Guy Carpenter & Company, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 12, 2020

14837873 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/837,873 08/27/2015 Victoria Louise JENKINS 40191/01802 3132
30636 7590 08/12/2020
FAY KAPLUN & MARCIN, LLP
150 BROADWAY, SUITE 702
NEW YORK, NY 10038
EXAMINER
SMITH, SLADE E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mmarcin@fkmiplaw.com
okaplun@fkmiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte VICTORIA LOUISE JENKINS and
OTTO ERNST REINHOLD BEYER

Appeal 2020-002816
Application 14/837,873
Technology Center 3600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, LARRY J. HUME, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–58, which are all claims pending in
the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Guy
Carpenter & Company, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
These teachings relate generally to “computerised [sic] systems for
placing reinsurance and insurance risk.” See Spec. ¶ 1.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal (italics added to contested dispositive prior-art limitation):
1. A computerized method of auctioning reinsurance
capacity, the method performed by an auction server computer
system communicating with a cedent computer and a plurality
of bidder computers via a communications network, the server
computer system comprising a processor, a memory, a received
bids database, an auctions database; an adjusted bids database
and an administration database; the method comprising the
steps of:
receiving at the server computer system bids from bidder
computers to participate in a reinsurance auction, the auction
having a predetermined reserve price and reserve quantity and
each bid comprising a bid price and a bid quantity at that price,
each bidder computer having a pre-determined maximum
quantity biddable in the auction;
validating the received bids at the server computer
system and storing validated bids in the received bids database
and the adjusted bids database of the computer system in order
of time of receipt;
for each received bid, comparing the sum of quantities of
prior received bids and the received bid with the reserve
quantity of the auction;

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
Sep. 9, 2019); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 28, 2020); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 31, 2019); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed Feb. 21, 2019); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
Aug. 27, 2015).
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if the sum of quantities is greater than the reserve quantity,
signing down the quantity of one or more of the received bids
and prior received bids according to a price priority and, for
each price, according to a time of receipt priority so that the
sum of quantities of the prior received bids and the received bid
is equal to the reserve quantity;
after the step of comparing, overwriting the quantity of
signed down received or prior received bids in the adjusted bids
database; and
at the end of the auction, concluding reinsurance
contracts with bids remaining in the adjusted bids database.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Kraehenbuehl et al.
(“Kraehenbuehl”)
US 2002/0046067 A1 April 18, 2002
Rabenold et al.
(“Rabenold”)
US 2005/0187856 Al Aug. 25, 2005
Barry et al. (“Barry”) US 2006/0136324 A1 June 22, 2006
Lark et al. (“Lark”) US 7,409,360 B1 Aug. 5, 2008
Hough et al. (“Hough”) US 2013/0091047 Al April 11, 2013
Crutchfield et al.
(“Crutchfield”)
US 2014/0188688 Al July 3, 2014
Rejections on Appeal
R1. Claims 1–58 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or abstract idea) without significantly more. Final
Act. 3.
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R2. Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9, 18–31, 34, 35, 37, 45–51, 55, and 56 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of
Kraehenbuehl and Hough. Final Act. 25.
R3. Claims 4, 5, 32, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combination of Kraehenbuehl, Barry, and Hough.
Final Act. 76.
R4. Claims 8 and 36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combination of Kraehenbuehl, Rabenold, and Hough.
Final Act. 82.
R5. Claims 10, 38, and 52–54 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over the combination of Kraehenbuehl, Lark, and Hough.
Final Act. 85.
R6. Claims 11–17, 39–44, 57, and 58 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Kraehenbuehl,
Crutchfield, and Hough. Final Act. 93.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 7–13) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of patent-ineligible
subject matter Rejection R1 of claims 1–58 on the basis of representative
claim 1.3 We address claims 1–58, rejected under Rejections R2 through
R6, infra.

3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We agree with particular arguments presented by Appellant with
respect to obviousness Rejections R2 through R6 of claims 1–58.
However, we disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to
subject matter eligibility Rejections R1 of claims 1–58 and, unless otherwise
noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s
Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address
specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows.
1. § 101 Rejection R1 of Claims 1–58
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 7–13; Reply Br. 2–7) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter is in error because “the claimed matter is directed to
a practical application.” Appeal Br. 7.

