Hardeman Garment Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 11, 1968

172 N.L.R.B. 1161 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

Hardeman Garment Corporation and James B.
White . Case 26-CA-2869
July 11, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND BROWN
On April 16, 1968, Trial Examiner Boyd Leedom
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed-
ing, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision . Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup-
porting brief; the General Counsel filed a motion to
strike an attachment to the Respondent's brief; the
Respondent filed an opposition thereto and a
request to reopen the record; and the General
Counsel filed a responsive pleading.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief,
and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, as modified below.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner as modified
below and hereby orders that the Respondent, Har-
deman Garment Corporation, Bolivar, Tennessee,
its officers, agents , successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as modified herein.
1. Add the following as the last clause of the first
indented paragraph of the notice attached to the
Trial Examiner's Decision:
... or because he utilizes the processes of the
National Labor Relations Board.
2. Add as the last indented paragraph of the
notice the following:
WE WILL notify the above-named employee
if presently serving in the Armed Foreces of
the United States of his right to full reinstate-
ment upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Milita-
ry Training and Service Act, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
' The Respondent seeks to reopen the record for the purpose of adduc-
ing testimony by employee Long, which, it expects, will disprove the Trial
Examiner 's finding that Long was assigned to the layout table to do White's
work on July 22 following White's discharge ( allegedly because not
needed ) However, the Respondent has failed to justify its request for a
further opportunity to litigate this matter Moreover, as indicated below,
the availability of work for White following his discharge is demonstrated
by evidence other than any assignment of Long to the layout table on July
22
In adopting the Trial Examiner's unfair labor practice findings we rely
upon the following facts and circumstances The sudden , midday discharge
of White on July 22, following his union activity that morning and the even-
ing before , the several explanations offered by the Respondent at the time
of discharge and at the hearing , the statements by Personnel Director Pet-
tigrew to White on July 28 and thereafter that he, Pettigrew , had heard that
White was still getting union cards signed , President Stringer's statements
to White on August 23 that he, Stringer, wished White would leave the
Union alone, that it was a bad thing, and that he wished White would quit
fooling with it, and the availability of work for White during the critical
period herein
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BOYD LEEDOM, Trial Examiner: This case was
tried at Bolivar, Tennessee, on December 11 and
12, pursuant to charges filed August 31 (amended
twice, September 27 and October 9) and a com-
plaint issued on the said charges dated October 13,
all in 1967. It presents the questions whether
Respondent Hardeman Garment Corporation
discharged its employee James B. White and
refused to reinstate him; threatened him with loss
of employment; marked him as a troublemaker; and
warned him to cease engaging in union activities all
because he sought to bring a union into Respon-
dent's plant and because he filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges (later withdrawn) under the National
Labor Relations Act, in violation of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) thereof.
Respondent is engaged in the manufacture of
men's and boy's pants. White started working for
Respondent on November 29, 1966, as a sorter on
layout tables. After 4 or 5 months on the layout ta-
bles he was transferred to the job of checking,
where he worked for only a couple of weeks. Then
in a move initiated by his own complaint to his su-
pervisor that he could not keep up with two "order
pullers" and that the work he was doing seemed
useless , he was transferred back to the layout ta-
bles, and worked there another 3 or 4 weeks. He
was discharged on July 22, 1967. During the period
172 NLRB No. 113 1161
1162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of his employment from November 29 to July 22
his pay increased from the starting figure of $1.25
to $1.55 per hour.
White was discharged by Vann Pettigrew,
Respondent 's personnel director . The termination
notice handed to White by Pettigrew stated the
reason for the separation to be " Reduction in de-
partmental workforce."
White 's first charge against Respondent was
dated July 25, 1967, and alleged that he had been
unlawfully discharged by reason of his activities in
behalf of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America , AFL-CIO. This is the charge that was
withdrawn, as of August 15, 1967, with the ap-
proval of the Acting Regional Director . It is White's
contention , and he testified , that he withdrew this
charge on a promise that he would be reemployed,
at least part time , by Respondent . Respondent de-
nies making any such promise . Because of Respon-
dent 's failure to make any satisfactory arrangement
for his reemployment following the withdrawal of
the initial charge , as White claims , he filed the sub-
sequent charges , twice amended , as previously
stated , with the second amendment , adding the al-
legation for the first time that Respondent had vio-
lated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act in that it dis-
criminated against him in refusing to reemploy him,
because he had filed the charges.
