Harris-Woodson Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 26, 1946

70 N.L.R.B. 956 (N.L.R.B. 1946)

In the Matter of HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC., and UNITED CANDY
WORKERS LOCAL INDUSTRIAL UNION No. 1274, AFFILIATED WITH THE
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 1
Case No. 5-C-1900 .-Decided August 06, 1946
Mr. Sidney J. Barban, for the Board.
Messrs. Williams, Robertson cC Sackett , by Mr. S. H. Wlliams, of
Lynchburg , Va., and Messrs . John C. Gall and Karl M. Dollack, by
Mr. Karl M. Dollack, of Washington , D. C., for the respondent.
Messrs. Lloyd P. Vaughan and Ernest B. Pugh, of Richmond, Va.,
for the Union.
Miss Kate Wallach, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On February 27, 1946, Trial Examiner W. P. Webb issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above=entitled proceeding, finding that the
respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Interme-
diate Report attached hereto.. Thereafter, the respondent filed ex-
ceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. On June
25, 1946, the Board, at Washington, D. C., heard oral argument in
which the respondent and the Union participated.
The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made at the
hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief of the respondent, the-con-
tentions advanced at the oral argument and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner with the following additions and
modifications :
1. The Trial Examiner found that the respondent refused to recog-
nize and bargain with the Union, on and after September 1, 1943, as
I Incorrectly referred to in the complaint as "United Candy Workers Local 1274-
CIO"
70 N. L. R. B., No. 74.
956
HARRIS -WOODSON CO., INC. 957
the exclusive representative of its employees. The respondent did not
deny that it refused to bargain with the Union, but claimed in justi-
fication of its conduct that it entertained a bona fide doubt concerning
the Union's majority status and that it was entitled to an election to
resolve this question. The record, however, does not sustain this con-
tention.' Thus, it appears that the Union was unanimously designated,
and was certified by the Board, as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive on October 1, 1942, and continued to represent a majority of the
employees at all times since that date ; that, prior to the expiration
of its contract with the Union and before the lapse of even a year fol-
lowing the Union's certification, the respondent unlawfully interro-
gated its employees concerning their union affiliation and at the same
time sought to induce them to deal directly and individually with it
in derogation of the statutory bargaining representative; that the re-
spondent claimed that a substantial majority of its employees no longer
desired the Union to represent them and on this alleged basis cancelled
its contract with the Union and refused thereafter to deal with it,
although the respondent's own poll showed only a small minority of
the employees as desiring to withdraw from the Union and although
there was no other representation claims by a rival union; 2 and that
the respondent rejected the Union's offer to prove its majority status
to the respondent by submitting evidence of its current dues-paying
membership. Under these circumstances, we not only agree with the
Trial Examiner that the respondent did not in good faith entertain
any doubt concerning the Union's majority status and therefore insist
on an election to resolve such doubt, but we also conclude that by tak-
ing action to destroy the Union's majority representation the respond-
ent acted in bad faith and ran the risk as to what the facts of the
Union's representation really were.3 The facts in this regard are clear;
not only do they raise a presumption, which the respondent failed to
refute, of the continuation of the Union's majority status, but they
also clearly show independently of such presumption that the Union
did, in fact, represent a majority of the employees on and after Sep-
tember 1, 1943.4 The suggestion in the dissent that this record contains
"indications" that the Union "still possessed a majority" is,'to put it
mildly, an understatement. The evidence on this subject is unambigu-
ous, and plays a primary role in our determination to decide the case
as we do. We conclude, therefore, as did the Trial Examiner, that
the respondent violated Section 8 (1) and (5) of the Act by refusing
2 See N L. R B. v The Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F (2d) 954, 956 (C C A 2), enforcing
24 N. L. R. B. 829.
3 Matter of John S. Doane Company , 63 N. L. R B. 1403 , 1405-1406; Matter of Pacific
Plastic & Mfg Co., Inc, 68 N. L. R. B 52.
4 The record shows, without contraversion , that a majority of the employees in the ap-
propriate unit were members in good standing in the Union in August , September, and
October 1943 and in March 1945.
958 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to recognize and deal with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees.
2. We are convinced, furthermore , that the respondent 's entire course
of conduct demonstrates an intent to evade its obligations under the
Act. Thus, the record shows, as the complaint alleged ahd as we
have stated above, that the respondent attempted'to destroy the'Union's
majority status by seeking to induce its employees to deal directly
and individually with it in derogation of the statutory representative;
and it also appears in this connection with President Harris rejected
the Union 's request to discuss the matter of Elder's discharge and
that Harris specifically stated in this regard that "he thought that
in the place of going to see a union man when Torrence laid her off,
that she should have come in the office and seen him." The respondent
was required to bargain with the Union concerning the grievance
arising out of Elder's discharge . We find that, by its refusal to do
so, and by its other efforts to induce direct and individual dealing in
disregard of the statutory representative , the respondent also violated
Section 8 ( 1) and (5) of the Act.
3. The complaint alleged that the respondent also violated Section
8 (5) of the Act by refusing to comply with an order of the War
Labor Board directing the respondent to recognize, and renew its
contract with, the Union. The Trial Examiner made no findings, in
this respect , and none of the parties has excepted thereto. Accordingly,
we shall dismiss this allegation of the complaint.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 _(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the respondent , Harris-Woodson Co., Inc.,
Lynchburg , Virginia , and its officers , agents, successors , and assigns
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Candy Workers
Local Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations , as the exclusive representative of all its em-
ployees in the unit described in paragraph 2 (a) of this Order, with
respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment , or other condi-
tions of employment;
(b) Discouraging membership in United Candy Workers Local
Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations , or any other labor organization of its employees, by
discharging or refusing to reinstate any of its employees , or by dis-
criminating in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of` their employment;
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 959
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist United Candy Workers Local
Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon, request, bargain collectively with United Candy Workers
Local Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations, as the exclusive representative of all its pro-
duction employees employed at its Lynchburg, Virginia, plant,
excluding maintenance and clerical employees, firemen, and all super-
visory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline,
or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively
recommend such action, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment;
(b) Offer Edna B. Elder immediate and full reinstatement to her
former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to
her seniority or other rights and privileges;
(c) Make whole Edna B. Elder for any loss of pay she has suffered
by reason of the respondent's discrimination against her, by payment
to her of a sum of money equal to the amount which she would nor-
mally have earned as wages during the period from May 10, 1945,
the date on which she was discharged, to the date of the respondent's
offer of reinstatement; less her net earnings during such period;
(d) Post at its plant in Lynchburg, Virginia, copies of the notice
attached to the Intermediate Report herein marked "Appendix A."
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the
Fifth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent's rep-
resentative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to,
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material;
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifth Region, in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Said notice , however, shall be, and it hereby is, amended by striking from the first para-
graph thereof the words "RECOMMENDATIONS OF A TRIAL EXAMINER" and substi-
tuting in lieu thereof the words "A DECISION AND ORDER."
960 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges
that the respondent violated Section, 8 (5) of the Act by refusing to
give effect to a Directive Order of the National War Labor Board, be,
and it hereby is, dismissed.
MR. GERARD D . REILLY, dissenting :
I think the Board is establishing a dangerous precedent in this case
by holding, in effect, that a union unwilling to agree to a consent
election after the expiration of a contract can nevertheless compel an
employer to bargain with it as the exclusive representative of the
majority of the employees.
Undoubtedly the anti-union attitude of this company was a factor
in the instant determination. It should never be forgotten, however,
that a complaint case involving a representation issue is not merely a
matter of balancing the equities between the parties of record-that
is, the employer and the union-since the persons having the most
important stake in the matter are the individual workers.
Although the Wagner Act gives labor organizations great power,
since under the circumstances described in Section 8 (3) and Section
8 (5), a union can bargain for all the employees in a given unit and
even force (if an employer is willing) non-union employees or mem-
bers of a dissident faction to join it; the statute, nevertheless, places
certain safeguards on the rights of individuals. One of the most
important of these is that a labor organization, to be entitled to such
rights, must represent a majority in an appropriate unit. This does
not mean that a majority can be presumed from circumstances long
antedating the representation controversy, for under the proviso to
Section 8 (3) collective agreements containing provisions for com-
pulsory membership are valid only if the contracting labor organiza-
tion is the majority representative of the employees "covered by such
agreement when made." [Italics supplied.]
We should therefore be most vigilant whenever a union seeks to
negotiate a contract with compulsory membership features-the
situation in the instant case-to see to it that that union is truly
representative of the wishes of the majority. Eleven years of history
with the administration of this Act have convinced us all that the
most scientific method of insuring the freedom of choice for the indi-
vidual worker is a secret ballot conducted by this Board. Such elec-
tions are also one of the quickest methods of disposing of representa-
tion disputes, because if an employer is willing (as the record shows
the respondent in this case was) to waive a preelection hearing, the
mechanics of conducting the voting and making a tally of the ballots
can be taken careof in a single day by one of our regional offices. The
majority claim of any union unwilling to submit to such an expeditious
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 961
method of proof, therefore, should be subjected to the greatest
scrutiny.
