Gulfmont Hotel Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 29, 1964

147 N.L.R.B. 997 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

GULFMONT HOTEL COMPANY 997
Gulfmont Hotel Company and Hotel, Motel . and Club Employees
Union , Local 251, AFL-CIO, affiliated with Hotel and Restau-
rant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-
CIO; and Stationary Engineers , Local No. 707, affiliated with
International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO. Case
No.. 3-CA-1705. June 29, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 9, 1964, Trial Examiner Fannie M. Boyls issued her De-
cision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain af-
firmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision and the entire, record in the case, including the
exceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, Gulfmont
Hotel Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on October 29, 1963, by Hotel, Motel and Club Employees
Union, Local 251, AFL-CIO, affiliated with Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, and Stationary Engineers, Local No. 707,
affiliated with International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, herein called
the Unions, a complaint was issued on December 24, 1963. The complaint alleged
that Respondent, Gulfmont Hotel Company, had refused to bargain with the Unions
in violation of Section &(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Respondent filed an answer
admitting the refusal to bargain but alleging _as an affirmative defense that it had,
and continues to have, a good-faith doubt as to the majority status of the Unions.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Fannie M. Boyls,
on February 3, 1964, at Houston, Texas. The parties waived oral argument at the
conclusion of the hearing, but thereafter the General Counsel and Respondent filed
briefs, which I have carefully considered.
147 NLRB No. 138.
998 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record in this case ' and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a corporation engaged at Houston, Texas, in the operation of the
Ben Milam Hotel. During the 12-month period preceding the issuance of the com-
plaint, which is a representative period, Respondent' s gross revenue from its hotel
operations exceeded $500,000, and more than 75 percent of its patrons were transients
who remained at the hotel for less than 30 days. During this period Respondent
purchased goods and materials valued -at more than $5,000, which goods and mate-
rials were shipped to its Houston, Texas, hotel directly from points outside the State
of Texas. Respondent concedes, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
It is conceded , and I find , that Hotel , Motel and Club Employees Union, Local
251, AFL-CIO, affiliated with Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
International Union , AFL-CIO, and Stationary Engineers , Local No . 707, affiliated
with International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Issues and applicable principles
Shortly before the termination date of its first contract with the Unions which had
been certified about 2 years prior thereto as the joint bargaining representative of
Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit, Respondent expressed a doubt as to
Unions' continuing majority status and refused to bargain for that asserted reason.
It is well settled, as Respondent recognizes, that in the absence of unusual circum-
stances, a certified union's majority status during the certification year is irrebuttable,
but that after the first year of the certification the presumption, although continuing,
is rebuttable even in the absence of unusual circumstances. The employer motivated
by a good-faith and well-founded doubt as to the union's continuing majority status
after the first year of the certification, may rebut this presumption by calling upon
the Board to conduct another election, or he may, without breaching his statutory
bargaining obligations, cease recognizing the union while refraining, of course, from
taking action which might tend to dissipate the majority status. Whether the em-
ployer is motivated by a good-faith and well-founded doubt is 'a question of fact to be
decided in each case. Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, 672, cited
with approval by the Supreme Court in Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96, 104;
Hayworth Roll and Panel Company, 130 NLRB 604; Downtown Bakery Corp., Suc-
cessor to Snsayda's Home Bakery, Inc., 139 NLRB 1352.
B. Chronology of events
There is no substantial dispute concerning the subsidiary facts in this case.
Following their certification on September 18, 1961, as the joint bargaining rep-
resentative of Respondent's employees in an .appropriate bargaining unit,' the Unions
and Respondent on November 27, 1962, entered into a bargaining contract which
was to be in effect- from December 1, 1962, to December 1, 1963. This contract did
not contain an automatic renewal clause but section 32 thereof provided:
Should either party desire to negotiate the terms of a new Agreement or modify
the existing Agreement, the other party shall be notified of such desire at least
60 days prior to the termination date of this agreement. The parties agree to
meet no later than thirty (30) days prior to the expiration date of this Agree-
ment and hold meetings at reasonable times thereafter and endeavor in good
faith to negotiate a new agreement.
' This unit consists of all employees of Respondent at Its Ben Milam Hotel In Houston,
Texas , including regular part -time employees , garage and laundry employees , operating
and maintenance engineers , the secretary to the manager, and the auditing department
(back office) employees ,. but excluding irregular part-time employees , guards, watchmen,
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
GULFMONT HOTEL COMPANY 999'
By letter dated September 30, 1963 (61 days prior to the expiration date of the
contract), Respondent delivered by messenger to the office of the Unions , a letter
stating:
In accordance with the provisions of Section 32 of the Agreement . . . we
hereby advise you that we desire to terminate this Agreement because we have
a bona fide doubt that your Local Unions represent a majority of our employees
in a unit appropriate for bargaining.
