Grouse Mountain Lodge

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 7, 2001

333 N.L.R.B. 1322 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1322
Grouse Mountain Associates II, a Limited Partner-
ship, d/b/a Grouse Mountain Lodge and Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees Union,
Local 427. Cases 19–CA–24764 and 19–CA–
24765
May 7, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
HURTGEN AND WALSH
On July 16, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Burton
Litvack issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
The Respondent filed a brief in answer to the General
Counsel’s cross-exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2 as
modified herein and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.
We adopt, with one exception, the judge’s decision
finding violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
For the reasons stated below we disagree with the judge
that the Respondent created the impression that it was
engaging in surveillance of its employees’ union activi-
ties.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt, pro forma, the judge’s rec-
ommendation to dismiss the complaint allegation that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act when, on or about July 15 and 18,
(1996), it announced new holiday pay and paid sick leave benefits for
employees in unsigned memoranda from the quality assurance (QA)
committee.
In fn. 3 of his decision, the judge inadvertently stated that the Re-
spondent both admitted and denied that Patrick Tobin was its agent
within the meaning of Sec. 2(13) of the Act. We clarify that the record
reflects that the Respondent denied that Tobin is its agent within the
meaning of Sec. 2(13).
In adopting the judge’s finding that William (Bill) Caron’s statement
to Terry Widdifield that the Union movement was not succeeding and
that he could “get these things for [her]” constituted an unlawful prom-
ise of unspecified benefits to dissuade employees from supporting the
Union, we disavow the judge’s speculation, in fn. 13 of his decision,
that Caron was presuming on his friendship with Widdifield and aware
that she would repeat his remark to other employees.
In adopting the judge’s finding that Kayla Elkins’ statement that “if
[the Respondent] could get rid of Terry and a few others [the union
movement] would pass” constituted a veiled threat to terminate em-
ployees who were known or suspected supporters of the Union, Chair-
man Truesdale finds it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s statement, in
fn. 21 of his decision, that Elkins deliberately meant to be overheard.
On August 15, 1996, Kayla Elkins, the Respondent’s
controller, issued a memorandum which stated, inter alia:

I just read a bulletin in which the Union arrogantly and
falsely claims to have “helped” Grouse Mountain
Lodge employees get the increased benefits (time and
one half for holidays and personal leave time) recently
announced by the Executive Committee. I know for a
fact that since first being mentioned by the QA Com-
mittee several years ago, those added benefits have
been on the owners’ agenda but Lodge finances would
not permit them. When the owners recognized 1995
would be our first profitable year ever, they put things
in motion. Unfortunately, legal counsel to Grouse
Mountain Lodge said they could not implement any
new benefits while union organizing efforts were ac-
tive. When the Executive Committee recently con-
cluded those organizing activities had failed from lack
of employee interest and support our attorney gave us
the go ahead. The QA Committee deserves our thanks
and credit, but the Union had no impact on the Owners’
and Executive Committee’s decisions. [Emphasis
added.]

The judge found that the statement in the above-quoted
paragraph that the Respondent “recently concluded those
organizing activities had failed from lack of employee
interest” created the impression among employees that
the Respondent was engaging in surveillance of their
activities in support of the Union. In excepting to the
judge’s finding, the Respondent essentially argues that
Elkins’ above-quoted statement was a lawful observation
of the fact that the union campaign had not succeeded.
We find merit in the Respondent’s exception. Without
more, the above-quoted language does not demonstrate
that the Respondent unlawfully placed its employees’
organizing activities under surveillance or that employ-
ees reasonably believed their activities were the object of
unlawful surveillance.
“The Board’s test for determining whether an em-
ployer has created an impression of surveillance is
whether the employee[s] would reasonably assume from
the statement in question that [their] union activities had
been placed under surveillance.” Tres Estrellas de Oro,
329 NLRB 50 (1999), citing United Charter Service, 306
NLRB 150 (1992). In this regard, “[T]he Board does not
require employees to attempt to keep their activities se-
cret before an employer can be found to have created an
unlawful impression of surveillance. . . . Further, the
Board does not require that an employer’s words on their
333 NLRB No. 157
GROUSE MOUNTAIN LODGE 1323
face reveal that the employer acquired its knowledge of
the employee’s activities by unlawful means.” Tres
Estrellas de Oro, supra at 51, quoting United Charter
Service, supra at 151. The rationale behind “finding ‘an
impression of surveillance’ as a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act is that employees should be free to
participate in union organizing campaigns without the
fear that members of management are peering over their
shoulders, taking note of who is involved in union activi-
ties, and in what particular ways.” Tres Estrellas de Oro,
supra, quoting Flexsteel Industries, 311 NLRB 257
(1993). Thus, the question before us is whether the
above-quoted language in Elkins’ memorandum would
lead employees reasonably to assume that their union
activities had been placed under surveillance. Of course,
the General Counsel has the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent
unlawfully created the impression of surveillance.3
Like the judge, we focus on the text of the allegedly
unlawful language. The comment is couched in conclu-
sory terms. On its face, the language does not address
surveillance, and it does not refer to specific employees.
Additionally, the language does not suggest how the Re-
spondent reached its general conclusion that the union
campaign had been unsuccessful. Thus, the language, by
itself, does not reasonably create the impression that the
Respondent engaged in surveillance of its employees’
organizing activities to reach its conclusion that the un-
ion movement had not succeeded.
We turn next to the context in which the above-quoted
statement was made. Significantly, the judge found that
from the fall of 1995 through the winter and spring of
1996, the employees openly conducted their union activi-
ties and posted union-related materials on a bulletin
board. Elkins’ memorandum, which was dated August
15, was distributed to employees at the conclusion of the
openly conducted organizing campaign. Contrary to the
judge, in this context, it would not be reasonable for em-
ployees to believe that the Respondent had engaged in
surveillance of their union activities simply based on the
Respondent’s observation that “organizing activities had
failed from lack of employee interest and support.”4 To

3 See, e.g., LRM Packaging, 308 NLRB 829, 831 (1992).
4 The cases cited by the judge to support his finding that Elkins’
comment created the impression of surveillance involve factual con-
texts that are clearly distinguishable from Elkins’ conclusory statement
in her memorandum of August 15. In Keystone Lamp Mfg. Corp., 284
NLRB 626, 627 (1987), enfd. 849 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied
488 U.S. 1041 (1989), the Board found, inter alia, that the employer’s
controller created the impression of surveillance when he stated, to
Betty Lou Phillips, a known union activist, “I understand that your
attendance at meetings is dropping.” Significantly, the controller’s
comment to Phillips occurred the morning after a union meeting. Id.
the contrary, it would be more reasonable for employees
to assume, if anything, that the Respondent had reached
its conclusion that the union movement had not suc-
ceeded through lawful means, i.e., the absence of a de-
mand for recognition, the absence of a representation
petition, or lawful observation of an openly conducted
campaign. In sum, nothing in the context in which the
above-quoted statement was made would lead employees
reasonably to assume that the Respondent engaged in
surveillance of their union activities. Thus, we conclude,
contrary to the judge, that the General Counsel has not
met his burden of establishing that this comment violated
Section 8(a)(1).
However, contrary to our dissenting colleague, we
agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by the statement in the August 15 memorandum
quoted above, that the Respondent’s delay in implement-
ing the two new benefits was caused by the Union’s or-
ganizing campaign.
In this memorandum, which, as noted above, was pre-
pared by Elkins, she addressed what she saw as arrogant
and false claims by the Union regarding its role in help-
ing employees get time-and-a-half for holidays and per-
sonal leave time benefits, which benefits had recently
been instituted by the Respondent’s executive commit-
tee. The memorandum stated, in essence, that the Re-
spondent wanted to implement these new benefits, but its
attorney advised it that it “could not implement any new
benefits while union organizing efforts were active.”
Upon concluding that the union movement had failed,
the memorandum continued, the attorney gave the Re-
spondent the go ahead to implement the new benefits.5
The judge found that Elkins placed the onus for the
Respondent’s delay in implementing the new benefits
squarely on the Union by linking the delay to the union
campaign, and that the language had the effect of under-

Unlike the circumstances in Keystone Lamp Mfg. Co., supra, Elkins
comment, which was published at the end of the union campaign, and
which did not single out any particular employee, was a conclusory
statement unrelated to specific union activities.
In Airport Distributors, 280 NLRB 1144, 1147 (1986), the employer
twice interrogated an employee as to whether that employee had signed
a union authorization card. Both times, after the employee responded
that he had not signed an authorization card, the employers’ president
told the employee, “[t]hey’re telling me you did.” Id. The Board
adopted the judge’s conclusion that the employer’s statement created
the impression of surveillance. The Board also adopted the judge’s
conclusion that the employer had created the impression of surveillance
by telling an employee that the employer had “narrowed it down to
three” individuals who supported the Union. Id. at 1148, 1149. Elkins’
conclusory comment is significantly dissimilar to these remarks.
5 The judge found that there is no record evidence demonstrating
that, as of the date of the memorandum, the campaign had ceased. The
judge also noted that the Respondent did not state that there was a
business justification for the delay in implementation.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1324
mining the Union by creating the impression that, but for
the ongoing campaign, the Respondent would have im-
plemented the benefits.
Under Board law:

It is well established that an employer is required to
proceed with an expected wage or benefit adjustment
as if the union were not on the scene. . . . An exception
to this rule, however, is that an employer may postpone
such a wage or benefit adjustment so long as it
“[makes] clear” to employees that the adjustment
would occur whether or not they select a union, and
that the “sole purpose” of the adjustment’s postpone-
ment is to avoid the appearance of influencing the elec-
tion’s outcome.