Although the record in this case does contain indications that the
Union, after the expiration of its contract, still possessed a majority,
the inference in most cases in which a union declined to enter a consent
election would be to the contrary. Moreover, it is somewhat suspicious
that even here, when the question of proving a majority arose, the
Union, in proposing several different procedures, carefully avoided
the one method devised by Congress and this Board for resolving
such problems?
While it has been established that after certification a presumption
of continuing status lasts for a "reasonable time," 2 it is very doubtful
if the courts would concede that more than 1 year is such a reasonable
time. In our own decisions we have taken the position that the pre-
sumption attached to a certification exists only for I year .3
The position taken by the majority would seem to indicate that
a company cannot question a union's majority unless it can produce
some evidence to the effect that the union membership has declined,
yet in the same breath they reprimand this employer for privately
interrogating his employees as to their current attitude towards the
Union. While I agree that the latter practice is to be deplored, it
seems to me that decisions of this sort tend to place a premium on
such conduct.
During the war this Board repeatedly protested the practice of the
War Labor Board in treating unions whose status as majority repre-
sentative was in dispute as being entitled to secure new collective
agreements from the War Labor Board. It will be noted in this very
case, however, that this Union did resort to the War Labor Board
and even though that agency was without jurisdiction to decide such
matters, obtained a "directive" for a new agreement.
While I do not understand that the majority attaches any weight
,to the proceedings before the War Labor Board, nevertheless it seems
to me that a decision of this kind tends to encourage such dubious
administrative policies. Moreover, by permitting unions, whose ma-
jority status has been drawn into question, to avoid a real test of their
pretensions, we fail to vindicate the right of the individual employees
to have a reasonable opportunity not only to change bargaining rep-
1 The Union insisted upon one of three alternatives : ( a) a card check , ( b) a comparison
of the membership cards with the Company ' s pay roll , or (c) a series of interviews with
the employees to De conducted by a Minister of the Gospel or a member of the local college
faculty. (From the argument of Union counsel before the Board, June 25, 1946, p. 24 )
2 N L. R B. v Botany Worsted Mills , 133 F. ( 2d) 876 (C. C. A. 3) ; N. L. R. B v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 140 F ( 2d) 217 (C C A. 4).
3 Matter of Tabardrey Manufacturing Company, 51 N. L R B. 246 ; Matter of Kimberly-
Clark Corporation , 61 N. L It. B 90 . See also Matter of Montgomery -Ward d Co., Incor-
porated, 56 N. L. R. B. 208.
0
962 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
resentative but to disavow their current representative, if they so
desire.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. Sidney J. Barban, for the Board.
Messrs. Williams, Robertson & Sackett, by Mr. S. H. Williams, of Lynch-
burg, Va., for the Respondent.
Mr. Lloyd P. Vaughan, of Richmond, Va., for the Union
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a second amended charge duly filed by United Candy Workers Local
Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called
the Board, by the Regional Director for the Fifth Region (Baltimore, Maryland),
issued its complaint dated December 5, 1945, against Harris-Woodson Co, Inc.,
Lynchburg, Virginia, herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies
of the complaint and the second amended charge, accompanied by notice of
hearing thereon, were duly served upon the Respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, as amended at the
hearing, alleged in substance : (1) that on and after about August 1, 1942, the
Respondent urged, persuaded, and warned its employees to refrain from becoming
or remaining members of the Union ; questioned them concerning their member-
ship in the Union; threatened them with discharge or other reprisals if they
joined or assisted the Union ; and made disparaging and derogatory remarks
about the Union and its representatives; (2) that on, and at all times after,
September 25, 1942, the Respondent refused, upon request, to recognize and to
bargain with the Union, which was on that date and at all times thereafter,
pursuant to a Board election, the exclusive representative of all the Respondent's
employees within an appropriate unit; (3) that the Respondent refused to
comply with a Directive Order of the National War Labor Board, directing the
Respondent to recognize the Union as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees within the said appropriate unit and to renew its contract with the
Union; (4) that the Respondent dealt directly and individually with its em-
ployees, in the said appropriate unit, concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment; (5) that on or about May 10,
1945, the Respondent discharged Edna B. Elder and, since that date, has
continuously refused to reinstate her to her former or substantially equivalent
position, for the reason that she joined and assisted the Union, and engaged
in concerted activities with other employees of the Respondent for the purposes
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and (6) that by such
acts and statements, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
On January 8, 1946, the Respondent filed its answer to the complaint, admitting
(a) certain allegations of the complaint with respect to its corporate existence
and the nature of its business; (b) that at all times since October 2, 1943, it has
refused to recognize and to bargain with the Union, as the exclusive representa-
tive of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit; and (c) that on or about
May 10, 1945, it discharged Edna B. Elder and thereafter refused to reinstate her ;
but denying that it had engaged in or was engaging in the alleged unfair labor
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 963
practices. The answer sets up certain affirmative defenses which will be dealt
with below.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Lynchburg, Virginia, on January
15, 10, 17, 18 and 21, 1946, before the undersigned W. P. Webb, the Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board and the Respondent
were represented by counsel, and the Union by its field representative. All parties
participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded
all parties.
A motion by Board's counsel to amend the complaint by substituting the date
"September 25, 1942" for the date "July 26, 1943," in the first lines of paragraphs
VII and VIII, was granted by the Trial Examiner without objection.
A motion by Board's counsel to amend the complaint and other formal plead-
ings, by substituting the name "United Candy Workers Local Industrial Union
No. 1274," which is the correct name of the Union as shown in its charter, for
the name "United Candy Workers Local 1274-CIO," was granted by the Trial
Examiner.
At the conclusion of the hearing a motion by Board's counsel to conform the
pleadings to the proof with respect to formal matters was granted by the Trial
Examiner without objection.
A motion by the Respondent's counsel to amend the Respondent's answer by
deleting the phrase "as alleged in paragraphs VII and VIII," in the first and
second lines of paragraph 6, was granted by the Trial Exminer without objection.
The parties waived the privilege of oral argument before the Trial Examiner
at the conclusion of the hearing. Briefs submitted by counsel for the Board and
the Respondent have been received by the Trial Examiner.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the Trial Examiner makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, Harris-Woodson Co, Inc, is a Virginia corporation, having
its principal office and place of business in Lynchburg, Virginia, where it is en-
gaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of candy and related products.
During the calendar year 1945, the Respondent purchased, for use at its plant,
raw materials valued in excess of $50,000, of which more than 50 percent was
obtained from sources outside Virginia. During the same period, the Respondent
manufactured finished products valued in excess of $100,000, of which approxi-
mately 50 percent was sold and distributed to points outside Virginia. The
Respondent concedes and the undersigned finds, that for the purpose of this pro-
ceeding, it is engaged in commerce, within the meaning of the Act.
II THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Candy Workers Local Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor organization admitting to mein-
bership employees of the Respondent.
This union was first known as "Local Industrial Union, CIO." However, when
the Congress of Industrial Organizations issued a Charter to it on September 11,
1942, the name was changed to "United Candy Workers Local Industrial Union
No 1274." This was done in order to give it a number and also to identify it
with the candy industry.
712344-47-vol 70-62
964 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Sequence of events: interference, restraint, and coercion
During an organizational campaign conducted by Earl Crowder, district repre-
sentative of the United Steelworkers of America, C. I. 0, in the Lynchburg,
Virginia, area in 1942, a number of the Respondent's employees signed authoriza-
tion cards in the Steelworkers. In August 1942, at the direction of Ernest B. Pugh,
C. I. O. Director for the State of Virginia, whose headquarters were in Richmond,
Virginia, Lloyd P. Vaughan, a C. I. O. field representative, went to Lynchburg and,
with the consent of the Steelworkers, took over the organization of the Respond-
ent's employees for the Union A meeting was held and a majority of the Re-
spondent's employees joined the Union. On or about August 26, 1942, the Union
notified the Respondent that it represented a majority of these employees and
requested a conference for the purpose of collective bargaining. The Respondent
refused the request, and informed the Union that it would bargain with it only
after the Union had been certified by some legal agency as the representative of
its employees. On September 5, 1942, the Union filed a Petition for Investigation
and Certification of Representatives with the Regional Office at Baltimore, Mary-
land (Case No. 5-R-1106), alleging that the appropriate unit consisted of "all
production employees, exclusive of supervisory staff" ; that the number of
employees in such unit was approximately 75; and that the Respondent had re-
fused to agree to a card check, but would agree to a consent election.