On all the evidence adduced , on my observation
of the witnesses as they testified , and on careful
consideration of the briefs filed in behalf of the
General Counsel and the Respondent , I make the
determination that Respondent violated the Act in
the manner hereinafter set forth in detail, on the
basis of the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE EMPLOYER-JURISDICTION
I find that the allegations of the complaint,
respecting the nature and volume of business car-
ried on by the Respondent , are true and conclude
therefrom that Respondent at all times material
herein was an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. This
matter is not in dispute.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The 8( a)(3) Violation
The evidence reveals that there was very little
union activity within Respondent 's plant prior to
the time of White 's discharge . There is no evidence
of any such activity following the discharge. The
idea of organizing Respondent's employees came to
the attention of White through a fellow employee,
Luther Carter . The activity consisted of the solicita-
tion of only a "few " employees by White , and con-
tacts with other employees by Carter , although the
evidence as to Carter's activity is negligible. The
same might be said respecting White 's activity
although direct evidence reveals the names of at
least four employees White contacted seeking their
adherence to the Union . No union literature was
placed in the hands of either White or Carter and
so none was distributed by either or anyone else in
the plant . No authorization cards were distributed
and employees ' signatures had not been sought.
There is no direct evidence that knowledge of such
union activity , as there was , ever came to the atten-
tion of any supervisor or person in managerial
status except it be through the contact made by
White with Leroy Williams ; and as hereafter ap-
pears I find that Williams was not a supervisor at
the time that White made the contact with him, if
he ever was.
Notwithstanding , White 's union activity was
slight and even though there is no direct evidence
of management 's knowledge of such activity , a find-
ing that Respondent did have knowledge of his
union activity seems inescapable under the circum-
stances hereinafter set forth from which I draw the
inference that there was company knowledge that
motivated Respondent in his adverse action
respecting White 's employment.
An essential element of this finding I make of
company knowledge is the fact that I credit the
testimony of White as to all matters relevant and
material to the issues herein ; and as hereinafter in-
dicated in some instances discredit the testimony of
certain of Respondent 's witnesses ; and as to some
significant matters White's testimony is undisputed.
Throughout his testimony , particularly as it relates
to conversations with Hulon Stringer , Respondent's
president , and Pettigrew , personnel manager, there
is a recital of plausible detail and incidents that
makes his story believable beyond any reasonable
doubt . In his version of conversations with Stringer
and Pettigrew, are statements attributed to them
that I find damaging to their case and that are un-
denied.
It is undisputed that about 8o'clock on the even-
ing of July 21, 1967, White and Carter met with
Glenn Phillips, representative of the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO, to lay
plans for further steps in an organizing drive within
Respondent 's plant . This meeting was held in Phil-
lips' car at the Court House Square of Bolivar
where Respondent 's plant is located . Phillips told
the two employees of a previous effort to organize
the plant and gave them the names of employees
who had shown an interest in the Union. Among
these employees was Leroy Williams , hereinbefore
mentioned and whom counsel for the General
Counsel contends is a supervisor . The next morn-
ing, a Saturday, White contacted Williams seeking
his aid in behalf of the Union , indicating to him that
because he , as a janitor , got into many parts of the
plant , he would be in a good position to work effec-
tively . This probably occurred between 9 and 10 o'-
clock in the morning and certainly prior to the
HARDEMAN GARMENT CORP. 1 163
time, about 11:45 a.m., when White was called into
the personnel manager's office and discharged. This
close timing of the discharge with Phillips' meeting,
the most positive and substantial action taken by
White in his effort to organize the plant, is a com-
pelling factor in the light of other circumstances, in
the inference I draw that the Company had
knowledge of union activity.
As hereinbefore indicated the notice of termina-
tion given to White stated that he was discharged to
effect a reduction in a departmental workforce.
