Greyhound Terminal

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMay 9, 1962

137 N.L.R.B. 87 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

GREYHOUND TERMINAL 87 Accordingly, we.find that the following employees of the Employer constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All production and maintenance employees at the Employer's Ana- heim, California, plant, including plant clerical employees, but exclud- ing employees in the administrative and finance, field engineering and sales, and purchasing "units," the industrial engineering and produc- tion engineering departments and the office section of the production control department of the manufacturing "unit," and the. engineers and office employees in the quality control "unit," and also excluding administrative and executive employees, salesmen, draftsmen, office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.] William S. Shurett, d/b/a Greyhound Terminal and Amalga- mated Association of Street , Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America , AFL-CIO, Division 1174. Case No. 15-CA-1969. May 9, 1962 DECISION AND ORDER On February 5, 1962, Trial Examiner David London issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair . labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report together with a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case , and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions 1 of the Trial Examiner.2 , We note an inconsistency between provision 1(c) of the Recommended Order and, the language of the notice to employees . As the findings do not appear to warrant the broad cease-and -desist order , we shall amend provision 1(c) to read: "In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing his employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act." 2The Respondent operates a bus terminal pursuant to a written agreement with The Greyhound Corporation (Southeastern Greyhound Lines Division) to sell tickets, furnish 137 NLRB No. 11. 88 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER The Board hereby adopts the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner with the modifications of provision 1(c) in accordance with footnote 1, supra, and of provisions 2(e) and (f) in accord with foot- notes 11 and 12 of the Recommended Order. information, and maintain waiting room, toilet, and baggage facilities The Respondent occupies the premises by virtue of a separate lease agreement with Greyhound The lease and contract are mutually coterminous Under that contract, the Respondent serves in "the position of a trustee" for the benefit of Greyhound with respect to passenger and express tickets and the net proceeds derived from the sale thereof During 1960, the Respondent's gross income in commissions from Greyhound for the sale of tickets amounted to $45,812 66, while other income from coin-operated toilets, telephones, and vending machines; parcel storage, and rental of portions of the teiminal property to a restaurant and a taxicab company for use as a taxistand amounted to over $23,000 The Respond- ent's terminal facilities constitute a link in the transportation of passengers and express in interstate commerce, and all phases of the operations are related to and part of such facilities Accordingly, the income from the total operations is to be considered in deter- mining whether such facilities fall within the Board's discretionary standards for the assertion of jurisdiction As the Respondent's gross income from those operations exceeds $50,000, the Respondent's business meets the jurisdictional standards established by the Board, and we find that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction H P 0 service, Inc, 122 NLRB 394 INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF TIME CASE Upon a charge and an amended charge, filed August 16, 1961, and October 6, 1961, respectively, the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, on October 27, 1961, issued a complaint against William S. Shurett, d/b/a Greyhound Terminal, herein- after called Respondent, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S C., Section 151, et seq.), herein called the Act. By his duly filed answer, Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held before David London, the duly designated Trial Examiner, at Pensacola, Florida, December 12 and 13, 1961. All parties were represented at the hearing by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs. Since the close of the hearing, briefs have been received from the General Counsel and Respondent which have been duly considered. Upon consideration of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and upon my observation of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent is engaged in the operation of a bus terminal at Pensacola, Florida, pursuant to a written agreement with the Greyhound Corporation (Southeastern Grey- hound Lines Division), to sell tickets, furnish information, maintain waiting rooms, toilet and baggage facilities, and related terminal services. Respondent receives a commission from Greyhound Corporation on ticket sales, charters, and tours. Dur- ing the year 1960, which period is representative of all times material herein, Respondent's gross income from the terminal operations exceeded $50,000. Re- spondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in com- merce and as an essential link in interstate commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.' 