KMST-TV, Channel 46, 302 NLRB 381, 382 (1991), quot-
ing Atlantic Forest Products, 282 NLRB 855, 858 (1987).
“[I]n making such announcements, however, an employer
must avoid attributing to the union ‘the onus for the post-
ponement of adjustments in wages and benefits,’ or dis-
parag[ing] and undermin[ing] the [union] by creating the
impression that it stood in the way of their getting planned
wage increases and benefits.’” Atlantic Forest Products,
supra at 858, quoting in part Uarco, Inc., 169 NLRB 1153,
1154 (1969).
In light of the facts and principles described above, the
Respondent’s statement that it had been counseled that it
“could not implement any new benefits while union or-
ganizing efforts were active” is overly broad: this state-
ment effectively blames the delay on the mere presence
of the union campaign. Thus, contrary to our colleague’s
assertion, the memorandum does not merely “explain[]
that the benefits were not give during the Union cam-
paign because such a grant of benefits might well have
been unlawful [or] objectionable.” This is an excessively
benign characterization of the memorandum, which as
quoted above, unequivocally stated that the Respondent
had been advised by its attorney that it “could not” im-
plement “any new benefits while union organizing ef-
forts were active. (Emphasis added.) The language in
the memorandum went beyond merely “blaming” the law
for the delay in implementing benefits.
Importantly, in no way did the Respondent make clear
that its decision to grant or not grant new benefits was
not dependent on the results of the union campaign. Nor
did the Respondent explain “that the ‘sole purpose’ of
the adjustment’s postponement [was] to avoid the ap-
pearance of influencing” the outcome of the campaign.
KMST-TV, Channel 46, supra at 382. Thus, as the judge
found, the memorandum had the effect of telling em-
ployees that, but for the Union’s presence, they would
have obtained these benefits earlier.6
Our colleague contends that our analysis of this issue
somehow relies on a “false dichotomy.” This is not so.
In finding that the Respondent attributed to the Union
“the ‘onus for the postponement of adjustment in wages
and benefits,’” we have analyzed the entire relevant por-
tion of the memorandum pursuant to the principles de-
tailed above. Atlantic Forest Products, supra at 858.
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we also adopt the
judge’s finding that Manager-on-Duty William Caron’s
statement to employee Terry Widdifield violated Section
8(a)(1). In either May or April 1996, towards the con-
clusion of the union campaign, Widdifield, a server and
an ardent union supporter, remarked to Caron, during an
informal gathering, that it would be very nice if servers
could have wage increases. Caron responded, “[Y]ou
know this Union movement thing wasn’t happening.
You know, I can get these things for you.” The judge
found that Widdifield could unmistakably infer from the
statement that the union campaign would not succeed
and that Caron could obtain items that the union support-
ers wanted without the Union’s interference. Thus, the
judge concluded that Caron’s statement constituted a
definite promise of unspecified benefits made to dissuade
employees from supporting the Union.
In parsing Caron’s statement, our dissenting colleague
observes that the first part of Caron’s statement was per-
haps intended to convey the thought that the union cam-
paign was not doing well, and that, in the second part of
his statement, Caron was not saying that he would secure
benefits for employees only if the Union were defeated.
On this basis, our colleague concludes that Caron’s
statement is hopelessly ambiguous and, thus, not viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1).
The Board’s test for interference, restraint, and coer-
cion under Section 8(a)(1) is an objective one and de-
pends on “whether the employer engaged in conduct
which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with

6 Although the benefits were not expected by the employees, the
memorandum plainly states that the benefits “have been on the owner’s
agenda.” We agree with the judge that the legal principles described
above are applicable in situations where a respondent has blamed a
union for employees’ loss of unexpected benefits. See, e.g., Jaison’s,
212 NLRB 1, 7–8 (1974). Cf. Noah’s Bay Area Bagels, LLC, 331
NLRB 188, 191–192 (2000) (finding an 8(a)(3) violation based on the
employer’s withholding restoration of a health insurance plan at one
store (the “Telegraph” store) while at the same time lawfully restoring
the plan at all of its other stores, without regard to whether the restored
benefit was expected, because the employees at the Telegraph store
were not provided with assurances that the withholding of the restora-
tion of the plan at that store was only temporary and that it would be
restored retroactively following the election, regardless of the outcome
of the election).
GROUSE MOUNTAIN LODGE 1325
the free exercise of employee rights under the Act.”
American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959).
Thus, the key question here is whether Caron’s statement
may reasonably be understood as unlawful under Section
8(a)(1).
We agree with the judge that it may. Regardless of the
precise meaning of the words “this Union thing wasn’t
happening,” it is clearly a comment about the ongoing
union campaign. Further, the second part of Caron’s
statement—“[Y]ou know, I can get these things for
you”—cannot be justifiably separated from the first part
of his statement. Concededly, Caron did not state with
precise clarity that he would only secure benefits for em-
ployees if the Union were defeated. But the fact that
Caron did not make such an explicit statement does not
absolve the unlawfulness of the remarks he did make.
The words “I can get these things for you,” which imme-
diately followed Caron’s statement that “this Union thing
wasn’t happening,” can reasonably be interpreted as an
enticement to get Widdifield, an ardent union supporter,
to give up her efforts on behalf of the Union. As the
judge found, the inference of Caron’s remark is unmis-
takably clear. Nothing more is required to find a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) here. As our colleague correctly
observes, an employer may speak about a union cam-
paign. Under Section 8(c), however, employer state-
ments cannot contain, among other things, a “promise of
benefit,” as Caron’s remark to Widdifield did.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Grouse
Mountain Associates II, A Limited Partnership, d/b/a
Grouse Mountain Lodge, Whitefish, Montana, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Delete paragraph 1(i) and reletter the subsequent
paragraphs.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

MEMBER HURTGEN, dissenting in part.
Unlike my colleagues, I conclude that the judge erred
by finding unlawful a statement made by William Caron,
the Respondent’s hotel manager-on-duty, to employee
Terry Widdifield. Widdifield said, during an informal
postshift gathering of employees and Caron, that it would
be very nice if the Respondent’s servers (of whom she
was one) could have wage increases. Caron replied,
“Terr, you know this Union movement thing wasn’t hap-
pening. You know, I can get these things for you.”
The judge found that Caron’s message to Widdifield,
an ardent union supporter, was that the union campaign
would not succeed and that he could obtain what the un-
ion adherents wanted without a Union. The judge
viewed Caron’s comment to Widdifield as a definite
promise of unspecified benefits (“these things”). The
judge further concluded that the promise was made to
dissuade employees from supporting the Union, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1).
In my view, Caron’s statement is ambiguous. The first
part of its says that “this Union thing wasn’t happening.”
In fact, the union campaign was happening. Perhaps,
Caron’s comment was intended to convey the thought
that the campaign was not doing well. In any event, the
bottom line is that the meaning of the comment (either as
intended or understood) is far from clear.
My colleagues apparently disavow the judge’s state-
ment that the Respondent was saying that the Union
would not win the campaign. They say only that the
statement was “clearly a comment about the Union cam-
paign.” I agree. However, an employer is free to speak
about a union campaign.
The second part of the comment is similarly unclear.
Even if Caron was saying that he could secure benefits
for the employees, he was not saying that he would do so
only if the Union were defeated.
In sum, I do not share my colleagues’ view that
Caron’s comment was “unmistakably clear.” The one
thing that cannot be said about Caron’s remark is that it
is “unmistakably clear.” Nor do I think that the General
Counsel has shown that the remark is reasonably to be
understood in the way envisaged by my colleagues.
I agree with my colleagues’ finding that the Kayla El-
kins’ memorandum did not create an impression of sur-
veillance. In my view, however, they err by upholding
the judge’s finding that other parts of the same memo-
randum violated Section 8(a)(1).
The judge made this finding because he concluded that
the memorandum (quoted in pertinent part by my col-
leagues) blamed the Union for the delay in implementing
new benefits.1 I disagree. In my view, the memorandum
was a permissible response to the Union’s claim that the
Union had helped the Respondent’s employees to obtain
the increased benefits. The memo explains that the bene-
fits were not given during the union campaign because
such a grant of benefits might well have been unlaw-
ful/objectionable. The memo concludes that, once the
campaign was over, this impediment was removed and
the increase was given. In sum, Respondent gave a rea-

1 The judge conceded that the announced benefits were not expected
by the Respondent’s employees.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1326
sonable and correct explanation in response to a union
claim. There was nothing unlawful in Respondent’s do-
ing so.
My colleagues quote from, and then apply, the princi-
ple set forth in Atlantic Forest Products, 282 NLRB 855
(1987). However, that principle is inapplicable here.
The principle is that, during a campaign, “an employer is
required to proceed with an expected wage or benefit
adjustment.” (Emphasis added.) In the instant case,
there was no expected benefit, and the Respondent was
therefore not required to proceed with one during the
campaign. Indeed, as discussed below, it is likely that
the Respondent was required not to proceed with one.
Further, even if the principles of Atlantic Forest are
applied, there is no violation here. In this regard, my
colleagues assert that the Respondent acted unlawfully
because it blamed the Union for the delay in the increase.
I disagree. The benefits had not been planned prior to
the Union’s campaign. Thus, if the benefits had been
granted during that campaign, the grant would likely be
held unlawful or objectionable, or at least the Respon-
dent had reasonable concerns in this respect. The Re-
spondent therefore delayed the increase until after the
campaign was over, and explained this to the employees.
The Respondent did not attribute to the Union the onus
for the postponement. Nor did the Respondent disparage
and undermine the Union by creating the impression that
it stood in the way. Rather, the Respondent accurately
conveyed to the employees the legal advice it had re-
ceived and which caused it to delay the implementation
of the new and unexpected (by the employees) benefits.
In short, the Respondent did not “blame” the Union; the
Respondent “blamed” the law.
My colleagues say that the Respondent did not offer
any “business justification” for delaying the implementa-
tion of the benefits. My colleagues then leap to the con-
clusion that the Respondent was blaming the Union for
the delay. My colleagues have missed the point, and
they have thereby set up a false dichotomy. The Re-
spondent’s justification was not grounded in business
necessity, and the delay was not blamed on the Union.
Instead, as the Respondent carefully explained, the delay
was grounded in considerations of law. Further, the Re-
spondent did not blame the Union for the delay. The
Respondent simply explained that the Union could not
take credit for the ultimate grant of the benefits.
My colleagues state that their analysis does not rely on
a false dichotomy. I disagree. Essentially, they have
devised a conceptual scheme whereby the Respondent
must either have grounded its justification for the delay
on business necessity or have blamed the delay on the
Union. Those are not the only two possibilities and, in
fact, the Respondent did neither.
Finally, in agreeing with the judge’s conclusion that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) by assisting the
Respondent’s quality assurance (QA) program, I do not
rely on his finding that Caron was the executive commit-
tee’s conduit to the employee participants at QA meet-
ings for all matters about which the executive committee
desired additional employee input.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees as to their
union membership, sympathies, and activities and the
union membership, sympathies, and activities of their
fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT promise unspecified benefits to our
employees in order to induce them to forego support for
Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 427 (the
Union).
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of
unspecified privileges if required to negotiate a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the Union in order to
induce them to forego support for the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that we will
change our staffing practices during nonpeak months in
order to induce them to forego their support for the Un-
ion.
WE WILL NOT publish and maintain a work rule in
our employees’ manual, mandating that our employees
initially discuss work “problems” with their supervisors
rather than with their fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT offer to implement a 401(k) savings
plan for our employees in order to dissuade them from
supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT make veiled threats to terminate
known supporters of the Union.
WE WILL NOT inform our employees that our delay
in implementing new benefits was a result of the Union’s
organizing campaign.
WE WILL NOT assist and support the QA program, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
GROUSE MOUNTAIN LODGE 1327
WE WILL remove from our employees’ manual the
provision mandating that our employees initially discuss
work “problems” with their supervisors rather than with
their fellow employees.