A consent election agreement was entered into by the parties, and approved
by the Regional Director on September 14, 1942. The appropriate unit agreed to
by the parties consisted of "all production workers, excluding maintenance, and
supervisory and clerical employees, and firemen " The election was held by
the Board on September 25, 1942. There were 43 eligible voters in the unit,
all of whom voted for the Union On September 29, 1942, District Representa-
tive Crowder, acting for the Union, informed the Respondent by letter that it
had come to his attention that, since the employees had joined the Union, the
Respondent had deliberately curtailed production and had laid off employees with
long service records, which had never been clone before, except in slack periods,
and then strictly in accordance with seniority. On October 1, 1942, the Regional
Director issued his "Report on Consent Election," in which he found and deter-
mined that the Union had been- designated and selected by a majority of the
employees in the agreed unit as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees within the unit. No objections were filed by any party. 'Soon after
the election, the members of the Union met and adopted certain proposals to be
submitted to the Respondent through the union negotiating committee. In sub-
stance, the Union desired an increase in wages, union shop, check-off of union
dues, holidays and vacations with pay, seniority rights, and other conditions of
employment. During the ensuing 2 months or more, the Respondent and the
Union had a number of meetings. The Respondent was usually represented by
R. A. Harris, its president, and the Union by Crowder or Vaughan, together with
a- negotiating committee composed of employees selected by the Union. The
Union's proposals were submitted to Harris, but he objected to all of them.
The only counterproposal made by Harris was in respect to a wage increase.
At that time the Respondent was contributing 50 cents a month for each em-
ployee under a group insurance plan. Harris proposed that this payment be
diverted from the insurance plan and be paid to the employees as an increase in
wages.. The Union refused to agree to this proposal The credited testimony of
Vaughan with respect to the efforts of the Union to bargain with the Respondent
reads, in part, as follows :
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 965
Well, as the conference moved along, when we first met we weren't too
badly tempered, but as we moved along, the relationship between the company
and the union became a little more or less strained; and as we moved along,
we were getting further and further apart. I remember quite distinctly Mr.
Harris, the Respondent, claimed the law did not force him to sign a labor
contract with the union, but all the law did was to force him to bargain.
I pointed out that our experiences in past negotiations didn't indicate to me
that bargaining was in good faith. I threatened to file charges against the
company with the National Labor Relations Board. Mr. Harris considered
,this threat rather lightly, and, he made several statements that the Union
had been doing a lot of bluffing and he wished they would do something besides
talk so much Then he said he woulld riot sign any labor contract with the
union; he would sit down and bargain with them but he would not sign any
contract . . . Well, we maintained that he would sign a contract, that the
union was strong enough to force him to, that we were going to have our
rights since we had already been certified by law as a bargaining agency ;
we didn't think our proposals too much. We reduced our wage proposals
considerately . . . Then we [Vaughan and the negotiating committee]
met with the union, with the membership, rank and file membership . .-.
And a report was made to the rank and file on our inability to make progress
in negotiating the contract. The rank and file felt rather keenly about this,
and so they took a strike vote, authorized the committee that if it was neces-
sary that a strike be called in order to force Mr. Harris to deal with the
union. Well, at first, before this strike was to be called we were to make one
more effort to reach a meeting of minds of the company. So I called the
Respondent at his office [Mr. Harris] . . . At his office, and he objected
to meeting with us again, said his mind was made up, and we were . . .
had already taken too much time of his on this thing, and we were unable to
reach any agreement. And I told him that this conference wouldn't last
very long, that it was more to his interest than it was to ours, and I hinted at
a work stoppage, so he agreed to meet with the committee briefly, and so
we met the following day at the appointed time. We asked Mr. Harris if
his mind had been changed on the issues at stake. He said they weren't, and
so we acquainted Mr. Harris with the action of the union on the night before,
which is the strike vote. He considered this lightly. He didn't think it was
a serious threat at all of a work stoppage, apparently he didn't. He said his
mind was-remained unchanged. We told him if he could not submit a
counter proposal we could, take back to the rank and file and recommend
that it be accepted that we were going to strike, or if he didn't pay ten per-
cent an hour increase across the board, and he refused to do it. And at the
appointed hour-I remember it was the day before Thanksgiving, the strike
took effect. It was one hundred percent effective.
The strike began at 2: 00 p. in., Wednesday, November 2:i, 1942, and lasted
until Tuesday morning, December 1, 1942 As soon as the strike began, the
Union notified the United States Department of Labor, which assigned Con-
ciliator Thomas B Morton to the case. The Respondent placed an advertise-
ment in a local paper for employ ees to take the place of the strikers Morton
went to Lynchburg and discussed the strike with the parties. The testimony
of President Harris in respect to the employment of new workers, reads in
part as follows :
. . . during the time of the meeting, when this strike was being discussed
in a conference with Mr. Morton, he called me at my home and asked me if
the employees would agree to go back the next morning would we agree not
c
966 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to hire any additional people who might apply on account of the advertise-
ment we put in the paper the night before? We told him we had given our
employees until Monday morning [November 30, 1942] to come back, but
we were perfectly, willing to extend that time because we felt a very definite
loyalty to them; and if he wanted us to move the time up until the next
morning [Tuesday, December 1, 1942] we would be delighted to do so, and
we would agree not to take on any new employees, but they would be ex-
pected to agree in return that those people whom we had taken on since
the strike started, which was a pretty good number of people, [10 or 12]
that we would not discharge them until our Christmas rush was over, and
we would not make any remarks at all about their striking, which was a
right they had, which we readily admitted, and they in turn would not
make any uncomplimentary remarks toward the new employees hired
All of the strikers returned to work at 8: 00 a m, Tuesday, December 1, 19,42,
under the same terms and conditions which had existed prior to the strike.
This was done pursuant to an agreement between Conciliator Morton and Presi-
dent Harris that if the strikers would return to work, the Respondent would
continue to bargain with the Union. A meeting between the Respondent and
the union negotiating committee, which was attended by Morton and Vaughan,
was held that night, but nothing was accomplished. The next day another and
more extended meeting was held at a local hotel. The Respondent was repre-
sented by President Harris and Attorney Frost. Vaughan and the negotiating
committee appeared for the Union. Morton arranged for representatives of
the Respondent to occupy one room, and representatives of the Union an adjoin-
ing room. He acted as intermediary and conducted the negotiations by going
from one room to the other. After discussions, which lasted well into the early
hours of the next day, President Harris agreed, subject to the approval of the
Respondent's board of directors, to execute a contract containing provisions for
a 5-cent an hour increase in wages, maintenance of membership, and check-off.
The union representatives agreed to accept these provisions, provided they were
approved by a majority of the union members. Subsequent to this meeting,
the Respondent's board of directors approved the 5 cents an hour increase in
wages, but refused to accede to the maintenance of membership and check-off
provisions. In the meantime all of these provisions had been voted upon and
accepted by the union members. Vaughan took no further part in the nego-
tiations, as he was inducted into the Armed Forces on December i, 1942. Con-
ciliator Morton informed the union negotiating committee that the Respondent's
board of directors had refused to agree to the proposed maintenance of mem-
bership and check-off, but if the Union would execute a contract covering the
wage increase, the matter of maintenance of membership and check-off would
be discussed and considered about the middle of May 1943 The Union agreed
to this and about January 1 or 2, 1943, the parties executed a contract, which
was made retroactive to October 2. 1 042
The contract. which was captioned Wage Agreement, became effective as of
October 2, 1942, and continued in force and effect until October 1, 1943 It con-
tained a provision that. "unless terminated, this agreement shall continue there-
after from year to year, subject to revision and amendments. Either party may
open negotiations for revision or amendments to this agreement by giving a
thirty (30) days' written notice of such desire to the other party."
The contract contained other provisions in respect to purpose of agreement;
recognition of the Union as the exclusive representative of all production em-
ployees of the respondent, excluding maintenance and clerical employees, firemen
and supervisory employees; recognition of a shop committee, method of settling
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 967
grievances or disputes ; seniority ; holidays ; military service ; schedule of hours
and rates of pay ; and other miscellaneous provisions. The contract set out in
detail just 'what wage raises the employees would receive and stated that such
rates would remain in effect until about May 15, 1943. It also provided that
wages and the check-off would be discussed about the middle of May 1943.
The contract was signed, on behalf of the Union, by employees Edna B. Elder,
Massie D Beard, and Gertrude R. Laughorn, members of the negotiating com-
mittee A few days after the contract had been signed, Crowder,-with the consent
of President Harris, addressed a meeting of all the employees in the plant.