1 See William S. Shurett, d/b/a Greyhound Terminal, 15-RC-2383 (not published in NLRB volumes), of which I have taken official notice, see also United Warehouse and Terminal Corporation, 112 NLRB 959 GREYHOUND TERMINAL IL THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED 89 Amalgamated Association of Street , Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America , AFL-CIO, Division 1174, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES From the time of the Mardi-Gras celebration in 1961 to the following May 10, the Union engaged in a campaign to organize Respondent's agents and porters. On May 10, 1961,2 Respondent had in his employment 12 employees engaged as agents or porters.3 By May 10, nine of these employees had signed cards designating the Union as their collective-bargaining representative and it was undenied that another such employee, A. G. Watkins, was, during all times relevant herein, a member of the Union in good standing. During the morning of Wednesday, May 10, George S. Gay, president and business agent of the union, accompanied by Edward Oliver, an officer of the Union's Inter- national organization, called on Respondent at the Pensacola terminal. Oliver at that time informed Respondent that the latter's employees had joined the Union, that it represented a majority of his employees, and that Oliver was there to negotiate a labor agreement in their behalf. Oliver stated that because Respondent "had a small company, and certainly knew all of his people personally, . . . saw their checks weekly and knew their signatures, [the Union was] prepared to give him the applications carrying the signatures of his people so that he could recognize them, so that there would be no question that [the Union] did represent his people." Oliver further told him that he did not have the cards with him at that particular moment and that they were in his hotel room, but that he would bring them back Oliver pointed out that the terminal had formerly been operated by Greyhound Lines under a contract with the Union and that it was the intention of the Union to "restore the working conditions, wage rates covering the employees of the Pensacola terminal" that had prevailed while that terminal was being operated by Greyhound Lines. Respondent remonstrated that "he was not as big a company as Greyhound and that he simply could not afford those kind of wages and working conditions," and Oliver intimated that some concessions might be made. Respondent expressed surprise that his employees had joined the Union and asked Oliver what his rights as an employer might be and Oliver advised him to obtain counsel. After Respondent stated that he wanted ",to talk to Greyhound," the parties agreed to meet the next day. As the meeting adjourned, Oliver told him that the two union representatives would go to the hotel, secure the authorization cards in question, and return to the terminal and "show them to him so that there would be no question [the Union] represented those people." Oliver and Gay went to the hotel, got the cards, and returned immediately to the terminal. There, they found Respondent seated in a booth of the coffeeshop with Beverly Boyd, superintendent of the Mobile-Pensacola area for Greyhound Lines, engaged in conversation concerning a Greyhound driver. The union offi- cials were invited to join Respondent and Boyd and they did so Gay handed Respondent the nine authorization cards that had been signed by Respondent's agents and porters. Gay mentioned that there was no card for A. G. Watkins but stated that Respondent knew that he had been a member of the Union since 1938, a statement which was not challenged or denied by Respondent. As Respondent looked the cards over, Oliver asked him whether he recognized any of the signatures and Respondent replied that they were authentic, and that there was ,.no doubt in [his] mind that [the Union] represented his employees" but that he did not know what he was going to do about it until he met with them the next day. Oliver and Gay returned to the terminal on the following day, Thursday, May 11, and Oliver again asked Respondent whether he was ready to begin negotiations. The latter replied that he was not able "to get hold of his people," or talk to his attorney, and asked for a couple of more days for that purpose. Oliver informed him that if he did not agree to negotiate, the Union would impose a strike, and that they would see him the next day at I0 a.m. The two union officials went to the terminal about 10:30 a in. of May 12, where Respondent told them that he had "just a few things to tell [them] and that [would] be all," and that his attorney had advised him that he had "already talked too damn 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to dates herein are to the year 19G1 3 Though the wife of Respondent was also employed as an agent, she may not be con- sidered as an "employee" within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act. 90 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD much." He informed the two men "that he did not agree that [they] represented the majority of his employees" and that he did not agree that they "were asking for the correct unit." Oliver stated that if he did not believe that they represented his employees "he could call them in and ask them, or count them walking the picket line." Respondent's only reply was ,that there should be an election before the men went out on strike and asked