In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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Under the USPTO’s Revised Guidance, informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, is claim 1 patent-ineligible under
§ 101?
Principles of Law
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it is a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.4
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4

4 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the USPTO’s patent-
eligibility analysis under § 101. MPEP § 2106.
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853)));
and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and
mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under
this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what
the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one
inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”).
Examples of claims that do not recite mental processes because they
cannot be practically performed in the human mind include: (a) a claim to a
method for calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver and an
absolute time of reception of satellite signals, where the claimed GPS
receiver calculated pseudoranges that estimated the distance from the GPS
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receiver to a plurality of satellites, SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International
Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010); (b) a claim to
detecting suspicious activity by using network monitors and analyzing
network packets, SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 930 F.3d 1295, 1304
(Fed. Cir. 2019); (c) a claim to a specific data encryption method for
computer communication involving a several-step manipulation of data,
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (distinguishing TQP Development, LLC v. Intuit Inc., 2014 WL
651935 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2014)) (the specific data encryption method
“could not conceivably be performed in the human mind or with pencil and
paper”). While a claim limitation to a process that “can be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” qualifies as a mental
process, a claim limitation that “could not, as a practical matter, be
performed entirely in a human’s mind” (even if aided with pen and paper)
would not qualify as a mental process.5
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view
respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent

5 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372, 1375–
76 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft
Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade
Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is
now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘“inventive
concept’” sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Revised Guidance
The PTO published revised guidance in the Federal Register
concerning the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019) (hereinafter
“Revised Guidance”) (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-
07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal
agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also
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October 2019 Update at 1 (October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility)
(hereinafter “October 2019 Update”).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes);6 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual for Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).7
See Revised Guidance 52–53.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.8
See Revised Guidance 56.

6 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(i)”).
7 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(ii)”).
8 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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Step 2A(i) – Abstract Idea
Informed by our judicial precedent, the Revised Guidance extracts and
synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain
that the abstract idea exception includes the following groupings of subject
matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity —
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts;
legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
Revised Guidance 52 (footnotes omitted).
Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent-
eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis,
except in situations identified in the Revised Guidance.9

9 In the rare circumstance in which an examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
of the Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See Revised
Guidance, Section III.C.
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However, if the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea
enumerated above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon), the claim
requires further analysis for a practical application of the judicial exception
in Step 2A(ii).
Step 2A(ii) – Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception in Step 2A(i), we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception in Step 2A(ii) by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and
in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.
The seven identified “practical application” sections of the MPEP,10
cited in the Revised Guidance under Step 2A(ii), are:
(1) MPEP § 2106.05(a) Improvements to the Functioning of
a Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical
Field
(2) MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine
(3) MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
(4) MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations
(5) MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An
Exception

10 See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Citations to the MPEP herein refer
to revision [R-08.2017]. Sections 2106.05(a), (b), (c), and (e) are indicative
of integration into a practical application, while §§ 2106.05(f), (g), and (h)
relate to limitations that are not indicative of integration into a practical
application.
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(6) MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
(7) MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological
Environment
See Revised Guidance 55.
If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited
above, then the claim is not directed to the judicial exception, and the patent-
eligibility inquiry ends. See Revised Guidance 54. If not, then analysis
proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
Under our reviewing courts’ precedent, it is possible that a claim that
does not “integrate” a recited judicial exception under Step 2A(ii) is
nonetheless patent eligible. For example, the claim may recite additional
elements that render the claim patent eligible even though one or more claim
elements may recite a judicial exception.11 The Federal Circuit has held
claims eligible at the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B)
because the additional elements recited in the claims provided “significantly
more” than the recited judicial exception (e.g., because the additional
elements were unconventional in combination).12 Therefore, if a claim has
been determined to be directed to a judicial exception under Revised Step
2A, we must also evaluate the additional elements individually and in
combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an inventive