He explained the contract to them and the responsibility of both the Respondent
and the Union in respect to it. He also complimented 'the Respondent for its
cooperation in negotiating the contract. At a meeting between the Respondent
and the union representatives about the middle of June 1943, wages and the
check-off were discussed, but no agreement was reached. -
In the latter part of July 1943, Frank Grasso, a C. I. 0. field representative,
went to Lynchburg pursuant to the direction of Ernest B. Pugh, C. I. 0. Regional
Director for the State of Virginia, for the purpose of assisting the Union. He
attended meetings of the Union and, on about July 25, 1943, had a meeting with
President Harris They discussed the questions of a union shop, check-off, and cer-
tain wage adjustments. Harris refused to agree to any of these proposals Accord-
ing to Grasso, Harris said that "it was against his philosophy to agree to any
union shop, it was un-American, it was coercive to the people, to the employees to
be compelled to be in a union." Grasso told him that 100 percent of the employees
were members of the Union and that they were a factor in the business. Harris
replied, "Well, they might think they are a factor but I am running this company
and I will not agree ever to any union shop." Harris further said that his direc-
tors agreed with him in that respect. Grasso then requested a meeting with the
Respondent's directors, but Harris refused the request, and stated that his
answer was final In respect to the check-off, Harris said to Grasso, "never shall
I do this, no check off, never. I will not become an agent for the union. This is a
free country. There will be no membership union shop here." Grasso then sug-
gested that a United States Conciliator be called in, which was agreed to by
Harris The next meeting occurred on August 12, 1943 Conciliator Morton,
Harris, Grasso and the negotiating committee were present No agreement was
reached at that meeting Harris stated at the meeting that lie was not in a
position, at that time, to give any further consideration to the Union's request
for maintenance of membership and the check-off In respect to the wage adjust-
ments requested by the Union, Harris' testimony reads as follows :
As I recall they had seven people they were asking increases for, some of
whom had been with us a very short while and due to business conditions we
did not feel we could make increases for them, however, we did have two who
had been with us for quite awhile who did not receive as much increase as
the balance at the time the increases were put in, and we very readily agreed
we thought it was nothing but right and fair in spite of business conditions
to make some increase to them . . . It was agreed to be done by us, but the
Union said it could not be done until the new contract was put into effect.
At that meeting it was mutually agreed that no further negotiations in respect
to a union shop and check-off would be undertaken until another meeting could
be held about the first of September 1943, which was 30 days before the contract
would expire, and then a new contract could be discussed. The exact date set
for the next meeting was September 3, 1943, which was agreeable to all parties,
however, Harris stated that he might wish to change the date to a later day as
he might be on vacation at that time.
968 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On August 24, 1943, President Harris wrote Conciliator Morton that he would
not be able to attend the September meeting. Morton immediately notified Grasso
to that effect . The meeting was never held.
On August 31, 1943, Grasso wrote a letter to President Harris, which reads as
follows :
On behalf of your employees , who are members of L. I. U. 1274-C. I. O.
may I state that it is our expectation that a meeting with you for the purpose
of collective bargaining will take place in the very near future on a date
which is not too far apart from our previous agreed upon meeting (late of
September 3rd.
Meanwhile , may I bring to your attention the following two questions.
1. The Union shall not look with favor upon the remarks usually made
by Mr. Torrence to new employees-said remarks are, "You need not join
the union-Your wages will be just as much-You can save money by not
paying union dues
2. Article VII-Section 6 of the union agreement provides for a bulle-
tin board which to date has not been furnished by the company.
According to Harris , at the time the Union came into the plant in August 1942,
and on several occasions thereafter , he told all of his supervisory employees that
the employees had a right to join "anything they saw fit , and it didn't come
under the head of their business to make any comment along the line in any way
at all." Harris further testified that he investigated the complaints made by
Grasso, and that Superintendent Torrence admitted to him that when he hired
new employees , or if other employees asked him , he would tell them that there
was a union in the plant but the plant was an open shop and they could join
the Union or not, just as they wished Harris further stated that the failure
to provide a bulletin board, as called for in the contract , was merely an oversight.
On September 1 1943, President Harris prepared and submitted to his employees
a letter, which reads as follows :
Our union contract expires Oct . 2nd this year , and notice of any change
to be made should be given within thirty ( 30) clays ahead of the expiration
date.
Therefore , as we wish to be governed by the wishes of the majority of our
employees , we ask whether of your own free will and accord you prefer
to deal with the Co. through a union or union representative , or as we have
done ever since we have been in business , until last fall-dealing with each
individual as you have a right to consult us and ask our advice at all times.
We feel that the loyalty of our employees is lessened by you having to deal
through a union, liut if it is your wish to continue this , you have your choice.
Any employee has the right to join any organization that he or she wishes
to join. Contrary to some statements made it is not necessary for any of
you to be a member of any organization to work for Harris Woodson Co.
I will therefore appreciate your advising whether you wish us to consider
you a member of a union and deal with the C. I. O. for the renewal of the
contract
According to the testimony of President Harris, Superintendent Torrence,
and Foremen Dillard E. Scott and Thomas S Boles , after having had the letter
prepared , Harris gave it to Superintendent Torrence with instructions to ascer-
tain from the employees whether they preferred to bargain directly with the
Respondent or through the Union , and to report back to him that day . Torrence's
testimony in this respect reads, in part, as follows :
He [Harris ] instructed me to take the letter upstairs and read it to the
help and have the head of the departments to read it to the help . . . I
I
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 969
read the letter to a couple of girls, two of the girls upstairs . And then
took the letter up to Mr. Boles and asked him to read it to his help. Also
Mr Scott, and a Mr. Bingen, [foremen] who was here at that time . . .
Well, the girls came to me and asked me if they could get the letter, they
wanted to show it to the other girls, and I said yes , they could get it, and
they came and got the letter and took it back to the dressing room, I think,
and read the letter ... I reported to Mr Harris that Mr. Boles told me
there was two or three in that department that prefer to work through the
company, and Mr. Bingen's department there was about four in there that
chose the company, and Mr. Scott's there was two or three he said prefer
to operate through the company, to do business through the company . . .
I didn't have any reports from the girls, their department.
The letter was brought to the attention-of the employees on September 1,
1943, and Superintendent Torrence made his report to President Harris on the
same day. At that time there were 4 or 5 employees in Foreman Scott's depart-
ment. When Scott questioned them, he wrote certain names on the letter There
were 7 or 8 employees in Foreman Boles' department when he read the letter
to them Boles' testimony in this respect read, in part, as follows :
My instructions were when-Mr. Torrence handed me the paper, and he
says, "I want you to read this paper to your help, to the ones that' s working
for you" . . . Now. I want you to find out whether the help wishes to
continue in the union; the union is about to pass out, and we want to know
today to give them thirty days notice" . "I want you to report to
me today or tonight before you leave what the help wishes to do."
According to Harris, his purpose in circulating the letter was to notify the
employees that the contract would expire in October, and to ascertain if any
substantial number of them desired the Union to represent them in negotiating
for a new contract. Also it would give him an opportunity to give the Union
the required 30 days' notice of his intention not to renew the contract after it
had expifed on October 1, 1943. .
On the same day that he questioned his employees in regard to their union
:affiliation through the medium of the letter of September 1, 1943, Harris wrote
a letter to Grasso, which reads as follows :
Last fall after an election in which our employees showed the desire to
be represented by the C. I. O. we signed the contract, but it now seems
that a substantial group are no longer interested in having the C. I. O.
represent them, and this is your notice that before entering an agreement
we want an election held, at which time they can vote by secret ballot, and
we will be very glad to stand by their wishes, as we were in the other case.
According to Harris, one of his reasons for informing Grasso that he would
not negotiate for a new contract until an election had been held, was his belief
that a substantial number of the employees were no longer interested in having
the Union represent them, and that this belief was based on the canvass of the
employees made by the foremen on September 1, 1943. Another reason was that
he had received information that just before the election i>; September 1912,
certain employees had been intimidated and coerced by other employees in the
plant to join the Union. It is significant that the Respondent filed no objections
to that election It is also significant that, at the time of the canvass on
September 1, 1943, there were approximately 40 employees in the plant and,
according to Superintendent Torrence, he reported to Harris that only 8 or 10
had signified that they would prefer to bargain directly with the Respondent
rather than through the Union, and then only when interrogated by their fore-
970 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
men. Grasso testified that prior to Harris' letter to him, dated September 1,
1943, Harris had never made any claim whatsoever that any of the employees
were no longer interested in having the Union represent them.
The next meeting between a representative of the Union and the Respondent
occurred on or about September 9, 1943. Grasso's credited testimony, in respect
to this meeting , reads as follows :
I, as a representative of the union, was of the belief that I was going to
negotiate the company on a contract September 3rd-1943. The letter was
received on-September 1st from Mr. Harris to me. It was indeed a surprise
and it was deemed by me as most unexpected on the part of the company.
It was unexpected and not warranted. So I called upon the company and
tried to indicate to Mr. Harris-This was in the early part of Septem-
ber. There was no good logic or reasoning for his request-that all of the
people, all of the employees were members of the union and Mr. Harris said
that he thought that he had a right to make such a request and was going
to do so, the request of terminating the contract and asking for another
election. That discussion took place between Harris and I during the early
part of September . . . It was within a week, within a week, a week
to ten days. Possibly around the 9th of September . . . I tried to [see
Harris] and failed many, many times and finally succeeded. During this
first week between the date of his letter to the actual day when I did suc-
ceed to get him; Mr., Harris was trying to escape me because day after day
I would park my car in front of his office and there stay two or three hours
hoping that he might come around the office. His secretary would say that
Mr. Harris is out of town and not expected, and on one day during this week
I waited the whole afternoon. I saw the employees at lunch time and they
went up stairs after lunch and told me that Mr. Harri"s had been around
and not to believe the office when they say that Mr. Harris was not in town
because he had been there in the morning, and I went back again during
the day, called up the office and the office said that Mr. Harris was out of
town and wasn't expected back, and I remained there and took a chance
til five o'clock when I saw Mr. Harris park his car in the garage which is
more or less adjacent to the plant and proceeded to come into the plant, and
-1 stopped- him on the sidewalk, and that is the way I got to speak to
him . . . I told him first of all that I had been trying to reach him for
some two days and that "even this very day your office says-that you are out
of town and here you are." Mr. Harris said no answer to that. He was
red in the face . . . I am trying to indicate that it was a surprise to
him to see me there. He didn't expect me. I again told him that we ought
to get together on this contract inasmuch as all of the people were dues
paying members and I tried to show to Mr. Harris that I was willing to
prove to him the dues paying membership and show in that way that we had
sufficient bargaining powers. Mr. Harris said, "No, I will not take dues
receipts. I want an election." And I said, "Well, that would establish a
precedent. We just can't do that." I said, "we have contracts with com-
panies which run for five or six years. They begin with an election but we
don't have an election each and every year." I said, "Think of the Board.
If they were to conduct before each contract, each repeated contract, an
election we would be forever conducting elections." He said, "I don't care
what other people do. I am running this business and this is what I want."
During that meeting, Grasso again requested Harris to negotiate with the
Union for a new contract, but Harris refused the request and insisted on an elec-
tion. On September 14, 1943, the Union filed charges against the Respondent
with the Regional Office (Case No. 5-C-1696) alleging the violation of Section 8
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 971
(1) and (5) of the Act. These charges were withdrawn by the Union on October
29, 1943.
On September 28, 1943, Conciliator Morton wrote President Harris in respect
to the meeting between the Respondent and the Union which was supposed to
have occurred on or about September 3, 1943. The letter reads as follows :
In checking over the cases on my desk, I note that contract which your
company has with the United Candy Workers Union expires October 2, 1943:
It was my understanding, when we adjourned our last meeting with some
issues unsettled, that we would meet again on or about September 3, in
the Virginia Hotel to continue the conference, at which time all issues of
the renewed contract would be open for discussion. Won't you be kind
enough to advise me if you are at this time in position to set a date for this
meeting.
I am writing a letter to Mr. Grasso on the same subject (see copy
enclosed).
My best wish for the continued success of your business.
On September 29, 1943, the Respondent acknowledged receipt of Morton's let-
ter, and advised him that Harris was absent from the plant. Beginning about
October 15, 1943, and extending into November 1943, there was an exchange of
letters between Conciliator Morton, President Harris and the Union representa-
tives, Pugh and Grasso. It appears that Morton desired to bring the parties
together and effect an amicable settlement and the union representatives were
quite willing to meet with the Respondent for that purpose. President Harris'
position was that he would meet with the Conciliator and the union representa-
tives, only for the purpose of arranging for an election. At that time the Union
was opposed to an election. It claimed to represent approximately 100 percent of
the employees in question.
On January 29, 1944, the controversy between the Union and the Respondent
was certified to the National War Labor Board by the United States Conciliation
Service. On March 31, 1944, a Panel hearing was held at Lynchburg, Virginia.
The Respondent refused to attend the hearing, taking the position that the War
Labor Board had no jurisdiction over the Respondent, as, it was not engaged in
war work. Another Panel hearing was held at Lynchburg on April 8, 1944. The
Respondent appeared at that hearing and questioned the jurisdiction of the War
Labor Board. The majority of the Panel decided in favor of the Union. On May
30, 1944, the Regional War Labor Board for the Fourth Region, issued its Direc-
tive Order, requiring, inter alsa, that the Respondent enter into a written agree-
ment with the Union, which would provide for maintenance of membership, check-
off, wage increases, etc.
On June 13, 1944, C. I. O. Regional Director Pugh wrote the Respondent and
requested that a meeting of the Respondent and the Union be arranged for June
23, 1944, for the purpose of carrying out the Directive Order of the W. L. B. On
June 19, 1944, President Harris informed Pugh by letter that the Respondent
had filed an appeal against the W. L. B. Directive, and declined to meet with
the Union. On August 8, 1944, W. L. B. informed the Respondent that the peti-
tion for review had been denied, and that the Directive Order of May 30, 1944,
was still in full force and effect On August 11, 1944 Pugh renewed his request
that the Respondent and the Union confer with reference to a new contract.
This request was denied by the Respondent on August 16, 1944, with the statement
that its position had not changed. After some correspondence between the Re-
spondent and the Regional Office of W L. B. at Atlanta, Georgia, no further
action was taken, -either by the Respondent or W. L. B. with respect to the
Directive Order.
972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On March 14, 1945, C. I. O. State Director Pugh, accompanied by three other
union representatives , unexpectedly , called on Harris in the latter 's office. Pugh
endeavored to revive bargaining relations between the Union and the Respondent,
but without success. They discussed the War Labor Board Directive Order, and
both Pugh and Harris agreed that W. L. B. had no means of enforcing the order.
The result of this meeting was that the parties agreed to a consent election to
be held under the direction of the Regional Director of the Board, not less than
30 days after notices of the election were posted . Harris insisted on this 30-
day interval , and he testified that his reason therefor was "for the purpose of
acquainting our employees with the situation as to whether they wished the
Union to represent them." Harris' further testimony in this respect , reads as
follows :
The purpose of that was the fact in the previous election it had been ruled
that an employer had no right of freedom of speech in such cases at all ; that
anything that might be said we couldn't even reply to it ; if a person came
direct and asked for information we couldn 't give it, and that that no longer
applied due to the decision rendered in the Tube Bending case , and we stood
on our rights to be able to use free speech . . . For the purpose of acquainting
our employees with the situation as to whether they wished the Union to rep-
resent them.
On March 20, 1945 , the Union filed a Petition for Certification of Representatives
with the Regional Office. ( Case No. 5-It-1880. ) The Respondent was notified
to this effect by the Regional Director on March 21 , 1945. The Respondent
replied on March 23, 1945 , advising the Regional Director that it would not pro-
ceed with the election until the Directive Order of the War Labor Board had
been withdrawn : On April 9 , 1945, Pugh requested the Regional Director to
withdraw the Petition . On the same date, Pugh so informed the Respondent,
stating that the Union would undertake to request a withdrawal of the W. L. B.
Directive only after the Respondent had executed a contract with the Union.
The Respondent refused to concur in this proposal . On April 13 , 1945, the Regional
Director informed the Respondent that the Petition had been withdrawn. On
May 17, 1945, the Union filed the original charge in the instant proceeding.
Other acts of interference , restraint , and coercion
Bessie Poe , a former employee of the Respondent , testified that she joined
the Union in August 1942 and, a short time thereafter as she was leaving the
ladies' dressing room in the plant, Superintendent Torrence called to her to
come over to him. She was wearing an old pair of shoes at the time and just
as she got near to Torrence, she stepped out of one of them. She said to Torrence,
"Oh, excuse me, Mr. Torrence , I done stepped out of my shoe ." Torrence replied,
"That ain't the only derned thing; you are going to step out of your job if
you don't let this union alone ." This testimony of Poe was substantially cor-
roborated by gmployee Franklin . Torrence flatly denied having made this state-
ment to Poe . The undersigned was not favorably impressed with the testimony
of Torrence , and in view of the corroborative testimony of Franklin , the under-
signed does not accept Torrence ' s denial and finds, that he made the statement
substantially as testified to by Poe and Franklin.
In June 1943 employee Louise Franklin , a member of the Union , was laid off
for a few days by Superintendent Torrence because she failed to report for work
as instructed by him . She endeavored to explain her absence , but her explana-
tion was not accepted by Torrence . Franklin then became angry and said to
Torrence , "You are just like old Hitler, want to have your way." Torrence then
told her to " tell John L . Lewis about it." This testimony was substantially cor-
roborated by Edna B. Elder. Superintendent Torrence made no denial of
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 973
Franklin's testimony. He admitted having talked to Franklin on that occasion,
but he could not remember positively exactly what was said. The undersigned
credits the testimony of Franklin and Elder.
On one occasion when Superintendent Torrence was soliciting donations for
the Red Cross among the employees, he asked employee Franklin if she wished
to give anything Franklin replied that she, would give it to Gertrude Laughorn.
Torrence replied, "Stick to Gertie and see where it will get you." Laughorn
was Secretary and Treasurer of the Union. Franklin's testimony was corrobo-
rated by Elder, and is credited by the undersigned. Torrence's denial of this
testimony is not credited by the undersigned.
In June 1943, according to Poe, she left the Respondent's employ, and when
she asked Superintendent Torrence if she could have a release, he replied in
the affirmative and added, "I wish some more of these big old cows here would
go and get them a job somewhere else and let the derned union alone." Torrence
flatly denied having made this statement to Poe. However, for reasons assigned
above, the undersigned does not credit his denial and finds that he made the
statement substantially as testified to by Poe.
According to the credible and undenied testimony of Katherine Tyree, the
next day after she went to work in the Respondent's plant in August 1943,
Superintendent Torrence called her into his office and asked her if she was
a member of any union. Upon her replying in the negative, Torrence told her
that there was a union in the plant and that she would be solicited to join it,
but that she did not have to do so unless she wanted to. Torrence also told
her that if she did not care to join the union, she could work in the plant and
make the same wages and that she would not then have to pay money to the
Union every month.
Ethel Mayhew, a former employee of the Respondent, testified that at the
time Superintendent Torrence read the "statement" to her and another employee
in the cold storage room of the plant, he told them that he had been on vacation
in Georgia, and that the female employees in a candy factory down there were
getting 40 cents an hour (the same wage the Respondent was then paying) and
they did not belong to a union, and the "company didn't think it was right for
them to have to pay out $1200 a year in union dues." Torrence's testimony in
respect to this incident, reads as follows:
I told them I was glad to know we were paying as much as the plant
in Atlanta, as in larger places I was surprised to find it I thought they
were paying more down there . I didn't say anything about whether it
was right for the girls to be paying $12 00 a year dues.
The undersigned credits the testimony of Mayhew.
Lillie Seagle testified that while she was working in the plant in March 1945,
Superintendent Torrence spoke to her about a donation to the Red Cross,
and when she informed him that she would give it through the Union, be replied,
"Hell with the union; you are not getting your living from them ; you are getting
your living from Harris-Woodson, aren't you?" This testimony was substantially
corroborated by Elder. Torrence admitted that he solicited Red Cross donations
on that occasion, but denied having made that statement to Seagle. His testi-
mony was that lie made no reply to her, but "just walked on off and called the
next girl." The undersigned does not accept his denial, and credits the testi-
mony of Seagle and Elder in this respect.
Conclusions in respect to interference, restraint, and coercion
The undersigned concludes and finds from the entire record in the case, that
by presenting the letter of September 1, 1943, to its employees and requesting
974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
them to state whether they desired to bargain through the Union or directly
with the Respondent, and by the foregoing acts and statements of Superintendent
Torrence, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. ,
B. The discriminatory discharge of Edna B. Elder
Prior to her discharge by the Respondent-on May 10, 1945, Elder had been
continuously employed by the Respondent in its Lynchburg plant for approxi-
mately 12 years. She was one of the first employees to join the Steelworkers,
and later became a charter member of the Union. She was elected president of
the Union in 1942, and has retained that office ever since. She was a member of
the union grievance and negotiating committees, and participated in meetings
between the Union and the Respondent with respect to grievances and collec-
tive bargaining. She was the most active of any of the employees in furthering
the interests of the Union. She participated in the strike in November 1942.
She was one of the union committee which signed the contract between the
Respondent and the Union. She personally handled approximately all of the
grievances of the employees, and arranged meetings with the Respondent's
president and superintendent for this purpose On the occasion when employee
Franklin had been laid off by Superintendent Torrence, Elder took the matter
up with President Harris, and Franklin was recalled to work. On another oc-
casion, during cold weather, several employees, including Elder, entered the
plant through the boiler room door because the regular entrance door had not
been opened and they did not wish to stand out in the cold. Although there was
no posted rule against this, they were reprimanded by Superintendent Torrence
Elder told Torrence that she would take it up with President Harris and have
the front door opened earlier However, before she could speak to Harris
about it, Supei uitendent Torrence informed her that it would be all right for
the girls to enter through the boiler room door during bad weather A short time
prior to her discharge, Elder complained to President Harris that Superin-
tendent Torrence had used abusive language to some of the members of the Union,
because they preferred to give their Red Cross donations through the Union,
rather than through the Respondent.
On Thursday, May 10, 1945, Elder was working in the machine room, which
is adjacent to Superintendent Torrence's office. She was putting candy on the
conveyor which took it to the packing room. Just before lunch time, the tele-
phone in Torrence's office rang Torrence was on the floor above, at the time.
Mrs. Viar, who had charge of the machines in the machine room although she
was not a supervisory employee, attempted to answer the telephone, but had
difficulty in taking the message. After it had rung several times Viar requested
Elde e to answer it. Elder did so and while she was talking, Superintendent
Torrence came down the steps and entered the office, preparatory to going to lunch
and, in a loud voice, asked Elder who had given her permission to use the
telephone during working hours. Torrence's voice was so loud that Elder had
to'ask the person^on the other end of the line to repeat what he had said
The call was from someone who wanted Foreman Boles to call a certain number
at lunch time. Elder then asked Torrence if lie had a pencil so that he could take
down the number Torrence replied that he already had the number. Elder's
testimony as to what occurred after that, read as follows :
And I hung the 'phone up. It was about time for him [Torrence] to go
to lunch, and I went on back out to the machine. And he usually colnes-
down . . . I didn't want to detain him to explain why I got up from the
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 975
machine. And after lunch I went out to the office to explain to him that
the 'phone had rung three times, and Mrs. Viar asked me to answer it, I
wasn't using the 'phone. He never did give me a chance to explain. He
said if I didn't like the way he ran the darn office I could go down stairs
and get my time. He talked very angry to me, and I told him he couldn't
talk to me, that I wouldn't take that And after a lot of argument on both
sides, I said that an old man as old as he was with one foot in the grave and
one out shouldn't be telling stories on people, he should be trying to live bet-
ter He said it was all right about him being an old man. Quite a bit of
argument on both sides, and he told me to go downstairs for my time, and I
did . . . I went to see Mr Torrence for the purpose of explaining to him
what I was doing at the office at the 'phone . . . I don't think Mr. Torrence
ever heard anything that I said because he was talking all the time, and as
I said before, there was a lot of argument on both sides . . . he didn't talk
very nice at all.
Elder further testified that when Torrence came into the office and asked her
who had given her permission to use the telephone, she did not then explain to
him that she was not using it but only answering it at the request of Mrs. Viar,
because Torrence was on his way to lunch and she did not wish to detain him
and that she could explain it later. After Torrence had returned from lunch,
Elder, according to her testimony, immediately went into his office to explain
to, him why she had answered the telephone. Her testimony further reads as
follows :
I didn't get a chance to tell Mr. Torrence anything because Mr. Torrence
didn't allow me to even start an explanation . He was shouting at me in a
very angry manner that I took more privileges than anybody in the plant,
nobody had given me permission to use the 'phone or answer the 'phone. I
heard that. And quite a lot of other things were said as I told you before,
on both sides . . . I was trying to tell him that I didn't use the 'phone, that
I didn't use the 'phone without permission during working hours was what
I was trying to tell him, but he drowned my voice out. I don't think be even
heard me.
Soon after her discharge, Elder reported it to Boyd Peyton, president of the
local Textile Union, C. I. 0., because Pugh, C. I. O. Regional Director for the
State of Virginia, was absent from Lynchburg. Peyton endeavored to take the
matter up with President Harris, but the latter refused to discuss it with him.
Harris told him that the contract with the Union had expired on October 2, 1943,
and there was no more reason why he should discuss Elder's discharge with
him than with any other roan on the street.
The testimony of Superintendent Torrence, in respect to Elder's discharge,
reads in part as follows:
Q. Now, Mr. Torrence, I believe you did testify that if Mrs. Elder had
not come back to you the second time there on May 10th you would not have
discharged her.
A. No, I would have not. I had dismissed the matter all together.
Q. That is your testimony?
A. Yes, it is.
Q So, therefore, you did not discharge her for answering the telephone.
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Well, now, just why did you discharge her?
A. I discharged her when she came back to me and started the argument
with me, and she came to my office and said-I think she started off by saying,
this is the second or third time this 'phone has caused her trouble between us,
976 DECISIONS OF` NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and I said, "Now, Mrs. Elder, you don't have to leave your work to come out
here and start an argument with me. Your job is in there feeding the ma-
chine." And she says, "I want to have this out with you." And I says, "Well,
now"-I don't recall just the word that came in But during the conversation,
why, she remarked to me, "If I was as old as you and had one foot in the
grave, I wouldn't be finding fault with the help " I remarked, "With one
foot in the grave I can do as much as some people with two out."
Q. But I am asking you now to state specifically just why you did discharge
her?
A. I discharged her because she left the work and came to the office and re-
newed the argument with me with reference to the 'phone, and during the
argument I told her, I says, "Mrs. Eldei, you are just the same as any other
help, and if you don't go back on your job and all I will be forced to discharge
you." And she say, "You can't discharge me." And I says, "Well, I will show
you what I can do." And so I went downstairs and turned in the time
Q. Now, if all these things or one of them or-just tell us exactly what did
really persuade you right then and there to discharge her?
A. Well, when she said I couldn't discharge her, I discharged-I told her I
could.
* * * *
Q. Did you ever discharge an employee prior to this time for'argqing with
you? 11
A. I would have to do some right much thinking because I have had quite
a few arguments with help in the factory and never discharged. For instance,
Mrs Elder, I have had arguments, for instance, and had arguments with dif-
ferent help of the factory, didn't discharge. Little matters come up and be
forgotten, and nothing more said about it.
Q. Everything didn't run smoothly in the plant there all the time, did it?
A. No, sir, that's tight.
Q. And an employee with a number of years service there is an experienced
employee and is valuable ; is that so?
A. Good help is valuable to us.
Q. It costs the Company a lot of money to train people down there?
A. Oh, yes ; yes, sir.
Q You wouldn't be too readily disposed to .discharge all employee for
just simply argument or talking back or something of that sort, would
you?
A. No, sir; no indeed. We don't discharge for just anything at all I
never have
According to employee Gertrude Laughorn, soon after the discharge of Elder
there was a mass meeting of the employees. Laughorn and two other employees
were selected to see President Harris about getting Elder reinstated, and to
discuss the lay-off of employee Seagle, and Laughorn related to Harris the
circumstances connected with, Elder's discharge, which corroborated Elder's
testimony. Harris replied that he would never reinstate Elder The testimony
of Laughorn in this connection reads as follows :
Mr. Harris told me, and said "Miss Laughorn, I can forget the telephone
message altogether, and I have papers against Mrs. Elder to fire her before,"
and I asked him if he couldn't produce them. And he also told me that
Mrs. Blankenship [forelady] had been down and told him some things on
her, and I asked him, and he said he didn't only have papers on Mrs. Elder
but he had them on other girls, and I asked if-said I think he should
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 977
produce them against Mrs. Elder because I had worked in the plant twenty,
years and everyone in there ; Mrs. Seagle had been there for years, had
been there twenty to thirty years, and I think that the best part of her
life and after working a girl thirty or twenty years you shouldn't say "go
somewhere else for employment if I am not paying you enough" . . . He
told me that Mrs. Elder had been working at the plant for-for a long time,
at least eleven years, or twelve years, and he thought that in the place of
going to see a union man when Mr. Torrence laid her off that she should have
come in the office and seen hum ; instead of that, she went uptown and
saw a union man which didn't have any more to do with it than a man in
the street.
According to the credited testimony of Foreman Boles, Elder had worked
under him nearly every day during the 12 years she had been working in the
plant, and that he had observed her conduct and work during that time ; that
she obeyed his instructions ; did her work well ; never gave him any trouble ;
never "talked back" to him ; and he had never had occasion to find fault with
her conduct or work.
Concluding finding
There is very little difference in the testimony of Elder and Torrence as to
what occurred at the time of Elder's discharge, except that Elder denied that
she told Torrence that he could not discharge her. In view of his observation
of these two witnesses, and the entire record in the case, the undersigned accepts
this denial of Elder and finds that she did not make this statement to Torrence
as testified to by him. Any contention of the Respondent that production was
affected because Elder answered the telephone or endeavored to explain to
Torrence, after lunch, why she had answered it, is without merit. The record
shows and the undersigned finds that all of the employees, of necessity, left
their work from time to time during the day. Provision was made for these
absences by having another employee do the work in the meantime. In reference
to the work Elder was doing at the time of her discharge, her testimony reads
as follows:
Mrs. Viar has substituted for every employee in the building that has
ever worked in there in the machine room, and no girl ever works at the
machine without leaving the room, and she takes their place. There used to
be a man worked in there and when they left the man took their place . . .
there are two people who can take your place, the woman who runs the
machine and also a girl that sets up on the machine, if it is a type of candy
she can put enough on the belt to last she will take your place, otherwise
Mrs. Viar, or the man who runs the machine, will take your place.
It is hardly reasonable to believe that any employer would summarily dis-
charge a valued and experienced employee with 12 years of honest and faithful
service, for the reasons assigned by Torrence for the discharge of Elder, especially
as Torrence testified that good help was valuable to the Respondent. The record
shows that Elder's services were satisfactory. Neither does it seem reasonable
that Torrence discharged her because she referred to his age (Torrence was 70
years of age) However, Torrence invited an argument by not giving Elder an
opportunity to explain to him why she had answered the telephone. Torrence
did not desire to treat this incident as an ordinary occurrence in the plant. He
seized upon this opportunity to rid the Respondent of the most influential and
active member of the Union. The action of President Harris in refusing to even
discuss the discharge of Elder with Peyton, the C I. 0 representative, and his
statements to Laughorn and the two other employees that he could "forget the
telephone," but he had other things on Elder and other girls too, and that he
978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would never reinstate Elder, clearly indicate that'the Respondent discharged
Elder for reasons other than those assigned by the Respondent.
In summary, the undersigned concludes and finds from the entire record in the
case that the Respondent discharged Edna B. Elder on May 10, 1945, and has
since refused to reinstate her for the reason that she joined and assisted United
Candy Workers Local Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, and engaged in concerted activities for the purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, thereby the Respondent
discriminated in regard to her hire and tenure of employment, discouraged mem-
bership in the United Candy Workers Local Industrial Union No. 1274, and in-
terfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in 'Section ,7 of the Act.
C. The refusal to bargain collectively
1. 'The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, and the undersigned finds that
all production employees of the Respondent employed at its Lynchburg, Virginia,
plant, excluding maintenance and clerical employees, firemen, and all super-
visory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or other-
wise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such
action, at all times material herein constituted and now constitute a unit ap-
propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9 (b) of the Act.
2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit
Pursuant to a consent election held in the plant on September 25, 1942, under
the direction of the Regional Director for the Fifth Region, the Regional Direc-
tor issued his "Report on Consent Election" dated October 1, 1942, which shows
that there were 43 employees on the eligible list and that 43 valid ballots were
cast, all of which were for the Union. Neither the Respondent nor the Union
filed any objection to the Regional Director's Report. There was received in
evidence at the instant hearing documentary proof. that during the month of
August 1943, the Union had 27 paid up members in good standing within the
aforesaid appropriate unit; 38 in September 1943, and 37 in October 1943. It
was stipulated by the parties that during the months of August, September, and
October 1943, the number of employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit averaged
about 40, that is, the total number for any one of the 3 months never exceeded
43, and was never less than 37 The Respondent's pay roll for the week ending
March 15, 1945, received in evidence shows 31 employees within the aforesaid
unit The Union's records, received in evidence, shows that 28 of these employees
were members of the Union.
The undersigned finds that the Union was on September 25, 1942, and at all
times thereafter has been the duly designated representative of a majority of
the Respondent's employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit and that, by virtue
of Section 9 (a) of the Act, the exclusive representative of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages , hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
3. The refusal to bargain on September 1, 1943, and thereafter
As related above, the Union won the consent election on September 25, 1942,
by a unanimous vote. The complaint alleged that on and at all times after this
election, the Respondent refused to recognize and to bargain collectively with
the Union. The undersigned finds that this contention is not substantiated by
the record, as to the period from September 25, 1942, to September 1, 1943.
HARRIS -WOODSON CO., INC. 979
Vaughan, C.-I 0 field representative, testified thait during one of the bargaining
conferences prior to the execution of the contract, President Harris stated that
he would not sign any contract with the Union. Harris' testimony in this
.respect, which is credited 4y the undersigned, was that the Union insisted at
every conference that the Respondent sign a contract immediately, and the
Respondent took the position that it was not obligated to sign a contract until
all the provisions of the contract had been mutually agreed upon. A short time
°. thereafter the contract between the Union and the Respondent was executed..
The contract was due to'expire on October 1, 1943, provided due notice was given
by either party. In August 1943, the Union endeavored to bargain with the
Respondent in respect to a new contract to become effective on the expiration of
the then existing contract. The Respondent rejected the Union's proposals
and demanded an election. On October 1;-1943, as related above, the respondent
'wrote the Union in substance that it was giving the Union the required 30 days'
notice of termination-of the existing contract, and in effect serving notice upon
the Union that it would not bargain for anew contract until an election had-
been held and the Union had been duly certified as the o epresentative of a
majority of its employees Harris' testimony in respect to this letter, reads as
follows :
After the letter of September 1, 1943 was written we had never changed our
plan in any way at all concerning an election before bargaining further.
The Respondent. in its answer to the complaint, admitted that at all times
since October 2, 1`.,43, it has refused to recognize or bargain collectively with
the Union for the reason that "prior to September 1, 1943, there came to this
Respondent information that its employees were claiming that in this election
[September 24, 1942] they had -4oted for said Union as their bargaining repre-
sentative because of statements improperly and unlawfully made to them before
the election by persons interested in the organization of said Union." This posi-
tion of the Respondent is untenable and without merit. The employees voted
unanimously for the Union and no objections to the election were filed by any
party. The Respondent accepted the result of the election and forthwith bar-
gained with • the Union. The Respondent further contended that the canvass
of the employees on September 1, 1943, showed that a "substantial group" of the
employees were no longer interested in having the Union represent them for the
purpose of collective bargaining. The record shows that at the time of the
canvass there were approximately 40 employees in the appropriate unit and only
8 or 1(Pindicated that they would prefer to bargain directly with the Respondent.
According to President Harris' testimony the Respondent insisted upon an elec-
tion and that 30 days elapse between the date of the notice of the election and
the date of the balloting, and that the reason therefor was "For the purpose of
acquainting our employees with the situation ag to whether they wished the
Union to represent them." In other words, it was the intention of the Respond-
ent to campaign against the Union prior to the election.
The undersigned concludes and finds that the Respondent, on September 1, 1943,
and at all times thereafter, has refused to bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, in respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment,
and has thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section I, above,
712344-47-vol. 70-63
980 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have' a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
\.
Since it has been found that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce, it will be recommended that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which the under-
signed finds will effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid ap-
propriate unit. It will therefore be recommended that the Respondent, upon
request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of
its employees within such unit.
It has been found that the Respondent discharged and- thereafter refused to
reinstate Edna B. Elder for the reason that she joined and assisted a labor or-
ganization and engaged in concerted activities for the purposes of collective
'bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. It will therefore be recommended
that the Respondent offer her immediate and full reinstatement to_ her former
or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other
rights and privileges. It will be further recommended that the Respondent make
her whole for any loss of pay she has suffered by reason of her discriminatory
discharge by payment to her of a sum of money equal to the amount she would
normally have earned as wages from the date of her discharge to the date of
the Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less her net earnings' during such period.
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of Section
8 (1), (3), and (5) of the Act, the undersigned will, recommend that the Re-
spondent cease and desist not only from engaging in such conduct but also from
in any other m€lnner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, for the following
reasons : The Respondent's whole course of conduct discloses a definite purpose
to defeat self-organization and its objects among its employees Soon after the
Respondent's employees sought to organize as members of the Union, a consent
election was held in the plant, resulting in a 100-percent victory for the Union.
Prior to the expiration of the contract, the Respondent interrogated its employees
as to whether they desired the Union to represent them nor preferred to bargain
directly with the Respondent. The 'Respondent also refused to bargain with
the Union for a new contract. -It agreed to a consent election, provided the
balloting would not take place until 30 days after the notice of election was
posted, in order to give the Respondent an opportunity to electioneer against the
Union. After successfully evading, for about a year and a half its legal obliga-
tion to bargain with the Union, the Respondent sought to consolidate its efforts
to discourage membership in the Union by discharging. and refusing to reinstate
the president and most active member of,the Union, conduct which strikes at
the very "heart of the Act." The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh -Cir-
cuit observed in N. L R B. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Company, 116
F (2d) 350, 353 (C. C. A. 7), that "No more effective form of intimidation nor one
4
i By "net earpings" Is meant earnings less expenses,'such as for transportation,, room,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the respondent, which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful
discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere. See Matter
of Crossett Lumber Company, 8 N. L. R. B. 440. Monies received for-work performed upon
Federal, State, county, municipal, or other work-relief projects shali, be considered as
earnings. See, Republic Steel Corporation v N. 1;'R. B ,'311 U S. 7.
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 981.
more violative of the N. L. R. Act can be conceived than discharge of an employee
because he joined a union." Because of the Respondent's unlawful conduct and
its underlying purpose, the undersigned is convinced that the unfair labor prac-
tices found are fairly related to the other unfair labor practices proscribed by
the Act, and that, based upon the past conduct of the Respondent as related herein,
there exists a real danger that any or all of such proscribed practices may be
committed in the future by the Respondent. Therefore the preventive purpose of
the Act may be frustrated unless the cease and desist order is coextensive with
the general threat as indicated.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the
case, the undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Candy Workers Local Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated, with the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All production employees employed by the Respondent at its Lynchburg,
Viiginia, plant, excluding maintenance and clerical employees, firemen, and
all supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline,
or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend
such action, at all times material herein constituted, and now constitute, a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9 (b) of the Act.
3 United Candy Workers Local Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, was on September 25, 1942, and at all
times thereafter has been the exclusive representative of all the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bai wining, within the
meaning of Sectiob 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing, on September 1, 1943, and at all times thereafter, to, bargain
collectively with United Candy Workers Local Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as the exclusive representative
of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, the•Respondent has engaged in
and.is engaging in unfair labor practices, within9the meaning of Section 8 (5)
of the Act.
5. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Edna
B. Elder, thereby discouraging membership in United Candy Workers Local
Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated,with the Congress of Industrial Organizations,
the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within
the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
16. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section
8 (1) of the Act. -
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
undersigned recommends that the Respondent, Harris-Woodson Co., Inc., Lynch-
burg, Virginia; and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and, desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Candy Workers Local In-
dustrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizatlolls,
s
I
•982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment ;
(b) Discouraging membership in United Candy Workers Local Industrial
Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or any
other labor organization of its employees, by discharging or refusing to reinstate
any of its employees, or by discriminating in any other manner in-regard to their
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment;
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist United Candy Workers Local Industrial Union No. 1274,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing; and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act ; - -
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively. with United Candy Workers Local
Industrial Union No. 1274, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, as the exclusive representative of all its production employees employed`
at its Lynchburg, Virginia, plant, excluding maintenance and clerical employees,
firemen, and all supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge,
discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively'
recommend such action, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such un(Atanding in a signed agreement
(b) Offer Edna B. Elder immediate and full reinstatement to her former,
or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other.
rights and privileges ;
(c) Make whole Edna B. Elder for any loss of pay she has suffered by reason
of the Respondent's discrimination-against her, by payment to her of a sum of
money equal to the amount which she would normally have earned as wages
during the period from May 10, 1945, the date on which she was discharged, to
the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less her net earnings z dur-
ing such period ;
(d) Post at its plant in Lynchburg, Virginia, copies of the notice attached
hereto, marked "Appendix A " Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Fifth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the
Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days. thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. - Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material ;
(e) Notify the Regional Director.for the Fifth Region in writing within ten
(10) days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply with the foregoing recommendations.
It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10) days from the
date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, the. Respondent notifies the said
Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommenda-
tions, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the Respond-
ent to take the action aforesaid.
2 See footnote 1, supra. 3
HARRIS-WOODSON CO., INC. 983
As provided in Section 33 of Article II of the Rules and Regulations of the
National Labor Relations Board, Series 3, as amended, -effective November 27, 1945,
any party or counsel for the Board may, within fifteen (15) days from the date
,of the entry of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section
32 of Article II of said Rules and -Regulations, file with the Board, Rochambeau
Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original and four copies of a statement in
writing, setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to-any other
part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections)
as he relied upon, together with the original and four copies of a brief in support
thereof. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or
brief, the party or counsel for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof
upon each of the other parties and shall fife a copy with the Regional Director.
As further provided in said Section 33, should any party desire permission to
argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be made in writing to the
Board, within ten (10) days from the date of the order transferring the case
to the Board.
W. P. WEBB,
Trial Examiner.
Dated February 27, 1946.
"APPENDIX A"
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our-employees that:
Ave will not in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in' the exercise of their right to self-organization, .to form labor
organizations, to join or assist United Candy Workers Local Industrial
Union No 1274, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations,
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through represen-
tatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
We will offer to the employees named below immediate and full rein-
statemen@ to their former or substantially equivalent positions without
prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed,
and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the
discrimination.*
We will bargain collectively upon request with the above-named union
as the. exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit
described herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is : All pro-
duction employees employed at the Respondent's Lynchburg, Virginia, plant,
excluding maintenance and clerical employees, firemen, and all supervisory
employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or other-
wise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such
action.
* Edna B Elder
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named
union or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment against
984 DECISIONS OF' NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
any employee because of membership in or activity on behalf of any such labor
organization.
HARRIS-WOODSON CO, INC.
\ Employer.
Dated -------------------- By ------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Nom-Any of the above -named employees presently serving in the armed
forces of the United States will be offered full reinstatement upon application
in accordance with the Selective Service Act after discharge from the armed
forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not
be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. ,
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