for time to get his business in order before the strike was imposed The request was refused and the two union officials informed the em- ployees that Respondent had refused to recognize the Union and instructed them to walk out. A picket line was established about 12:30 p.m. of that day and was continuously maintained to the time of the hearing herein. At least seven of Respondent's agents and porters who had signed the authorization cards aforementioned participated in that picketing activity. Several times after the strike began, Gay asked Respondent to negotiate but he refused to do so and told Gay that he would never do so On May 12, Respondent began hiring replacements for the striking employees and soon thereafter had a full complement of such replacements. The foregoing findings pertaining to the conferences between Respondent and the Union are based on the composite testimony of Gay and Oliver which I credit for the reasons hereafter stated, and my evaluation of the trustworthiness of the witnesses involved based on their demeanor while on the witness stand. Respondent, who, prior to his operation of the Pensacola terminal, had "numerous jobs with Greyhound Lines," the last as its assistant regional manager in Birming- ham, testified that he had only one meeting with Gay and Oliver on May 10 and that it occurred about 2 p.m. of that day. Respondent admitted that at their first meeting Oliver told him "that he had signed up the majority of [his] employees and wanted to know if [he] would recognize him or his Union as the bargaining agent for [Respondent's] employees." He further testified, however, that during that first meeting, in an explanation that lasted 45 minutes to an hour, Oliver told him that Respondent had "a legal right to ask for an NLRB election to see if [the Union] represented the majority of his people" following which he informed the union rep- resentatives that he "didn't think [he] could go through with it without the procedure of the NLRB election." However, during cross-examination, when he was asked the explicit question whether during that meeting he told Oliver that he "wanted an election," he testified: "I more or less listened at that meeting to gather or see what he had to say. He told me that he would give me to the next day to make up my mind, and that is what I planned to do." According to the testimony of Respondent and Boyd, the coffeeshop incident during which the authorization cards were handed to Respondent, took place on Thursday, May 11, which testimony, however, I do not credit. Respondent con- ceded that during the conversation on May 10 Gay apologized for not having the cards with him and told Respondent that he would "bring them later." I find it incredible to believe that Gay and Oliver, both of whom lived hundreds of miles distant from Pensacola, and who apparently relied on the authorization cards to establish their demand for recognition, would have delayed showing the cards until the following day. Boyd, whose headquarters are in Mobile, Alabama, testified that he was not in Pensacola on May 10 and that the coffeeshop incident occurred on Thursday, May 11, during one of his "routine visits" to that city. He testified further, however, that these routine visits occurred "usually on Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday." When asked how he happened, 7 months later, to recall that the incident in question occurred on May 11, and not on May 10, he conceded that he had no written record thereof and attributed it only to "the chain of events." I find that the coffeeshop conference occurred shortly after noon on May 10.4 Nor do I credit Respondent's testimony that Oliver told him at their first meeting that he had "a legal right to see if [the Union] represented the majority of his people," or that Respondent told Oliver and Gay that "he didn't think [he] could go through with it without the procedure of the NLRB." Careful examination of Respondent's own testimony concerning the first meeting between the parties, when the remarks by Respondent referred to immediately above were allegedly made, fails to disclose that he interposed any challenge to Oliver's admitted assertion that the Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees, ' Boyd testified that he considered Respondent "a very good friend" of about 20 years' standing and that at one time Respondent was his superior at Greyhound Lines Re- spondent testified that he talked to Boyd "almost every day" and that he called him at Mobile during the morning of May 10 before the union officials' first visit, but following his previous midnight conversation with employee Blanchard concerning 'Which more will be said later GREYHOUND TERMINAL 91 or that Respondent expressed any doubt, bona fide or otherwise, to Oliver's assertion of the Union's majority status. In that state of the record, and keeping in mind that Oliver had in his possession, at that moment , absolute proof of the Union's majority, it would stretch credulity to the breaking point to believe that Oliver would tell Respondent that he had an unqualified "legal right to see if [the Union] represented the majority of his people" thereby causing a delay in the negotiations for which he had been sent to Pensacola by his International office.5 The implausibility of Respondent's version of the first conference on May 10 is further heightened by his testimony that at the same conference "there was a dis- cussion . . . pretty lengthy . as to the type of contract" that the Union was proposing. If Respondent, who impressed me as a sharp-minded businessman, had any doubt about the Union's asserted right to negotiate in behalf of his employees, it seems most improbable that he would engage in any "lengthy" discussion of contract terms. On the entire record I find that Oliver's reply to Respondent's request for information as to his rights was limited, in substance, to the suggestion that he consult a lawyer. As previously indicated, the findings pertaining to Respondent's statement at the time the nine union authorization cards were handed to him at the coffeeshop conference are based on the composite, credited testimony of Gay and Oliver. Respondent denied making the statements attributed to him by Gay and Oliver. Ac- cording to his testimony, when Gay handed him the cards he "looked at them and thumbed through them for probably a minute or a minute and a half, . . . not over 2 minutes" and then handed them back to Gay. When asked by his own counsel what, if anything, was said about the authorization cards at that session, he testified as follows: "Not anything whatsoever. There was not one remark made about them. Mr. Gay didn't say a word to me when he pulled them out and handed them to me, and I didn't say anything when I handed them back to him and, in fact, nobody said airy king about it." Boyd's testimony was identically to the same effect Con- sidering the purpose for which the cards were brought to the conference, the extent which Gay and Oliver observed they were being examined by Respondent, and the extent to which he admitted thumbing through the cards, I find it incredible to believe that both Gay and Oliver should have failed to elicit from Respondent some response, favorable or unfavorable, to their previously asserted claim of authenticity of the cards. Respondent further testified that "at the time [Gay] handed [himl the cards [he] had already made that decision that [he] was going to ask the NLRB to conduct an election." A moment or two earlier, however, he testified that though he assumed that the cards were handed to him "to show [him] who had signed up, [he] did not examine them for that purpose because [he] did not have a record of their signatures out there in the coffeeshop [he] wanted to wait to examine them to see." This, notwithstanding that he had admitted there were "available" to him canceled paychecks and "tax exemption certificates" bearing the signatures of his employees Respondent, in his brief, characterizes " this case [as ] an attempt to circumvent the provisions of the Act which call for a secret ballot election under Government supervision [and] an attempt to destroy the opportunity for a free and untrammeled choice of bargaining agent." I conclude that this analysis of the case is erroneous with respect to both the applicable law and the facts as heretofore found. It has consistently been held, both by the Board and the courts, that an employer, when confronted with a union's demand for recognition or negotiation, has no absolute right to a secret election under Board supervision to determine whether or not a majority of his employees have designated the Union as their collective- bargaining representative. Almost 10 years ago, the Board had occasion to say that "in the 18 years that this Board has administered the Act, it has consistently, and with judicial approval [citing cases] and legislative acquiescence [citing legis- lative history], held that a union's majority status can properly be determined by membership or authorization cards " Brown Truck and Trailer Manufacturing Company, Inc, et al., 106 NLRB 999. It is only when the employer has a good- faith doubt, existing at the time of the demand, that the Union has in fact been designated, that he may resist the demand and insist upon a Board election. N L.R.B. v. Poultry Enterprises, Inc. 207 F. 2d 522 (C.A. 5); N L.R B. v. Southeastern Rubber Mfg. Co., Inc, 213 F 2d 11, 15 (C.A 5). Here, it has been found that after the authorization cards in question were handed to Respondent on May 10, he not only failed to express any doubt that the Union's demand was properly authorized, but that he expressly acknowledged that he was s Tn this connection, it should be noted that Oliver has been an officer of the Inter- national Union since 1946 92 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD satisfied that the Union was, in fact, the duly authorized representative of his employees.6 In that state of the record his later demand for a Board election could not have been because of a good-faith doubt of the majority status of the Union, or legally justified. I find that his demand for an election was interposed only to delay negotiations with the Union and to gain time to embark upon a campaign to destroy the Union's majority at any Board election that might follow. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D.C.). Respondent further contends in his brief that "at the time Gay handed the cards to him in the coffeeshop, one of his employees (Blanchard) had already advised him that the Union had put considerable pressure on him to get him to sign a card," and that another employee, Morgan, testified that "Gay threatened him with loss of employment if he refused to go out on strike with the rest of the employees." Based on this hypothesis, Respondent contends that "this coercion on the part of the Union, being known to Respondent at the time of the Union's demand for recognition, is in itself justification for the employer's refusal to bargain with the Union." Not only did Respondent fail to advance, or even suggest, to the union officials at any time that these incidents played any part in his refusal to recognize the Union, but there is no credible evidence in this record to support his factual con- tention, at least as to the Blanchard incident. Thus, Respondent testified that "a little after midnight on the morning of May 10, . . . before Mr. Oliver and Mr Gay had come to see" him, he had a telephone conversation of approximately 15 to 20 minutes' duration with Blanchard, Boyd's son-in-law, who told him that Oliver and Gay had just been at his home "and put considerable pressure on him trying to get him to sign a card," but that he had refused to do so. Not only am I unable to make the finding that Respondent apparently requests relating to the events at Blanchard's home because they were based on hearsay and conclusionary testimony, but it is significant that Blanchard, who did not go out on strike, was not called by Respondent to testify concerning the alleged "pressure" exerted by the union officials.? Though Morgan, who also did not go out on strike and was in Respondent's employment at the time of the hearing, testified that Gay told him when he signed the union authorization card that he had "to go with them [as] that would be the only way that [he] would be able to work," I conclude that this isolated instance of excessive zeal is not sufficient for me to conclude that it tainted the entire Union's majority status .8 Credible testimony establishes, indeed Respondent admits, that within a month or two on various occasions after the strike started, Respondent solicited most, if not all, of the strikers, some of them while they were engaged in picketing, to abandon the strike and return to work. I further find that on one such occasion Respondent told employee John Williams, while on the picket line, that his salary would be raised if he returned to work. On another occasion he told Williams he had lost his job, and that if anyone called him for a reference he would tell them that Williams had walked out on strike against Respondent. About 21/z months after the strike started Respondent asked employee Mathis what he was going to do, without a job, when the strike was over, thereby implying that he had been discharged for engaging in the strike. On the day the strike began, Respondent told employee James Youngstrom, who prior to that time had a weekly work schedule of only 16 hours, that if he came back to work he could put in as much time as he "could stand." By soliciting strikers to abandon the strike, offering them inducements to do so, and by threatening them with reprisals if they failed to do so, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Irving Taitel, Ruth Taitel and Jerome Taitel, d/b/a 1. Taitel and Son, a partnership, 119 NLRB 910, enfd. 261 F. 2d 1 (C.A. 7); Water- man Industries, Inc., 91 NLRB 1041. I further find and conclude that on May 10, 1961, the Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union as statutory bargaining representative of those employees. Whatever e In this connection it should he noted that Gay's testimony that Respondent told him on May 12 he had been informed by his counsel that he had "already talked too damn much" stands undenied by Respondent 7 The failure to do so, warrants the inference that if his testimony were adduced, it would not be favorable to Respondent NLRB v Remcnpton Rand, Inc 94 F 2d 802, 871 (CA 2) : NL R R v Sam Wallach and Sam K Schwalm, d/b/a TVallick and Schwalm Company, et al , 198 F 2d 477, 483 (C A 3) 8 Cf Puerto Rico Food Products Corporation, 111 NLRB 293 GREYHOUND TERMINAL 93 doubt, if any, that existed in Respondent's mind concerning the Union's majority status, that doubt must have been removed on May 12 when a majority of his agents and porters "struck for recognition and picketed Respondent's properties in support of their strike." 8 The complaint alleges, and I conclude that the strike which began on May 12, 1961, was an unfair labor strike caused and prolonged by Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I recommend that he cease and desist therefrom and that he take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent has unlawfully refused to recognize and to bargain with the Union as the representative of his employees in an appropriate unit, it is recommended that Respondent be required, upon request, to extend recognition to, and to bargain with, the Union. Having concluded that the strike of May 12 was an unfair labor practice strike, it is also recommended that Respondent be required to comply with provisions 2(b) and (c) of the Recommended Order, infra, pertaining to the reinstatement rights of employees that engaged in that strike.10 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and as an essential link in interstate commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Em- ployees of America, AFL-CIO, Division 1174, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All agents and porters employed by Respondent at his Pensacola Greyhound terminal, excluding Mrs. William S. Shurett, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute, and have at all times material to this proceeding constituted, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act. 4. The above-named Union, on and since May 10, 1961, has been the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate bargaining unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa- tive of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The strike of Respondent's employees that commenced on May 12, 1961, was caused and prolonged by the aforementioned refusal to bargain. 