11 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
12 See, e.g., Amdocs, Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300,
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR Holdings v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more
than the exception itself).13
Under the Revised Guidance, we must consider in Step 2B whether an
additional element or combination of elements: (1) “Adds a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present;” or (2) “simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.” See Revised Guidance,
Section III.B.14
In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or combination of
elements) is not well-understood, routine or conventional unless the

13 The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, “[t]he question of whether a claim element or
combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a
skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
14 In accordance with existing Step 2B guidance, an Examiner’s finding that
an additional element (or combination of elements) is well understood,
routine, conventional activity must be supported with at least one of the four
specific types of evidence required by the USPTO Berkheimer
Memorandum, as shown above. For more information concerning evaluation
of well-understood, routine, conventional activity, see MPEP § 2106.05(d),
as modified by the USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum (USPTO
Commissioner for Patents Memorandum dated Apr. 19, 2018, “Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” (hereinafter
“Berkheimer Memo”).
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examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a rejection in
writing with, one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the
specification or to a statement made by an applicant during
prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . .
2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions
discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the
well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s). . . .
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official
notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of
the additional element(s). . . .
See Berkheimer Memo 3–4.
If the Examiner or the Board determines under Step 2B that the
element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly more than the
exception itself, the claim is eligible, thereby concluding the eligibility
analysis.
However, if a determination is made that the element and combination
of elements do not amount to significantly more than the exception itself, the
claim is ineligible under Step 2B, and the claim should be rejected for lack of
subject matter eligibility.
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Analysis
Step 1 – Statutory Category
Claim 1, as a method claim, recites one of the enumerated categories
of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, the issue before us
is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that the limitations of claim 1 cover the
abstract idea of “conducting an auction for a limited amount of reinsurance
capacity where eligible (i.e. ‘validated’) bids for quantities of capacity that
can’t be fully filled are reduced in quantity (i.e. ‘signed down’) according to
bid price priority (and bid time of receipt priority) so that contracts can still
be created for the partial portions of those bids that can be filled at their
lower (or later) bid prices at the end of the auction while honoring more
fully the higher priced (or earlier received) bids to the extent that the limited
amount of reinsurance capacity permits.” Final Act. 3–4 (underline
omitted). The Examiner concludes the limitations:
[F]all[] within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas
enumerated in Section I of the 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance: b) Certain methods of organizing
human activity - fundamental economic principles or practices
(including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or
legal interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales
activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal
behavior or relationships or interactions between people
(including social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions). c) Mental processes - concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion).
Final Act. 4.
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Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in error because
the claimed subject matter is integrated into a practical application under a
Step 2A analysis. Appeal Br. 7–8. Appellant further argues: “The Appellant
submits that the claimed subject matter cannot be reasonably characterized
as solely encompassing the concept of performing an auction or creating a
contract. As will be demonstrated below, the claims clearly recite elements
that integrate the purported abstract idea into a practical application of that
exception.” Appeal Br. 8.
We conclude claim 1 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either
natural phenomena or laws of nature. We evaluate, de novo, whether
claim 1 recites an abstract idea based upon the Revised Guidance.
First, we look to the Specification to provide context as to what the
claimed invention is directed to. In this case, the Specification discloses that
the invention relates generally to “systems for placing reinsurance and
insurance risk.” Spec. 1.
Appellant’s Abstract describes the invention as:
A computerized [sic] auction system for enabling auctions of
reinsurance placements. A server computer system comprises a
processor, memory, auctions database, received bids database,
adjusted bids database and administration database. The system
communicates on line, or via a private network, with a cedent
computer and a plurality of reinsurer computers. Selected
reinsurers are invited to participate as bidders in an auction and,
when the auction commences, can submit one or more bids in
an attempt to secure participation at a price that is the same as
or lower than a reserve price. The auction runs in real time and
bids are ranked in ascending order of price and, within price, in
ascending order of time of receipt. A bidder can enter new bids
in an attempt to maintain participation in response to
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competitive bids from other bidders or in an attempt to increase
participation. Each bidder can see the price, participation and
rank for their own bids and for competitors’ bids. However, a
bidder cannot see the identity the owners of competing bids in
the auction. A new bid is validated and may be signed down to
a lower participation or zero if the total participation of bids for
a given bidder exceeds that bidder’s maximum permitted
participation for the auction, or if the total participation of all
bids exceeds the reserve participation for the auction. Progress
of the auction is transparent to bidders who can see their bids
being signed down and who can submit fresh bids at prices
lower than the reserve price.
Spec. (Abstract).
In TABLE I below, we identify in italics the specific claim limitations
in claim 1 that we conclude recite an abstract idea. We additionally identify
in bold the additional (non-abstract) claim limitations that are generic
computer components and techniques, and underline limitations representing
extra or post-solution activity:

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TABLE I
Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance
[L0] A computerized method of
auctioning reinsurance capacity, the
method performed by an auction server
computer system communicating with
a cedent computer and a plurality of
bidder computers via a
communications network, the server
computer system comprising a
processor, a memory, a received bids
database, an auctions database; an
adjusted bids database and an
administration database; the method
comprising the steps of:
A method is a statutory subject
matter class. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. See 35 U.S.C. § 101
(“Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of
this title.”).
As claimed, a server computer
system, computers, processor,
memory, and databases
represent generic computer
components and functionality.
See Spec. 12, l, 24–13, l, 11.
[L1] receiving at the server computer
system bids from bidder computers to
participate in a reinsurance auction, the
auction having a predetermined reserve
price and reserve quantity and
each bid comprising a bid price and a
bid quantity at that price, each bidder
computer having a pre-determined
maximum quantity biddable in the
auction;
Receiving information, i.e.,
“receiving . . . bids . . . to
participate in a reinsurance
auction” or data gathering, is
merely insignificant extra-
solution activity that does not
add significantly more to the
abstract idea to render the
claimed invention patent-
eligible. Revised Guidance 55,
n.31; see In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc), aff’d on other grounds,
561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“[T]he
involvement of the machine or
transformation in the claimed
process must not merely be
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Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance
insignificant extra-solution
activity.”).
[L2a] validating the received bids at the
server computer system and

[L2b] storing validated bids in the
received bids database and the adjusted
bids database of the computer system in
order of time of receipt;
“[V]alidating the received
bids” is an abstract idea, i.e., a
certain method of organizing
human activity in the form of a
commercial interaction, i.e., a
sales activity. See Revised
Guidance 52.
As claimed, “storing . . . bids
in . . . [a] database” represents
insignificant extra-solution
activity. See Revised
Guidance; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(g).
[L3] for each received bid, comparing
the sum of quantities of prior received
bids and the received bid with the
reserve quantity of the auction;
“[C]omparing the sum of
quantities . . .” is an abstract
idea, i.e., “an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion”
which could be performed as a
mental process. See Revised
Guidance 52.
[L4] if the sum of quantities is greater
than the reserve quantity, signing down
the quantity of one or more of the
received bids and prior received bids
according to a price priority and, for
each price, according to a time of
receipt priority so that the sum of
quantities of the prior received bids and
“[S]igning down the quantity
of one or more of the received
bids,” as claimed, is an
abstract idea, i.e., “an
observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion,” which
could be performed as a
mental process. See Revised
Guidance 52.15

15 The “‘mere automation of manual processes using generic computers’ . . .
‘does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology,’”
Trading Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
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Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance
the received bid is equal to the reserve
quantity;
[L5] after the step of comparing,
overwriting the quantity of signed down
received or prior received bids in the
adjusted bids database; and
“[O]verwriting the quantity of
signed down received or prior
received bids” represents
insignificant post-solution
activity. Revised Guidance 55,
n.31; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(g).
[L6] at the end of the auction,
concluding reinsurance contracts with
bids remaining in the adjusted bids
database.
Concluding reinsurance
contracts with bids remaining
in the adjusted bids database is
an abstract idea, i.e., a certain
method of organizing human
activity in the form of a
commercial interaction, i.e., a
sales activity. See Revised
Guidance 52.
Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.) (bracketed labeling added).
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard,16 and aside
from any claimed computer-related aspects, we conclude limitations [L1]