GROUSE MOUNTAIN ASSOCIATES II, A
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A GROUSE
MOUNTAIN LODGE

Daniel R. Sanders, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Daniel D. Jones, Esq. (Crowley, Haughey,Hanson, Took &
Dietrich), of Kalispell, Montana, for the Respondent.
Scott Hanson, of Missoula, Montana, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BURTON LITVACK, Administrative Law Judge. The unfair
labor practice charge in Case 19–CA–24764 was filed by Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 427 (the
Union) on September 5, 1996, and the unfair labor practice
charge in Case 19–CA–24765 was filed by the Union on Sep-
tember 6, 1996. After investigation of the unfair labor practice
charges, on November 27, 1996, the Acting Regional Director
for Region 19 of the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) issued a consolidated complaint, alleging that Grouse
Mountain Associates II, a Limited Partnership, d/b/a Grouse
Mountain Lodge, had engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act). On December 17, 1996, the Union
filed a first amended unfair labor practice charge in Case 19–
CA–24765. Thereafter, on July 18, 1997, the Acting Regional
Director for Region 19 issued an amendment to the aforemen-
tioned consolidated complaint and, on August 20, 1997, the
Regional Director for Region 19 issued a second amendment to
the aforementioned consolidated complaint. Respondent timely
filed answers to the consolidated complaint and to its amend-
ments, essentially denying the commission of the alleged unfair
labor practices. Pursuant to a notice of hearing, which accom-
panied the consolidated complaint, a trial on the merits of the
unfair labor practice allegations was held before the me on
September 16 and 17, 1997, in Kalispell, Montana. At the
hearing, all parties were afforded the opportunity to examine
and to cross-examine all witnesses, to offer into the record all
relevant documentary evidence, to argue their legal positions
orally, and to file posthearing briefs. The latter documents
were filed by counsel for the General Counsel and by counsel
for Respondent and have been carefully considered by the un-
dersigned. Accordingly, based upon the entire record herein,
including the posthearing briefs and my observation of the re-
spective testimonial demeanor of the several witnesses, I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a State of Montana limited partnership with an
office and place of business located in Whitefish, Montana,
where it is engaged in the business of operating a full-service
resort. During the 12-month period preceding the issuance of
the consolidated complaint, which period is representative, in
the normal course and conduct of its business operations de-
scribed above, Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of
$500,000 and purchased and received goods and products, val-
ued in excess of $50,000, directly from suppliers located out-
side the State of Montana. Respondent admits that, at all times
material, it has been an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits that, at all times material, the Union has
been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
The consolidated complaint alleges and the General Counsel
contends that Respondent engaged in acts and conduct violative
of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act by recognizing and bar-
gaining with an in-house labor organization, known as the qual-
ity assurance (QA) committee, an entity to which Respondent
renders assistance and support and which it dominates, even
though the QA committee does not represent a majority of Re-
spondent’s employees in a unit appropriate for collective bar-
gaining. The consolidated complaint also alleges and the Gen-
eral Counsel also contends that Respondent engaged in acts and
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, through its su-
pervisors, by interrogating its employees regarding their activi-
ties and support for the Union, by informing its employees it
was attempting to gain increased wages and benefits for them
through the QA committee but, in view of their support for the
Union, could not do so, by announcing new benefits for its
employees in QA committee memoranda, by stating, in the
presence of current and former employees, that, if it could get
rid of named union supporters, the union movement would die,
and by offering financial incentives to its employees in order to
encourage them not to support the Union. Further, the consoli-
dated complaint alleges and the General Counsel contends that
Respondent engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining in its employee handbook a
provision which prohibits its employees from discussing work-
ing conditions and problems with other employees; by, in a
March 15, 1996 memorandum to its employees, impliedly
threatening employees that, if they chose representation by the
Union, it would discontinue its practice of keeping employees
employed during those months of the year when its operating
revenues were lower than during peak tourist seasons and that
current benefits enjoyed by employees would not be included in
a collective-bargaining agreement; and by, in an August 15,
1996 memorandum to its employees, informing its employees
that it had withheld additional benefits upon advice from its
attorney to not implement new benefits during a union organiz-
ing activity and that it had concluded that their union organiz-
ing activities had failed from lack of interest and support,
thereby implying to its employees that it had engaged in sur-
veillance of their union organizing activities. Respondent de-
nied the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices, argu-
ing that the QA committee is not a labor organization within the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1328
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and that, in any event, it
does not assist and dominate the QA committee, that the prohi-
bition in its employee handbook has nothing to do with the
employees’ terms and conditions of employment, and that the
statements, in its memoranda to its employees, were privileged
by Section 8(c) of the Act.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent, which is a limited partnership consisting of four
limited partners and two general partners (Harry (Buzz) Crutcher
and Brian Gratton),1 operates a 144-room resort hotel and bar and
restaurant facility, including public meeting rooms and a lap
swimming pool, in Whitefish, Montana. The record reveals that
Crutcher is Respondent’s managing partner for the resort hotel;
that, instead of a general manager, day-to-day operations of the
facility are overseen by a three-member group, known as the
executive committee, consisting of Tobby Slatter, the director of
operations, Kayla Elkins, the controller, and Glenn White, the vice
president of sales and marketing; that, with the approval of the
managing partner, the executive committee makes all decisions
regarding Respondent’s employees’ terms and conditions of em-
ployment; that William (Bill) Caron is the resort hotel’s manager-
on-duty (MOD);2 and that Patrick Tobin is the lodge bar manager.3
Respondent employs a core group of approximately 110 employees
at the resort hotel, with the number fluctuating to as high as 145
employees during peak season (June through October) and to as
low as 100 employees during the slowest period, November
through early December. The record further reveals that the Union
commenced an organizing campaign amongst Respondent’s hotel
employees in the fall of 1995; that such continued through the
winter and spring of 1996;4 that the employees openly conducted
their union activities, including the posting of union-related materi-
als on a bulletin board,5 at the hotel; and that Respondent was
aware of employee Terry Widdifield’s membership on the Union’s
organizing committee.
B. The Alleged Unlawful Interrogation
Neil Clements, who worked for Respondent from the spring
of 1994 through the fall of 1996 as a “buser” in the hotel’s res-