For the foregoing reason, we are also precluded from negotiating and/or
recognizing your Local Unions as exclusive bargaining representatives of our
employees ... .
This letter, which had been slipped under the door of Union Secertary-Treasurer
Mera in his absence, was not discovered by him until after he had mailed to Re-
spondent , on October 1, proposals for a new agreement and a request that the parties
discuss these terms and that they meet for that purpose not later than 30 days
before the expiration of their current contract .2
On October 10, Respondent replied to the Unions' letter of October 1, calling at-
tention to and reiterating the position it had taken in. its September 30 letter to the
Unions. The Unions responded by letter dated October 21, stating that, "The Union
carries 77 members on check off . plus an excess number of members . . . who
are not on check off," asserting that "the Union represents the majority of your em-
ployees in the bargaining unit as per NLRB certification of September 18, 1961," and
reiterating their request for a bargaining conference . Respondent replied to this
letter on October 25, 1963, stating: "As our evidence establishes that your Local
Unions do not represent a majority of the employees . and that your contention
to the contrary is incorrect , we must decline to comply with your request for a meet-
ing for the purposes . of _ negotiating a new collective-bargaining agreement," and
advising the Unions, "If you desire further evidence that a majority of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit do not desire to be represented by your Local
Union, you may desire to Me a petition for an election with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board at any appropriate time." 3'
The Unions thereupon filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board on
October 29, and no further communications were had between the parties.
C. Respondent 's asserted grounds for doubting the Unions ' majority status
Respondent asserts .that the doubt expressed in its September 30 letter as to the
Unions' continuing majority status was based on the fact that the Unions won the
election in September 1961 by a narrow margin , the vote being 111 for and 106
against the Unions; the fact that at no time after the bargaining agreement was signed
did the list of employees signing authorizations for dues checkoffs exceed 77; the
fact that from time to time during the contract year there were a substantial number
of terminations , for nondiscriminatory reasons, of employees :who had signed check-
off authorizations ; and the fact that 13 employees , whose names were on one or
more checkoff lists, notified Respondent on various dates between December 1962
and September 1963 that they no longer wished to be represented by the Unions or
have their dues deducted.
The fact that the election was a close one did not in itself, of course , furnish
grounds for believing that the Unions, 2 years later, had lost their majority status,
and I do not understand Respondent to take this position . Its position , rather,
appears to be that where , as here , the Unions have won by only a narrow margin,
evidence of even a slight diminution of support for the Unions might warrant a
good-faith belief that the Unions have lost their majority status, whereas, if the
Unions had- won by a large majority , the same evidence of diminution of support
would be too insignificant to affect the Unions ' representative status. With this in
2 In view of the reference by Respondent in its letter of September 30 to section 32 of
the agreement and the fact that Respondent thereafter checked off dues in October and
November pursuant to the contract terms, I cannot accept the General Counsel's conten-
tion that the letter had , or was intended to have, the effect of immediately terminating
the bargaining relationship.
3 The bargaining contract , although signed and negotiated by both Unions, refers to the
joint bargaining representatives as the "Union " and the correspondence , whether signed by
a representative of both or only one union, similarly refers to the "Union." In this Deci-
sion, however , the plural is used without regard to the term used by the parties in their
correspondence.
1000 DECISIONS OF. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mind , I turn now to an analysis . of evidence submitted by Respondent relative to
checkoff lists , the terminations of employees , and the revocations of checkoff
authorizations.
Pursuant to section 29 of the bargaining agreement , the Unions , commencing in
December 1962 and continuing through November 1963, sent to Respondent prior
to the 25th day of each month a list of employees who had authorized the deduction
of their dues and affiliation and -reinstatement fees from their paychecks ; and Re-
spondent , out of the first paycheck due those employees on the following month,
deducted such authorized sums and remitted them to the Unions. , The checkoff lists
indicated on their faces the amounts to be deducted and whether . for dues, affilia-
tions, or resinstatements . Each month upon receiving the list, . Respondent's auditor,
Alice Bower, would check the list for accuracy and would strike therefrom the names
of any employees whose employment might have been terminated or.who might
have revoked their checkoff authorizations prior to the 25th day of that month.
She would then transmit to the Unions, after the first payday in the following month,
the amount due the Unions in accordance with the list as adjusted by her , together
with a letter listing the names of those deleted from the list.
To facilitate an evaluation of the data upon which Respondent allegedly relied
in concluding that the Unions had lost their majority status , there is set forth below
a compilation of the information contained in the documents introduced.