(quoting Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055
(Fed. Cir. 2017)).
16 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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though [L6] identified in TABLE I above, recite abstract functions that
would ordinarily be executed when auctioning reinsurance capacity. See
Final Act. 3–10.
We determine that claim 1, overall, recites certain methods of
organizing human activity in the form of commercial transactions, i.e., sales
activities, and alternatively, claim 1 recites fundamental economic principles
or practices in the form of auctioning reinsurance capacity. This type of
activity, i.e., for each received bid, comparing the sum of quantities of prior
received bids and the received bid with the reserve quantity of the auction,
for example, is emblematic of a commercial transaction, in the form of a
sales activity or an economic practice.17
Thus, under Step 2A(i), we agree with the Examiner that claim 1
recites an abstract idea. Under our Revised Guidance, we specifically
conclude claim 1 recites a judicial exception of a certain method of
organizing human activity in the form of commercial interactions, i.e., sales
activities (“auctioning reinsurance capacity”) and, alternatively, we conclude

17 Our reviewing court recognizes that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does
not, “impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. Further, “[t]he Board’s
slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability
analysis.” Id. Moreover, merely combining several abstract ideas does not
render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math)
to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see
also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination
of abstract ideas).
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claim 1 recites a fundamental economic practice. In either case, we
conclude claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims recite a judicial exception, as we conclude above, we
proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) in which we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
As to the specific limitations, in addition to the abstract limitations
[L2a], [L3], [L4], and [L6] identified in TABLE I, above, we find limitation
[L1] (“receiving . . . bids . . . to participate in a reinsurance auction”) recites
insignificant data gathering. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). Data gathering, as
performed by the steps or function in Appellant’s claims, is a classic
example of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
We also find limitations [L2b] (“storing validated bids in the received
bids database and the adjusted bids database of the computer system”) and
[L5] (“overwriting the quantity of signed down received or prior received
bids in the adjusted bids database”) recite insignificant post solution activity.
The Supreme Court guides that the “prohibition against patenting abstract
ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by’ . . . adding ‘insignificant postsolution
activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
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In addition, we conclude limitation [L0] (preamble) recites a “server
computer system,” “cedent computer,” “bidder computers,” and
“communications network” in which the server computer system includes “a
processor,” “a memory,” a “received bids database,” an “auctions database,”
“adjusted bids database” and an “administration database” which, as
claimed, represent well-understood, routine and conventional components at
a high level of generality.
On this record, we are of the view that Appellant’s claims do not
operate the recited generic computer components in an unconventional
manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the “adjusted bids
database” — by storing bids — enables a server to track bids in real-time
while hosting an auction for reinsurance capacity integrates the recited
abstract ideas into a practical application. Appeal Br. 10. We find each of
the other limitations of claim 1 either recite abstract ideas, extra-solution
activity, or generic computer components as identified in Step 2A(i), supra
(see TABLE I, L0 through L6), and none of the limitations integrate the
judicial exception of auctioning reinsurance capacity into a practical
application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited
above. The claim as a whole merely uses instructions to implement the
abstract idea on a computer using a database or, alternatively, merely uses a
computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea in the environment of
reinsurance auctioning.
Accordingly, on this record, Appellant has not shown an improvement
or practical application under the guidance of MPEP section 2106.05(a)
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(“Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or to Any Other
Technology or Technical Field”) or section 2106.05(e) (“Other Meaningful
Limitations”). Therefore, we conclude the abstract idea is not integrated into
a practical application, and thus the claim is directed to the judicial
exception.
Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, and not integrated
into a practical application, as we conclude above, we proceed to the
“inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we must “look with more specificity
at what the claim elements add, in order to determine ‘whether they identify
an “inventive concept” in the application of the ineligible subject matter’ to
which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DirectTV, LLC,
838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In applying step two of the Alice analysis, our reviewing court guides
we must “determine whether the claims do significantly more than simply
describe [the] abstract method” and thus transform the abstract idea into
patentable subject matter. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We look to see whether there are any “additional
features” in the claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby
rendering the claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an
abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be
more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566
U.S. at 79.
Limitations referenced in Alice that are not enough to qualify as
“significantly more” when recited in a claim with an abstract idea include, as
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non-limiting or non-exclusive examples: adding the words “apply it” (or an
equivalent) with an abstract idea18; mere instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer19; or requiring no more than a generic computer
to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.20
Evaluating representative claim 1 under step 2 of the Alice analysis,
we conclude it lacks an inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea of
auctioning reinsurance capacity, i.e., receiving, validating and comparing
bids and overwriting the quantity of signed-down bids in the adjusted bids
database, and concluding reinsurance contracts with the bids remaining in
the adjusted bids database, into a patent-eligible application of that abstract
idea.
The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, 811 F.3d at 1325. In particular, “[t]he question of whether a
claim element or combination of elements is well-understood, routine and
conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.”
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.
As required under Berkheimer, the Examiner provides a particular
type of evidence of the well-understood, routine, and conventional nature of