There is no evidence whatever that White was told
he was being discharged because of unsatisfactory
work. While Respondent, through various wit-
nesses , sought to establish that his unsatisfactory
work performance was a part of the reason for his
discharge, there are irrefutable circumstances tend-
ing to counteract such evidence. In the first place,
the evidence tending to establish'that White's work
was not acceptable is not persuasive that his per-
formance was much different from that of his fel-
low employees. Thus there is no evidence that he
was ever individually given a reprimand for poor
performance. The testimony adduced to establish
his ineffectiveness is in generalities, such as he was
"slow" and made mistakes, and wholly lacking in
specificity. It leaves much room for doubt as to
whether the testimony was grounded on certain
knowledge. Contrary to the evidence that he was
not a satisfactory employee, it is not denied that his
wages were increased from $1.25 to $1.55 during
the short time he worked for Respondent; and it is
undisputed that one of the supervisors, who later
testified that his work performance was not good,
at one time offered him a promotion to supervisory
status on a night shift; and that on another occasion
he was complimented on the job he was doing as a
sorter.
The testimony of two fellow employees as to
White's poor work performance is so conclusional
in character as to be almost totally lacking in
probative force. To illustrate, Joe Allen answered,
when asked if the mistakes passed on to him from
White's work station went up or down in number
after White left the job, "Well, I would say down."
When pursued with the question "How much?" he
said, "Well, I really couldn't say that but con-
siderably."
The record does clearly reveal that White, before
coming to Respondent, had moved from job to job
with frequency. This history proves little, if
anything, however, on the issues joined in this case.
Highly damaging to Respondent's defense is the
circumstance that right at the time White was
discharged to effect a reduction in the work force,
and for weeks thereafter, Respondent required its
employees, doing the very work from which White
was discharged, to work many hours overtime with
regularity. While the evidence adduced in behalf of
Respondent is intended to show that some of this
overtime was required by unusual circumstances,
nevertheless the unexpected work requiring the
overtime continued over an extended period during
which time White was in great need of employment
and earnings to support his family; and Respondent
was claiming it had nothing for him to do not-
withstanding promises that management was very
anxious to help him, particularly after he withdrew
the initial charges of discriminatory discharge.
Much of Respondent's testimony is aimed toward
economic justification in the discharge tending to
show that for weeks and even months ahead of
White's discharge the layout tables were over-
manned . This testimony reveals a special trip made
by management to another manufacturer's plant
where work on the layout tables involved only two
employees handling substantially the same number
of garments for which Respondent employed six or
more people. This trip was made no doubt in good
faith but seems unrelated to White's subsequent
discharge. It has little if any probative value on the
question of economic discharge in view of the fact
that the effort to reduce the number of personnel
on the layout tables did not go beyond White's
dismissal , and the substantial overtime done by the
employees in his classification following White's
termination as previously found. Thus Respondent's
claim that the discharge was economically
motivated seems to be hollow and almost wholly
without substance.
It is significant that on the very day White was
discharged (for the reason that too many people
were working on the layout tables) another em-
ployee, Lorenzo Long, was put to work on the job
that White left, that is, sorting, and worked that af-
ternoon.
Another circumstance given some weight in
drawing the inference that the Company had
knowledge of White's union activity is the size of
the community and the size of the plant . Bolivar is
a small town. While Respondent normally em-
ployed over 400 people in its plant in Bolivar, the
number is not so large but that it is reasonable to
assume White's union activity, limited as it was but
involving contacts with some of these employees,
could easily have found its way to the offices of
management.
The status of Leroy Williams bears directly on
the matter of company knowledge. There is no
evidence in the record that as of the time of
White's discharge, Williams was a supervisor. A
month later however it appears from the evidence
that Stringer, Respondent's president, intended to
give him a degree of supervisory status-authority
that, if it had existed at the time of White's
discharge, might have constituted company
knowledge through White's direct contact with Wil-
liams about the Union. Thus it would appear from
the confidence management reposed in Williams in
granting him this authority within a month after the
White discharge, there was a closeness in the rela-
tionship between management and Williams that
could well have resulted in Williams carrying to
management the information White had given him
1164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the morning of the discharge that White was active-
ly engaged in bringing a union into the plant. I give
no weight to Williams' testimony that he never ad-
vised management of White's activity.