Date of checkoff Total on checkoff Employer cancellations
list or last list, including , from list because of
checkoff au- in parenthesis , terminations of em- Adjusted
Month thorization new affiliates ployment or revoca- total on
letter for and reinstate- tions of checkoff checkoff
month I ments authorizations, the
latter in parenthesis
December 1962--------------- Not shown 77 (74) 7 70
January 1963 ----------------- Not shown 74 (12) 4 (2) 70
February 1963---------------- 2.22 76 ( 7) 8 (1) 68
March 1963 ------------------- - 3.20 75 (6) 8 67
April 1963-------------------- 4.24 75 (9) 6 69
May 1963--------------------- 5.17 69 ( 1) 5 (2) 64
June 1963 -------------------- 6.19 75 (9) 4 71
July 1963- -------------------- 7.18 76 (6) 2 74
August 1963------------------ 8.20 76 (2) 5 71
September 1963--------------- 9. 23 77 (6) 6 71
The sole witness testifying in Respondent 's behalf was John H . Crooker, Jr.,
chairman, of Respondent 's board of directors . He testified that after discussing with
Respondent's president , Sautelle, whether Respondent should continue to recognize
and bargain with the Unions , he authorized the letter of September 30 to the Unions.
He further testified that prior to deciding to discontinue recognition of the Unions,
he had seen the August and September checkoff lists and had earlier seen at least
the first two lists submitted by the Unions. Thus, he was, able to ascertain that there
were substantially the same number of employees on checkoff for the last 2 months
as for the first 2 months; and if he examined the list as adjusted by Respondent's
auditor, he was apprised that in August and September there was one more employee
on checkoff in those months than there was in December 1962 and January 1963.5
Crooker also testified that although on five or six occasions in 1963 his attention had
been called to the fact that someone had revoked his authorization , he did not see
the complete revocation file containing 13 revocation letters signed prior to the end
4 Although the heading on each checkoff list indicated that it was for the month ending
on the last day of the month for which the list was submitted , the lists were actually
submitted on various dates prior to the 25th of each month , as required by the contract.
5 The September checkoff list is dated September 23, but the auditor's letter to the
Unions explaining deletions from the list is dated October 10. It is possible , therefore, that
on, September 30, when Respondent asserted its doubt as to the Unions ' continuing majority
status, it knew only that 77 names appeared on the checkoff list and did not then know
that the number, after audit, would be reduced to 71, the same as on the adjusted August
list. I do not , however, rely upon this circumstance in determining whether Respondent's
asserted doubt as to the Unions ' continuing majority status was asserted in good faith.
GULFMONT HOTEL COMPANY 1001
of May 6 and 4 others signed in October until after the issuance of the complaint in
this case. Since the total number of employees on checkoff lists in August and
September, which Crooker said he saw, were substantially the same as at the begin-
ning of the checkoff s, he had no reason to believe that terminations of employment
and revocations exceeded the number of new affiliates and reinstatements.
In its brief, Respondent asserts that a comparison of the August and September
checkoff lists with a list of terminations (Respondent's Exhibit No. 34) prepared by
Respondent subsequent to the issuance of the complaint shows that only 64 em-
ployees on the August and September checkoff lists were still employed when the
termination list was later prepared. In arriving at that figure, Respondent's counsel
has subtracted from the August and September checkoff lists employees who were
terminated subsequent to the 25th of those respective months, the pertinent dates
fixed by contract, and his figures, accordingly, do not correctly reflect the number
of employees on checkoff at any pertinent date. It is not disputed that the August
and September lists as well as the other lists, as adjusted by Respondent's auditor,
correctly reflect the number of employees on checkoff as of the 25th day of each
month for which these lists were compiled. Moreover, it is these lists and not what
subsequently might have been compiled in connection with defending the unfair labor
practice charge which must be considered in determining Respondent's good faith in
refusing to bargain.
Respondent has not contended that the percentage of employees on checkoff to-
ward the end of the contract year was less than toward the beginning or any other
part of that year, and the record affords no basis for any such assumption. It
shows that there were 224 employees in the bargaining unit on the date of the
election and only 186 on September 30, but it does not show how many were in the
unit during any other period. It must be assumed, therefore, for the purposes of this,
proceeding, that the percentage of Respondent's employees on checkoff when Re-
spondent expressed its doubt as to the Unions' continuing majority status and refused
to bargain was at least as large as at the beginning of the checkoff period. The
burden was on Respondent to show otherwise if, as it appears, Repsondent was relying
on the checkoff lists as a basis for its asserted doubts as to the Unions' continuing
majority status.