18 Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–23.
19 Alice, 573 U.S. at 222–23, e.g., simply implementing a mathematical
principle on a physical machine, namely a computer.
20 Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (explaining using a computer to obtain data, adjust
account balances, and issue automated instructions involves computer
functions that are well-understood, routine, conventional activities).
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the recited computer components and functions21 by concluding, the steps in
claim 1 “do not constitute significantly more than the abstract idea because
they comprise or include well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry (e.g. all or portion(s) of the
‘receiving[] bids’, ‘comparing [a] sum’, ‘overwriting [a] quantity’ steps), see
Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2360, and/or that are otherwise not significant
toward constituting any inventive concept beyond the abstract idea.” Final
Act. 9. The Examiner cites additional case law in support of the evidentiary
requirements under Berkheimer. Id.
As further evidence of the conventional nature of the recited “adjusted
bids database” in claim 1, the Specification merely discloses, “[t]he adjusted
bids database stores details of live bids for each open auction.” Spec. 22.
The recited “adjusted bids database” is consistently described in general
terms throughout the Specification. See, e.g., Spec. 7, ll. 10–14.
Thus, because the Specification describes the additional elements in
general terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim
limitations may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional
computer components and techniques, particularly in light of Appellant’s
Specification, as quoted above.22

21 See Berkheimer Memo 4 (“A citation to one or more of the court
decisions discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood,
routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s)”).
22 Claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation, as
understood by those of ordinary skill in the art and taking into account
whatever enlightenment may be had from the Specification. In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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With respect to the Step 2B analysis, we conclude, similar to Alice, the
recitation of the recited “database,” “processor,” “memory,” “computers,”
and “server computer system,” is simply not enough to transform the patent-
ineligible abstract idea here of auctioning reinsurance capacity into a patent-
eligible invention under Step 2B. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (“[C]laims,
which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform
[an] abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
We conclude the claims fail the Step 2B analysis because claim 1, in
essence, merely recites various computer-based elements along with no
more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea using
the computer-based elements.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the Revised
Guidance, that each of Appellant’s claims 1–58, considered as a whole, is
directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a
practical application and does not include an inventive concept.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent
claim 1, and grouped claims 2–58, which fall therewith. See Claim
Grouping, supra.
2. § 103 Rejections R2–R6 of Claims 1–58
For essentially the same reasons argued by Appellant (see generally
Appeal Br. 14–18) we reverse the Examiner’s Rejection R2 of independent
claim 1, and also Rejections R2 and R6 of independent claims 29, 57, and
58, which recites the dispositive limitation in commensurate form. For the
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same reasons, we also reverse rejections R2–R6 of all claims 2–28 and 30–
56 that depend therefrom.23
Issue 2
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 14–18) the Examiner’s Rejection R2 of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of
Kraehenbuehl and Hough is in error. These contentions present us with the
following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Kraehenbuehl and
Hough teach or at least suggest “[a] computerized method of auctioning
reinsurance capacity, the method performed by an auction server computer
system communicating with a cedent computer and a plurality of bidder
computers via a communications network, the server computer system
comprising a processor, a memory, a received bids database, an auctions
database; an adjusted bids database and an administration database,”
wherein the method includes, inter alia, the step of “for each received bid,
comparing the sum of quantities of prior received bids and the received bid
with the reserve quantity of the auction,” as recited in claim 1?