1 In reality, there are just five partners, with Crutcher acting as both a
limited and general partner.
2 Caron is on duty from approximately 4 p.m. until midnight and,
except for the bar manager, the chef, and the restaurant manager, he is
the only management representative in the hotel for most of his work
shift. As such, Caron is responsible for taking care of guest needs and
overseeing all operations of the hotel. With regard to matters involving
the hotel’s employees, Caron has no authority to hire or fire, and issues
relating to employee discipline, which arise during his shift, are re-
ferred to the employee’s department manager.
3 Respondent admits that Crutcher is its agent within the meaning of
Sec. 2(13) of the Act; that Elkins and Tobin are its supervisors and
agents within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) and (13) of the Act; and that
Caron is its supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of the Act.
Respondent denies that Caron and Tobin are its agents within the mean-
ing of Sec. 2(13) of the Act.
4 Unless otherwise stated, all dates herein shall be in 1996.
5 This includes GC Exh. 5, a document, dated March 15 and entitled
“Why Union,” which sets forth various demands of those employees,
who support the Union, including “time and one half for working our
posted day off, after 6 consecutive days and for holidays.”
taurant while attending high school, testified that, one day in
April during the height of the union organizing campaign, his
family’s automobile, which he used to travel to and from work,
required repair and that Bill Caron picked him up at his home6
in the hotel’s van and “he offered to give me a ride home after
my shift was over.” Clements accepted Caron’s offer. Accord-
ing to Clements, during the ride home, they spoke, and “he just
asked me if I knew anything about the Union . . . . I said I
didn’t know anything about it, and we didn’t talk about it any-
more.” Caron testified that he recalled using the hotel’s van to
give Clements a ride home from work but that he could not
recall the content of their conversation. There is no record
evidence that Clements was an avowed union adherent or that
Respondent suspected Clements of having such sympathies.
Further, while both Clements and Caron testified that they often
spoke about various subjects while the latter collected his tips
at the conclusion of his shift, they were not social friends and,
according to Clements, prior to the incident in the hotel van,
they had never spoken about the Union.
Clements impressed me as being an honest and forthright
witness and, given Caron’s lack of recall, I credit the former as
to his above-described conversation with Caron. With regard
to whether, as alleged in the consolidated complaint, Respon-
dent’s supervisor’s questioning of Clements constituted con-
duct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,7 the test is “whether
under all the circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends
to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the
Act.” Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217 (1985);
Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), affd. 760 F.2d 1006
(9th Cir. 1985). While Caron’s question was arguably casual,
utilizing the above analysis convinces me that such was, in fact,
coercive. Thus, Clements was not a known union adherent, and
there is no evidence to suggest that Respondent believed he was
a union supporter. Also, as they had never previously dis-
cussed the Union, Caron’s question must have been unex-
pected. Further, while Caron and Clements may have spoken
often at work, they were neither social friends nor had appar-
ently anything more than a supervisor-employee relationship,
and, rather than posing his question in the restaurant before
leaving the hotel when Clements was amongst other employees,
Caron interrogated Clements in a one-on-one context while in
the hotel van. Moreover, as will be discussed infra, Respondent
6 Clements lives approximately 10 minutes from the hotel.
7 Counsel for Respondent argues that Caron’s conduct may not be
attributed to Respondent as the record evidence does not warrant a
finding that he was Respondent’s agent and that a finding of agency is
necessary “before the Board can conclude that statements allegedly
made by [an individual] are attributable to the Respondent.” However,
Respondent did admit that Caron was a supervisor within the meaning
of Sec. 2(11) of the Act, and, contrary to counsel, the Board has long
held that “Section 2(13) of the [Act] makes it clear that an employer is
bound by the acts and statements of its supervisors whether specifically
authorized or not.” Ideal Elevator Corp., 295 NLRB 347, 347 fn. 2
(1989); Dorothy Shamrock Coal Co., 279 NLRB 1298, 1299 (1986).
Further, that Respondent may have undertaken extensive efforts to train
its supervisors against engaging in certain acts and conduct during a
union organizing campaign neither insulates Respondent from a finding
that it committed unfair labor practices nor raises any presumption that
the individuals did not engage in unlawful acts and conduct.
GROUSE MOUNTAIN LODGE 1329
had previously disclosed its opposition to the Union to its em-
ployees, and Caron gave no assurances against reprisals to
Clements. Finally, and most significantly, as will also be dis-
cussed infra, Caron’s interrogation occurred in the midst of
other unlawful acts and conduct committed by Respondent,
including conduct attributed to Caron himself. In these circum-
stances, I believe Caron’s deceptively innocuous8 interrogation
of Clements was coercive and, thus, violative of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Advance Waste Systems, 306 NLRB 1020 (1992).
C. Comments Attributing Loss of Potential Benefits for the
Employees to Their Support for the Union
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent, acting
through William Caron, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
telling employees that it was trying to obtain employee raises
and benefits through the QA committee but could not do so
because of the Union. In this regard, Pam Driscoll, who
worked for Respondent from 1987 through 1996 as a server in
the hotel’s restaurant and who was a member of the Union’s
organizing committee,9 testified that, from the summer of 1995
through the summer of 1996, she and Bill Caron often spoke
about the QA committee;10 that Caron would inform her about
the employees’ ideas and suggestions, on which QA was work-
ing; that she, in turn, would relate her own suggestions and
proposals to Caron; and that “he was very good about sharing
[QA matters] with the employees that didn’t attend” QA meet-
ings. In particular, according to Driscoll, “We talked fre-
quently after work . . . . We discussed the Union . . . . the issues
that the people who wanted the Union had. It was Bill’s hope
to resolve those issues without a union to take them to QA.”11
In the same regard, Terry Widdifield, who has worked for Re-
spondent at the hotel as a night server in the restaurant since the
facility opened in 1984, testified that Caron was usually on duty
on Saturday nights when she worked and that, after employees
clocked out, everyone gathered informally; and that there
would be general discussions. She recalled, “I can remember
always saying that it would be very nice if our servers could
have wage increases” and, at least once in April or May, Caron
replying, “Terr, you know this Union movement thing wasn’t
happening. You know, I can get these things for you . . . .”12
While specifically denying the language of the consolidated
complaint allegation, Caron averred that “there would probably

8 In this regard, I note that Clements cut off Caron’s inquiry by say-
ing he did not know anything. It is likely that, if the employee had
answered affirmatively, Caron’s search for information would have
continued.
9 Respondent was aware of her role on the Union’s organizing com-
mittee.
10 Briefly stated, according to Driscoll and Terry Widdifield, Re-
spondent’s QA program at the hotel was designed to permit the hotel
employees to bring to management’s attention ideas and suggestions on
various issues, ranging from their working conditions to hotel-guest
matters and to safety concerns.
11 Among the subjects she and Caron would discuss were daycare for
employees’ children, seniority, holiday and vacation pay, and other
benefits for employees—“We discussed everything.”
12 There is no dispute that Widdifield and Caron were social friends.
According to the employee, she communicated Caron’s comment to
other employees.
be a . . . comment that I could make that got turned into that
allegation.” As to this, he testified that employees were always
asking him questions, and “I tried not to” answer. “But I just
got approached by so many people” and might have told em-
ployees “I wish there was something that I could do for you
guys. But, with all the Union activity I can’t, it’s illegal.” He
added that all decisions on employees’ terms and conditions of
employment are made by the executive committee, that he is
not a member of that body; and that employees were aware of
his limited authority.
In his posthearing brief, counsel for the General Counsel ar-
gues that the respective testimony of Driscoll and Widdifield
supports the allegation of the consolidated complaint and that
“the only possible conclusion” from the foregoing is that Caron
unlawfully communicated a message to employees “that sup-
porting the Union has cost them potential benefits.” While I
shall rely upon the respective accounts of Driscoll and Widdi-
field, each, of whom, appeared to be testifying in a candid
manner and was a more impressive witness than Caron, I do not
believe one may reasonably infer from either account what
counsel for the General Counsel concludes, and I see nothing
unlawful in Caron’s comment to Driscoll. Thus, the latter un-
derstood that the QA system was designed to permit employees
to propose suggestions and ideas to the hotel’s executive com-
mittee for its consideration of them and there is no record evi-
dence that the latter accepts all the suggestions and ideas, which
are proposed by the hotel’s employees. Further, it appears that
Caron was merely expressing his opinion to Driscoll and was
making no promises to her, and, of course, such is privileged
under Section 8(c) of the Act. Alterman Transport Lines, 308
NLRB 1282 at 1282 fn. 3 (1992). However, as to Caron’s
comment to Terry Widdifield, while I do not view it in the
same light as does counsel for the General Counsel, I likewise
believe the supervisor’s comment was unlawful. Thus, Caron’s
comment, unlike what he said to Driscoll, was not couched in
terms of the QA program, and the unmistakable inferences,
which, I believe, he desired Widdifield, who Respondent knew,
was one of the ardent supporters of the Union amongst the em-
ployees, to draw, was that the union campaign would not suc-
ceed and that he could obtain what the union adherents de-
manded in their posted materials without the Union’s interfer-
ence.13 Put another way, I view Caron’s comment to Widdi-
field as a definite promise of unspecified benefits (“these
things”) in order to dissuade employees from supporting the
Union—a patent violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I
so find. Highland Yarn Mills, 313 NLRB 193, 207 (1993);
Airtex, 308 NLRB 1135 at 1135 fn. 2 (1992).
13 The fact that Caron and Widdifield may have been social friends is
irrelevant, and, if anything, I believe that Caron was presuming on their
friendship and aware that Widdifield would repeat his remark to other
employees. Further, while Caron may not have had authority to insti-
tute policy changes, there is no record evidence that he could not sug-
gest policy changes outside of the QA process or that employees were
actually aware of his asserted limited authority. Further, the fact that
employees approached him to reestablish the QA program may well
reflect their belief that, given his position as the hotel’s MOD, he did
have some influence with the executive committee.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1330
D. The Announcement of the New Employee Holiday
Pay Benefit
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when, on about July 15 and 18, it
announced new holiday pay and paid sick leave benefits for
employees in unsigned memoranda from the “QA Committee.”
With regard to what occurred, Harry Crutcher testified that,
along with other suggested benefits, paying employees time and
one half for working on “holidays” had been a QA proposal
since approximately 1991; however, “the financial status of the
company could not justify it” until January 1996 at which time,
according to Kayla Elkins, the executive committee and the
general partners realized that 1995 had been the first profitable
year in the Grouse Mountain Lodge’s existence. Elkins added
that “it was at that time that the owners felt that there [were]
financial resources . . . . to create a benefit for the employees.
But because of the union activity . . . at the hotel, it was [our
attorney’s] suggestion that we not grant any new benefit.”
Subsequently, in July, Respondent’s executive committee, with
the approval of the general partners, decided to implement a so-
called “holiday incentive plan” under which employees would
be paid time and one half for working on four holidays during a
calendar year—Christmas after 5 through 11:59 p.m. Christmas
Day, New Years Eve after 5 through 11:59 p.m. New Years
Day, and two additional holidays, which would be selected
after considering suggestions from employees through the QA
program. The executive committee’s decision was reached on
July 11, and, according to the uncontroverted, respective testi-
mony of Caron and Elkins, the “minutes” of that meeting, Joint
Exhibit 1(b) were posted on employee bulletin boards inside the
hotel.14 Four days later, on July 15, a QA program meeting was
held. According to the “minutes” of this meeting, Joint Exhibit
1(a), Caron, who conducted the meeting, began by “doing an
extensive review” of the executive committee minutes as such
related to the personal leave and holiday pay benefits. At that
QA program meeting, it was suggested that an employee poll
be conducted to choose the two other holidays for which em-
ployees would be paid time and one half for working. The
suggestion was forwarded to the executive committee and was
subsequently adopted.
Based upon the foregoing, it is apparent that the consolidated
complaint allegation is factually incorrect, and I agree with
counsel for Respondent that, to the extent the General Counsel
asserts that the paid holiday benefit was a product of Respon-
dent’s QA program and announced by a “QA Committee,” no
record evidence exists to support such a contention. Clearly,
the paid holiday benefit was announced and implemented by
Respondent’s executive committee. Further, inasmuch as, in
his posthearing brief, counsel for the General Counsel has pos-
tulated no legal arguments as to why the executive committee’s
announcement was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, one
can only assume that he recognizes that the factual error in the
consolidated complaint allegation is fatal and that the executive
committee’s announcement itself of the new employee benefits
was not a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In any event,

14 In the same document, Respondent’s executive committee also
announced a new personal leave time benefit.
as I do not believe the mere announcement of the new em-
ployee benefits constituted a violation of the Act, I shall rec-
ommend dismissal of amended paragraph 7(a)(3) of the con-
solidated complaint.
E. The March 15 Harry Crutcher Memorandum
There is no dispute that, on March 13, Harry Crutcher
drafted and published a memorandum to Respondent’s resort
hotel employees entitled, “Be Careful About Union-Organizer’s
Promises.” According to Respondent’s managing partner, his
memorandum was prompted by the unanswered nion literature,
which Respondent had permitted employees to post at the hotel
during the winter months and a desire to explain Respondent’s
position regarding the Union. The General Counsel contends
that statements in two paragraphs are unlawful, violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The second paragraph on page two
of the document, which immediately follows Crutcher’s re-
sponse to the union supporters’ March 15 demands document,
reads as follows:

Good, spirited discussion on tough issues is healthy.
But, when organizers are intentionally misleading to
you—whom they claim they want to help—shouldn’t you
questions [sic] their real motives? (Dues!) The sad irony is
that the union organizers’ claims of what they have done
for others are less good than what Grouse now provides,
insurance, vacations—compare. Bonuses? At Grouse,
they’re currently common in the summer and at Christmas.
There are a number of privileges our employees have that
would be unlikely to be included in a union contract.