The evidence reveals that when White was
discharged he had the least seniority of the several
employees working at the layout tables. I find how-
ever that the moves respecting White, that resulted
in his being least in seniority , fit well into the pat-
tern I find that establishes discriminatory motiva-
tion on the part of Respondent. Thus just a few
weeks prior to his discharge he was moved from the
layout tables into the classification of "checker"
not generally then in use in the plant . It was his
function as checker to check the work of "order
pullers" who stacked from stock garments as to
size, color, and type required in specific orders
handed to them. While it cannot be stated positive-
ly from the record that White was least in seniority
as a "checker" the evidence certainly tends to
establish that this would be the fact. When he com-
plained that he could not keep up with two order
pullers and furthermore that his function there
seemed to be quite unnecessary, and that the order
pullers had indicated they would rather do their
own checking , he was transferred back to the
layout tables . Significantly then , as I view the
evidence and the subsequent action of Respondent,
the only person on the layout tables junior to White
in seniority , Leslie Henson , was transferred into
another department leaving White vulnerable in
case of a reduction in force among the sorters. And
the record clearly reveals from Respondent's own
witnesses that , as of about the time White was reas-
signed to sorting , a reduction in force was an-
ticipated there. Thus Robert E. Farris was told by
Pettigrew when he asked to go there so he could
get some overtime , it would not be wise as there
was going to be a layoff and he would be laid off as
a junior employee in the department . Also Henson
was advised when transferred out of sorting (at or
about the time of White 's return to the tables) that
there was to be a layoff- information that Henson
interpreted as one of the reasons he was assigned
from the sorter's job.
In drawing the inference I do that Respondent
had knowledge of White 's union activity when he
was discharged , I rely heavily on the statements I
find were made by Stringer and Pettigrew in con-
versations with White following his discharge and
his later withdrawal of the initial charges , state-
ments attributed by White to Stringer and Pet-
tigrew and not denied by either of them . Thus I find
that on July 28 , when White had gone to the com-
pany offices to get information concerning his
unemployment compensation , Pettigrew said to him
that he had heard that White was still getting union
cards signed . Earlier , and at the time of the
discharge interview on July 22 , Pettigrew had also
revealed that union activity was on his mind when
in giving White advice as to what he might do in his
own best interests he stressed the uncertainty of
employment in a factory . He indicated that he him-
self after long tenure with another company had
been laid off even though he had been a company
man and had not been a union member.
On August 22, when White made a repeated trip
to the company offices to find out if any work was
available for him in the factory in line with
representations he said were made to him when he
withdrew the initial charge , Pettigrew advised
White that he , Pettigrew , had heard White was still
getting union cards signed . In this conversation,
rendered so very credible by the detail supplied by
White in restating it, Pettigrew told White how
either his father or grandfather said that it was
better to take the $5 or $6 a month you pay for
union dues and put it on a new bicycle for one of
your children- that something like that was more
important.
On August 23 White, unable to make contact
with Stringer at the office , called at his home in the
evening . Stringer first told White that he wished he
would leave the Union alone , that it was a bad
thing , and that he wished White would quit fooling
with it.
On August 24, when White again called at Pet-
tigrew's office, looking for Stringer , he told Pet-
tigrew of his visit the night before with Stringer and
of Stringer 's statement that he wished White would
quit fooling with the Union . Pettigrew told him that
he did not think Stringer really believed White was
still engaging in union activity and that it had to be
only a rumor.
None of these statements , all unrefuted in the
testimony , are consistent with the denials of
Stringer and Pettigrew that they had any knowledge
of White 's union activity when he was discharged.
This is particularly so in view of the fact that the
statements made after his discharge treat his union
activity as a continuing thing , beginning as early as
July 28, 6 days after his discharge , when Pettigrew
told him that he had heard he was still getting cards
signed . I therefore find it necessary to discredit the
denials of both Stringer and Pettigrew that they had
knowledge of such union activity when White was
discharged . If they in fact had heard of union activi-
ty on White 's part, as I have found , and yet categor-
ically denied " knowledge " of such union activity,
as they did, conceivably they made mental reserva-
tions justifying the denials on the basis that they did
not in fact have knowledge but only rumor; for the
question put to each was geared to knowledge and
the brief answer was " None whatsoever ." In any
event , I have not credited the denial of either.
On the basis of all the foregoing I find and con-
clude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act when on July 22, 1967, it discharged
White.
B. The 8(a)(4) Violation
From all the evidence , I find and conclude that
on August 14 Stringer and Pettigrew went to the
HARDEMAN GARMENT CORP. 1 165
home of James White, following his discharge and
the filing of unfair labor practice charges against
Respondent, under the pretext of conferring with
him respecting his unemployment compensation.
They did this to induce him to withdraw the
charges, by veiled threats, and words reasonably in-
terpreted by White to constitute promises of reem-
ployment. The withdrawal was effectuated with the
approval of the Acting Regional Director of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board the next day in the of-
fices of Respondent.
In the conversation Stringer and Pettigrew held
with White in their car in front of his home, he was
advised that when the word got around among em-
ployers that he had filed charges he might become
known as a "troublemaker" and that it would be
difficult for him to get employment, inasmuch as
prospective employers would likely check with
Respondent concerning him. While Stringer denied
that he made any promise of employment when he
held the conversation concerning the withdrawal of
charges, he also testified that he said "James, I real-
ize that you've got a problem and I'll help you any
way I can. If there's something we can do for you,
we'll do it ... I mean that, I really mean that.
Whatever I can do for you I will be glad to do it."
This statement in and of itself could well be con-
strued by White to mean future employment, the
most reasonable way in which Stringer could help
him, and that is the way White interpreted it. And
he testified that when asked by White if he could
have his job back if he withdrew the charges, he
told White that he could not because they had been
forced to take people off of that particular classifi-
cation and then added "I don't know of any other
jobs that I have at the moment, but I'll tell you like
I told you before if I have something we will give
you a job and I'll do the best I can by you, but I
have no promises to make."
White gave the reasonable testimony, which I
credit, that "they didn't say `I promise to put you
back to work if you withdraw the charge"'; but was
told that it was Respondent's intention to call him
back, and that they "offered to call" him back dur-
ing the discussion concerning the withdrawal of the
charges. He summed it up in another way by saying
that when he wanted to know if he could go back to
work "the way Stringer talked he would put me
back to work." He also testified that Stringer would
consider putting him back to work even if only part
time.
Stringer led into the inducement to withdraw the
initial charge by telling White he had called
Respondent's lawyer and told him that White
seemed somewhat apologetic about filing the
charge , and that the lawyer said if this was so
possibly he would want to withdraw it. I find that
Stringer asked White at the "withdrawal con-
ference" if he would call the representative of the
National Labor Relations Board handling the
matter and withdraw the charge. White agreed to
call at the company offices the next day where the
withdrawal was consummated.
I find and conclude that, notwithstanding state-
ments as to reemployment, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act in that it
failed and refused to reemploy White because of his
union activity in the plant and because he had filed
the withdrawn charges. The very extent of the help
both Stringer and Pettigrew did give White, to keep
him satisfied following his discharge and the
withdrawal of the charges, short of reemploying
him, is evidence in and of itself that they were
determined to keep him out of their factory
because of his union activity and his resort to the
National Labor Relations Board. Thus both
Stringer and Pettigrew made numerous efforts to
get him employment other places and succeeded in
getting him a job which he held only. briefly with
the town of Bolivar. The extent of the commitment
made by Stringer to White as the initial charge was
being withdrawn, and Stringer's determination not
to get White back on the factory payroll, is quite
clearly revealed in his final effort to render White
assistance. During the week of August 22, 1967
(ending August 26), sorters in the factory (doing
the very work from which White had been
discharged) did 86.3 hours overtime as revealed in
Joint Exhibit I of the Respondent and General
Counsel. Notwithstanding this abundance of factory
work Stringer took White to Abe Self, a contractor
building a new building for Respondent, and had
Self give White a job at the same pay he had been
receiving when discharged by Respondent, with the
understanding that White would go on Respon-
dent's payroll rather than Self's. It is significant that
in the weeks immediately following, as indicated by
the Joint Exhibit 1, that is the weeks ending Sep-
tember 2 to November 25, each showed overtime
by regular employees from a minimum of 59.3
hours to a maximum of 180.7 hours; and for the
week ending September 2, the week after White
went to work for Self, these employees did 146.2
hours overtime.
Respondent's effort to explain away the failure to
hire White under existing circumstances in the fac-
tory, on the basis that the overtime was caused by
unusual situations and could have afforded him
only temporary work at the best, is totally unper-
suasive that the failure to employ was justified.
Neither is such failure in keeping with the promise
hereinbefore quoted, made by Stringer to White
when they were talking about withdrawal of
charges, that Stringer would do anything he could
do to help White. This lack of good faith, so clearly
revealed, can only be interpreted as a determina-
tion to keep White out of the plant because of his
interest in the Union and the filing of the charges.
The record reveals that between July 22, when
White was fired, and September 1, Respondent en-
gaged 12 new employees. While Pettigrew's ex-
planation as to why White could not be considered
for some of these jobs is plausible, I am not per-
suaded that he could not have performed some of
1166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the others-a circumstance adding to the convic-
tion that because of his union activity Respondent
was determined not to reemploy White.
C. The 8( a)(1) Violations
In addition to the violations of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act previously found, I find and conclude that
the statements of Pettigrew and of Stringer herein-
before set out to the effect that they had heard
White was continuing his union activity, and by
Stringer that it was bad and he should quit fooling
around with the Union, in the context of his then
seeking reemployment pursuant to the promises
made to him that he would be reemployed, con-
stituted unlawful coercion in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
III. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices, I shall
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative actions set forth in the
Recommened Order that follows, including the
posting of an appropriate notice, to effectuate the
policies of the Act. Respecting the unlawful dis-
crimination that I have found as to the employee
James B. White, he shall be made whole for any
loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him, by the payment of a sum of money
equal to the amount he would normally have
earned as wages from the date on which his em-
ployment was terminated by Respondent to the
date on which Respondent shall offer him proper
reinstatement as herein provided, less his interim
net earnings to be computed on a quarterly basis in
the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289. Interest on backpay shall be com-
puted in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case and the
foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I
recommend that Hardeman Garment Corporation,
it officers , agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging , forcing the termination of, or
refusing to employ or reemploy, or otherwise dis-
criminating against employees in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment in order to discourage membership in
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
(b) Interrogating any employee concerning ac-
tivity in respect to union organization in a manner
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
constituting a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
(c) Threatening employees as troublemakers for
resorting to the processes of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
(d) Threatening employees with any denial of
work or employment or any other reprisal because
they become or remain members of the Union or
give any assistance or support to it , or any other
labor organization , or because they seek to utilize
the processes of the National Labor Relations
Board.
(e) In any like manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization , to form , join , or assist
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing , and to engage in other concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
mutual aid or protection , and to refrain from any or
all such activity.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer to the employee , James B. White, rein-
statement to his former or to a substantially
equivalent position , without prejudice to his
seniority and other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed ; and make him whole for any loss he may
have suffered by reason of the Respondent's dis-
crimination against him in the manner described in
The Remedy section of this Decision.
(b) Notify the employee named above if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of his right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Ser-
vice Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request , make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying all payroll records , social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due and the right of employ-
ment under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its plant in Bolivar , Tennessee , copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix ." ' Copies
of said notice , on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 26, after being duly signed by
Respondent 's representative , shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to in-
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
HARDEMAN GARMENT CORP. 1167
sure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26,
in writing , within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision , what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.2
t In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 26, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
ganization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid
or protection , and to refrain from any or all
such activity.
WE WILL offer to James B. White immediate
and full reinstatement to his former or substan-
tially equivalent position , without prejudice to
his seniority and other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make the said James B. White
whole for any loss of earnings he has suffered
as a result of the discrimination against him.
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the of the National Labor Relations
Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we
hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT fire any employee , make him
quit , refuse to reemploy him, or treat him dif-
ferently in any way because he joins or favors
the Union.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate or
threaten our employees regarding their or
other employees ' activities or sympathies for or
against any union.
WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere
with , restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of their right to self-organization , to form,
join, or assist Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor or-
HARDEMAN GARMENT
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions , they may
communicate directly with the Board 's Regional
Office , 746 Federal Office Building , 167 North
Main Street , Memphis , Tennessee 38103,
Telephone 901-534-3161.