23 Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced
by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments.
See Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(finding an administrative agency is at liberty to reach a decision based on “a
single dispositive issue”).
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Analysis
Independent Claim 1
Appellant argues:
In the entirety of Kraehenbuehl, there is not a single
instance of disclosure in which a “sum” is determined based on
data from previously received bids and a currently received bid,
let alone “the sum of quantities of prior received bids and the
received bid” as recited in claim 1. . . . Since Kraehenbuehl fails
to disclose either determining a sum that is any way analogous
to the “sum” recited in claim 1 and a reserve that is in any way
analogous to the “reserve quantity” recited in claim 1,
Kraehenbuehl cannot possibly be characterized as disclosing
“for each received bid, comparing the sum of quantities of prior
received bids and the received bid with the reserve quantity of
the auction” as recited in claim 1.
Like, Kraehenbuehl, Hough fails to provide a single
instance of disclosure in which a “sum” is determined based on
data from previously received bids and a currently received bid,
let alone “the sum of quantities of prior received bids and the
received bid” as recited in claim 1.
Appeal Br. 15. See also Reply Br. 7–8.
The Examiner finds Kraehenbuehl’s available and consumed
capacities described in ¶¶ 54–62 teaches or at least suggests the disputed
limitation “the sum of quantities of prior received bids and the received bid.”
Final Act. 29.
The Examiner additionally finds:
Regarding “sum of quantities of prior received bids and the
received bid”, KRAEHENBUEHL recites e.g. “the [total]
consumed capacity [that] has been subtracted” par. [0062]
including all of “its consumed capacity” par. [0060] pertaining
to each of “[t]he AREs [] visited” par. [0060]. Regarding
“reserve quantity”, KRAEHENBUEHL recites e.g. “a capacity
of the reinsurance product to be sold” Abstract or e.g. “The
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amount that the reinsurance company agrees to insure” par.
[0010] or “available capacity” pars. [0052], [0059]-[0060],
[0062], [0064].
Ans. 9.
We disagree with the Examiner’s finding because, for the reasons set
forth by Appellant, we do not find the cited portions of Kraehenbuehl
disclosing available and consumed capacities, or the total consumed capacity
that has been subtracted, teach or suggest the disputed limitation “for each
received bid, comparing the sum of quantities of prior received bids and the
received bid with the reserve quantity of the auction,” as recited in claim 1.
In particular, we do not find a teaching or suggestion for comparing any sum
of quantities of bids as recited in claim 1 within the cited sections of
Kraehenbuehl.
Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are persuaded of at
least one error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination
to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1, such that we find
error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection R2
of independent claim 1. Similarly, we do not sustain Rejection R2 of
independent claim 29 and Rejection R6 of independent claims 57 and 58,
which each recite the dispositive disputed limitation in commensurate form,
and for which the Examiner relies upon the stated teachings of Kraehenbuehl
in the same manner.
For the same reasons, we also do not sustain Rejections R2–R6 of
dependent claims 2–28 and 30–56 that variously and ultimately depend from
independent claims 1 and 29.
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REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2–14) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position
in the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err with respect to the patent ineligibility
Rejection R1 of claims 1–58 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and we sustain the
rejection.
(2) The Examiner erred with respect to obviousness Rejections R2
through R6 of claims 1–58 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art
combinations of record, and we do not sustain the rejections.
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).

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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Basis /
References Affirmed Reversed
1–58 101 Subject Matter Eligibility 1–58
1–3, 6, 7, 9,
18–31, 34,
35, 37, 45–
51, 55, 56
103
Obviousness
Kraehenbuehl,
Hough

1–3, 6, 7, 9,
18–31, 34,
35, 37, 45–
51, 55, 56
4, 5, 32, 33 103
Obviousness
Kraehenbuehl,
Barry, Hough
4, 5, 32, 33
8, 36 103
Obviousness
Kraehenbuehl,
Rabenold, Hough
8, 36
10, 38, 52–54 103
Obviousness
Kraehenbuehl,
Lark, Hough
10, 38, 52–54
11–17, 39–
44, 57, 58 103
Obviousness
Kraehenbuehl,
Crutchfield, Hough
11–17, 39–44, 57, 58
Overall
Outcome 1–58
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED