman that if any were laid off they would
be given lesser jobs. But there was no practice or requirement that another employee
be displaced, as noted, supra. Nor, clearly, is Lyons satisfied with the lesser job given
him when he was reemployed. (Ward also testified that he may have told cranemen
"in special cases" that if work became slack he would take care of them and, if nec-
6 This is not a case of shifting alleged grounds ror discharge. Cf. International Furni-
ture Company, 98 NLRB 674, 678.
1390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
essary, put them on some other job. This was not pursued or otherwise connected.)
It has not been shown that Johnnie Lyons was discriminated against either at the
time he was laid off or when he was rehired.
c. Rager
Rager worked on the shakeout. He had been employed in the south end of the
foundry under Clardy, but about the end of February asked for a transfer. He there-
upon was moved to the north end under Peterson. After that transfer and in mid-
March, Rager told Clardy that he believed that his next move would be out the door.
Clardy repeated this to Peterson, and told him also that he had had trouble with Rager,
the latter having refused to carry out an assignment and being unwilling to work with
certain men These latter items were clearly not reasons for Rager's later discharge
but, reported to his foreman, they could contribute to his selection. Rager explained
on the stand that he had refused to dump a sweeper and told Clardy that he had
hurt his shoulder; when Clardy insisted, Rager replied: "I told you I didn't want
to help dump that sweeper. If you want to dump now bad enough, why you go over
and help him dump." The incident was reported to Ward, who called Rager into
the office and accepted his explanation. Any annoyance which Rager's reply stirred
in Clardy was clearly not connected with organizational activities.
Peterson's conclusion concerning Rager was that he was slow and disinterested
and that his work was poor. Rager testified that he had never been told that he
was a slow worker; Clardy had many times said that he was as good as any man who
ever worked for him. On Rager's behalf, Honaker testified that shortly after his
return to the night shift the night foreman told him that Rager was one of the best
shakeout men in the plant, and kept Rager overtime to train Honaker. Aside from
the latter's unreliability on the stand, noted, supra, there is no explanation of the
need, nowhere else mentioned , to train Honaker at that late date . As for Rager's
statement that his next move would be out the door, his was hardly a denial , judging
from his manner and his words as, according to the transcript , he did not answer the
General Counsel's question whether he ever said anything to that effect, but testified
that he did not recall ever having made that statement. (As inconclusive was the
answer which I did note at the hearing. "If I did, I don't recall ")
Rager was selected for layoff by his foreman, Peterson, who consulted with Ward
one or more days before, and told Rager at the end of the shift on April 10 that the
Company was cutting down on production and Rager would no longer be needed
There is no reason for doubting Peterson's denial of knowledge of Rager' s union
membership or activities I find no discrimination against Rager.
d. Lions
Lions, a chain hookei, was selected for layoff by his foreman, Mettee, who con-
sulted with Ward a day or more earlier and told Lions at the end of his shift on
April 10 that he was going to be laid off. The Company's employment agent testi-
fied uncertainly that in the latter part of August or September 1953 Lions applied for
work. The latter did not mention any such application, and no further evidence was
offered in this connection although Lions was later recalled.
Mettee testified that in making his selection he wanted to retain men who were
able to fill in on the molding machines. All of his chain hookers except Lions had
worked on the machine. Two or three months before the layoff Lions had said that he
would quit if he had to fill in on the machine. Lions had also refused to change his
shift to make room for a man who would work on the machine. The responsi-
bility and skill required to work on the machine and the availability of a new man
for such work are not in issue in view of Lions' refusal to perform that work. Sev-
eral other men quit the following week and were not replaced. Lions denied that
he had ever refused to work nights; he did not deny that he had refused to work
on the machine nor that he said he would quit if he had to fill in on the machine.