7. By soliciting strikers to abandon the strike, offering them inducements to do so, and by threatening them with reprisals if they failed to do so, Respondent violated Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Respondent, William S. Shurett, d/b/a Greyhound Terminal, his officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union named herein as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees of Respondent in the appropriate bar- gaining unit described above. ° Seven Up Bottling Company of Miami, Inc, 92 NLRB 1622, enfd as modified on an- other point 196 P 2d 424 (C A. 5) , enfd in full 344 U S 344 10 Cone Brothers Contracting Co , 135 NLRB 108, footnote 2. 94 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Soliciting strikers to abandon their strike , offering them inducements to do so, and threatening them with reprisals if they failed to do so. (c) In any other manner interfering with , restraining , or coercing his employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request , bargain collectively with the Union named herein as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit. (b) Upon application , offer immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges , to all those employees who engaged in the strike that began on May 12, 1961 , and who have not already been reinstated to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing, if necessary , any persons hired by Respondent on and after May 12, 1961, who were not in Respondent 's employment on that day. (c) Make whole the employees specified in paragraph numbered 2(b) immedi- ately above, for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of Respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them in a manner provided in said paragraph numbered 2(b), by payment to each of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages during the period from 5 days after the date on which he applied for reinstatement to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings , if any, during said period. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying , all payroll records , social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay which may fall due under this Recommended Order. (e) Post at his terminal at Pensacola, Florida, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." ii Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof , and be maintained for a period of 60 con- secutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, in writing within 20 days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.ii u In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order " 12 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we notify our employees that: WE WILL, upon request , bargain collectively with Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, AFL- CIO, Division 1174, as the exclusive representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement . The appropriate unit is: All agents and porters employed by me at the Greyhound Terminal, Pensacola , Florida, exclusive of Mrs. Shurett, guards , and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL, upon application , offer immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, ETC. 95 or other rights and privileges , to all those employees who were on strike on and after May 12 , 1961 , and who have not already been reinstated to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges , dismissing , if necessary , any persons hired by us on or after May 12 , 1961 , who were not in our employ on that date. WE WILL NOT solicit any strikers or pickets to abandon the strike , offer them inducements to do so, or threaten them with reprisals if they fail to do so. WE WILL NOT engage in any like or related acts or conduct interfering with, restraining, or coercing our employees in the exercise of their rights to self- organization , to form labor organizations, to join or assist Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, AFL-CIO, Division 1174, or any other labor organization , to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such activities. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming, or remaining , members of the above -named Union , or any other labor organization. WILLIAM S. SHURETT, D/B/A GREYHOUND TERMINAL, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (WILLIAM S SHURETT) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, T6024 Federal Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, Telephone Number, 529-2411 , if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, ' and Local No. 2772, United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO 2 and Vulcan- Cincinnati , Inc 3 Case No. 9-CB-928. May 10, 1962 DECISION AND ORDER On March 28, 1961, Trial Examiner Thomas S. Wilson issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Vulcan filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs, and Respondents filed a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the extent consistent herewith. 1 Hereinafter referred to as Respondent International. 2 Hereinafter referred to as Respondent Local. 3 Hereinafter referred to as Vulcan 137 NLRB No. 9.