D. Analysis and conclusions
From the foregoing facts, it is apparent that there was not even a slight decrease
in the number of employees on checkoff during the latter part of the contract year,
as compared with the number on checkoff at the beginning of that period, which
could have caused Respondent to believe that the Unions had lost the slender majority
they obtained in the 1961 election. Although there were 13 employees on checkoff
who at various times prior to September 30 (but none since May) had rejected
their checkoff authorizations and expressed a desire no longer to be represented by
the Unions, this number was far outweighed by the 58 new affiliates or reinstatements
during the same period? . Indeed, as was obvious from the face of the checkoff lists
themselves, these new checkoff authorizations amply offset not only the revocations
but also all terminations as well, which are shown on the monthly transmittal letters
of Respondent's auditor. It follows, therefore, that the evidence adduced in support
of Respondent's contention regarding the checkoffs, revocations, and terminations
does not rebut the presumption of the Unions' continuing majority status or warrant
any reasonable belief that such status had been lost.
Respondent does not expressly assert that the fact that a majority of Respondent's
employees never at any time authorized duductions of their dues caused it to doubt
the Unions' majority status, but if this be Respondent's position, it must be rejected.
Unless, as in Hayworth Rolland Panel Company, 130 NLRB 604, a union expressly
bases its claim to majority status on the number of employees on checkoff, the fact
that less than a majority have authorized such checkoffs is immaterial to the issue of
majority status. Employees for various reasons unconnected with their desire to have
a union represent them, may fail to execute checkoff authorizations. There may be
some who prefer, as a matter of principle, to pay their financial obligations in per-
son; there may be others who prefer to decide when and if they can afford to spare
the money for dues and fees; and there may even be some who are willing to vote
6 The withdrawal letter of one of these employees, Ramona Al. Cracia, Is undated, but It
is reasonable to assume It was written In February since her name appears on the December
and January adjusted checkoff lists but not thereafter.
7 This figure, of course, excludes the 74 new affiliates listed on the December 1962 check-
off list.
1002 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for and accept union representation but who decide to be free riders and enjoy the
expected benefits of representation without paying for them at all. Accordingly,
although the voluntary signing of checkoff authorizations by a majority in the unit
may be considered as evidence of a union's majority status, the converse is not true.
The fact that a majority in the unit do not sign such authorizations has no bearing
on the majority issue.
The Unions here never based their claim to majority status on the number of
employees appearing on the checkoff lists.8 Indeed, in response to Respondent's let-
ters of September 30 and October 10, the Unions expressly asserted that in addition to
the members on checkoff, they had "an excess number of members . . . who are
not on checkoff" and made clear that they were relying, as the certified representative,
upon the presumption of continuing majority status. They, of course, had a right
to rely upon this presumption of continuing majority and the burden was on Respond-
ent to produce evidence to rebut that presumption. This it has not done.
The General Counsel contends that in addition to the factors already considered,
there should also be considered as evidence of Respondent's lack of good-faith doubt
the fact that it did not promptly file a representation petition with the Board in an
attempt to have its asserted doubt resolved. Although Respondent could have filed
such a petition prior to October 1,9 it, as well as the Unions, was precluded under
the Board's contract-bar rules from filing such a petition during the 60-day period
prior to December 1, the expiration date of the contract. Nelson Name Plate Com-
pany, 122 NLRB 467. Respondent might have filed such a petition after Decem-
ber 1, but this gesture would have been futile, for,-on October 29, the Unions filed
their unfair labor practice charge, and under established Board practice, a representa-
tion petition will not be processed while unfair labor practice charges against the
employer are pending. N.L.R.B. v Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F. 2d 303, 307-308
{C.A. 5); N.L.R.B. v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc., 195 F. 2d 350, 351 (C.A. 5), cert.
denied 344 U.S. 863. Indeed, even where the employer files a representation petition
and the Board starts processing it, the petition will be held in abeyance or dismissed
if during pendency of the representation proceeding a refusal-to-bargain charge is
filed. The Randall Company, Division of Textron, Inc., 133 NLRB 289. In the
circumstances of this case, I do not rely, even in part, upon Respondent's failure to
file a representation petition in finding that Respondent's asserted doubt had no
reasonable basis in fact and that Respondent was not motivated by a good-faith
-doubt as to the Unions' continuing majority status when it refused to bargain.
One other contention of the parties warrants mention. The General Counsel con-
tends that the initial date of the refusal to bargain was on September 30, when
Respondent informed the Unions that it could no longer recognize and bargain with
them, and Respondent, as I understand its position, would place the date as Octo-
ber 10, or later in October, when Respondent replied to the Unions' request for bar-
$In its brief Respondent obviously misconstrues testimony of Union Secretary-Treasurer
Mera in suggesting that Mera was claiming majority status based on checkoff authoriza-
tions. To be sure, in response to the question, "Did you advise the 'Company in any
manner of the total number of members at any time during the 2-month period prior to
September 30, 1963?" Mera replied, "I advised the Company monthly on my checkoff list."
However, immediately following this response are the following questions by Respondent's
'counsel and answers by Mera:
Q. But that is all?
A. I don't recollect advising the Company. There was no need to.
Q So your answer is you did not?
A. To my recollection.
Thus, Mera made clear that he had no recollection of ever advising the Company of the
total number of union members at any time during that 2-month period
I In Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 NLRB 1000, the Board announced its present
contract-bar rule to the effect that a petition may be filed between 90 and 60 days before
the expiration date of a contract but not within the 60-day insulation period. Although,
as Respondent points out in its brief, there is language in Montgomery Ward d Co,
Incorporated, 137 NLRB 346, 347, dealing with contract-bar rules for contracts of a longer
duration than 3 years, which can be read as precluding a petition by either of the contract-
ing parties during the entire term of the contract, a reading of the entire decision, I be-
lieve, makes it clear that the Board was only making the point that whereas a non-
Incumbent union may file a petition at the appropriate time before the end of 3 years, the
contracting parties may not file such a petition until the appropriate time (90 to 60 days)
before the termination date of the contract.
GULFMONT HOTEL COMPANY 1003
gaining . Although I agree with the General Counsel that a notice from an employer
that it will no longer recognize and negotiate with the incumbent bargaining rep-
resentative is tantamount to a refusal to bargain, I do not regard it as important in this
case whether one date or the other be selected, since Respondent has not shown that
it 'had any more reason to doubt the Unions' majority status in October than it had on
September 30, and it has continued to refuse to bargain. -
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All employees of Respondent at its Ben Milani Hotel in Houston, Texas, in-
cluding regular part-time employees , garage and laundry employees, operating and
maintenance engineers , the secretary to the manager , and the auditing department
(back office) employees, but excluding irregular part-time employees , guards, watch-
men, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
2. On September 30, 1963, and at all times thereafter, the Unions were, and still
are, the joint exclusive representative of Respondent 's employees in the appropriate
unit described above for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. By refusing on September 30, 1963, and thereafter , to bargain collectively with
the Unions as the joint exclusive representative of all the employees in the above-
described appropriate unit , Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 ( a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has refused to bargain with the Unions , in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, my Recommended Order will require it to
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is hereby ordered that Respondent, Gulfmont
Hotel Company, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with Hotel , Motel and Club
Employees Union, Local 251, AFL-CIO, affiliated with Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, and Stationary Engineers,
Local No. 707, affiliated with International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO,
as the joint exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the unit herein
found appropriate.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with , restraining , or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section T of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Hotel, Motel and Club Employees
Union, Local 251, AFL-CIO, affiliated with Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
-Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, and Stationary Engineers Local No. 707,
affiliated with International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO , as the joint
exclusive bargaining representative of all its employees in the unit herein found
appropriate, with respect to rates of .pay, wages, hours of employment and other
terms and conditions of employment , and embody any understanding reached in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post at its Ben Milani Hotel in Houston , Texas, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Direc
tor for the Twenty-third Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places,
10 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order"
shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice. In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals,
Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
1004 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
including all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region, in writing, within
20 days from the receipt hereof, what steps have been taken to comply herewith."
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Hotel, Motel and Club
Employees Union, Local 251, AFL-CIO, affiliated with Hotel and Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, and Stationary
Engineers, Local No. 707, affiliated with International Union of Operating
Engineers, AFL-CIO, as the joint exclusive bargaining representative of all our
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if
an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
GULFMONT HOTEL COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 6617
Federal Office Building, 515 Rusk Avenue, Houston, Texas, Telephone No. CA.
8-0611, Extension 296, if they have any question concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions.
Orange County Machine Works and Lionel Richman . Case No.
21-CA-5645. June 29, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a charge duly filed by Lionel Richman, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Director of the Twenty-
first Region, on December 26, 1963, issued a complaint against Re-
spondent Orange County Machine Works alleging that Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Copies of the charge, com-
plaint, and notice of hearing before a Trial Examiner were duly served
upon the Respondent and the Charging Party. In substance the com-
plaint alleged that the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers, Local 92,
AFL-CIO, was and is the exclusive representative of Respondent's
production and maintenance employees in an appropriate unit, and
that commencing on or about October 1, 1963, Respondent unilaterally
147 NLRB No. 132.