At no point in his memorandum did Crutcher either explain, to
Respondent’s hotel employees, what he meant by the word
“privileges” or give any examples. However, testifying at the
trial, Crutcher did what he failed to do in his memorandum and
explained that, rather than referring to traditional employee
benefits, such as insurance and bonus payments, his last sen-
tence refers to “privileges or perks” such as “things we’ve done
over the years that would not be traditionally part of any sort of
collective-bargaining agreement by nature,” including ski
passes, golf privileges, and borrowing money.
The consolidated complaint alleges that the last sentence of
the paragraph constitutes an unlawful implied threat that, if
Respondent’s employees select the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative, current benefits, enjoyed by employ-
ees, would not be included in a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. In his posthearing brief, counsel for the General Counsel
argues that the last sentence language constitutes a threat of a
loss of benefits for employees resulting from their support for
the Union. In contrast, counsel for Respondent argues that “to
conclude that statement was an implied threat requires a level
of insensitivity uncommon in today’s workplace,” and that the
language is “innocuous and readily and logically explained.”
However, while Crutcher belatedly offered an explanation at
the trial, his memorandum contains neither an explanation of
nor examples for the word “privileges,” and I agree with coun-
sel for the General Counsel that what Crutcher disingenuously
terms privileges are, in reality, types of benefits extended to the
hotel’s employees and that the clear implication of the last sen-
GROUSE MOUNTAIN LODGE 1331
tence of the quoted paragraph is a loss of benefits if the em-
ployees select the Union as their bargaining representative. A
threatened loss of benefits, whether general or specific, because
of employees’ support for the Union is unlawful. Harper-
Collins Publishers, 317 NLRB 168, 179 (1995); Waste Man-
agement of Utah, 310 NLRB 887 (1993). Moreover,
Crutcher’s threat to employees of lost “privileges” if Respon-
dent is forced to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union may be equated with another employer’s threat-
ened loss of “favors” if forced to deal with a third party, a
statement found by the Board to have constituted an unlawful
threat. Mediplex of Wethersfield, 320 NLRB 510, 518 (1995).
Therefore, rather than being innocuous, I find that Crutcher’s
written statement was coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
The fourth paragraph on the second page of Crutcher’s
memorandum reads, as follows:

Unfortunately, our Lodge is in a seasonal resort area.
The number of skiers is declining nationally, so we have
directed our Sales Department to change winter marketing
emphasis to corporate groups. We hope to see results next
year. Presently, Grouse experiences substantial operating
losses from November through May and operating profits
from June through October. five months good—seven
months bad. Still, we now choose to keep the Lodge open
year round—even in bad months, partially for your bene-
fit. We know that you don’t get enough hours during
those bad times, but we do the best we can and, I assure
you, are concerned about the income pinch on off season.
It hits us too, because we have to use profits made in the
good months to finance operations during the bad months.
A union would force the owners to a totally different ap-
proach.

As above, Crutcher neglected to include an explanation of his
language for the hotel’s employees. However, at the trial, he
averred that, recognizing the Union as the employees’ bargain-
ing representative would necessitate a change in Respondent’s
approach to doing business “because . . . we didn’t have the
flexibility to do what we thought was appropriate.” In this
regard, he noted that a union contract may specify minimum
shifts and scheduling, whether the hotel must remain open, and
whether it may send employees home in certain situations and
that, in such situations, employers are unfairly handcuffed.
The consolidated complaint alleges that the last sentence of
the latter paragraph impliedly threatens Respondent’s hotel
employees that, if they chose union representation, Respondent
would discontinue its practice of keeping them employed dur-
ing those months, in which it experiences substantial operating
losses, and counsel for the General Counsel contends that
Crutcher’s unmistakable message to the hotel’s employees was
“that Respondent will not be as lenient or flexible in dealing
with the exigencies of the slow season if a union were in
place.” Again, counsel for Respondent argues that Crutcher’s
words were “innocuous” and that he was merely responding to
the Union’s posted demands. Contrary to counsel, if Crutcher
was concerned with the Union’s bargaining flexibility, it was
his obligation to have so informed the employees. He failed to
do so, and, on any “level of sensitivity,” the coercive nature of
his words is crystal clear. Thus, I agree with counsel for the
General Counsel that Crutcher’s written language conveyed a
clear warning to the hotel’s employees that Respondent would
change approach to staffing in nonpeak seasons if they chose
the Union as their bargaining representative—a blatant viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. HarperCollins Publishers,
supra; Waste Management of Utah, supra.
F. The Employees’ Manual
There is no dispute that Respondent’s employees’ manual,
General Counsel’s Exhibit 2, dated March 26, 1996, has been in
effect at all times material herein. The section of said the
manual, entitled, “Employee Problems,” reads as follows:

Problems are bound to occur in the best of companies. This is
normal. Such problems should be discussed with your Super-
visor first, not with fellow employees. You may expect a fair
hearing on any problems or dispute that may arise.
If, after full consideration of the problem, you feel
your Supervisor has not rendered a fair and equitable deci-
sion, you may request permission to speak to the Execu-
tive Committee.

Harry Crutcher explained that there is a business reason for the
above provision—“that, in order to maintain productivity and
efficiency within an organization, you want as little wasted
time as possible. . . . if it is something . . . to be discussed with
another employee, it may be good for the soul . . . but it is not
necessarily going to get a solution.” He added that no em-
ployee has ever been disciplined for violating this provision and
that it is not a prohibition but, rather, merely a “policy recom-
mendation.”
The consolidated complaint alleges that the foregoing em-
ployees’ manual provision is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act as it prohibits employees from discussing working condi-
tions and problems with other employees. In this regard, coun-
sel for the General Counsel notes that the word “problems” is
not defined and, thus, may be interpreted as including griev-
ances involving terms and conditions of employment. Arguing
that the provision is not unlawful, counsel for Respondent
points out, as discussed above, that Respondent has placed no
restrictions on its employees’ Section 7 activities and that the
provision has never been utilized to discipline employees for
discussing terms and conditions of employment with other
employees. However, the Board has long held that an em-
ployer acts in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by publish-
ing and maintaining any type of written or oral rule which pro-
hibits employees from discussing matters relating to their terms
and conditions of employment with their fellow employees as
such has a tendency to coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Medeco Security
Locks, 319 NLRB 224, 228 (1995); Aroostook County Regional
Opthamology Center, 317 NLRB 218 (1995); Triana Indus-
tries, 245 NLRB 1258 (1979). Further, where, as herein in-
volved, ambiguity appears in an employee work rule, which is
promulgated by their employer, the ambiguity must be resolved
against the promulgator of the rule rather than the employees,
who are subject to the rule. Medeco Security Locks, supra;
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1332
Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 315 NLRB 79, 84 (1994). Moreover,
contrary to Respondent, a finding that such a rule has been
unlawfully maintained is not dependent upon evidence of en-
forcement of the said rule. Radisson Plaza Minneapolis, 307
NLRB 94 (1992). Finally, other than Crutcher’s self-serving
justification for maintaining the above-quoted employee work
rule, Respondent offered no business justification for the rule.15
Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s employee work rule,
mandating that employees first discuss “problems” with their
immediate supervisors rather than fellow employees, is viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
G. The Alleged Unlawful Offer of a Financial Benefit
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent engaged
in conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by offering a
financial benefit to an employee to encourage the employee to
not support the Union. In this regard, employee Terry Widdi-
field, who, Respondent knew, was a member of the Union’s
organizing committee, testified that she had been invited to
attend a charity concert and barbecue in Whitefish in late
March; that she attended the event with William Caron, Patrick
Tobin, the bar manager,16 and the latter’s date; and that, early in
the evening of the event, after her work shift, she met Caron,
Tobin, and his date in the resort hotel’s bar for drinks before
leaving for the concert. According to Widdifield, at one point,
she and Tobin were speaking to each other while the others
were not listening, and “Patrick looked at me and he said, Terr,
I got it from the man, how about a 401(k) plan. And it angered
me. . . . I said its too late, you know this is bullshit. And he
said, I know, Terr.” Widdifield added that nothing more was
said and that the matter was not raised again. While he recalled
having drinks in the hotel bar prior to attending the concert with
Caron, Widdifield, and his girl friend, when asked if he dis-
cussed a 401(k) plan with Widdifield that night, Patrick Tobin
replied, “Not to my knowledge, not the best of my recollection
I would recall anything like that.” Tobin added that there exists
no 401(k) plan for anyone at Respondent’s resort hotel.
As between Widdifield and Tobin, the former impressed me
as being the more trustworthy and candid witness, and I shall
credit Widdifield’s version of their conversation in the resort
hotel’s bar before leaving for the charity concert and barbecue.
In support of the consolidated complaint allegation, counsel for
the General Counsel characterizes the conversation as Respon-
dent’s offer of a benefit to a known union adherent designed to
sway her from supporting the Union, and, as there can be no
other reasonable explanation for Tobin’s offer, I agree. An
offer of specific benefits, such as a 401(k) plan, to an employee
in order to dissuade said employee from supporting a union is
patently violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Pincus Eleva-
tor & Electric Co., 308 NLRB 684, 692 (1992). Accordingly,
Respondent’s offer of a 401(k) plan to Terry Widdifield was
unlawful, and I so find.

15 While Crutcher professed that the manual provision was not a rule
but, rather, a policy recommendation, it is not labeled as such.
16 As with William Caron, Respondent admitted that Tobin is a su-
pervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of the Act, and, pursuant to
Sec. 2(13) of the Act, Respondent is responsible for the acts and con-
duct of its supervisors whether or not authorized to engage in such.
H. The Stumptown Station Incident
The consolidated complaint alleges that, in April, Respon-
dent, acting through Kayla Elkins, in the presence of current
and former employees, stated that the Union had interfered with
desired physical improvements to its facilities and that, if they
could get rid of a named employee, the Union would die. In
support of said allegation, Louise Adams, who worked for Re-
spondent from January 1995 through May 1996, testified that,
at approximately noontime one day in the spring of 1996 before
she left her job with Respondent, she went to the Stumptown
Station, a restaurant in Whitefish, and had occasion to be there
at the same time as Kayla Elkins and two friends.17 According
to Adams, she was at the restaurant “to see my friend Jim who
is a bartender there . . . . I noticed Kayla and two other gals
having lunch . . . . at a table. . . . I just sat down at the bar and
waited for my friend Jim [to finish] . . . .” Adams recognized
one of the women, who was eating lunch with Elkins, as Kris-
ten Sterns, a former employee at the Grouse Mountain Lodge.
She did not know the identity of the other woman at Elkins’
table. Placing the table at which Elkins sat, as “maybe 15 feet
or so” from where she was seated at the bar, Adams recalled
that Elkins and her companions “were the only people in the
bar, and they were talking pretty loud” in “bar voices,” which
are necessary “to talk over the music.”18 Adams continued, “I
think I heard Kristen say something like well, what is it that
they expect? And, Kayla said something like, well, they expect
guaranteed shifts, even when it’s not busy.” Also, “I think
Kayla said that, if we can get rid of Terry and a few others, this
whole thing would pass.”19 At this point, Adams recalled, Kris-
ten Sterns stood and walked from the table, passing by Adams
on her way to the bathroom, and, when Stern returned to the
table, the three women arose and left the restaurant.20 Finally,
Adams conceded that, until seen by Sterns as she walked to the
bathroom, the three women failed to notice her presence in the
restaurant.
Kristen Sterns, who worked for Respondent until July 1995
as director of sales, recalled having lunch at the Stumptown
Station restaurant in early April 1996 with Elkins and another
friend, Holly Apple. Sterns, who stated that the three women
regularly meet for lunch at different restaurants in the Whitefish
17 Apparently, the Stumptown Station restaurant is a two-room facil-
ity. One room is a dining room and the other contains the restaurant’s
bar and some tables and chairs, which are arranged next to the bar.
Also, there is seating at the bar itself.
18 No music was playing at the time.
19 Adams assumed that the “Terry” to whom Elkins referred was
Terry Widdifield.
20 According to Adams, she returned to the resort hotel after lunch
and reported what she observed and heard to Widdifield. The latter
corroborated Adams on this point, testifying that, one day, upon leaving
Kayla Elkins office and on her way back to the dining room, Louise
Adams, who was at the front desk, yelled to her. She immediately went
over to Adams, who told her, “Terry, watch your ass, they’re out to get
you,” and “she related briefly what she had overheard in Stumptown . .
. .” Thereafter, according to Widdifield, she confronted her bar man-
ager with what Adams told her, and “she said it was not true.” Also,
Widdifield testified, she subsequently met Kristen Sterns, who denied
that the alleged conversation ever occurred.
GROUSE MOUNTAIN LODGE 1333
area, testified that they ate at a table in the bar area, that there
was just one other couple, who were having lunch at another
table, in the bar area at the time, and that it was “quiet.” She
further testified that the subject of the Union did arise during
the lunch conversation and that she raised it, commenting “that
the employees of [Respondent] had quite a few benefits, that’s
unfortunate that [the Union was] happening at this time, and
Kayla . . . was reiterating what she understood to be the law.
And informing Holly and myself . . . that, even if [Respondent]
wanted to increase benefits for the employees . . . . with the
union activity going on, they couldn’t do that because it would
be seen as . . . unfair labor practices.” Sterns specifically de-
nied any mention of “Terry” or Terry Widdifield and the com-
ment attributed to Elkins. While conceding she went to the
bathroom during the lunch, Sterns denied seeing Adams, with
whom she is acquainted, in the bar area during the lunch and
specifically denied seeing her while walking to the bathroom.
Finally, Sterns denied having a conversation with Widdifield
about what might have been said during the lunch. Holly Ap-
ple, who worked for Respondent from 1987 until 1993, testified
similarly about the lunch with Sterns and Elkins at the Stump-
town Station restaurant. According to her, other than a couple
having lunch at another table, the only other person in the bar
area while she ate lunch was the bartender, and she denied see-
ing a woman at the bar. As to the lunch conversation, she con-
firmed that the hotel employees’ union activities were a subject
of the conversation. “I recall . . . Kayla telling us how things
that were happening. Just how it was upsetting her. . . . And I
do remember Kristen talking about the benefits and how good
they were at Grouse Mountain. I recall Kayla explaining the
laws about how they can’t change any benefits, or add anything
now as the union activity was going on.” Apple specifically
denied any mention of Terry Widdifield’s name during the
lunch and the comment, which was attributed to Elkins. During
cross-examination, Apple conceded that she was sitting in a
manner so that “my side was to the bar” and that it was possible
a woman could have been sitting at the bar without her knowl-
edge. Testifying with regard to her lunch with Sterns and Ap-
ple, Elkins recalled that she was the only one of the three who
sat facing the bar, and she specifically denied seeing Adams in
the area of the bar at any point during the lunch. According to
her, the Union arose during the lunch conversation—“Kristen
had brought up the benefit issue. . . . I made the comment, I’m
really not sure what the Union was looking for. . . . shared with
them my personal opinion of the Union, and the activity that
was taking place.” Elkins specifically denied mentioning
“Terry” or Terry Widdifield and the comment, which was at-
tributed to her.
Whether Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act depends upon my analysis of the credibility
of the respective witnesses, and, in this regard, notwithstanding
that Elkins, Sterns, and Apple each specifically denied what
was attributed to Elkins by Adams, the latter appeared to be a
far more candid and believable witness. Thus, if one is to rely
upon the respective accounts of Elkins, Sterns, and Apple that
Adams was not present in the bar area of the restaurant during
their lunch, the inevitable conclusion to be reached is that Ad-
ams fabricated her entire testimony. However, unless Adams
was, in fact, present at the Stumptown Station restaurant, as she
testified, how could she have known three facts not in dis-
pute—that the three friends ate lunch together at the restaurant,
that a topic of their conversation was the Union’s organizing
campaign, and that, at one point during the meal, Sterns left the
table and went to the bathroom. In these circumstances, the
only reasonable conclusions are that Adams was truthful as to
her presence and what she overheard and that Elkins, Sterns,
and Apple each dissembled. Two points buttress my conclu-
sions. First, while Sterns and Apple corroborated each other as
to what was said about the Union during the lunch, Elkins con-
tradicted them, giving an entirely different account about what
was said with regard to the union activity. Next, Adams’ testi-
mony that she informed Terry Widdifield as to what was said
about her was corroborated by Widdifield, who, I previously
stated, impressed me as being an honest and straightforward
witness. In these circumstances, I find that, during lunch with
her friends, Sterns and Apple, and in Adams’ presence, Kayla
Elkins remarked that, if they could get rid of Terry “and a few
others,” the union movement would pass and that, by “Terry,”
Elkins meant Terry Widdifield, a known union adherent. I
agree with counsel for the General Counsel, and find, that the
comment, overheard by an employee,21 constituted a veiled
threat to terminate employees, whom Respondent knew or sus-
pected were supporters of the Union, and, thus, was violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Great Lakes Window, Inc., 319
NLRB 615 at 615 (1995).
I. Elkins’ August 15 Memorandum to the Employees
On August 15, Kayla Elkins issued a memorandum to Re-
spondent’s resort hotel employees which, in part, states:

I just read a bulletin in which the Union arrogantly and falsely
claims to have “helped” Grouse Mountain Lodge employees
get the increased benefits (time and one half for holidays and
personal leave time) recently announced by the Executive
Committee. I know for a fact that since first being mentioned
by the QA Committee several years ago, those added benefits
have been on the owners’ agenda but Lodge finances would
not permit them. When the owners recognized 1995 would
be our first profitable year ever, they put things in motion.
Unfortunately, legal counsel to Grouse Mountain Lodge said
they could not implement any new benefits while union orga-
nizing efforts were active. When the Executive Committee
recently concluded those organizing activities had failed from
lack of employee interest and support, our attorney gave us
the go ahead. The QA Committee deserves our thanks and
credit, but the Union had no impact on the Owners’ and Ex-
ecutive Committee’s decisions . . . .

With regard to the sentence, in which she discussed Respon-
dent’s attorney’s advice not to implement the above benefits,
Elkins testified that Respondent’s managing partners and the
executive committee had decided, in January, to implement
time and one half for holiday pay, “but because of the union

21 Elkins admitted that she had a clear view of the bar area from
where she sat. Therefore, I believe that not only did she see Adams
sitting at the bar but that she meant for Adams to overhear what she
said. Thus, the reference to a “few others” was left deliberately vague.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1334
activity . . . at the hotel, it was [our attorney’s] suggestion that
we not grant any new benefit. . . . And so we did not.” As to
the sentence regarding the failure of the Union’s organizing
activities, Elkins testified that “[i]t’s a small hotel. . . . You
could just tell, from employees coming up to us, people who
are against the Union, that the support that the Union had [was]
weaning.”
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Elkins informed Respondent’s
employees that it had withheld additional benefits based upon
advice from its attorney not to implement new benefits during a
union organizing campaign. The Board law is quite clear that,
in the midst of a union organizing campaign, an employer must
proceed with an expected wage or benefit adjustment as if the
organizing campaign had not been in progress. America’s Best
Quality Coatings Corp., 313 NLRB 470, 484 (1993); Atlantic
Forest Products, 282 NLRB 855, 858 (1987). The Board has,
however, recognized an exception to this rule—an employer
may postpone the implementation of such a wage or benefit
adjustment if it makes clear to its employees that the granting
of the adjustment is not dependent upon the result of the union
organizing campaign and that the “sole purpose” of the post-
ponement is to avoid the appearance of influencing employees
in their decision to support the union. Atlantic Forest Products,
supra. In so doing, however, an employer acts in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if it attributes its failure to implement
the expected wage or benefits adjustment to the presence of the
union. Twin City Concrete, 317 NLRB 1313, 1318 (1995);
Atlantic Forest Products, supra. Herein, in her memorandum
to the resort hotel’s employees, Elkins placed the onus for Re-
spondent’s delay in implementing the above-described new
employee benefits squarely upon the Union by linking Respon-
dent’s delay to the ongoing organizing campaign, and, notwith-
standing that the two announced benefits were not expected by
the hotel employees, I believe the same principle applies.22
Thus, despite Elkins’ belief that the Union’s organizing cam-
paign had lost its momentum, there is no record evidence that,
in fact, the campaign had ceased, and her written comment
clearly had the effect of undermining the Union by creating the
impression that, but for the ongoing organizing campaign, Re-
spondent would have implemented the time and one half holi-
day pay and personal leave benefits. Accordingly, I find that
Elkins’ written comment, that Respondent’s delay in imple-

22 Citing Brooks Bros., 261 NLRB 876 (1962), Respondent’s attor-
ney argues that, inasmuch as Respondent has no historic practice of
granting benefits early in a calendar year, implementation of the two
new benefits during the organizing campaign would have constituted
presumptive unfair labor practices and that Elkins was merely respond-
ing to the Union’s attempt to take credit for the new benefits with a
statement of fact. While I obviously can not, and do not, comment
upon the advice, which was given to Respondent by its attorney, Re-
spondent is bound by what Elkins wrote and, if the executive commit-
tee’s stated rationale for delaying implementation of the two benefits is
unlawful, Respondent will just have to live with the consequences of its
honesty. Presumably, if business justification for implementing the
benefits had existed in January 1996, Respondent would have done so.
Likewise, if business justification existed for the delay in implementa-
tion, Elkins would have so stated.
menting the two new benefits was caused by the Union’s orga-
nizing campaign, was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The consolidated complaint next alleges that Elkins’ com-
ment, in her August 15 memorandum, that the executive com-
mittee had concluded that the Union’s organizing campaign had
failed from lack of employee interest and support, created the
impression that Respondent was engaging in surveillance of its
employees’ activities in support of the Union in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In support, counsel for the General
Counsel contends that such a statement would have made the
resort hotel’s employees believe that Respondent knew the
levels of support for the Union and, as such, created the impres-
sion that Respondent had engaged in surveillance of their union
activities. On the other hand, counsel for Respondent argues
that what Elkins wrote “was merely a statement of the obvious”
and that “noticing the decrease in organizing activity did not
require surveillance but not to notice it would have been gross
inattentiveness.” As to whether Elkins’ statement was unlaw-
ful, I must concentrate solely on her words, and, in this regard,
note that, in her memorandum, she offered no explanation,
justification, or basis for the executive committee’s conclusion.
Moreover, her comments were not phrased in terms of specula-
tion; rather, the clear implication from her statement was that
the executive committee had knowledge that the Union’s orga-
nizing campaign had no support and had failed. Absent expla-
nation, an employee reasonably may have believed that Re-
spondent’s executive committee gained its knowledge illegally
by engaging in surveillance of its employees’ organizing activi-
ties. In these circumstances, I believe that Respondent created
the impression, amongst its employees, that it had engaged in
surveillance of their union activities and, thereby, engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Keystone Lamp
Mfg. Corp., 284 NLRB 626, 627 (1987); Airport Distributors,
280 NLRB 1144, 1149 (1986).
J. The Quality Assurance Committee
Paragraphs 5(a) and (b) and 6(a) through (c) of the consoli-
dated complaint alleges that, at all times material herein, an
entity, known as the QA committee, has existed at Respon-
dent’s resort hotel to deal with Respondent concerning wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of its
employees and is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act and that Respondent has rendered assis-
tance and support to and dominated the QA committee, has
recognized and bargained with the QA committee regarding
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of
its employees, and has engaged in the foregoing acts and con-
duct notwithstanding that the QA committee did not represent a
majority of Respondent’s employees in an appropriate unit in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. At the outset, in
Respondent’s employee’s manual, under the heading “Sugges-
tions,” is the following language:

The Lodge feels that each employee is important. Therefore,
his/her ideas are important also. Any suggestions for im-
provement will be appreciated by [Respondent]. This is your
organization and we want to grow together. Please sign any
written suggestions and place them in the QA Box located in
the employees’ lunchroom and kitchen break areas. All sug-
GROUSE MOUNTAIN LODGE 1335
gestions are discussed at the QA meetings. (QA= Quality As-
surance.)

In this regard, the labor organization allegation of the consoli-
dated complaint refers to the “QA Committee,” and William
Caron and Kayla Elkins, in her August 15 memorandum, both
referred to the “QA Committee.” Nevertheless, Harry Crutcher
testified that quality assurance, which has existed at the resort
hotel since its opening in 1984, is not a committee or an organi-
zation but, rather, a “program” designed to address guest satis-
faction, employee satisfaction, and safety issues and to give
“people” an opportunity to bring “concerns” in these areas to
the attention of management. Likewise, employee Terry Wid-
difield and former employee Pam Driscoll each described Re-
spondent’s QA program as a method designed to enable the
resort hotel’s employees to bring to management’s attention
ideas and suggestions on various issues, ranging from their
working conditions to hotel-guest matters to safety issues.23
The record establishes that the QA program exists on two lev-
els—an employee suggestion box, into which employees place
anonymous suggestions, and meetings, which employees are
invited and encouraged to attend. It is the latter aspect of the
QA program, which is alleged to bring it within the definition
of a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act. As to this point, while the record reveals that the QA
program has no formative documents, such as bylaws, and no
established structure or formal operating procedures, it does
appear that Respondent viewed the program’s meetings with
more formality than as simply an opportunity for employees to
make anonymous suggestions, such as would be deposited in
the suggestion box. Thus, analysis of the minutes of the QA
program meetings, which are in the record, discloses that Wil-
liam Caron continually refers to QA as an entity, as in “QA
requested” or “QA would like to add,” refers to those attending
QA meetings as “QA members,” does not attribute suggestions
to any individual employee, and differentiates between those
attending QA meetings and other employees, as in “QA mem-
bers and other employees have expressed . . . .” Moreover, the
executive committee utilized the QA program for determining
which holidays would generate the time and one half wage rate
and for obtaining employees’ views on the types of lunches,
which Respondent would provide for them.
The record establishes that, during 1995 and 1996, QA pro-
gram meetings were scheduled and held once a month at the
resort hotel. Further, while, in the first few years of Respon-
dent’s facility’s existence, the employees, who attended the QA
program meetings, were elected by the employees in their re-
spective departments as representatives of the departments, at
least during 1995 and 1996, attendance at QA program meet-
ings was open to every employee of the resort hotel, including
supervisors and management representatives, who only “occa-
sionally” attended. The record also establishes that between

23 Examples of the matters raised, by employees, in the QA program
include daycare for employees’ children, employees’ meals, linoleum
floor covering in the employee rest room, employee parking, smoking
in the employees’ cafeteria, informational signs, VCR rentals by guests,
grounds upkeep, the glass covering for the pool area, and nonskid strips
in entry areas.
four and 20 employees attend each QA program meeting; that
few, if any, employees attend every such meeting; and that
those employees, who do attend, normally are either beginning
or ending their work shifts and are paid for the time spent at
QA program meetings. William Caron has been the chairper-
son for the QA program meetings since October 1995. Appar-
ently, the QA program had become moribund in the mid-1990s,
and, according to Caron, he became involved after “I had a
couple of employees to approach me. . . . they thought I would
be the perfect person to get it going again.” As chairperson,
Caron is the one responsible for setting the dates, the times, and
the locations of the QA program meetings, opening each meet-
ing and introducing topics of discussion, and preparing a “min-
utes.” With regard to these documents, Caron faithfully records,
without comment, each suggestion or response to an executive
committee question” and, after each QA program meeting,
drafts and posts the meeting’s minutes throughout the resort
hotel and sends copies to each department head and to the ex-
ecutive committee. The latter group either accepts or rejects
the QA program meeting suggestions and ideas or requests
further employee input. Caron testified, and there is no dispute,
that, with regard to what is discussed at each QA program
meeting, “there really [isn’t] any definition. [Those who attend
are] allowed to bring up anything that they [want] to suggest”
as to employee, guest, and hotel matters. Kayla Elkins de-
scribed what then occurs as a “conversation amongst employ-
ees,” with one employee suggesting something, other employ-
ees giving their opinions as the suggestion’s value, and the idea
thoroughly debated. On occasion, according to Elkins, the
discussion sometimes results in a different suggestion than
what was originally proposed. She added that Caron some-
times participates in the discussion. According to Caron, he
initially will raise matters, which are “on-going” and have not
yet been answered by the executive committee or a department
head, or as to which the executive committee desires further
employee input. Caron further testified that he sees his role as
being that of a conduit between the employees and the resort
hotel’s management, and there is no record evidence that he
ever has vetoed a suggestion. Finally, Elkins testified that she
has attended two QA meetings since the fall of 1995, and, “if
someone brought up an idea and I had an opinion. A variation
of what they were talking about, I would voice my opinion.”
Likewise, Terry Slatter, the resort hotel’s director of operations,
testified that he has attended QA meetings and that he has par-
ticipated in discussions—“I would contribute my input when I
could.”
As to whether Respondent has unlawfully rendered assis-
tance and support to and dominated the QA program in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel and counsel for Respondent agree that I must ini-
tially determine whether the QA program falls within the defi-
nition of a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.24 In this regard, the Board has held that an
24 Sec. 2(5) of the Act defines a labor organization as follows:
The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1336
“organization of any kind, or any agency or employee represen-
tation committee or plan” is a labor organization “if (1) em-
ployees participate, (2) the organization exists, at least in part,
for the purpose of `dealing with’ employers, and (3) these deal-
ings concern ‘conditions of work’ or concern other statutory
subjects, such as grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, or hours of employment. Further, if the organization has
as a purpose the representation of employees, it meets the statu-
tory definition of ‘employee representation committee or plan’
under Section 2(5) . . . if it also meets the criteria of employee
participation and dealing with conditions of work or other statu-
tory subjects.” Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990, 994
(1992). Regarding the initial element, as employees suggest
and debate ideas at the QA program meetings, it is clear that
employees participate in the QA program. Further, while it
lacks the structure of the employee action committees in Ona
Corp., 285 NLRB 400 (1987), and in Electromation, Inc., su-
pra, the safety and fitness committees in E. I. du Pont & Co.,
311 NLRB 893 (1993), or the grievance committee in Keeler
Brass Co., 317 NLRB 1110 (1995), or similar employee enti-
ties, which are the subject of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act
decisions by the Board, given its use, by Respondent, for the
development of the process for determining the holidays, for
which employees would be paid time and one half, and for
determining the types of lunches, which would be provided to
employees, and given Caron’s comments regarding the sugges-
tions and ideas and the process itself, the QA program meeting
process seens to be perceived, by Respondent, as constituting
some sort of employee representative entity and certainly
viewed with a degree of formality greater than due a mere sug-
gestion box procedure. In this regard, that the QA program
lacks any formal structure or formative documents, including
bylaws, is, of course, irrelevant in resolving the QA program’s
status as a labor organization. Electromation, Inc., supra;
Armco, Inc., 271 NLRB 350 (1984); S & W Motor Lines, Inc.,
236 NLRB 938, 942 (1978).
As to the second of the criteria, the Supreme Court held in
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959), that the term
“dealing with” in Section 2(5) of the Act is broader than the
term “collective bargaining.” In E. I. du Pont & Co., supra, the
Board noted that “the term ‘bargaining’ connotes a process by
which two parties must seek to compromise their differences
and arrive at an agreement. By contrast, the concept of ‘deal-
ing’ does not require that the two sides seek to compromise
their differences. It involves only a bilateral mechanism be-
tween two parties.” The mechanism “ordinarily entails a pat-
tern or practice in which a group of employees . . . makes pro-
posals to management, management responds to these propos-
als by acceptance or rejection by word or by deed, and com-
promise is not required.” If such a pattern or practice is estab-
lished by the record evidence, and a group exists for the pur-
pose of following said practice, “the element of dealing is pre-
sent.” Id. at 894. In my view, such is exactly what occurs be-
tween the participants in the QA program meetings and Re-
spondent’s executive committee. Thus, at the QA meetings,

part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
while suggestions and ideas are initially raised by individual
employees, these are then debated amongst the employees, who
have attended the meeting, sometimes altered, and then submit-
ted to the executive committee in the name of QA program
rather than as an individual employee’s suggestion.25 Thereaf-
ter, the executive committee either accepts or rejects the ideas
or returns them to the next QA program meeting for further
development. Finally, concerning the third element, there can
be no doubt that, among the subjects raised at the QA program
meetings and submitted to the executive committee, are matters
related to the employees’ terms and conditions of employment,
including such issues as daycare for the children of employees,
employee parking, holiday pay, employee lunches, and em-
ployee smoking areas. In these circumstances, while not free
from doubt, I believe that the resort hotel’s QA program quali-
fies as a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act provides that

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or ad-
ministration of any labor organization or contribute finan-
cial or other support to it; Provided, That subject to rules
and regulations made and established by the Board pursu-
ant to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited from
permitting employees to confer with him during working
hours without loss of time or pay[.]

An employer violates this section of the Act by interfering with,
assisting, or dominating a labor organization. As to domina-
tion, which, by degree, is the more serious of the unlawful acts
and the finding of which is essential to a disestablishment rem-
edy,26 in Electromation, Inc., supra, the Board noted that, al-
though Section 8(a)(2) of the Act does not define the specific
acts which may constitute domination, “a labor organization
that is the creation of management, whose structure and func-
tion are essentially determined by management . . . and whose
continued existence depends upon the fiat of management, is
one whose formation or administration has been dominated
under Section 8(a)(2).” However, “when the formulation and
structure of the organization is determined by employees,
domination is not established, even if the employer has the
potential ability to influence the structure or effectiveness of the
organization.” Id. at 995–996. Further, while an employer’s
involvement with a labor organization may not rise to the level
of domination, such may constitute unlawful assistance or inter-
ference. Thus, while not exercising control over the activities
of an employee organization, an employer may unlawfully
interfere with said entity by suggesting its establishment, indi-
cating a willingness to bargain with it, or suggesting the draft-
ing of certain proposals. Texas Bus Lines, 277 NLRB 626, 627
(1985); Wheelco Co., 260 NLRB 867 (1982). Likewise, an
25 This is significant and differentiates the QA program meeting
from its suggestion box, for, in the suggestion box concept, “where
employees make specific proposals to management, there is no dealing
because the proposals are made individually and not as a group.” E. I.
du Pont & Co., supra at 894.
26 NLRB v. Mine Workers District 50, 255 U.S. 453, 458–459
(1958); Ona Corp., 285 NLRB 400 (1987).
GROUSE MOUNTAIN LODGE 1337
employer may unlawfully assist, but not dominate, a labor or-
ganization by, among other acts and conduct, recognizing and
bargaining with the labor organization at a time when it was
under a statutory duty to recognize another, by meeting on
company time with payments to employee representatives, and
by “the preparation and distribution of minutes of those meet-
ings . . . .” Mooresville IGA Foodliner, 284 NLRB 1055, 1068
(1987).
Herein, contrary to counsel for the General Counsel, as the
current QA program does not appear to be the creation of Re-
spondent’s hotel management, I do not believe that Respon-
dent’s hotel management’s involvement in the QA program
constituted domination of it. In this regard, notwithstanding
that the function of the program remains as set forth in the em-
ployees’ manual, there is no record evidence that Respondent
devised the structure of or prepared formative documents for
the conduct of the QA program or that the hotel’s management
exerts any control over which employees attend meetings or
over the subjects raised and discussed at QA program meetings.
However, at all times material herein, Respondent’s manager-
on-duty, William Caron, has designated the dates, times, and
locations for all QA program meetings. Further, he has acted as
the chairperson for each QA meeting and recorded the minutes,
distributing the document to the executive committee and to all
department managers, and has been the executive committee’s
conduit to the employee participants at QA meetings for all
matters about which the executive committee desires additional
employee input. In these circumstances, I believe that, while
not arising to the level of dominance, Caron, an admitted su-
pervisor, on behalf of Respondent, has rendered significant
assistance and support to the QA program, conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. Mooresville IGA Foodliner,
supra.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating an employee as to his union membership,
sympathies, and activities, Respondent engaged in conduct
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By promising unspecified benefits to an employee in order
to induce her to forego support for the Union, Respondent en-
gaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By threatening its employees with loss of unspecified
privileges if required to negotiate a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the Union in order to induce them to forego support
for the Union, Respondent engaged in conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By threatening its employees that it would change its staff-
ing practices during nonpeak months in order to induce them to
forego support for the Union, Respondent engaged in conduct
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By publishing and maintaining a work rule in its employ-
ees’ manual, mandating that employees initially discuss work
“problems” with their supervisors rather than their fellow em-
ployees, Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. By offering to implement a 401(k) savings plan for an
employee in order to dissuade her from supporting the Union,
Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
9. By making veiled threats to terminate known supporters of
the Union, Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
10. By informing its employees that its delay in implement-
ing new benefits was as a result of the Union’s organizing cam-
paign, Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
11. By informing its employees that the Union’s organizing
campaign had failed due to lack of employee support, Respon-
dent created the impression in the minds of its employees that it
had engaged in surveillance of their union activities and thereby
engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
12. The QA program is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
13. Through its manager-on-duty, an admitted supervisor, by
arranging the time, date, and location of meetings, acting as
chairperson of meetings, acting as a conduit for information
from the executive committee to its employees at meetings, and
by taking the minutes of meetings, Respondent assisted and
supported the QA program in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(2) of the Act.
14. Respondent’s above-described unfair labor practices are
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
15. Unless specified above, Respondent engaged in no other
unfair labor practices.
THE REMEDY
I have found that Respondent has engaged in serious unfair
labor practices herein. Accordingly, I shall recommend that it
be ordered to cease and desist from said the activities and to
take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act, including removing the unlawful provision
from its employees’ manual and the posting of an appropriate
notice to its employees.27
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and the entire record herein, I issue the following
recommended28
ORDER
The Respondent, Grouse Mountain Associates II, A Limited
Partnership, d/b/a Grouse Mountain Lodge, Whitefish, Mon-
tana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from

27 Inasmuch as I have found that Respondent only offered unlawful
assistance to the QA program and did not dominate the labor organiza-
tion, I shall not recommend that it disestablish the entity.
28 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1338
(a) Interrogating its employees as to their union membership,
sympathies, and activities and the union membership, sympa-
thies, and activities of their fellow employees.
(b) Promising unspecified benefits to employees in order to
induce them to forego their support for the Union.
(c) Threatening its employees with loss of unspecified privi-
leges if required to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union in order to induce them to forego their support
for the Union.
(d) Threatening its employees that it would change its staff-
ing practices during nonpeak months in order to induce them to
forego their support for the Union.
(e) Publishing and maintaining a work rule in its employees’
manual, mandating that employees initially discuss work “prob-
lems” with their supervisors rather than with their fellow em-
ployees.
(f) Offering to implement a 401(k) savings plan for its em-
ployees in order to dissuade them from supporting the Union.
(g) Making veiled threats to terminate known supporters of
the Union.
(h) Informing its employees that its delay in implementing
new benefits was as a result of the Union’s organizing cam-
paign.
(i) Informing its employees that the Union’s organizing
campaign had failed due to lack of employee support, thereby
creating in the minds of its employees that it was engaging in
surveillance of its employees’ union activities.
(j) Assisting or supporting the QA program, a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
(k) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Remove from its employees’ manual the provision, man-
dating that employees initially discuss work “problems” with
their supervisors rather than with their fellow employees.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Whitefish, Montana, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”29 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained by
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since September 5, 1996.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 19 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official, on a form provided by the Region, attesting
to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dis-
missed as to any other alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act not specifically found herein.

29 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”