Mettee denied knowledge of Lions' union membership or activity ; nor does there
appear to be any basis for such knowledge. I find no discrimination against Lions.
e. Honaker
Honaker was a shakeout man, his duties being to work on castings: drilling,
hammering, loading, punching heads, and doping. His foreman, Clardy, selected
him for layoff, and told Ward the latter part of that week. Clardy testified that he
decided to lay off Honaker and Douglas on April 7 or 8, and he believes he told
Ward on the 10th. Ward testified that Clardy consulted with him 1 to 3 days before
April 10.
HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS COMPANY 1391
Clardy testified further that almost 6 months before , when he had assigned
Honaker to a job in the south end of the foundry, the latter , after working a while,
threw his hammer, "hit the clock," and walked off the job, quitting almost 2 hours
early. He was off for a day or two, but returned the following week on the night
shift. There was a need for men, and he was kept on. According to Honaker,
he was admittedly angry because he did all the work on the north end, then was
run to the south end to do that job, and would have to "work his head off to catch
up" when he returned to the north end. He "began to dislike it a little more.
When [he] got it all done, the heavy work done, in comes some of the guys from
drinking coffee or what they had been doing, and started to working, peaking
around. [He] pitched the hammer down at the end and [he] said, `If that's the
way he runs the day shift, I don't want no part of it.' " He did not hit the clock
with the hammer, but punched out. None of this apparently perturbed Clardy,
who merely asked, "Have you quit?" Honaker replied in the negative, said he
wanted to "cool off," and went home. He testified further that he had been on
the day shift more than 2 or 3 months, preferred the night shift, and after he
walked out he went to the foreman on that shift and then to Ward and arranged
to work on the night shift. He was transferred to the day shift under Clardy a
week before the layoff ( t is not claimed that such transfer was discriminatory.)
That Clardy selected him Lor layoff is not surprising; it does not indicate unlawful
discrimination.
Ralph Lyons, who remained on the job during the week after Honaker's layoff,
testified that the latter was not replaced although Honaker testified that on his last
day there remained a great deal of work to be done and that it would take 4 or 5
men to catch up on the work he was doing; but that the amount to be done was
normal for the middle or the end of the week. It does not appear that this back-
log was not reduced in the normal course as production was reduced.
There is no evidence that Clardy knew of the union membership or activities of
his men , he denied such knowledge. Without emphasizing Clardy's reliability as
a witness , I find no discrimination against Honaker.
f. Douglas
Douglas worked on the shakeout, he had also hooked chains and had been in
the heat crane for about 6 weeks. ([n evident error he placed the latter service
in March ) Like the other men under Clardy, he was classified as a laborer.
According to Douglas, Clardy had asked him whether he would like a better job,
on the ladles or crane, and Douglas had replied that he would like the crane, not
the ladle; Clardy said he would speak with Ward, and the latter then transferred
Douglas telling him that he could return to his old job in 6 weeks if he did not
like the crane. Six weeks later Douglas told Ward that he didn't like that job:
Ward "hemmed and hawed," but when Douglas said the next night that he did not
want to remain in the crane, Ward let him return to the shakeout.
Clardy testified that in the latter part of December 1952, Douglas asked for a
transfer from the shakeout, but after riding in the crane for about 2 months said
he did not like it, and was returned to the shakeout. Clardy also referred to many
absences without notice, after one of which he took Douglas to Ward, who spoke to
him. Then, a little more than a month before the layoffs, when Douglas returned
to the shakeout from the crane, both Ralph Lyons and Rager protested against work-
ing with him. This led to Rager's transfer, noted, supra.
Clardy selected Douglas for layoff, discussing it with Ward when he did that of
Honaker, supra. He told Douglas at the end of the shift on April 10 that he had
tried to keep him but there was not enough work and they had to lay him off.
Including the issue of who had initiated Douglas' transfer to the crane , the several
items are not of outstanding import. The necessity for reduction accepted, if we
further accept the General Counsel's argument that it was not shown that Douglas'
record in respect of absences (or in any respect) "compared any better or any
worse with any of [the ] other employees," the burden of proving discrimination
has not been sustained . As in Honaker 's case, Clardy denied knowledge of Douglas'
union membership or activities . There is no evidence of such knowledge or of dis-
crimination . (Also like Honaker, Douglas was not replaced.)
g. Blanton
Blanton is a thoroughly experienced crane operator . He was in the hospital for
"gas, nerves" during the night of March 28. At the doctor's direction he asked Ward
at the latter's home on March 29 to be taken out of the crane for about 30 days,
explaining that he was pretty weak . When he reported for work on March 31, he
1392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was assigned to work as floor molder's helper. After he had worked on the floor
for about 2 weeks, he returned to the crane, where he worked until May 1. He
testified that about April 28 or 29, he told Ward that he had heard that he was to
be replaced, and asked why. Ward explained that about a year before he had had
to transfer Blanton from a crane to the floor. Blanton then asked whether he could
not have a job on the floor, but Ward said that he did not need anyone on the floor.
Blanton testified further that another foreman, Allen, told him on May 1 that
Ward had warned Blanton against "trying to change other people's way of thinking."
How this latter alleged confirmation of a statement which the witness did not claim
that Ward made proves discrimination against him, as the General Counsel claimed,
is not clear. When he related the earlier conversation with Ward which allegedly
contained a threat, and which is referred to, infra, Blanton testified that no one else
was present; and that alleged threat was quite different. I credit Allen's denial that
he made any reference to Ward or to the Union.
Blanton had worked in the No. 3 crane, which was very dusty, until about a
year before he went to the hospital on March 28, 1953. He had sinus trouble, had
continual headaches, and had asked for and received a transfer to the No. 1 crane,
where he worked until March 28. The relief which he last sought was from the less
dusty or No. 1 crane. After the period of approximately 2 weeks on the floor, he
returned to the No. 1 crane.
Ward testified that with the falling off of work and the need to eliminate 5 crane-
men, he considered Blanton's health and his consequent unavailability for certain
work, and selected him for layoff, transferring 4 others. He testified further that
Blanton could not stand the gas and smoke of the shakeout. Blanton's was hardly
a reply when he testified that working conditions on the shakeout were no worse
and perhaps not as bad as on the No. 3 crane; the latter was evidently the worst of
all. The limitation on Blanton's versatility is clear even if we accept his statement
that he had done chain hooking, mainly in 1939. Ward testified without contradic-
tion that a few days before April 10 he told Blanton, then working on the floor, that
if he could go back on the crane he would not be among those laid off. Here the
condition which ultimately determined his layoff was recognized, but he was favored
over others until additional layoffs became necessary. There is no evidence of inter-
vening union activity by Blanton or of circumstances which would even suggest that
the Company learned of any such activity. I find no discrimination against Blanton.
B. The alleged independent violation of Section 8 (a) (1)
The General Counsel in his brief points to alleged instances of interference vis-a-vis
11 employees, and the complaint alleges at least 6 such instances. Because of that
variance, I shall refer to testimony received and not noted, supra, which even remotely
suggests interference. One cannot find interference in each situation described if
for no other reason than that the matter was not alleged or, whatever a witness
intended, his testimony did not disclose such interference. For example, Ross tes-
tified that about April 3 (this appears to refer to the allegation of a threat about
March 30 in paragraph numbered 6 (a) of the complaint) Ward called him in and
said, "I would hate to have to tell you I can't use you, but that is just what will happen
if this thing doesn't get in . . . they could cut the place up for scrap." The tran-
script reads "if this thing does get in"; but I heard the negative "doesn't," the word
"does" at that point suggests an emphasis which is not indicated by the context,
and the witness later again stated that Ward threatened discharge only "if this thing
doesn't get in," as the transcript correctly sets forth. The latter answer was read
back and permitted to stand. Ward identified the reference as being to the officials
of the Company, but denied any threat. This was definitely not a threat of result
(as distinguished from a reference to the Company's beneficence) if the Union did
come in; yet it is not otherwise suggested that Ward was in fact encouraging organiza-
tional activities by threat of what would occur if the Union did not come in. I
attempted at the hearing to obtain clarification of the witness' earlier statement,
but in the absence of such clarification or contradiction and with the later confirma-
tion, I shall base no finding on such testimony. (There was not here any such
involvement or nicety of language as would tax the ability reasonably expected of
these witnesses. I will make no finding of violative language while at the same
time refusing to rely on the language employed.) In any event I credit Ward's
version of this conversation and the circumstances under which it occurred. (That
Ward spoke to Ross about union activities certainly does not indicate that he knew
who was active. According to Ross, Ward referred to the various men who had
come up under his supervision.)
HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS COMPANY 1393:
The alleged suggestion to Yohe about April 8 (possibly embraced in the allegation
concerning that date in paragraph numbered 6 (a) of the complaint) that he quit-
was at the hearing specifically disclaimed as a violation (although it is pointed to
as such in the General Counsel's brief). Certainly the indication of advantage
allegedly pointed out to Hutchison on April 17 is not within the charges of threat
and hardly such a violation by interrogation as is alleged in paragraph numbered 6.
(c) of the complaint. As much can be said of Ward's alleged advice to Price and
Green after their layoff that they should have gone to their supervisor; and of the
suggestion of surveillance in Sewell's testimony that Ward indicated that he knew
who had signed cards.
Blanton testified that a few days after the meeting of March 29 (this may be
covered by the allegation concerning April 8 in paragraph numbered 6 (a) of the
complaint), in apparent reference to the union activities, Ward threatened that he
would have to say that he did not need him any more. We recall that Blanton
was not thereafter laid off on April 10, and it has already been found that his.
layoff on May 1 was not discriminatory. His own uncertain recollection of his
union activities does not indicate any reason for Ward's alleged threat to him.
Nor do I believe that Ward, uncertain of Blanton's role, if any, and as circum-
spect as Blanton's own testimony indicates, made any such threat. Ward testified
that he spoke to Blanton only about visiting when he should be working. As
noted, supra, Ward favored Blanton on April 10. I credit Ward's denial of unlawful
interference.
Beason, a patently reluctant witness, testified that at noontime one day (the
questioning suggested that this item may have been intended to be covered by the
reference to July 31 in paragraph numbered 6 (a) of the complaint) Ward asked
whether he had heard much union talk in his community. Beason lives in a settle-
ment which is about 12 miles from Attica and has a population of 30 or 40. I
find no interference here. DeZarn, another reluctant witness called by the General
Counsel, and who had been in Arizona, testified that at some unspecified date
Ward asked whether he knew what had taken place while he was away, and added,
"I hope you are not mixed up in it." The witness said that Ward did not define
"it": "You could take it for several different things." I am not prepared to agree
with the General Counsel that "In view of Ward's conversation with other employees
about the Union during early April 1953, there can be no doubt that Ward was
referring to the union activity then taking place among Respondent's employees."
Johnnie Lyons testified that on July 31, when he spoke to Ward about getting
back, the latter admitted that he had laid men off for union activities; and warned
that if the Company "did find out that [Lyons] had anything to do with" the union
activity, they would not call him back. (As noted, supra, Lyons was thereafter
reemployed.) These statements were allegedly made by Ward after the service of
the charge herein. I credit his denial.
Ralph Lyons clearly displayed his animus because of an allegedly increased
work burden; he quit on April 17. (His case was included in the original charge,
but not thereafter.) In the face of more reliable evidence to the contrary, he testi-
fied that as many heats were poured after the April 10 layoffs as before. I do not
credit his testimony that some 4 days or a week after the March 29 meeting, Ward
told him that he did not want union activity going on in the foundry (the witness
first referred to it as in the office) and, more directly, told him, "So don't be union,
minded." I credit Ward's denial, which was in general terms. Nor do I find the
alleged interference by interrogation in the statement which Lyons attributed to
Foreman Clardy: "I hear they are trying to get a union in here." And when asked,
"What about it?" that "If they get a union in here they will close down." Clardy
made no denial of this testimony, but no threat by him is alleged, and the item,
standing alone is slight.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Harrison Steel Castings Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The Company has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) or (3) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]